

Employment and Social Developments in Europe

Annual Review 2018



Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2018

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Foreword



We need reliable data and a thorough analysis of social and labour market developments across Europe to support our policy initiatives. The annual Employment and Social Developments in Europe review provides just this kind of up-to-date information. On the basis of available data, we highlight trends about EU workers as well as living conditions of all EU citizens.

This year's edition focuses on the changing world of work. Ongoing rapid technological change, in a context of globalized markets and ageing population, brings about opportunities as well as challenges. The changing world of work blurs the traditional distinction between different forms of employment, which tests the capacity of social welfare systems to cover all workers.

The latest employment and social trends are promising. Economic growth continues to favour employment growth and improvements in the social situation. There are more Europeans in employment than at any time in the past and the EU is moving ever closer to its Europe 2020 employment target of 75%. Unemployment rates have declined in practically all Member States and the labour market situations of women and youth have continued to improve in 2017 and early 2018. The evolution of the social situation is also gradually improving. Higher incomes from work, together with social transfers, have increased disposable incomes. According to the latest available data there are 5.6 million fewer people at risk of poverty or social exclusion than at the peak of 2012, and severe material deprivation has receded to an all-time low, with 16.1 million fewer people in that situation compared with 2012. Income inequality has been largely stable in the last few years.

Forecasting future developments is more complex, although certain trends can already be discerned. Digitalisation changes the way production is organized and enables the automation of tasks. Innovative technologies increase productivity, create new jobs, facilitate inclusiveness on the labour market, and allow for better work-life balance. However, these new opportunities are seized particularly by the high-skilled. Concerns over the loss of low-skill jobs persist. Moreover, digitalisation also leads to an increase in non-standard work, affecting working conditions and job quality. If these developments persist, some degree of replacement of low-skilled labour by automation as well as a decrease in standard (full-time, open-ended) employment can be expected. This would challenge the organization and financing of social protection mechanisms and the relevance of social dialogue. Although evidence is not conclusive, we observe that certain new non-standard forms of work have the potential of amplifying inequalities, including the gender pay gap.

In light of these developments, better education and the upgrading of the skills of the European labour force are key to reaping the benefits and minimizing the risks of transformations in production. This should not distract attention from ongoing efforts to make the European labour market even more inclusive, particularly for youth, women, older workers and people with disabilities. Social welfare may need to be rethought to provide inclusive protection. Social partners, too, have an increasingly important role to play in adapting the existing framework to the new forms of work. These findings of the 2018 Review contribute to the reflection about the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights and support the priorities outlined in the Commission's proposal for the Multi-Annual Financial Framework in May 2018.

I am confident that this year's edition will make a welcome contribution to academic discussion, public debate and, in time, to policy development.



Marianne Thyssen
Commissioner for Employment,
Social Affairs, Skills and Labour Mobility

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Executive Summary

The world is changing fast and so is the world of work. Technological transformation, global competition forces, and demographic change will continue to affect how people work, consume and live. These mega-trends have made the labour market more dynamic and have brought with them more diverse forms of work and new jobs, requiring new skills. They also have the potential to contribute to increasing inequality and challenge time-honoured institutions. Thus, established labour market regulatory frameworks and solidarity mechanisms may need to be adapted so as to ensure the sustainability of the welfare state and guarantee adequate protection for workers.

These changes, however, should be viewed as an opportunity for the European working age population, whether they are employees or self-employed, senior professionals extending their working lives or aspiring graduates and young entrepreneurs just entering the labour market. Policies are needed to help workers and entrepreneurs prepare for and adapt to technological changes, so that all EU residents can seize the opportunities they bring, while benefitting from adequate protection in case of need. Against this background, the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission proclaimed the European Pillar of Social Rights at the Gothenburg Social Summit of 17 November 2017, where the Commission also set out its vision for a European Education Area by 2025. European institutions thereby showed their commitment to fostering equal opportunities, to improving access to the labour market and Union-wide learning opportunities, to fair working conditions and social inclusion, to supporting people in the face of changing realities of work and to achieving new and more effective rights for Europeans. The European Union has been proactive in responding to the changing world of work, for instance through the targeted deployment of EU funds, various legislative proposals such as on work-life balance and access to social protection, and the Skills Agenda for Europe, which sets out ten actions intended to make suitable training, skills and support available to the EU population.

Last year's Employment and Social Developments (ESDE) looked at how, among other things, demographic change affects intergenerational fairness and solidarity in the EU. This edition of the annual ESDE review of continues the exploration of the impact of the mega-trends mentioned above by contributing to a better understanding of **the changing world of work** and its implications for employment and society. It will do so by analysing key employment and social issues for the European Union and its Member States, building on the key principles of the Pillar. The findings of the analysis are in line with the priorities outlined in the European Commission's proposal of May 2018 for the EU's post-2020 Multi-Annual Financial Framework.

ESDE reviews trends towards increasing automation in production and new forms of work appearing in labour markets. Specifically, it considers what these trends imply for equal opportunities, fair working conditions, adequate and sustainable social protection, and the dialogue between the social partners. The crucial questions on which this ESDE annual review focuses are: how is the world of work in the EU changing? What are the benefits and risks emanating from these changes? Are robots and automation creating more jobs than they are destroying? What skills will the future labour market require and how can people be helped to acquire them? How are changes in the world of work affecting the social fabric, including inequality? How can decent working conditions and adequate social protection be ensured in the years to come? In other words, how can the resilience

of Europe's labour force be buttressed so that it can support the competitiveness of the EU economy and the well-being of European society in increasingly globalised markets?

Against this background, the chapters in this report will examine:

Chapter 1 – Main Employment and Social Developments

Chapter 2 – A new labour market with new working conditions: future jobs, skills and earnings

Chapter 3 – Equal opportunities: skills, education and overcoming disadvantages

Chapter 4 – Inequality of outcomes

Chapter 5 – Access and sustainability of social protection in a changing world of work

Chapter 6 – Social dialogue for a changing world of work

1. MAIN EMPLOYMENT AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENTS

In 2017 and early 2018, the EU economy outperformed forecasts by expanding at the highest pace recorded since the onset of the crisis in 2008. Real GDP growth accelerated to 2.5% (in both the EU and the euro area) from 1.9% in 2016. Private consumption remained the main driver of economic growth but 2017 also saw an improvement in investment, while net exports rebounded strongly from their 2016 level, contributing significantly to the overall economic expansion.

Economic recovery picked up pace in 2017.

Stronger output growth in 2017 than in previous years, in conjunction with solid employment expansion resulted in an increase in productivity growth in the EU and in the euro area. This and the modest growth in nominal compensation per employee resulted in a very limited upturn in nominal labour costs. Nonetheless, there were large differences between Member States.

Table 1
Selected Macroeconomic, Labour market and Social indicators

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Real GDP (annual growth)	3.1	0.5	-4.3	2.1	1.7	-0.4	0.3	1.8	2.3	2.0	2.5
Employment											
annual growth	1.9	1.0	-1.7	-0.7	0.1	-0.4	-0.3	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.6
number of employed (000)	228890	231216	227222	225675	225986	225123	224529	226843	229325	232143	235823
Employment rate (total, 20-64)	69.8	70.3	69.0	68.6	68.6	68.4	68.4	69.2	70.1	71.1	72.2
rate (men, 20-64)	77.7	77.9	75.7	75.1	75.0	74.6	74.3	75.0	75.9	76.9	78.0
rate (women, 20-64)	62.1	62.8	62.3	62.1	62.2	62.4	62.6	63.5	64.3	65.3	66.5
Labour productivity (annual growth)											
per person employed	1.2	-0.6	-2.6	2.8	1.6	0.0	0.5	0.7	1.2	0.7	0.9
per hour worked	1.0	-0.4	-1.4	3.0	1.5	0.9	1.0	0.6	1.4	0.6	1.2
Unemployment											
rate (total, 15-74)	7.2	7.0	9.0	9.6	9.7	10.5	10.9	10.2	9.4	8.6	7.6
rate (men, 15-74)	6.6	6.6	9.0	9.7	9.6	10.4	10.8	10.1	9.3	8.4	7.4
rate (women, 15-74)	7.9	7.5	8.9	9.6	9.8	10.6	10.9	10.3	9.5	8.8	7.9
rate youth (15-24)	15.8	15.9	20.3	21.4	21.8	23.3	23.8	22.2	20.3	18.7	16.8
long-term unemployment rate	3.0	2.6	2.9	3.8	4.1	4.6	5.1	5.0	4.5	4.0	3.4
very long-term unemployment rate	1.8	1.5	1.5	1.8	2.2	2.5	2.9	3.0	2.8	2.5	2.1
number of unemployed (000)	16998	16768	21386	23011	23154	25294	26335	24832	22898	20942	18776
Real Gross Household Disposable Income per capita (2008=100)	99.8	100.0	100.3	99.9	99.2	98.0	97.8	98.8	100.5	102.2	
At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion rate				23.8	24.3	24.8	24.6	24.4	23.8	23.5	
Inequality: GINI coefficient of disposable income				30.5	30.8	30.5	30.5	31.0	31.0	30.8	

Source: Eurostat

[Click here to download table.](#)

The effects of the improving macroeconomic environment were also observed in the evolution of unemployment. The unemployment rate declined slightly faster in 2017 than in the previous two years, falling to 7.6 % and 9.1 % of the labour force in the EU and in the euro area respectively (corresponding to 18.8 million and 14.7 million people). Long-term unemployment also continued to decline at the same pace as in the previous two years, but still represents an important challenge: it constitutes nearly half of total unemployment. Unemployment decreased in all Member States but there are substantial disparities between countries, with some experiencing a tightening of labour markets. The number of unemployed people aged 15-24 fell to 3.8 million in 2017, well below the levels before the crisis (4.2 million in 2008). Despite the marked improvement in the labour market situation of young people, youth unemployment and long-term

Unemployment recedes faster and in all Member States...

and very long-term unemployment in the EU continue to be sizeable in a number of Member States.

237.9 million
 europeans employed in
 first quarter 2018

Employment growth also continued to benefit from the favourable macroeconomic environment. In 2017, roughly 235.8 million people aged 15+ were in employment in the EU (around 156 million in the euro area), over three and a half million

...while solid employment growth brings the EU within reach of its Europe 2020 target.

people more compared with 2016. The upward trend persisted in early 2018, with the number of the employed people marking a new all-time record of 237.9 million in the first quarter of 2018. The employment rate increased in 2017 by around 1 percentage point (pp) to 72.2 % of the population aged 20 to 64 years. Assuming this positive trend continues, the EU is well placed to reach its Europe 2020 target of a 75% employment rate. At the same time, the number of hours worked per person employed grew only modestly and is still below the 2008 levels.

Although 2017 saw a continuing shift of job creation away from the industrial, manufacturing and construction sectors towards service-oriented activities, this trend did attenuate somewhat as employment grew in all sectors except for financial activities. Part-time employment as a proportion of total employment remained stable in 2017.

Employment grew in all sectors except financial activities.

5.6 million
 fewer people at risk of
 poverty or social exclusion

The social situation in the EU continued to benefit from the economic recovery. From 2014 to 2016 incomes from work increased and, together with social transfers, led to a rise in the disposable incomes of households in the EU and

Severe material deprivation decreased by 16.1 million relative to 2012...

in a large majority of Member States. In 2016, there were 5.6 million fewer people at risk of poverty or social exclusion than at the peak of 2012 even though the proportion of people at persistent risk of poverty increased. Severe material deprivation declined in almost all Member States, falling to an all-time low of 33.4 million in 2017 (roughly 16.1 million fewer than the peak of 49.5 million in 2012).

These positive developments are a considerable achievement, signifying that the EU has by now largely overcome the crisis. But, there are still reasons for concern. Income inequality in the last few years has been stable at EU-level and has marked increases in roughly a third of the Member States. This is the case despite the significant redistributive effects of European tax and benefit systems. In particular, social protection expenditure continues to play an important role in supporting household incomes and it has been increasing in the EU. Moreover the number of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion, albeit reduced relative to 2012, remains at a level (118 million in 2016) which is still very far from the important Europe 2020 target of taking 20 million out of risk of poverty and social exclusion: it is roughly 800 000 people higher than when the target was set. However, notable differences across Member States persist and certain countries (e.g. Poland, Romania) have achieved their individual targets by a very large margin.

But inequality and relative poverty persist.

Between 2008 and 2017 the crisis and the relatively drawn-out recovery seem to have brought about greater dispersion in labour markets performance and social situations across the Member States. Severe material deprivation may be a notable exception, as there is a clear evidence of progress in limiting the number of people affected by it in the overwhelming majority of Member States. Unemployment rates across the Member States should become more similar from 2018 on, assuming the recent positive developments continue. For other indicators, such as the employment rate or Gross Disposable Household Income per capita, the crisis resulted in some divergence. Although this divergence was

The crisis slowed down the pace of convergence in EU labour markets and social situations.

mostly offset during the subsequent recovery, there is not yet strong evidence of an all-encompassing converging trend.

2. A NEW LABOUR MARKET WITH NEW WORKING CONDITIONS: FUTURE JOBS, SKILLS AND EARNINGS

Recent transformations are pushing the world's economies towards fast restructuring. Global competition increases pressure to optimise production processes and new information and communication technologies (ICTs) are developing quickly. Organisations and markets are globally intertwined through the internet while robots, other digital technologies and artificial intelligence are revolutionising the way products are being designed, produced and consumed. These new technologies create new markets and re-define the task content of jobs while making some traditional tasks obsolete. Concurrently, the sectoral shift from industry to services, which is a result of globalisation as well, has been going on for decades. Manufacturing as a proportion of total production and employment has been in continuous decline, while services have gained importance.

The shift of employment from industry to services...

Technological change is linked to two new trends: first, a faster improvement in the quality of capital to which labour needs to adjust, and, second, more flexibility in the organisation of the production process that brings about greater diversity in forms of work. Both have major implications for the EU's labour force and, eventually, for social conditions.

...is coupled with greater diversity in the forms of work.

37%-69% of tasks, depending on the country, are automatable by new technologies

The ongoing technological shift, together with globalisation, has contributed to an increase in the capital intensity of production, particularly in manufacturing, transport and logistics. For instance, capital intensity in Italy's trade and manufacturing sectors has increased

The number of robots in the EU industry has quadrupled in the last 25 years.

by more than 50% since 1995. So far, technological change has for the most part fuelled growth and driven improvements in human capital stock. The increasing use of industrial robots and machines in certain sectors, especially in the automotive sector (which accounts for half of the total number of robots) and in the metal products industries, increases the likelihood of their replacing people in a number of (usually low-skill) routine tasks. The stock of industrial robots in Europe has more than quadrupled in the past 25 years (from around 95 000 to over 430 000), with more than 40% currently located in Germany. While there is a divergence of views in the academic literature on the potential impact of technology on job creation vs. destruction, according to some studies, if existing new technologies were adopted in production processes, they could automate between 37% and 69% of today's tasks (depending on the Member State), leading to a significant change in the set of tasks performed on the job in many sectors.

Such estimates point to a high likelihood of extensive substitution of capital for labour in certain tasks and a high complementarity of capital and labour in other tasks. According to simulations undertaken in Chapter 2 on the economies of selected Member States (Italy, Germany and the Czech Republic), this transformation could bring about job losses but also new job creation. The losses will first affect the manufacturing sector. Indeed, a closer look at the processes of capital deepening (the increase of capital intensity in production) suggests that the capital stock is likely to increase, also because of the expected substitution of capital for workers with low-level skills and low-level education. But substitution is not the only motivation for capital investment. In fact, a better-educated, better-skilled labour force is complementary to capital, and an increase in physical capital can be stimulated by an upgrade of human capital, as demonstrated by the case of Germany. In other words, capital deepening occurs not only to replace labour but also to enable better-qualified workers to get full value from innovative technologies.

There is a process of increasing capital deepening...

This finding suggests that automation and artificial intelligence in general have significant potential for job creation. The European Commission recognised this potential early and is taking action to foster the take-up of artificial intelligence by the private and public sectors. In its Communication of April 2018 on Artificial Intelligence for Europe, the Commission outlines a number of measures and financing instruments through which it will promote this goal. Some Member States, too, are active in this area; for instance, France has announced a EUR 1.5 billion investment in artificial intelligence over the next five years.

The other trend, whose emergence has been greatly facilitated by the spread of innovative technology, is the increase in the number of non-standard (atypical) workers, i.e. workers in contractual relationships other than full-time open-ended contracts with a single employer, and a concomitant decrease in the number of full-time permanent employees.

...and an increase in non-standard work, enabled by new technology and globalisation.

Furthermore, job polarisation has been observed in all Member states since 2002, though to different degrees. Low-paying and high-paying jobs have increased steadily, while middle-paying occupations are on a declining path. Job polarisation is consistent with the hypothesis that the process of technological change in recent years has led to lower demand for labour in jobs in which routine tasks predominate, while strongly increasing the demand for labour in jobs in which non-routine tasks predominate. This has especially increased the demand for highly skilled workers.

For the moment, some changes in the labour market seem confined to small parts of the workforce. For instance, according to estimates by the Commission study "Platform Workers in Europe: Evidence from the COLEEM Survey", which was published at the end of June 2018, the proportion of adults who have provided work services through an online platform at some time is roughly 10% in the EU (ranging from 6% in Finland to 12% in Spain and the UK), while the proportion of people earning more than half of their income from platform work remains marginal, hovering slightly above 2 % in 2017. Fewer than 8% do this kind of work with some frequency and fewer than 6% spend a significant amount of time on it (at least 10 hours per week) or earn a significant amount of income from it (at least 25% of the total). Even though these numbers are still relatively low, they may have a significant impact. Chapter 2 finds a correlation between the growing incidence of non-standard contractual relationships and higher income volatility and lower job security, as observed in the case of platform workers.

Atypical forms of work are often associated with higher income volatility and lower job security.

Globalisation and technological change require a re-orientation of educational policies and more efficient public spending, to ensure that the working age population is equipped with the right set of skills to reap the full benefits of structural change. Model simulations suggest that labour market transitions are likely to remain frequent as new technologies are incorporated in the production process. Greater and more effective investment in both formal education and the development of skills (through training) will improve workers' productivity and labour market outcomes while also ensuring the sustainability of Europe's growth model.

Job substitution by physical capital calls for better-qualified human capital.

Ensuring that education and training provide people with the knowledge and skills they need to thrive personally, socially and professionally is a priority of the European Union as reflected in the vision for a European Education Area and the New Skills Agenda for Europe. Each of the 10 actions of the Skills Agenda is now underway. Actions such as the Up-skilling Pathways, the Digital Skills and Jobs Coalition and the Blueprint for Sectoral Co-operation on Skills, target up-skilling, cross-sectoral co-operation and identification of future skills needs as well as improving skills intelligence. Moreover, the adoption of the Council Recommendation on Key Competences for Lifelong Learning in May 2018 will further foster literacy, languages and entrepreneurship, among others, as a way to face the challenges of the future. The Commission also supports skills development in Europe through EU funds (e.g. the European Structural and Investment Funds, Horizon 2020 and the forthcoming Horizon Europe, the Employment and Social Innovation programme and the "Erasmus+" programme).

The Commission is contributing to up-skilling and re-skilling, including through the Skills Agenda for Europe.

3. EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES: SKILLS, EDUCATION AND OVERCOMING DISADVANTAGES

There are various obstacles on the path to achieving a better-skilled and better-educated labour force in the EU. On the one hand, in recent decades there was considerable progress in education, as people attained higher educational levels than the generations before them. For example, the EU succeeded in reaching higher levels of tertiary educational attainment for adults aged 30-34 (39.9% in 2017) and in reducing the numbers of early leavers from education and training (to 11% in 2017), thus virtually meeting these two Europe 2020 targets by

PISA: 22%
of young Europeans are low-achievers in maths

2017. However, the results of the latest (2015) PISA tests in the key disciplines of mathematics, reading and science have once again sent alarm signals about the level of competence of 15-year-old Europeans. In all three disciplines, one in five pupils is a low achiever and the trend has strengthened recently. Moreover, there is strong evidence that low achievers at the age of 15 will remain low achievers as adults, because the lack of basic skills strongly reduces the likelihood of a person achieving a satisfactory labour market outcome. In effect, there is an employability threshold which a high number of people in the EU cannot yet cross because of their poor initial educational achievement and its link to the ability to benefit from lifelong learning. This situation represents a concern for the economy, too, because there is a shortage of each of these basic skills in almost all Member States.

The poor PISA scores can be explained to a significant extent by a person's social background, measured by their parents' education attainment level. Having parents with only low-level education clearly reduces young students' chances of achieving high scores in PISA and attaining high skill levels during adulthood. The same is true for climbing the education ladder. All else being equal, people with highly-educated parents are ten times more likely to be highly-educated themselves than people from families with low levels of education. Indeed, in a subset of countries, the relatively tight connection between parental background and a person's achievement means that the educational system is unable to ensure equality of opportunity.

Educational attainment and skill levels play an important role in determining labour market outcomes. Children benefit from educational achievements of their parents. Conversely, poor human and/or social capital, passed on by parents with low-level education, impedes individuals from achieving and maintaining high labour market performance. For instance, for people whose parents have only low-level education, the odds of being in employment - as opposed to unemployed or inactive - is 47% lower than those of people with highly-educated parents, while their odds of losing the job they are working in is 60% higher.

Children of parents with high education are 10 times more likely than children of people with low education levels to be better educated themselves

Even when people from underprivileged backgrounds have managed, against the odds, to gain higher educational qualifications than their parents they may continue to experience residual disadvantages in the labour market. An unfavourable social background may still hamper someone's educational achievements. Furthermore, regardless of someone's education, a lower level of parental education may reduce their chances of improving the quality of their jobs over the course of a career.

However, social advantages are passed on to subsequent generations just as well as social disadvantages. This finding has important implications insofar as it suggests broad margins for policy action. Compensating for the impact of social disadvantage on someone's educational attainment and labour market

Existing gaps in the education of Europeans may be related to unequal opportunities...

Educational attainment is strongly determined by the education level of one's parents...

... and so are people's labour market outcomes.

Even higher education may not fully overcome disadvantage due to underprivileged background.

The positive effects of better education outlast a single generation.

performance may help many more people pass the employability threshold. This may be true not only for individuals but also for their children and following generations. In fact, there may well be an intertemporal multiplier of social achievements. One way to improve low-skill levels which are largely due to social background is to upgrade skills through lifelong learning. In that context, the analysis shows that intervention at a young age generates high returns both for the individual and the economy. The earlier lifelong learning begins, the better are the social and economic outcomes. But so far the take-up of training among people with low-level education and those in low-skilled jobs has been disappointing. Indeed, it seems that those who most need training make least use of it. Along with lifelong learning, promoting early childhood education for all can be effective in establishing a level playing field that reduces inequalities at an early stage in the life and work cycle. The need for action in this respect was recognised early by both the Commission and the Council, resulting in the Council Recommendation on High Quality Early Childhood Education and Care adopted on May 22 2018.

17 million

**fewer women than men,
aged 20–64, are in
employment**

Social disadvantage affects men and women alike. On average, women tend to be better educated than men. Additionally, recent progress in educational levels is mainly due to women improving their education level. However, analysis of women's labour market outcomes shows that

Women's advantage over men in education is not reflected in the labour market.

good education is a necessary but not sufficient condition for good labour market performance. The female advantage in education fails to translate into more favourable labour market performance for women. In fact, the narrowing of the employment gap between men and women has recently come to a halt. A significant proportion of the female employment gap remains unexplained by the traditional factors (such as women's interrupted careers due to caring responsibilities, their concentration in lower-paid occupations, etc.). Non-observable factors in the individual data, such as national institutions and culture, are presumably keeping women's labour market participation rates low. The gap affects women's chances of finding and keeping a job or progressing to a job requiring higher skills and offering greater responsibility (job quality). Given that the changes in the labour markets are largely technology-driven, the digital gender gap may create further cause for concern: women are not sufficiently engaged in STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics). In 2015, women represented only 16% of ICT specialists.

As a result of the rapid changes taking place globally, adjustments in labour force education and skill levels have become decisive factors in reaping the benefits of modern production technologies. Reducing gender inequalities in the labour market and opening up new opportunities for hitherto underprivileged groups, especially in education, would allow the EU to upgrade the skills and expand the potential of the labour force, thereby generating more job creation than destruction. This would happen because technological change is likely to bring higher demand for well-skilled and well-educated people that would be easier to match if Europeans had access to better education and skills. The varying opportunities for education and labour market participation between different Member States suggest that the institutional environment can and does make a difference. This, in turn, implies that there is scope for disseminating good practices and exploring targeted reform.

Limiting gender inequalities would also help to upgrade the skill levels of the EU workforce.

Furthermore, as advantage or disadvantage in educational attainment is passed on from one generation to the next, the benefits of policy efforts and investments in education are effectively multiplied over generations. Implementing policies that counter multiple inequalities of opportunity, in line with the principles of the Social Pillar, will therefore yield lasting benefits for the European economy and society and improve their future resilience and sustainability.

Combating inequalities of opportunity can yield lasting rewards for the EU economy.

4. INEQUALITY OF OUTCOMES

Both the risks and the opportunities the changing world of work brings about may result in new patterns of inequality across different socio-economic dimensions. On the one hand, a greater diversity of forms of work can enhance workers' choices, facilitate reconciliation between work and private life and ease access to the labour market for disadvantaged or underrepresented groups, including women and older workers. The flexibility offered by new forms of work can also be an element of resilience in the face of economic shocks. On the other hand, non-standard work has some negative implications for workers' well-being compared with that of standard workers. This is because new forms of work often imply fragmented careers and more frequent periods of inactivity, which may lead to greater earnings inequality (as a result of differences in hours worked) as well as to diminished access to training opportunities, social protection and services.

The flexibility in non-standard forms of work can enhance workers' choices.

Income inequality in the EU-28 has remained fairly constant over the last five years after a moderate increase in the aftermath of the crisis. However, disposable income in the EU is more equally distributed than in other parts of the world, including in the US, although market (pre-tax) inequality in that country is lower than in the EU as a whole. In this context, changes in the organisation of labour are shaping the income distribution in various ways. Overall, the analysis of the impact of the different income components on inequality indicates that the contribution to inequality of the sources of labour market income (labour earnings and self-employment) has not significantly increased since 2008. Labour earnings in the EU have contributed to inequality only slightly more in recent years (88% in 2016 as opposed to 86.1% in 2008). Conversely, given the evolving character of self-employment, the contribution of income from self-employment to inequality has declined.

Inequalities produced in the labour market have not greatly increased in the last decade...

Labour earnings remain the primary component of average income (around 66 %). Labour income distribution depends on a) the hourly wage and b) the hours worked. Insofar as changes in the world of work lead to a different distribution of working hours among workers, this will have an impact on inequality of earnings. Recent research shows that differences in hourly wages are the prevalent source of inequality in Eastern European countries, while in North-Western European countries a part of inequality stems from the distribution of working hours. In these countries, hours worked are both unequally distributed among workers and correlated with wages, so that those who earn higher hourly wages tend to work more hours and vice versa. This pattern can be increasingly observed in Mediterranean countries, too.

...although non-standard working arrangements may increase income inequality.

Inequality in the changing world of work may also emerge from an increased reliance on certain types of flexible work arrangements, such as solo self-employment and temporary work. This tends to lead to greater income volatility, which could, in turn, increase the vulnerability of workers in non-standard forms of employment. In a context of weaker income stability, the well-being of non-standard workers depends not only on income but also, crucially, on their capacity to draw on wealth and savings to smooth their consumption. It is therefore relevant to examine their living standards across different dimensions (including material deprivation and wealth situations) and employment types.

Assessing the social situation of non-standard workers requires more than income measurements alone.

**Lower risk of poverty
for standard compared
to non-standard workers**

Overall, standard workers have a lower risk of material deprivation and poverty than non-standard workers. While the poverty rate of the self-employed (24 %) is higher than that of standard workers (5 %), the former do not have a significantly higher risk

of material deprivation than standard workers. However, the self-employed are a heterogeneous group, with the solo self-employed facing a much higher risk of material deprivation and poverty than the self-employed with employees. The wealth distribution across employment types further reflects this heterogeneity: the self-employed with employees hold nearly twice as much net wealth as the

solo self-employed. In addition, the self-employed as a whole hold a higher proportion of wealth than those in other forms of employment.

Despite evidence of a higher risk of income poverty for workers on non-standard contracts, the welfare gap in income poverty and material deprivation across employment types is largely explained by workers' socio-economic characteristics such as education and occupation. The future impact of changes in forms of employment on wealth distribution and the risk of material deprivation is therefore likely to depend on the (prior) socio-economic and skill profiles of non-standard workers.

Another aspect of inequality relates to gender disparities in hourly wages and hours worked. Despite major recent increases in female labour market participation and higher levels of educational attainment for recent female cohorts, obstacles to gender equality remain. As Chapter 1 finds, gender pay gaps persist, even when controlling for occupational and sectoral differences and taking into account the fact that women often work shorter hours. These inequalities for women of working age are also likely to translate into gaps in social protection coverage, including pensions.

However, inequalities, such as gender gaps in pay and hours worked, persist ...

The European Pillar of Social Rights provides a compass for upward convergence in economic and social outcomes, mitigating within-country as well as cross-country inequality. Ensuring rights that guarantee a decent life and improve living conditions is at the core of the Social Pillar. Addressing challenges such as the higher risk of income poverty of workers in new non-standard contractual relationships requires action on several fronts, in particular up-skilling and re-skilling policies, "promoting fair wages and minimum incomes ensuring a life in dignity, gender equality, equal access to quality education and training for all". It also requires effective social protection, as discussed in Chapter 5.

...and it is important to mitigate the risks associated with different working arrangements.

5. ACCESS AND SUSTAINABILITY OF SOCIAL PROTECTION IN A CHANGING WORLD OF WORK

Social protection helps workers and families to cope with unforeseen circumstances and life-course needs, for example through replacement incomes, cost compensation or through enabling social services. However, faster economic restructuring or automation can be expected to amplify social risks, including (long-term) unemployment. Similarly, many of the non-standard forms of work increase flexibility for both workers and employers but increase income volatility for workers by making careers less predictable. Non-standard forms of work which blur the distinction between employment and self-employment raise questions about workers' access to social benefits, as well as the financial sustainability of social protection systems.

The non-standard forms of work affect traditional European social protection schemes...

Many of the existing national social insurance systems were designed primarily to protect "standard" employees and their families. This model provides social insurance primarily for employees who work full-time in an open-ended contract with a single employer. These insurance systems pool the risks of large groups of workers, some of whom receive income support when they lose earnings because of involuntary unemployment, maternity, sickness or disability. Workers and employers together make a major contribution to the financing of social protection. In effect, part of the labour cost is earmarked for this purpose.

...as most schemes were designed to protect workers in standard forms of employment.

Other forms of social insurance or assistance in the EU are less directly linked to employee status. They tend to aim for general coverage, based on citizenship. Such universal systems rely to a larger extent on financing from general government revenue. The same applies to residual social protection systems that target groups with very low income.

Specific groups of workers, such as the self-employed, can experience difficulties in obtaining social protection coverage. Casual, seasonal or freelance workers, apprentices and (vocational) trainees may be formally excluded from benefits for unemployment, sickness, maternity or other risks. In several Member States, the

Workers in non-standard work may be formally excluded from social insurance benefits...

self-employed are often excluded from social security schemes. Even where workers are formally allowed to join a scheme, they may fail to fulfil eligibility conditions. In addition, rights and entitlements may not be fully transferable when workers take up a new job. Hence a substantial number of workers are not covered by existing social insurance schemes.

The ensuing gaps in the coverage of social insurance can put additional pressure on safety nets of last resort and therefore lead to increasing reliance on means-tested entitlements. At present, the proportion of means-tested benefits in social expenditure is relatively low in the EU. There are small-scale experiments in or simulations of universal income to address the gaps in coverage, but they do not yet allow predictions about how this could affect work incentives or wages. More importantly, the impact on individuals' incentives and public finances remains uncertain, and so does the level of benefit that could be provided to the population.

...and coverage gaps may lead to more means-tested benefits or debates on universal income.

Over one quarter of EU GDP is spent on social protection

Structural changes in the labour market will likely have important implications for Member States' social security financing. Population ageing and changes in the world of work may lead to a shrinking contribution base for social protection and, in turn, increase the burden on

Ageing populations and more non-standard employment may shrink the financing base for social insurance.

the remaining contributors to welfare systems. Therefore, in addition to ensuring that people in all forms of contractual relationships contribute to the financing of social protection, governments may look to supplement social contributions by other types of taxes.

However, a future-proof social welfare system would not only provide payments to protect workers from a sudden loss of income and unexpected expenditure; it would also deliver key social and health services, including an individualised approach to professional development and employability support through their lives. Empowering workers to fulfil their labour market potential contributes to the financial sustainability of social protection systems and can yield high returns both to individual workers and the economy.

Modernised social welfare needs to be more encompassing.

Fit-for-purpose social protection systems can contribute to the smooth functioning of the labour market and to inclusive growth. The principles enshrined in the European Pillar of Social Rights provide a strong consensual basis for social protection systems which invest effectively and efficiently in people and support them through changes stemming from new and emerging challenges. As part of the Social Fairness Package, on 13 March 2018 the Commission presented a proposal for a Council Recommendation on access to social protection for workers and the self-employed.

6. SOCIAL DIALOGUE FOR A CHANGING WORLD OF WORK

Current technological, economic and social changes, such as digitalisation, globalisation, ageing, and changing life-styles, are strongly interlinked. Together they are transforming the organisation of work and the social dialogue. The social partners at European and national level, as well as at cross-industry and sectoral level are aware that ongoing changes are having an impact on the organisation of work. Their joint strategic documents show where negotiations between the social partners can help to shape the future of work in a sustainable way. In their discussions with public authorities, the social partners agree on the importance of the framework established by labour and social legislation. However, there is not much consensus on how and to what extent this framework needs to be revised.

The current technological, economic and social changes are transforming industrial relations.

The social partners generally agree that the changing world of work implies an increased demand for hard and soft skills directly linked to digitalisation. They also see the need to manage the transition from skills which are closely linked to

Social partners have developed good examples of up-skilling and re-skilling strategies.

activities which can be automated to new job profiles. Assuming that technological progress does not slow down, lifelong learning will gain growing importance. Chapter 6 provides examples of how the necessary up-skilling and re-skilling discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 can be and has been achieved through the joint efforts of the social partners. Strategies developed so far approach the need for up-skilling and re-skilling both at a sectoral and regional level (to take into account cases where the structural change linked to digitalisation implies the shift of employment from one sector to another in a given territory). This chapter discerns a pattern: cases which are managed with the support of trade unions are in general more all-encompassing. By contrast, in situations not involving independent representation of workers, there is a more pronounced divide between winners and losers.

Social dialogue can help

shape the increased flexibility of work

What is also pertinent to all workers is the major role social dialogue can play in shaping the increased flexibility in the time and place of work, which is facilitated by the new IT tools. Social partners agree in many instances that the traditional approaches to working time are no longer adequate. The

Social dialogue can help to manage the increased flexibility of work.

discussion on working time is shifting away from the customary polarised debate in which the trade unions ask for shorter working times and the employers seek more flexibility. New options are being considered, balancing employers' and workers' needs on a case-by-case basis, albeit under the umbrella of collective agreements.

However, the increasing diversity of contractual relationships means that the solutions developed by the social partners up until now might not be open to all workers. One reason is that certain work relationships blur the distinction between employees and self-employed. For instance, workers in the platform economy and freelancers may not fit into this type of categorisation. In contrast to fixed-term employment, temporary agency work or self-employment, some of the new non-standard forms of work are more difficult not only to insure for but also to organise. The representation of workers' interests in this more individualised labour market is increasingly problematic. These changes may be one of the factors explaining the decline in trade union membership.

Atypical work challenges the existing forms of social dialogue.

This difficulty notwithstanding, Chapter 6 provides an overview of cases where social partners have succeeded in entering into a constructive social dialogue over the last fifteen years, thanks, among other things, to new recruitment strategies devised by trade unions. In parallel, bottom-up initiatives providing services to non-standard workers and initiatives enabling semi-structured action are emerging, possibly paving the way for a development of collective action suited to the needs and preferences of workers engaged in non-standard forms of work. In certain instances, trade unions have engaged in coalition-building to increase the legitimacy of joint advocacy activities.

Trade unions are trying to expand the advocacy of workers' interests...

Employer organisation density has been fairly stable over the past decades. This can be attributed to the success employer organisations have had in providing targeted services to their members in the changing economic and organisational landscape. However, new forms of work challenge not only the trade unions. In some cases it is no longer clear who the employers are. In fact, some new forms of work might be considered as efforts by employers to avoid the responsibilities normally associated with that role (e.g. taxation, social security contributions) and to delegate them to society or to the individual worker. The social partners are making various efforts to maintain collective bargaining coverage, because their continued ability to do so safeguards their relevance and justifies their autonomous status.

...and employer organisations are challenged to keep their members aboard.

In conclusion, industrial relations are strongly affected by ongoing changes. The social partners and governments need to find ways of re-organising and strengthening social dialogue to ensure that it continues to be effective in the future world of work. The European Commission makes a sustained contribution

Re-organised social dialogue could become a cornerstone of sustainable and inclusive growth.

to this objective, by providing financial and logistical support to the social partners and promoting their involvement at the European and national level. A fully functioning social dialogue has a positive contribution to make not only to social welfare and cohesion but, ultimately, to sustainable economic competitiveness and growth. Re-organised social dialogue can convert the higher flexibility inherent in the new forms of work from a potential liability in terms of inequality and social cohesion into an asset for the EU's economy and society.

CONCLUSIONS

The economic recovery has been accompanied by improvements in labour market outcomes and the social situation. This is particularly true for demographic groups whose labour market performance or social situation has traditionally faced challenges (youth) or who are in steady transition from a position of lower labour market participation (women and older workers). While differences between Member States persist and are occasionally significant, both in labour markets and social dimensions, incomes from work in the EU have continued to increase over the last three years and together with social transfers have led to an increase in the disposable incomes of households. The risk of poverty or social exclusion in the EU has also steadily declined from its 2012 peak but – against the background of the crisis – has not yet made headway towards the target of taking 20 million people out of poverty by 2020. A stronger decline can be observed in severe material deprivation, which has decreased in practically all Member States.

Nonetheless, some developments signal that there is room for further improvement. The new-found strength of the labour markets has not been accompanied by a recovery of hours worked per person employed, which continued on a long-term downward trend that predates the crisis. Productivity growth remains relatively modest. Inequality and monetary poverty have also been fairly stable in the EU over the last few years.

In this context, the mega-trends of globalisation, technological transformation and demographic ageing drive important structural changes in European labour markets and society. The chapters in this year's ESDE analyse these changes and their impacts and explore the policies that may enable workers and entrepreneurs to harness them. Among other developments, globalisation and technological change are likely to drive further capital deepening and to facilitate the rise of non-standard forms of work. The benefits of these structural trends, such as the possibility of smoothing adjustments to potential shocks in labour demand, of achieving greater work-life balance, of overcoming mobility barriers to employment and creating more high-skilled job opportunities, should not be underestimated. Nor should the concomitant risks, such as job destruction, or, possibly, higher market income inequality. Reaping the former while minimizing the latter requires investment in up-skilling and re-skilling the EU's human capital. It also requires efforts to remove or mitigate persistent disincentives associated, among other things, with gender and social inequalities, which significantly hamper the efficient functioning of European labour markets. Moving in this direction is both an imperative for economic success and a requirement for political consensus. In its Reflection Paper on the Social Dimension of Europe, released in March 2017, the European Commission emphasised that investment in human capital creates opportunities for individuals to move on throughout their life cycle; this favours economic growth, labour market participation and living standards and lowers social risks.

Keeping the EU's workforce sufficiently educated and skilled to match the shifts in production processes should not distract from the need to identify a broader mix of policy responses to the ongoing mega-trends of technological change, globalisation and ageing. Stimulating investment in productive equipment and infrastructure is one such response, because, if uneven trends in this respect are not addressed, they could increase the existing divides in productivity and growth between Member States. Here, too, the European Commission's renewed emphasis on artificial intelligence and the financial support mechanisms it puts

at its disposal are designed to help lagging economies seize the potential of new technologies and improve their competitiveness to the benefit of their labour markets and social conditions.

The greater heterogeneity of jobs, the blurred distinction between employment and self-employment, the more fragmented careers and unpredictable income streams often associated with non-standard work, all pose additional challenges for social protection systems, most of which were not structured to accommodate the risks associated with the increasing complexity of non-standard work. Moreover, non-standard work together with population ageing is likely to erode the financing base of social protection systems and require a rethink of the traditional ways in which these have been financed. The stakes are worth the efforts, as effective social protection contributes to a smooth functioning of the labour market, to inclusive growth and to social cohesion. The social partners could make a significant contribution to the necessary re-designing of social protection in the Member States, but non-standard work has also challenged the existing forms of social dialogue. Trade unions' efforts to expand the advocacy of workers' interests and the emergence of parallel structures of self-organisation, as well as jointly developed strategies for workforce up-skilling and re-skilling, hold the promise of a re-organised social dialogue in line with the ongoing transformation of industrial relations.

The evidence analysed in this review suggests the substantial benefits of new technologies as job-creation engines and the importance of redesigning social welfare in ways that support people throughout their life course and thus strengthen the EU's economic competitiveness and social resilience. In fact, social welfare can be a productive investment, provided it allows individuals to take risks, to devote resources to learning (new) skills and to cope with fluctuating demand for work. Thus equipped with a new boat of better education and skills and with a modern life-jacket of social protection, the European labour force can be lifted rather than overwhelmed by the rising tide of globalisation, technological change and ageing.

Main Employment and Social Developments

1. INTRODUCTION ⁽¹⁾

In 2017 and early 2018 the pace of economic recovery in the EU accelerated. Economic growth was faster, spread across more Member States and broadened its sectoral base. Domestic demand remained the main growth engine, supported by investment growth and expansion in private consumption. Net exports performed strongly in 2017, supported by robust global trade. Over the coming years, the expansion is set to remain solid, broad-based across sectors and countries, and increasingly self-sustaining.

Economic growth has been a fertile ground for labour market conditions, which continued to improve in 2017 and early 2018. The numbers of people in employment reached new record levels, well above those observed before the economic and financial crisis which started in 2008. ⁽²⁾ In 2017 over three and a half million people more were in employment in the Union, compared with 2016. The positive trend continued in early 2018: in the first quarter, there were 237.9 million people in employment. In line with these developments, participation in the labour force increased and unemployment continued to diminish in practically all Member States. By April 2018 the unemployment rate had dropped to 7.1% in the EU, its lowest level since September 2008.

Improved labour market conditions have continued to benefit the social situation in the

EU. In particular, there has been a slow yet uninterrupted reduction in poverty. In 2016 there were 118 million people at risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (AROPE), one million fewer than in 2015 and 5.6 million fewer than at its peak in 2012.

Nonetheless, the European economy's known challenges persist, especially in the euro area Member States hardest hit by the crisis.

- Productivity made only modest gains in 2017
- Large disparities in labour market performance persist
- Income inequality in the EU has largely stabilised, while the number of people in AROPE remains well above the Europe2020 strategic target.

This chapter will review the main economic developments and analyse their implications for the labour market and society. Indicators based on the latest available data will show the macroeconomic, labour market and social situation and trends for the EU, euro area and Member States. Attention will also be given to the dynamics of convergence in the EU.

The analysis in this chapter complements the findings from the Social Scoreboard. ⁽³⁾ The Social Scoreboard accompanies the European Pillar of Social Rights. Its role is to help screen the performances of Member States in the employment and social field. The Social Scoreboard provides a number of indicators to gauge progress along the three dimensions of the Social Pillar: (i) equal opportunities and access to the labour market; (ii) dynamic labour markets and fair

⁽¹⁾ This chapter was written by David Arranz, Petrica Badea, Magdalena Grzegorzewska and Argyrios Pisiotis.

⁽²⁾ Henceforth referred to as "the crisis" or "the Great Recession."

⁽³⁾ See European Commission (2017f).

working conditions; and (iii) public support/social protection and inclusion. The Scoreboard was used for the first time to support EU policy guidance in the framework of the European Semester 2018. ⁽⁴⁾

2. A FAVOURABLE MACROECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT

Economic activity continued to expand in both the EU and the euro area. The largely synchronised expansion of the global economy at an annual pace of 3.7% in 2017 (up from 3.0% in 2016) helped to offset the disadvantageous effect of euro appreciation on exports. The resilience of net exports contributed to the upswing in investment. It also shielded labour demand in export-strong economies from potential negative second-round effects. These positive macroeconomic developments supported improvements in the labour market throughout 2017. This was so in spite of certain exogenous and endogenous risks forecast earlier. ⁽⁵⁾ Developments in 2017 strengthened the positive outlook, with economic sentiment rebounding very markedly.

2.1. Stronger and more balanced GDP growth

The EU economy grew faster in 2017 than forecast earlier. ⁽⁶⁾ Growth rose to 2.4% in both the EU and in the euro area. ⁽⁷⁾ After the double-dip recession (2009 and 2012), the EU and euro area economies regained their GDP pre-crisis peaks in 2013 and 2014 respectively and have been growing steadily since (*Chart 1.1*). By the fourth quarter of 2017, quarter-on-quarter growth of at least 0.6% had been observed for five consecutive quarters. In the first quarter of 2018 this pace moderated only slightly, to 0.4%. Growth in other major developed economies also accelerated in 2017 but at a slower pace than in the EU: the US economy grew at 2.3% (up from 1.5% in 2016) while Japan's economy expanded at 1.7% annually (up from 1.0% in 2016). ⁽⁸⁾ At an annual rate of 2.4% in 2017 (up from 1.8% in 2016), the growth of OECD economies mirrored output growth in the EU. ⁽⁹⁾ Private consumption remained the key driver of economic expansion in the EU, supported by the improving employment situation, rising disposable incomes, and inflation which continued to hover below policy target values. Yet its contribution to overall economic growth declined relative to 2016, as did that of government expenditure.

⁽⁴⁾ See European Commission (2018e).

⁽⁵⁾ The European Commission's *Spring 2017 European Economic Forecast* saw an improvement in the risk outlook relative to the Winter 2017 forecast, but still qualified 2017 risks as "tilted to the downside."

⁽⁶⁾ For instance, the European Commission's *Spring 2017 European Economic Forecast* expected annual economic growth of 1.9% in 2017.

⁽⁷⁾ See European Commission (2018d), p.1.

⁽⁸⁾ See European Commission (2018d), pp. 144-146.

⁽⁹⁾ Source: OECD data.

Annual investment growth in the EU strengthened notably in 2017, accounting for roughly one third of the annual growth in output.

Gross fixed capital formation made a stronger contribution to growth in 2017 than in any other year since the beginning of the crisis (see *Chart 1.2*). There were also qualitative elements in the 2017 investment upswing (such as the good performance of investment in equipment in the euro area) which bode well for its multiplier impact on economic growth. ⁽¹⁰⁾ Favourable financing conditions, buoyant business confidence, the lower levels of debt of non-financial companies, as well as the Investment Plan for Europe were among the supportive factors in this respect. ⁽¹¹⁾ But other factors, such as the decreasing but still high levels of sovereign and private debt overhang in some Member States, ⁽¹²⁾ may be holding investment back from realising its full potential. Nonetheless, the performance of gross fixed capital formation in 2017, reflecting modernisation trends, makes for a positive investment outlook in 2018. ⁽¹³⁾

Investment increased in all Member States. In 2017 investment accounted for 20.3% of total EU output (19.8% in 2016). ⁽¹⁴⁾ The annual growth rate for investment reached 3.8% in the EU, the highest point in over a decade. ⁽¹⁵⁾ The largest annual increases in investment were registered in some of the Member States that had been hardest hit by the crisis (27.8% in Cyprus, 16% in Latvia, 9.6% in Greece, 9% in Portugal, 5% in Spain, while investment increased by 16.8% and 13.1% in Hungary and Estonia respectively). In these countries, a continuation of this positive trend could support sustainable output expansion, as long as this notable rise in investment does not signify a return to risk-laden pre-crisis trends

⁽¹⁰⁾ See European Commission (2018d), pp. 33-34 and European Commission (2017b), pp. 36-38.

⁽¹¹⁾ As of March 2018, the operations approved under the Investment Plan for Europe were expected to trigger EUR 274 billion in investment. Among other investments, over half a million small-and-medium-sized enterprises are expected to benefit from measures enhancing access to finance. See European Commission (2018d), p. 33.

⁽¹²⁾ This includes the still high stock of non-performing loans (NPLs) in some countries.

⁽¹³⁾ The European Commission (2018d), pp. 26, 33 expects gross fixed capital formation to grow by 4.2% in 2018 in the EU and equipment investment in the euro area to grow by 6.1% in 2018.


⁽¹⁴⁾ The euro area benefited from faster growth in investment than the EU as a whole, with investment rising to 20.5% of the currency union's gross domestic product in 2017 (up from 20.1% in 2016) without approaching pre-crisis levels (22.2% in 2008), which were partly due to unsustainable trends such as asset bubbles, especially in the construction sector.

⁽¹⁵⁾ This outcome was stronger when excluding the highly volatile developments in the Irish economy. This is due to a 36% quarter-on-quarter drop in fixed capital formation in Ireland in the third quarter of 2017 (due to a statistical re-classification of certain activities of multinational enterprises) which resulted in an overall quarter-on-quarter contraction of investment by 0.3% in the euro area. The volatility in the performance of investment in Ireland continued in the fourth quarter of 2017, when investment expanded by 6.1%. See European Commission (2018d), p.32; European Commission (2017b), p.36; and European Commission (2018c), p.5.

Chart 1.1

Productivity rises slowly in a context of robust output and employment growth, while hours worked per person employed have not rebounded and may be on a long-term decline accelerated by the crisis

Growth in real GDP, real productivity, employment and hours worked (cumulative change - index 2008=100), EU and euro area



Source: Eurostat, National Accounts [nama_10_gdp, nama_10_a10_e, nama_10_lp_ulc]
[Click here to download chart.](#)

(such as investment in dwellings and the resulting housing asset bubbles). Productive investment could help to absorb unutilised labour supply, raise productivity and thus smooth out differences in labour market situations across countries.


The external balance of goods and services rebounded strongly, accounting for 14.5% of overall economic expansion in 2017. In fact, the contribution of net exports to growth was the highest since 2013. This is the result of both a leap in export growth and a continuation of the previous downward trend in imports, despite the appreciation of the euro (Chart 1.2). While each Member State's share of total EU exports remained largely stable,⁽¹⁶⁾ several Member States contributed particularly to this year's outcome. The Netherlands, Ireland, Denmark, Poland, Austria, Slovenia and Slovakia registered increases in the external balance of goods and services relative to 2016. The compositional change in EU-level GDP expansion also implies a greater sensitivity in the growth outlook to the degree of openness of world trade. The strengthening US resolve to pursue protectionist policies in trade relations with major partners, including the EU, signals potentially strong limitations to the future contribution of the EU's trade balance to economic growth.

⁽¹⁶⁾ As in previous years, Germany ranks at the top of Member States' shares of total EU net exports, followed by France and the Netherlands.

Chart 1.2

GDP increases faster, supported by rising investment and a strong external balance

Real GDP growth (% change on previous year) and contribution of its components, EU



Note: Investment here is defined as gross fixed capital formation, not gross capital formation, which would also include changes in inventories and acquisitions less disposals of valuables in a unit or sector.

Source: Eurostat, National Accounts [nama_10_gdp]
[Click here to download chart.](#)

Sustained economic growth is expected over the next two years in all Member States. According to the European Commission Spring 2018 Economic Forecast released in May 2018, real GDP growth in the EU and the euro area is projected to remain robust at 2.3% in 2018 and to moderate slightly to 2.0% in 2019.⁽¹⁷⁾ Economic activity is set to increase in all Member States over the forecast period, buoyed by improved consumer and business sentiment and the positive feedback of rising investment and employment expansion.


Nonetheless, certain earlier risks persist, while the year 2018 ushered in new risks as well. Remaining risks relate mainly to international and domestic security challenges as well as the strenuous political processes and business decision-making generated by Brexit. New risks include a potential faster tightening of US monetary policy by the Federal Reserve or a sharp correction in the assessment of asset valuation and credit risk by global financial markets, which could also curb the upswing in economic activity. There would be a similar effect from

⁽¹⁷⁾ See European Commission (2018d), pp. 1, 26-29.

Chart 1.3

Accelerating GDP growth accompanied by continuous employment growth

Real GDP growth and employment growth (% change quarter on quarter and cumulative change - index 2008=100), EU



Source: Eurostat, National Accounts [namq_10_gdp, namq_10_pe]. Data seasonally adjusted.
[Click here to download chart.](#)

an amplification of protectionist policies by the US or other non-EU governments. Also, the recent changes in US tax legislation, including the lowering of the corporate tax rate from 35% to 21%, may have adverse effects on business investment in the EU in the medium- to long-term.

2.2. Uninterrupted employment growth accompanies faster economic expansion

Employment in the EU continued to expand throughout 2017 to reach the highest level ever recorded. Following its decline from 2008 through 2013, employment has grown at a robust pace. It had surpassed its pre-crisis high point by mid-2016 in the EU and by the end of 2016 in the euro area (*Chart 1.3*). The pace of employment growth in 2017 rose to 1.6%. In 2017, the number of employed people was 235.8 million (155.9 million in the euro area).⁽¹⁸⁾ In the first quarter of 2018 this number rose further to 237.9 million. This compares with 231.2 million in 2008. This expansion notwithstanding, Greece and Latvia still record employment levels more than 10% below their respective 2008 peaks, while in Lithuania, Spain, Croatia and Bulgaria the numbers of employed people still fall well short of the levels observed in 2008.⁽¹⁹⁾

Employment growth in 2017 was more in line with the faster growth in gross domestic product (see *Chart 1.3*). In 2015 and 2016 employment grew faster than expected on the basis of economic expansion but the latter's stronger performance in 2017 has made this relationship more balanced. As analyses by the European Commission and the ECB show,⁽²⁰⁾ the earlier high responsiveness of employment (in number of people employed) to economic growth could be attributed, among other

factors, to the declining trend in hours worked per employed person due to increased part-time work, as well as to a shift of activity towards the more labour-intensive service sectors.⁽²¹⁾ In some Member States structural reforms have played a role in supporting employment expansion.⁽²²⁾

Employment growth in 2017 outperformed earlier forecasts.⁽²³⁾ It accelerated to 1.6% in 2017, both in the EU and the euro area.⁽²⁴⁾ The expansion is expected to continue in all Member States, prompted by growth in domestic demand, moderate but steady wage growth and in some Member States by structural reforms.

Since 2013, the recovery in the EU has been job-rich but not particularly hours-rich. The volume of total hours worked in the economy decreased in the EU and in the euro area until 2013, absorbing output contraction. Since 2015, total hours worked have been increasing but are not yet back to their 2008 peak levels (see *Chart 1.1*). This may be an indication of remaining slack in the labour market. On the other hand, hours worked per person in 2017 marked a slight decline (0.3%) relative to the previous year and were still at a level approximately 3.0% lower than in 2008. This was not a stand-alone annual decrease in hours worked per person but one more in what is a soft declining trend observed since 2000, long before the crisis. This trend points to a different interpretation, one that is less related to cyclical developments. The failure of hours worked per person to rebound to 2008 levels may be due not only to a

⁽²¹⁾ See European Commission (2018d), p.38 and (2018c), p. 6, 7.

⁽²²⁾ See European Commission (2016c), pp.5, 55.

⁽²³⁾ The European Commission's *European Economic Forecast Spring 2017* expected employment expansion to be just 0.9% in 2017. By the time the *European Economic Forecast Autumn 2017* was out, that projection was revised upwards to 1.4% for 2017, 1% for 2018 and 0.8% for 2019.

⁽²⁴⁾ These outcomes were closer to the expectations of the European Commission's *European Economic Forecast Winter 2018 (Interim)*, which expected annual employment growth in the EU to have accelerated to a robust 1.6% in 2017. As for the outlook, the European Commission's *European Economic Forecast Spring 2018*, pp.41-42 expects a deceleration of employment growth to 1.1% in 2018 and 0.9% in 2019 in the EU, which, however, it attributes primarily to weak employment growth in the UK (1.3% and 1.1% respectively in the euro area).

⁽¹⁸⁾ This level figure is based on data from National Accounts. According to the Labour Force Survey, the number of employed people aged 15+ in 2017 was 227.6 million in the EU and 148.3 million in the euro area.


⁽¹⁹⁾ In the case of Latvia, Lithuania and Bulgaria, a long-term decline in the overall population may be at play rather than negative labour market developments.

⁽²⁰⁾ See European Central Bank (2016a), pp. 53-71 and European Commission (2016c), p.16.

Chart 1.4

Modest productivity growth in the EU and in most Member States

Growth in real labour productivity per (employed) person, real GDP and employment (% compound annual growth 2014-2017), EU, euro area (EA19) and Member States



Note: Compound annual growth is a geometric average providing a constant rate over three years

Source: Eurostat, National Accounts (nama_10_gdp, nama_10_lp, nama_10_lp_ulc); calculations by DG EMPL

[Click here to download chart.](#)

cyclical effect set in motion by the crisis but may be part of a long-term structural decline linked to higher incidence of part-time work and changing preferences of workers in favour of more leisure. Although headcount employment has increased, the hours worked per employed person have not escaped the weak dynamics induced by the crisis: they have moved in a largely flat pattern since 2012, well below the pre-crisis peak level observed in 2008. Only in the UK, Sweden, the Netherlands and Slovenia have the average annual hours worked per person employed increased above the 2008 level.

2.3. Productivity growth remains modest and varies across Member States

Labour productivity continued its moderate increase throughout 2017. ⁽²⁵⁾ Labour productivity per person in the EU rose slightly by 0.8% (compared with 0.7% in 2016) although 15 Member States ranked below this mark. In the euro area it increased by 0.7% (compared with 0.5% in 2016). This was largely consistent with a longer-term trend observed during the recovery. Following an initial drop in 2009 and a strong rebound in 2010, growth in labour productivity stagnated from 2011 to 2012 ⁽²⁶⁾ before it started rising again at a modest pace of 1% or less in 2013 (see *Chart 1.1*). But by 2016 yearly growth in

productivity per person had slowed down again to 0.7% in the EU and 0.5% in the euro area. This overall evolution in labour productivity from the years prior to the recession up to 2017 captures primarily short-term changes, which were the outcome of fluctuations in output and employment. The decline of labour productivity in 2009 was due to the relative rigidity with which the labour market responded to lower demand during the economic downturn as a result of employment protection regulatory frameworks and labour hoarding. ⁽²⁷⁾ The restrained pace of growth in productivity per person employed is linked to factors such as the higher share of part-time jobs and the lower numbers of hours worked. ⁽²⁸⁾ Due to the reduction in hours worked per person it is important to examine more closely the evolution of productivity per hour worked.

Growth in productivity per hour in 2017 was faster than in productivity per person. In the EU it almost doubled, from 0.6% in 2016 to 1.1% (it rose from 0.6% to 0.9% in the euro area). In addition, from the start of the crisis (2008) to 2017, productivity per hour has cumulated more growth than productivity per person (a difference of 3.2 pps). In the future, an increase in the number of hours worked per person could both strengthen output growth in a more robust manner and support labour income.

There are differences in labour productivity growth across Member States. ⁽²⁹⁾ Between 2014

⁽²⁵⁾ Labour productivity here is measured specifically as labour productivity per person employed, which is the ratio of GDP in chain-linked volumes divided by employment. Labour productivity is also measured per hour worked, which would be the ratio of GDP in chain-linked volumes divided by average annual hours worked (i.e. average annual hours worked per person employed multiplied by the levels of employment). A series of chain-linked volumes is a series of economic data from successive years expressed in real (i.e. inflation- and deflation-adjusted) terms by computing the volume for each year in the prices of the preceding year, and then 'chain-linking' the data together to obtain a time-series of figures from which the effects of price changes have, at least in theory, been removed.

⁽²⁶⁾ Long-term, sustainable growth in labour productivity, on the other hand, depends on three main factors: investment and saving in physical capital, new technology and innovation in production processes, and human capital (which includes the levels of skills and motivation of labour).

⁽²⁷⁾ I.e. the practice of refraining from dismissal of redundant labour in order to maintain employee skills in anticipation of future growth.

⁽²⁸⁾ See "Part-time and temporary jobs" in section 3.3 below.

⁽²⁹⁾ Growth in labour productivity (measured here as the percentage change in GDP per person employed) is the difference between the growth rate of output and the growth rate of employment. The change in the case of Ireland should be interpreted with caution due to the one-off effect of the change that led to the sharp increase of this country's GDP. The strong output increase in 2015 and 2016 was to a large extent driven by a surge in gross capital formation, mainly reflecting the doubling (in constant prices) of intellectual property products.

Chart 1.5

Unit labour costs continue their restrained upward trend in most Member States

Growth in nominal unit labour cost, nominal compensation per employee and real labour productivity (% compound growth 2014-2017), EU, Euro area and Member States



Note: Compound annual growth is a geometric average providing a constant rate over 3 years. Nominal unit labour cost measures compensation per employee adjusted for labour productivity. Compensation per employee covers the total remuneration -- including gross wages and salaries before deduction of taxes and employees' social security contributions, employers' social security contributions, bonuses and overtime payments -- which is payable in cash or kind by employers to employees for work done by the latter during the accounting period.

Source: Eurostat, National Accounts [nama_10_gdp, nama_10_pe, nama_10_lp_ulc]

[Click here to download chart.](#)

and 2017, most Member States registered modest increases in labour productivity growth per person. The average productivity growth rate per person employed across the Member States was approximately 1.5% in 2017. However, the differential growth of output and employment between Member States accounted for some large variations in labour productivity. Ireland, Lithuania, Romania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia and Estonia led with labour productivity growth rates above 2%. At the opposite end, Greece and Portugal registered negative productivity growth. This reflects mainly the sharp and prolonged output contractions suffered until 2016 in Greece, and faster employment expansion than economic growth in Portugal. Productivity growth in Luxembourg was also negative in 2017, while the rates of Sweden, Italy, Belgium, Cyprus and Denmark hovered just above the zero mark, as their employment expansion was strong relative to output growth (see *Chart 1.4*). The average growth in labour productivity per hour across Member States rose from 0.9% in 2016 to 2.0% in 2017.

2.4. Labour costs continue their slow upward trend

Despite receding unemployment, wage dynamics in 2017 remained restrained in most Member States. The accelerated momentum of economic expansion and the accompanying increase in employment has as yet hardly been reflected in wage developments at EU level, and even less so in the euro area, where wage growth in 2017 was particularly subdued. However, the aggregate picture hides considerable heterogeneity. Central and Eastern European countries, for instance, saw stronger wage growth than other Member States.⁽³⁰⁾ Wage

moderation can be explained by, among other factors, low inflation and "sticky" inflation expectations, weak productivity growth and the weak dynamics in hours worked per employed person. In Member States with significantly underutilised labour resources, weak wage growth signals considerable remaining labour market slack.⁽³¹⁾ Another factor behind this slack is the long-term and ongoing shift from manufacturing to service sectors: there is a higher incidence of involuntary part-time work in services.⁽³²⁾ Pent-up wage deflation may also be playing a role in the weak wage dynamics.⁽³³⁾

Restrained wage dynamics have moderated the rise in nominal unit labour costs. In 2017 annual growth in nominal unit labour costs based on persons slowed to 0.3% (down from 0.8% in 2016), as annual growth in compensation per employee declined slightly to 1.2% and productivity growth rose to a little over 0.8%. The overall modest growth of nominal unit labour costs in 2014-2017 mainly reflected the subdued dynamics of nominal wages (compensation per employee), adjusted by modest increases in labour productivity.⁽³⁴⁾ In a similar vein, growth in nominal unit labour costs based on hours worked in 2017 rose

⁽³¹⁾ European Commission (2017d), pp. 10-11.

⁽³²⁾ Hong et al. (2017), pp. 78-79. Although a higher proportion of part-time in total employment is one of the reasons behind the long-term decline of number of hours worked per employed person, overall part-time work has been stable and involuntary part-time work has declined since 2015.

⁽³³⁾ This implies that wages, which (due to nominal wage protection measures) did not fall as might have been expected during the crisis as unemployment rose, are growing more slowly than might have been expected during the recovery, because of low productivity growth and labour slack. See European Commission (2017d), *Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe - Annual Review 2017*, p.44.

⁽³⁴⁾ On Ireland, see footnote in section 2.3.

⁽³⁰⁾ European Commission (2017d), pp. 15-18, 40-44.

to 0.1% in the EU (from -1.2% in 2016) and stood at 0.7% in the euro area.

The evolution in nominal unit labour costs varied considerably across Member States. In a few Member States nominal unit labour costs decreased between 2014 and 2017. In the case of Greece and Cyprus, this happened primarily because nominal wages fell. ⁽³⁵⁾ Nominal unit labour costs also declined in Ireland, Croatia, Finland and the Netherlands, due to increases in labour productivity per person. By contrast, the Baltic Member States as well as Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary registered bold increases in nominal unit labour costs from 2014 to 2017, as nominal wages increased much more strongly than productivity (see *Chart 1.5*).

Inflation rose but overall remained moderate in 2017. The core inflation rate moved to well above the 1.0% mark, standing at 1.5% in the euro area and at 1.7% in the EU, in January 2018. The relatively low inflation rate supported real wage growth and household purchasing power, despite the modest growth in nominal wages. ⁽³⁶⁾

3. THE LABOUR MARKET


In general, 2017 has brought significant improvements in the labour markets of the majority of Member States. Decreases in the unemployment rate have been greater than expected. The shift towards more jobs in the service sector has continued but attenuated. Important challenges remain, for example there has been no progress in narrowing gender gaps (employment and pay). At the same time, as this Annual Review will show, new challenges and opportunities have arisen linked to technological evolution: automation, artificial intelligence and new forms of work combined with globalisation and ageing.

3.1. Unemployment is decreasing faster than expected

Unemployment fell slightly faster in 2017 than in previous years. Forecasts one year ago were for a slowdown in the pace of unemployment decrease. However, during 2017 the unemployment rate decreased slightly faster (0.9 pp, 2.1 million fewer unemployed than in 2016) than in previous years (0.8 pp in 2016 and 2015). The unemployment rate in 2017 was 7.6% in the EU, accounting for 18.8 million people (and declined further to 7.1% by April 2018). In the euro area the unemployment rate moved down to 9.1% (representing 14.7 million people), decreasing at

the same pace as in the EU, by 0.9 pp (1.5 million fewer unemployed).

Chart 1.6
Unemployment continued to decline in 2017
Unemployment rate, % of labour force EU



Note: The grey area represents the gap between the average unemployment rate of the 3 countries with the lowest and the highest rate.

Source: Eurostat, series on unemployment [une_rt_a] and European Commission Forecast
[Click here to download chart.](#)

Unemployment decreased in all Member States in 2017. The drops varied quite widely, however. Vigorous decreases above 2 pps were recorded in the Member States with the highest unemployment rates, notably Spain (2.4 pps, down to 17.2%) and Greece (2.3 pps, down to 21.3%). Other countries, especially those with low rates, registered modest contractions of less than 0.5 pp. The main exceptions were Italy and the Czech Republic. Italy is the only country with a rate above 10% that registered a modest decline (0.4 pp). At the other end of the spectrum, the Czech Republic showed a robust decrease of 1.1 pps, down to a record low unemployment rate of 2.9% in 2017.

⁽³⁵⁾ European Commission (2017d), pp. 15-16, 133, 136, 138.

⁽³⁶⁾ The inflation rates quoted here conform to the methodology of the Harmonised Indices of Consumer Prices (HICP), which measures the changes over time in the prices of consumer goods and services acquired by households. The HICP is calculated according to a harmonised approach and a single set of definitions across the euro area, the EU, the European Economic Area as well as accession and candidate countries, providing a comparable measurement of inflation.


Box 1.1: Comparing the predicted with the actual unemployment rate

Since the start of the recovery, the labour market has performed much better than expected given the evolution of GDP. Job creation and economic growth are usually strongly correlated. Nevertheless, during the recovery some elements may have altered ways in which that relationship manifests itself. For example, more and shorter part-time work accounts for more people working but fewer hours. In fact, the total number of hours worked has not yet fully recovered to their pre-crisis levels. As result, predicting accurately the behaviour of the labour market has become more complex. In addition, labour market reforms in Member States have had a positive impact in the unemployment reduction, though this is difficult to measure. The chart below (Chart 1) shows how, over the last two years, forecasts have underestimated the reductions in the unemployment rate.

Chart 1

Forecasts have underestimated the reduction in the unemployment rate

Unemployment rate and forecasts, % of labour force, EU




Source: Eurostat, series on unemployment [une_rt_a] and European Commission Forecasts

Chart 1.7

Many Member States register the lowest unemployment rates since the onset of the crisis

Unemployment rate, % of labour force



Source: Eurostat, series on unemployment [une_rt_a]

[Click here to download chart.](#)**The outlook remains positive for unemployment reduction.**

The EU unemployment rate is already below its 2009 rate and approaching its 2008 low point. The European Commission Spring Forecast was for further reductions: down to 7.1% for 2018, and 6.7% for 2019. ⁽³⁷⁾ Reductions are also expected in the majority of Member States, particularly important in those with the highest rates. If the latest forecasts are correct, the dispersion of unemployment in the EU should decrease in the coming years (see section 5 of this chapter for more details about unemployment dispersion).

Long-term unemployment continues to decrease**Long-term unemployment continued to fall at a similar pace as in 2016.**


In 2017 in the EU, the long-term unemployment rate (which measures those unemployed for at least one year) dropped by 0.6 pp to 3.4%. The very long-term unemployment rate (measuring those unemployed for at least two years) fell slightly faster than the previous year, by 0.4 pp to 2.1%.

⁽³⁷⁾ See European Commission (2018d), p. 38.

Chart 1.8

Long-term unemployment decreases steadily

Long-term unemployment rate, % of labour force EU



Source: Eurostat, series on unemployment [une_ltu_a]

[Click here to download chart.](#)**Long-term unemployment decreased in all Member States in 2017.**

The majority (18 countries) registered rates below the EU average. On the other hand, there are three countries with rates much higher than the EU average: Greece (15.6%), Spain, (7.7%) and Italy (6.5%). In particular, Greece presents a very high rate of very long-term unemployed, 11.3%, which is five times higher than the EU average.


3.2. Solid growth in the labour market participation rate**Labour market participation continued its stable increase in the EU and euro area in 2017.**

As shown in *Chart 1.9*, EU labour market participation has followed a structural upward trend over the last decade, reaching an activity rate of 73.4% in 2017. The activity rate increased in the EU at a constant pace even during the crisis. This contrasts with the picture in the US, where labour market participation was higher than in the EU a decade ago, but declined strongly between 2008 and 2015, recovering slightly in 2016 and 2017. Over the last three years, participation rates in the EU and in the US have been almost identical. In 2017, the active population was almost 240 million people in the EU and almost 159 million in the euro area. The increase in 2017, of approximately 0.9 million, was modest. However, this modest increase has to be seen in the context of an EU working-age population which shrank by more than 5 million people between 2009 and 2017.

Chart 1.9

EU's activity rate growing steadily

Activity rate, % of population 15-64



Source: Eurostat, LFS [lfsi_emp_a]

[Click here to download chart.](#)**Older workers and women continued to drive the increase in the activity rate in 2017.**


There is still significant scope for both groups to increase their participation in the labour market. However, the participation rate of men aged 25 to 54 has been stable at 91% for the last ten years, with little margin for further increases. Therefore, tackling the demographic challenge in the near future will require further increases in the participation of both older workers and women. The positive factors (educational, socio-economic or health) that drove the growth in labour participation for those groups in recent years will be of reduced importance in the future.⁽³⁸⁾ Specific and targeted policies will be required to maintain increases. For the female population policies could focus on tax incentives, the availability of part-time jobs as well as family and maternity support (i.e. childcare and family home care).⁽³⁹⁾ Participation of older workers could be encouraged by improvements in health conditions and life expectancy, appropriate retirement policies, flexible working arrangements and lifelong learning opportunities..⁽⁴⁰⁾

Participation rates of third-country migrants are lagging behind rates of EU nationals.

In particular, the activity rate of women from third countries is 54.8%, 13 pps below the overall women activity rate in the EU. By contrast, intra-EU migrants show a higher participation rate than country nationals, 6 pps above.

⁽³⁸⁾ See Fernandez and Martinez (2017).⁽³⁹⁾ See Thévenon (2013).⁽⁴⁰⁾ See OECD (2017).

Chart 1.10
Activity rates in almost all Member States surpass 2008 values



Source: Eurostat, LFS [lfsi_emp_a]
Click here to download chart.

Activity rates increased in most Member States in 2017. The long-term trends and patterns seen in the EU as a whole reflect a widespread positive change in Member States, as shown by *Chart 1.10*. This has produced some upward convergence in activity rates in the EU. ⁽⁴¹⁾ Only two Member States have lower activity rates than in 2008: Ireland (down by 2.2 pps ⁽⁴²⁾) and Denmark (down by 1.9 pps). By contrast, Malta and Hungary, which registered the lowest activity rates in 2008, have achieved the greatest increase since then (11.3 pps and 10 pps respectively).

3.3. Employment growth driven by more jobs in service sectors


In view of its continued solid employment growth the EU is now on a path to reach the Europe 2020 target. In 2017 the employment rate reached 72.2% for people aged 20 to 64 (accounting for about 217 million people, compared with 214 million in 2016). The yearly growth was 1.1 pps, similar to the pre-crisis pace. With a similar evolution over the next few years, the 75% target for 'Europe 2020' is achievable. In the euro area the rate of

⁽⁴¹⁾ The upward convergence is due to an increase in the average activity rate (it has grown in nearly all Member States) combined with a reduction in the dispersion among Member States (coefficients of variation).

⁽⁴²⁾ The activity rate in Ireland has been driven mainly by the drop in the youth activity rate of young people (15-25). Its rate has dropped around 20 pps since 2008.

employment growth was similar to the EU's: 1 pp. The euro area employment rate surpassed its pre-crisis peak (71% in 2017, up from 70.2% in 2008). Nevertheless, the European Commission Spring Forecast 2018 predicts a slowdown in job creation over the next few years as the effect of fiscal incentives decreases and as (skill) shortages appear (*Chart 1.11*). ⁽⁴³⁾

Chart 1.11
Employment rate in the euro area is well above the 2008 peak



Note: The forecast is calculated with the estimation of employment growth and assuming a similar size of the workforce

Source: Eurostat, LFS [lfsi_emp_a], Commission Forecast and EMPL calculations
Click here to download chart.

The employment rate has increased in all Member States since the beginning of the recovery. In 2017 only Denmark saw a decrease in its employment rate (although the rate is still high at around 77%) while the average increase was around 1.4 pps. Thanks to the latest positive developments, there are already nine Member States above their national targets. Another nine Member States are less than 2 pps below their targets, which are therefore likely to be reached. However, there are still 10 Member States with employment rates below their 2008 levels, notably Greece and Cyprus (down by 8.6 pps and 5.9 pps respectively) as shown in *Chart 1.12*.


All the main demographic groups saw gains in employment in 2017. The employment rate increased for all the most relevant age and gender groups. As in recent years, older workers led the increases (especially women aged 55 to 64, who showed an increase of 2 pps). The youth employment rate grew at roughly the same pace as the rate for prime age workers, ⁽⁴⁴⁾ around 0.9 pp. Since 2008 three main trends have arisen: older workers have strongly led the increase in employment (gaining almost 12 pps since 2008), youth employment has not yet recovered from the crisis (it is still 2.7 pps below the 2008 rate) and women have increased their employment rate (by 3.7 pps) while the rate for men has remained almost unchanged.

⁽⁴³⁾ See European Commission (2018d), pp. 37-42.

⁽⁴⁴⁾ Those aged 25 - 54.

Chart 1.12
Nine Member States have already reached their 'Europe 2020' targets

Employment rate, % of population 20-64




Note: FR data is for France metropolitan
 Source: Eurostat, LFS [lfsi_emp_a]
[Click here to download chart.](#)

Employment by sectors

Employment continued to shift towards service sectors in 2017. Since 2008 there has been a clear trend in the sectors leading the destruction and creation of jobs. While the secondary sector (Industry, Manufacturing and Construction) showed the highest decrease in jobs, service-oriented activities have expanded strongly. In 2017 this trend continued but weakened as employment grew in all sectors, with the exception of the financial sector, which suffered a small decrease. Service sectors showed the highest job creation in both levels and growth, while signs of recovery appeared in Construction and Manufacturing (1.6% in both cases). Chapter 2 provides a detailed analysis of the specific structural changes related to the future of work.

Chart 1.13
Service sectors have led job growth during the recovery

Changes in employment by sector in the EU (2008-2017)




Note: Exact NACE activities: (A) Agriculture, forestry and fishing, (B-E) Industry (except construction), (C) Manufacturing, (F) Construction, (G-I) Wholesale and retail trade, transport, accommodation and food service activities, (J) Information and communication, (K) Financial and insurance activities, (L) Real estate activities, (M-N) Professional, scientific and technical activities; administrative and support service activities, (O-Q) Public administration, defence, education, human health and social work activities, (R-U) Arts, entertainment and recreation; other service activities; activities of households and extra-territorial organisations and bodies
 Source: Eurostat, National Accounts [nama_10_a10_e]
[Click here to download chart.](#)

Self-employment

Levels of self-employment remained stable in 2017. In the last five years, there have been no significant changes in the number of self-employed people, which stood at between 30 and 31 million. Nevertheless, as total employment grows, self-employment is falling as a proportion of the total. This effect was very visible between 2008 and 2017 as this proportion fell by about 0.5 pp while the number of self-employed people remained stable. Although the new forms of work (e.g. platform work) may drive a future increase in the number of the self-employed, their levels have so far been stable with no significant changes observed in recent years (see Chapter 2 for more details).

Chart 1.14
Self-employment accounts for less of total employment than in 2008

Self-employment, % of total employment 15-64, EU



Source: Eurostat, LFS [lfsa_egaps]
[Click here to download chart.](#)


Part-time and temporary jobs

Temporary employment as a proportion of total employment remained stable during 2017. However, the situation at Member State level is very different. In the case of temporary work in particular the recovery has increased the gaps between countries. For instance, Spain has registered the highest share of temporary employment (22.4% of total employment), which has increased by 3.3 pps since the start of the recovery and by 0.6 pp in 2017.

Part-time work as a proportion of total employment has been almost stable since 2013. However, Member States present very different patterns. The Netherlands has a very high proportion of part-time work, (almost 50%, with a big proportion of voluntary part-time work), while part-time jobs make up less than 10% of employment in 12 Member States. While the proportion of part-time is slowly decreasing, the recent reductions in involuntary part-time work are a positive development, see *Chart 1.15*.

Chart 1.15
Proportions of part-time and temporary work remain stable in 2017

Part-time and temporary work, %s of total employment 15-64 in the EU



Source: Eurostat, LFS [lfsi_pt_a, lfsa_eppgai]
Click here to download chart.


The gender dimension in employment

The recovery is not reducing the gender employment gap. Compared with 2008, women in 2017 have higher rates of employment (66.5% vs 62.8%), but in 2017 the gender employment gap remained unchanged at 11.5 pps. In fact, this gap has remained the same since 2013. The crisis years 2008 to 2012 had seen significant improvement: the gender gap decreased from 15.1 pps to 12.2 pps. However, this decrease reflected the fact that the crisis had a stronger negative impact on men than on women; the employment rate for men is still below the 2008 rate. In terms of full-time equivalents (FTEs) the gender gap is even larger, as women register higher rates of part-time work (see Chapter 3 for further analysis of the gender employment gap).

The gender pay gap⁽⁴⁵⁾ shows no significant reduction. Despite increases in the employment rate of women, the gender pay gap persists, standing at 16.2% in the EU and 16.3% in the euro area in 2016. The crisis and the recovery have not particularly influenced its evolution (see Chapter 4 for more details on inequalities in labour market outcomes).

Chart 1.16
No reduction in gender gaps over the last years

Gender employment gap (20-64, pps) and pay gap (% difference), in the EU



Note: The gender employment gap is calculated as the difference in the employment rate of men and women aged 20 to 64.
The gender pay gap represents the difference between average gross hourly earnings of male paid employees and of female paid employees as a percentage of average gross hourly earnings of male paid employees. It is calculated in unadjusted form.

Source: Eurostat, LFS [lfsi_emp_a] and earnings survey [earn_gr_gpg2] and EMPL own calculations

Click here to download chart.

3.4. A more dynamic EU labour market

Job vacancies continue to increase in the EU. Since the start of the recovery there has been a constant increase in the EU vacancy rate. Nevertheless, different dynamics appear at Member State level. There are still low vacancy rates (below 0.8%) in some countries, often countries with the highest unemployment rates: Greece, Spain and Italy. By contrast, the Czech Republic, Malta, Germany and United Kingdom have high vacancy rates (above or close to 2.5%) combined with low unemployment rates, hinting at tightening job markets.

Job-finding rates⁽⁴⁶⁾ have increased since the recovery, especially in 2017. Reductions in unemployment are usually accompanied by increases in the job-finding rate. That was the case in 2017 when, in a more dynamic labour market, the unemployed had more chances to find jobs. Separation rates⁽⁴⁷⁾ also decreased significantly in 2017.


⁽⁴⁵⁾ The gender pay gap is measured as the difference between average gross hourly earnings of male and female paid employees. It represents a percentage of the average gross hourly earnings of male paid employees.

⁽⁴⁶⁾ Percentage of unemployed people finding jobs.

⁽⁴⁷⁾ Percentage of employed people losing their jobs.

Chart 1.17
Job vacancy rate grows in the EU and in most Member States

Job vacancy rate: job vacancies as % of job vacancies plus occupied posts



Note: 1. Data for DK from 2010 and HR from 2012
2. Annual data based on quarterly data
3. Any company size except for IT, FR and MT where only companies with at least 10 employees are captured
4. Based on sectors: Industry, construction and services (B-5) except for IT and DK based on "Business Economy" (B-N)

Source: Eurostat, Job Vacancies Statistics [jvs_q_nace2]
[Click here to download chart.](#)

Labour shortages could be increasing in some countries. Low levels of unemployment could be producing shortages in certain sectors or professions.⁽⁴⁸⁾ The Czech Republic may be facing quantitative labour shortages⁽⁴⁹⁾, as in 2017 they had the biggest increase in job vacancy rates since 2013, combined with the lowest unemployment rate in the EU. Belgium, on the other hand, shows non-quantitative labour shortages, for example skills shortages: it combines one of the highest vacancy rates in the EU with an unemployment rate close to the EU average. Factors explaining these labour shortages include: labour costs and taxation ("tax wedge") which have been historically high even if recently declining, a regional imbalance between supply and demand (linked to low mobility) and some skills mismatches (e.g. inadequate language and high-qualification technical skills).⁽⁵⁰⁾

⁽⁴⁸⁾ For a discussion of the typology and measurement methodology of labour shortages, see European Parliament (2015), pp. 19-31.

⁽⁴⁹⁾ The total supply of labour in an economy falls short of the total demand for labour in that economy.


⁽⁵⁰⁾ See European Commission (2018a), p3. For a historical perspective on labour market mismatches in Belgium and other Member States see European Parliament (2015), pp. 35, 39-42.

In central and eastern European countries, labour shortages are even higher than in the pre-crisis period. According to the European Business and Consumer survey, labour shortages, as a factor limiting production, are rising especially in central and eastern European countries. Migration from these countries could have played an important role in the sharp rise of shortages⁽⁵¹⁾ there. At the same time, this migration may have mitigated the shortages in some northern and western European Member States where, nevertheless, shortages are also rising. Southern European countries, on the other hand, have low levels of shortages, in line with their low vacancy rates.

3.5. Sustained improvements in the labour market and education for young people

The youth unemployment rate dropped significantly in 2017. It decreased by 1.9 pps, down to 16.8%, approaching pre-crisis rates. Nevertheless the youth unemployment rate is still quite high in several Member States, with rates above 30% in Spain and Italy and 40% in the case of Greece. A similar and positive trend was observed in the NEET rate (aged 15 to 24).⁽⁵²⁾ In 2017, it declined by 0.6 pp to 10.9%, reaching the same NEET rate than in 2008. Most of the reduction in the NEET rate was due to the decrease in unemployed NEETs. At the same time, the proportion of inactive NEETs has remained constant in the last decade at around 6.1%, as seen in *Chart 1.18*.

Chart 1.18
Youth unemployment rate is dropping fast
Unemployment rate (% of labour force, 15-24) and NEET rate (% of population 15-24), EU



Source: Eurostat, LFS [une_rt_a, lfsi_neet_a]
[Click here to download chart.](#)

Youth employment continued its recovery in 2017. The youth employment rate rose by 0.8 pp to 34.7%, slightly less than the increase in the overall employment rate. In combination with the decrease in the unemployment rate, this indicates recent positive development in the labour market for young people. Nevertheless, the effects of the crisis can still be


⁽⁵¹⁾ See Darvas and Goncalves Raposo (2018).

⁽⁵²⁾ NEET stands for (young people) Not in Employment, Education or Training. The NEET rate represents the percentage of the population in a given age group who match that description.

observed in the employment situation of young workers, who suffered the biggest relative loss of jobs compared with other age groups. ⁽⁵³⁾ Despite recent progress, youth employment has not yet fully recovered from the crisis and is still registering rates below those of 2008.

Chart 1.19
Youth employment rate still below its 2008 level

Employment rate per age group (index 2008=100), EU



Source: Eurostat, LFS [lfsi_emp_a]

[Click here to download chart.](#)

After several years of steady decline, the rate of early leavers from education and training ⁽⁵⁴⁾ remained almost stable in 2017, just above the Europe 2020 target. The different evolution of youth employment and unemployment seen above can be partly explained by a higher attachment to education. In fact, longer stays in education can compensate for the fact that the youth employment rate has not fully recovered yet. This has been reflected in the continuous decrease in the rate of early school leavers over the last decade, bringing the rate very close to the Europe 2020 target of 10%. During the crisis, bad economic prospects may have discouraged young people from leaving education for a paid job. This may also explain why in a context of improved employment dynamics the pace of decrease has been modest recently, in particular in 2017 (0.1 pp). If the pace of the reduction in the early school leavers rate does not pick up, the target may be missed, if only narrowly. That young people are staying longer in education is a key factor in responding to the challenges and taking advantage of the opportunities the changing world of work brings. Staying in school facilitates higher educational attainment and the potential for upskilling during working life.

The continuous rise in the higher educational attainment rate brings the EU closer to its strategic Europe 2020 target. Tertiary educational attainment for those aged 30 to 34 has increased over the last few years, almost reaching the Europe 2020 target of 40% in 2017 (39.9%). In the near future, the cohorts who are now staying longer in education should achieve even higher rates of educational attainment.


⁽⁵³⁾ See a succinct discussion of the problem with policy suggestions in Andersen and Keuschnigg, pp. 9-11, 27-28.

⁽⁵⁴⁾ Henceforth also referred to as "early school leavers".

Chart 1.20

The EU has almost attained two Europe 2020 targets despite the crisis: lower school-leaving and higher tertiary educational attainment rates

Early school leavers (% of population 18-24), and tertiary educational attainment (% of people aged 30-34), EU



Source: Eurostat, LFS [t2020_40, t2020_41]

[Click here to download chart.](#)


Lifelong learning is not increasing in the EU.

Initial education and training need to be complemented through lifelong learning. Educational attainment correlates strongly with successful careers in terms of employability and earnings. At a time of fast technological change, ageing and globalisation, lifelong learning is key to maintaining a productive labour force and facilitating longer working lives. For the moment, however, as seen in *Chart 1.21*, participation in life-long learning is relatively limited (particularly among low-skilled persons) and there is no trend towards increasing participation, regardless of the educational attainment level.

Chart 1.21

Lifelong learning is not picking up

Participation rate in education and training (last 4 weeks), % of population 18-64 by educational attainment level, EU



Note: Break in series in 2013

Source: Eurostat, LFS [trng_lfs_02]

[Click here to download chart.](#)

4. IMPROVING BUT STILL CHALLENGING SOCIAL SITUATION IN THE EU


The social situation in the EU continues to improve. In 2016 ⁽⁵⁵⁾ 118 million people were living at

⁽⁵⁵⁾ **Note on the reference year:** EU-SILC data, used in poverty and inequality indicators, reflect incomes of the previous year (except for the UK and Ireland where incomes refer to the interview period). EU-SILC data also reflect activity status of the previous year. However, in this document, the reference

Chart 1.22

Disposable household income supported primarily by higher income from work

GDP and GDHI growth (% change on previous year), and contribution of GDHI components (pps), EU



Note: The nominal GDHI is converted into real GDHI by deflating with the deflator (price index) of household final consumption expenditure.

Source: DG EMPL calculations based on Eurostat data, National Accounts [nasq_10_nf_tr, namq_10_gdp]; Data non-seasonally adjusted;

[Click here to download chart.](#)

risk-of-poverty or social exclusion. This was 5.6 million fewer than at the peak of 2012. The standard of living has improved: median income has been increasing in real terms and the number of people in material deprivation has declined. Disposable income inequality has stabilised since 2014. Flash estimates from Eurostat show the same tendency for 2017: no significant changes in nearly all Member States (the exceptions are Ireland and Poland with significant decreases and Belgium with a very slight increase). Continuing favourable developments in the economic situation, in the labour market and in household incomes in 2017 are likely to have led to improvements in the social situation.

4.1. The financial situation of households buoyed by labour market improvements

Disposable household income benefits largely from higher income from work

The disposable income of households⁽⁵⁶⁾ in the EU increased further in 2017. Having dropped to a low point in 2012–2013, gross disposable household income (GDHI) has since then been increasing again in real terms.⁽⁵⁷⁾ Household

year is the survey year and not the income year. This choice is for consistency with indicators commonly used: Eurostat indicators and most of EMPL monitoring tools and reports use the survey year. Moreover AROPE combines AROP, VLWI (previous year) and SMD (survey year).

The 2016 reference year is based on EU-SILC 2016, which reflects the 2015 income year and activity status in 2015.

⁽⁵⁶⁾ The households sector is combined with non-profit institutions serving households (NPISH) under a single heading. The NPISH sector is relatively small.

⁽⁵⁷⁾ Yearly gross disposable income of households and adjusted gross disposable income of households in real terms per capita can be found on the Eurostat non-financial transactions database: nasa_10_nf_tr. Quarterly unadjusted and seasonally adjusted, gross disposable income of households and adjusted gross disposable income of households in real terms per capita,

income has continued to benefit from the expansion in economic activity and improved labour market conditions.⁽⁵⁸⁾ In the EU, GDHI had by 2015 returned to its previous peak of 2008–2009. In the euro area, where GDHI had dropped much more strongly than in the EU as a whole, it returned to its previous peak one year later in 2016 (*Chart 1.23*). There are signs that GDHI annual growth moderated in 2017, but remained above 1.5% in real terms in the EU and in the euro area (*Chart 1.22*).

The disposable income of households improved in nearly all Member States, but recovery to the pre-crisis level is incomplete in some. All Member States except for Greece saw growth in household incomes in 2017, while the change was not significant in Italy and Portugal. However, household incomes in some southern Member States have not yet recovered to the pre-crisis levels. In Greece GDHI is about 65% of what it was in 2009, and in Croatia, Italy, Portugal and Spain it is about 6–7% below previous highs.


are available on the Eurostat non-financial transactions database: nasq_10_nf_tr. EU and EA19 quarterly seasonally adjusted, adjusted gross disposable income of households in real terms per capita (% change on previous period) are available under nasq_10_ki

⁽⁵⁸⁾ See European Commission (2018b).

Chart 1.23

Household income tops its previous peak

GDHI growth (cumulative change – index 2008=100), EU and EA



Note: The nominal GDHI is converted into real GDHI by deflating with the deflator (price index) of household final consumption expenditure.

Source: Eurostat, National Accounts [nasq_10_nf_tr, namq_10_gdp]; Data non-seasonally adjusted; DG EMPL calculations

[Click here to download chart.](#)

Households continued to benefit from higher income from work, while increases in social benefits have stabilised. The labour income of both employees and the self-employed resumed its growth in 2014, mainly due to the recovery in the labour market, and has continued since then. Growth in property income and other transfers has been mixed in recent years. Households began to get less support in social benefits and to make higher contributions as market incomes improved. Increases in social benefits have moderated since the second half of 2016 and virtually stabilised in 2017. Increases in social contributions have been strong since 2016 (Chart 1.22).⁽⁵⁹⁾

More social protection expenditure went towards old-age pensions and health needs

Detailed data are only available up to 2015 to show what types of social protection have supported household incomes in the EU and that social protection played a major role in stabilising incomes between 2007 and 2009, especially for the higher number of unemployed people. After some reduction in 2011-2012 for all categories of people benefiting from social protection, social expenditure started to accelerate again in real terms from 2013.⁽⁶⁰⁾ It reached 3% in 2015, driven in particular by in-kind expenditure.⁽⁶¹⁾

⁽⁵⁹⁾ For a detailed discussion of disposable household income from work and wealth across different household compositions, based on the Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS), see European Central Bank (2016b). <https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpsps/ecbsp18.en.pdf>


⁽⁶⁰⁾ To reflect trends in real social expenditure, the harmonised index of consumer prices (HICP) is used as a deflator. It allows estimation of the trend in the overall real value or purchasing power of social expenditure. Inflation reflects the differential in HICP growth from one year to the other. When inflation is constant it has no impact, when inflation is declining it contributes positively, when inflation increases it contributes negatively. The HICP is a price index that reflects changes in prices of a basket of goods and services, which appears closer to the actual expenditure on consumption of households than

By 2015, social protection shifted to structural expenses (old-age pensions and health-related protection). The increases in social expenditure in the years 2013 to 2015 (Chart 1.24) were mainly due to further increases in spending on old-age (driven partly by demographic factors) and on healthcare. By contrast, expenditure on unemployment stabilised in 2013 and declined in 2014, as the economic environment improved. Expenditure on families, housing and combating social exclusion increased slightly in 2014-2015.

Chart 1.24

Old-age pensions and health-related expenditure drive up social protection spending

Growth in social protection expenditure (% change on previous year, in real terms) and contribution by functions (pps), EU



Note: Nominal expenditure is converted into real expenditure by deflating with the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP).

Source: Eurostat, ESSPROS [spr_exp_sum] and Price Statistics [prc_hicp_aind]; DG EMPL calculations

[Click here to download chart.](#)


the deflator of household consumption from the National Accounts (which also includes imputed rents, for instance).

⁽⁶¹⁾ The available National Accounts data disaggregate expenditure by in-cash and in-kind, but do not disaggregate it by function. The National Accounts data on government expenditure are available through 2016, as covered by the ESDE Annual Review.

Chart 1.25

Social protection expenditure increases in most Member States

Growth in social protection expenditure in 2012-2015 and in 2014-2015 (% change, in real terms) and contribution (pps) by functions, EU Member States



Note: The nominal expenditure is converted into real expenditure by deflating with the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP). Poland data from 2014

Source: Eurostat, ESSPROS [spr_exp_sum] and Price Statistics [prc_hicp_aind]; DG EMPL calculations

[Click here to download chart.](#)

Social protection expenditure continued to increase in all Member States in 2015.

Expenditure on old-age pensions and survivors' pensions increased in most Member States, partly reflecting demographic change, except in Denmark, where expenditure on pensions declined. Sickness and disability expenses contributed significantly to this growth in most Member States, except in Finland where it declined (*Chart 1.25*, right column). Compared with 2012, countries with large crisis-related fiscal consolidation needs, notably Greece and Cyprus, had lower expenditure on pensions as well as on sickness and disability (*Chart 1.25*, left column). Expenditure on unemployment benefits declined notably in Belgium, Cyprus, Ireland, Portugal and Spain, as labour markets improved (*Chart 1.25*, right column). Social protection in the EU will continue to play an important role, in particular in relation to new forms of work (see Chapter 5).

4.2. Social transfers mitigate the constant income inequality in the EU

Disposable income inequality in the EU remained broadly stable in 2016 (income year 2015) and

is still slightly higher than in 2012. ⁽⁶²⁾ Inequality, as measured by the GINI coefficient, ⁽⁶³⁾ was fairly constant at EU level between 2013 and 2016 (*Chart 1.27*). The quintile share ratio S80/S20 ⁽⁶⁴⁾ indicated that the richest 20% (top quintile) had an equivalised ⁽⁶⁵⁾ disposable income around five times higher than

⁽⁶²⁾ The reporting year in this chapter refers to the EU-SILC survey year, which measures income of the previous year. The latest survey 2016 data refer to income distribution in 2015.

⁽⁶³⁾ The **Gini coefficient** of equivalised disposable income measures the extent to which the distribution of equivalised disposable income after social transfers deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. It is a summary measure of the cumulative share of equivalised income accounted for by the cumulative percentages of the number of individuals. Its value ranges from 0 (complete equality) to 100 (complete inequality).


⁽⁶⁴⁾ The **S80/S20 income** quintile share ratio refers to the ratio of total equivalised disposable income received by the 20% of the country's population with the highest equivalised disposable income (top quintile) to that received by the 20% of the country's population with the lowest equivalised disposable income (lowest quintile).

⁽⁶⁵⁾ The Equivalised disposable income of a household: Eurostat applies an equivalisation factor calculated according to the OECD-modified scale - which gives a weight of 1.0 to the first person aged 14 or more, a weight of 0.5 to other persons aged 14 or more and a weight of 0.3 to persons aged 0-13. See

Chart 1.26

Income inequality increases in roughly a third of the Member States, while the impact of social transfers the tax-benefit system varies across Member States

GINI coefficient before social transfers and GINI coefficient of disposable income, EU Member States



Note: The Gini coefficient is an indicator with value between 0 and 1 (between 0 and 100 in this chart). Lower values indicate higher equality. In other words a value equal to 0 indicates everybody has the same income, a value equal to 1 indicates that one person has all the income.

Gini is based on total equalised disposable household income. The year refers to the EU-SILC survey year, income measured is from the previous year.

Green bars reflect redistributive effects of taxes and transfers, measured by differences between market income inequalities (the top of green bars) and disposable income inequalities (the top of dark blue bars).

Breaks in series: EE 2014, SE 2015, BG, LU and NL 2016. These Member States are classified based on EMPL estimation. For these Member States GINI 2012 is marked with smaller dots to indicate that comparison of 2012 to 2016 values should be avoided.

Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC [ilc_di12, ilc_di12bdi12c]

[Click here to download chart.](#)

that of the poorest 20% (lowest quintile) (5.2 between 2014 and 2016 compared with 5.0 in the period 2011-2013). However, in Lithuania, Romania and Bulgaria the S80/S20 ratio was higher than 7.0 in 2016.

According to Eurostat Flash Estimates, inequality remained stable in 2017 (income year 2016).

Flash estimates for the income year 2016, released as experimental data by Eurostat for the first time in Autumn 2017, ⁽⁶⁶⁾ indicate that no statistically significant change in inequality, as measured by S80/S20, will be observed between (income years) 2015 and 2016 in most Member States. Inequality was estimated to have decreased markedly only in Poland and to a lesser extent in Ireland, and to have increased somewhat in Belgium.


Income inequality would have been much higher without the redistributive effects of taxes and transfers. These effects are measured by the difference between market income inequality and disposable income inequality. ⁽⁶⁷⁾ Market income inequality (before taxes and transfers) has stabilised over recent years. The same is largely true for the

redistributive effects of transfers, although these were slightly stronger between 2008 and 2011 and weaker between 2013 and 2016 (*Chart 1.26*). ⁽⁶⁸⁾

Chart 1.27

Income inequality in the EU before and after social transfers has been fairly stable over the last decade

GINI coefficient before social transfers and GINI coefficient of disposable income, EU



Note: The Gini coefficient is an indicator with value between 0 and 1 (0 to 100 in this chart). Lower values indicate higher equality. In other words a value of 0 indicates everybody has the same income, a value of 100 indicates that one person has all the income. Gini is based on total equalised disposable household income. The year refers to the EU-SILC survey year; income measured is from the previous year. Values refer to EU27 between 2005 and 2007

Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC [ilc_di12, ilc_di12bc]

[Click here to download chart.](#)

http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/metadata/en/ilc_esms.htm, chapter 3.4.

⁽⁶⁶⁾ See report on Flash Estimates by Eurostat at <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/7894008/8256843/Flash-estimates-of-income-inequalities-and-poverty-indicators-experimental-results.pdf>

⁽⁶⁷⁾ Market incomes are the gross incomes earned by individuals or households before any redistribution via taxes and transfers, while disposable incomes are final incomes taking into consideration the effects of redistributive policies (which may involve the provision of in-kind benefits and services).

Progress in reducing inequality varies across Member States

Income inequality widened in some Member States between 2012 and 2016, while the extent of the redistribution effect differed. Several Member States (notably Bulgaria and Lithuania) saw

⁽⁶⁸⁾ See European Commission (2016b).

increases in disposable income inequality between 2012 and 2016. At the same time the impact of social transfers on income inequality (*Chart 1.26*, shown by the green parts of the bars, pensions excluded from social transfers) differed across Member States. Social transfers reduced income inequality by less than 10% in Bulgaria, Estonia, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal and Romania but by more than 20% in Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and UK.

Income inequality in the EU is lower than in some other major advanced economies, but remains a concern. Inequality in EU is still lower than in Japan, United States or Australia. However, it increased slightly between 2012 and 2016, driven by increases in countries such as Bulgaria, Italy and Romania. High inequality may have a detrimental impact on economic growth and its sustainability. ⁽⁶⁹⁾ Furthermore, high inequality raises concerns about fairness, ⁽⁷⁰⁾ as it usually reflects a higher risk-of-poverty and social exclusion ⁽⁷¹⁾ as well as a higher incidence of financial distress and, as such, it tends to threaten social cohesion.

Financial distress faced by the poorest people continued to ease in 2017 but remains at high levels, Measured as the percentage of people who need to draw on savings or to run into debt in order to cover current expenditure ⁽⁷²⁾, financial distress has eased over recent years, following a strong increase between 2011 and 2013 when the gap between income groups widened as financial distress increased most for people in the lowest quartile of household income. In 2017, 9% of adults in low-income households in the EU were in debt and a further 14% drew on savings to cover current expenditure (compared with 4% and 9% respectively for the total population).

4.3. The decline in the risk-of-poverty or social exclusion is driven by lower rates of joblessness and material deprivation


The number of people at risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (AROPE) in the EU continued to decrease in 2016. ⁽⁷³⁾ In 2016 (referring to income in 2015) 5.6 million fewer people in the EU were at risk-of-poverty or social exclusion than at the peak in 2012. The AROPE decrease followed strong increases in incomes stemming from the recovery in economic activity and improvements in labour markets, including declines in long-term unemployment and youth

exclusion and continued increased participation of older workers and women in the labour market.

Chart 1.28

Risk-of-poverty and social exclusion declines modestly due mainly to decrease in severe material deprivation

At risk-of-poverty or social exclusion rate, at-risk-of-poverty rate, severe material deprivation rate (% of population), very low work intensity households (% of population aged 0-59), EU



Note: The year refers to the EU-SILC survey year; income measured is from the previous year. AROPE, AROP: income from the previous year, SMD: current year, 2017 data estimated, VLWI: status in the past year. EU27 until 2009, EU28 thereafter. See the footnote (64) on page x for definitions.

Source: Eurostat, EU SILC (ilc_peps01, ilc_li02, ilc_mddd11 (estimates) and , ilc_lvhl11) [Click here to download chart.](#)

The number of people at risk-of-poverty or social exclusion has been falling slowly towards the pre-crisis level. By 2016 the number of people at risk-of-poverty or social exclusion in the EU had returned to a level closer to the 2008 low point and was roughly one million above that year's level: 968 000 for the EU27, 806 000 (estimated) for the EU28. The decline brought the AROPE rate down to 23.5%, just above the bottom 2009 value (23.3%). (*Chart 1.28*) Despite this improvement, 118 million Europeans, including 77 million in the euro area, were at risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (AROPE) in 2016. The Europe 2020 target of lifting 20 million people out of poverty by 2020 was set before the crisis, in 2008. The onset of the crisis, which, among other, resulted in a sharp increase of the AROPE rate in 2010, made this target far more challenging to reach.

The risk-of-poverty or social exclusion is also higher among certain types of employed people and could be linked to new forms of work (see Chapter 4).

The reduction in AROPE at EU level has been underpinned by different trends in AROPE's three components: at risk-of-poverty, severe material deprivation and living in very low work intensity households (*Chart 1.28*).⁽⁷⁴⁾

⁽⁶⁹⁾ See Halter et al. (2013), Cingano (2014), Ostry et al. (2014), Dabla-Norris et al. (2015), OECD (2015).

⁽⁷⁰⁾ However income is only a part of the multidimensional context of fairness, which includes inequality of opportunities, including health and health care, housing, education and mobility, see European Commission (2015a) and (2016d).

⁽⁷¹⁾ See European Commission (2016a) and (2017c).

⁽⁷²⁾ See European Commission (Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs), *Business and Consumers Survey*.

⁽⁷³⁾ The year in this chapter refers to the EU-SILC survey year, which measures income in the previous year. The latest survey 2016 data refer to income distribution in 2015.

⁽⁷⁴⁾ The **at-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (AROPE)** indicator corresponds to the number of people who are in at least one of the following situations: at risk-of-poverty or severely materially deprived or living in households with very low work intensity.

People at risk-of-poverty (AROP) have an equalised disposable income below the risk-of-poverty threshold, which is set at 60% of the national median equalised disposable

Severe material deprivation (SMD) has been declining since 2013, indicating improvements in standards of living. In 2017 ⁽⁷⁵⁾, 4.4 million fewer people were in SMD than in 2016. This decline added to a cumulative reduction of 16.1 million since 2012. This continuous and significant drop at EU level was mainly driven by strong decreases in a few Member States, i.e. Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the UK. However, the rate for people from non-EU countries is still much higher than for natives (15.2% against 6.4%, population over 18).

A recovery in the labour market led to a decrease in the number of people living in very low work intensity (VLWI) households in 2016. The rate of population in jobless households decreased in 2016 to 10.5%. ⁽⁷⁶⁾

The at risk-of-poverty rate has stabilised. This component of AROPE has a different pattern due to its dependency on both poverty and income distribution. Since its surge in 2014, the proportion of people at risk-of-poverty (AROP) has remained broadly unchanged at 17.3%. The increase in the number of people in AROP slowed to 152 000 in 2016 (referring to incomes in 2015) after more substantial increases in the previous two years: 783 000 in 2015 and 2.6 million in 2014. This slight deterioration in 2016 was mainly driven by the increase in the number of people in AROP in Italy and the Netherlands. Flash estimates available for individual Member States suggest that the levels of people at risk-of-poverty in the EU did not change significantly between 2016 and 2017 (income years 2015 and 2016).

income (after social transfers).

Severely materially deprived (SMD) people have living conditions severely constrained by a lack of resources, i.e. they experience at least 4 out of the following 9 deprivations: they cannot afford i) to pay rent or utility bills, ii) to keep their home warm enough, iii) to face unexpected expenses, iv) to eat meat, fish or a protein equivalent every second day, v) a week's holiday away from home, vi) a car, vii) a washing machine, viii) a colour TV or ix) a telephone.

People living in households with very low work intensity (VLWI) are those aged 0-59 living in households where the adults (aged 18-59, excluding students aged 18-24) worked not more than 20% of their total work potential during the past year.


⁽⁷⁵⁾ Latest data available, estimated by Eurostat.

⁽⁷⁶⁾ Further, the population in jobless households decreased in 2016 to 10.5%, according to Eurostat, LFS data [lfsi_jhh_a].

Chart 1.29

Living standards improve despite persistent poverty and inequality since 2012: median income (and the poverty threshold) rise and severe material deprivation falls

Poverty threshold (in real terms), at-risk-of-poverty rate, Gini coefficient of disposable income, severe material deprivation rate (cumulative change – index 2008=100), EU



Note: The year refers to the EU-SILC survey year; income measured is from the previous year. EU27 until 2009, EU28 thereafter. Severe Material Deprivation for 2017 is estimated. The nominal income is converted into real income by deflating with the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP).

Source: Eurostat, EU SILC [ilc_li02, ilc_mddd11, ilc_di12, ilc_di04]; DG EMPL calculations. [Click here to download chart.](#)

However, the rise in median income has improved standards of living, even if the at risk-of-poverty rate has stabilised. The 2014 surge in people at risk of poverty reflected two different trends: first, the weak economic and labour market situation until mid-2013, and secondly, the upward shift in the median income and therefore the poverty threshold ⁽⁷⁷⁾ as household incomes started to recover in mid-2013. However, after the surge in 2014, both AROP and inequality in the EU stabilised, whereas median incomes and poverty thresholds increased by a significant 6.4% between 2013 and 2016 (*Chart 1.29*). See Box 1.2 for more details. Eurostat flash estimates indicate that in 2017 there will be a significant increase in median income in most EU countries, with more than 5% in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland and Romania. The effect on AROP changes is difficult to assess due to its high level of dependence on inequality.

⁽⁷⁷⁾ **The risk-of-poverty threshold** is set at 60% of the national median equivalised disposable income (after tax and other deductions and after social transfers).

The total **equivalised disposable** household income, used in poverty and inequality indicators, takes into account the impact of differences in household size and composition. The equivalised income attributed to each member of the household is calculated by dividing the total disposable income of the household by the equalisation factor. This indicator gives a weight of 1.0 to the first person aged 14 or more, a weight of 0.5 each to other people aged 14 or more and a weight of 0.3 each to people aged 0-13.

Box 1.2: Why is AROP not falling although AROPE is shrinking? Under which cases would AROP decrease?

Starting from 2012, the at risk-of-poverty and social exclusion rate has been continuously decreasing, mainly driven by a strong decrease in Severe Material Deprivation. On the other hand, the at risk-of-poverty rate increased slightly in 2014 and has since stabilised while the poverty threshold has steadily increased since 2013. The three components of AROPE do not necessarily always move in the same direction. When this is happening, one could try and see which is the link between the increase in median income and relatively high levels of the AROP rate. Answering this, requires an analysis of scenarios following a hypothetical change in the distribution of income, an increase in median income and a consequent increase in the AROP threshold:

- If the increases in income are proportional for the whole population, median income will increase in the same proportion and AROP will remain constant.
- If increases in income are not equally distributed and low-income households experience lower/higher growth than median-income households, the poverty threshold will increase and AROP will accordingly increase/decrease.

Figures show that the people below the threshold are in the lowest three deciles of the income distribution. In countries where the AROP share is below 20% all the people below the threshold are in the first two deciles. In countries where AROP is over 20%, some people below the threshold are in the third decile. If the whole distribution shifts by an equal increase in income for everyone, a reduction in AROP will be observed because the shift "x" will be the same for the median as for every individual. When the threshold rises by 0.6*x, a certain number of people will move above the threshold and the AROP proportion will decrease.

A closer look at the distribution of equivalised income at lower levels shows that the first three deciles of the EU-28 distribution increased at a slower pace as compared with the AROP threshold (see Chart, left side). The chart indicates the yearly change for the threshold and the top cut-off points of the first three deciles of the EU28 distribution, represented as indexes (2005 = 100 for all series). While the threshold moved up between 2008 and 2016 from €8771 to €9969 (13.7% growth), the first decile cut off point changed from €7485 to €8230 (9.95% growth). For the second decile the growth for the same period was 12.9%, which was still lower than the growth in the threshold. There is a gap for the third decile too but to a lesser extent. Simply stated, income grew across the income distribution but more slowly in the low income deciles than the poverty threshold, thus, preventing a reduction in AROP (see Chart, left side).


A decrease in the AROP rate would require a higher pace of income increase for these three deciles as compared with the increase in the median. For there to be a short-term decrease in the AROP rate, it would be enough to have an increase in the income of people just below the threshold. However, for a sustainable and/or substantial downward trend in AROP rate, most people in these three deciles would have to experience faster income growth as compared with change in the threshold.

In addition, this increasing gap between the cut-off point for the first decile and the AROP threshold correlates with the increase of the 'persistent AROP' indicator (the percentage of AROP people during the current year who were AROP for at least two of three previous years: see Chart, right side). This observation is true for the second and third deciles as well, though to a lesser extent. The enlarging gap between the threshold and the first decile traps more people in AROP, for longer time. This gap provides also the most plausible explanation for the increase in the rate of persistent risk-of-poverty. Closing this gap would lower the inequality and drive the AROP rate down.

Chart 1

Lower deciles of the income distribution are growing more slowly than the poverty threshold (left). The increasing gap between the threshold and the first decile correlates with the increasingly persistent AROP (right)

Left: Income growth (index 2005 = 100), Right: The difference AROP threshold- first decile cut off (EUR) and persistent AROP (% of total population)



Source: Source: Eurostat, SILC [ilc_d01]

Chart 1.30

Risk-of-poverty or social exclusion are declining in half of the Member States

At risk-of-poverty or social exclusion rate, at-risk-of-poverty rate, severe material deprivation rate (% of population), very low work intensity households (% of population aged 0-59), EU Member States, 2012-2016



Note: Green bars indicate decrease between 2012 (where light green bars end) and 2015 (where dark green bars end). Red bars indicate increase between 2012 (where light red bars end) and 2015 (where dark red bars end), and grey bars indicate little or no change. AROPE combines AROP, SMD and VLWI. The length of bars of components should not add to the length of AROPE bar, because components overlap in AROPE and in components. The year refers to the EU-SILC survey year, income measured is from the previous year. AROPE, AROP: income from the previous year, SMD: current survey year, VLWI: status in the past year. Breaks in series: AROPE: BG EE 2014, SE 2015, LU NL 2016, AROP BG LU NL 2016, SMD SE 2015, BG LU NL 2016, VLWI EE 2014, SE 2015, BG LU NL 2016. These Member States are classified based on EMPL estimation. For these Member States the values for 2012 should not be compared to values in 2016.

Source: Eurostat, EU SILC [ilc_peps01, ilc_li02, ilc_mddd11, ilc_lvhl11]

[Click here to download chart.](#)

Progress in reducing poverty and social exclusion varies across Member States

The risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (AROPE) has decreased or stabilised since 2012 in most Member States. Some recorded notable declines in AROPE, namely Croatia, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Poland and Romania while other six countries recorded smaller declines. Small increases appear only in Estonia and the Netherlands (*Chart 1.30*).

AROP does not follow the same trend. The at risk of poverty rate (AROP) has grown or stagnated since 2012 in most Member States (*Chart 1.30*, second column). Only Croatia, Finland and Greece recorded declining poverty rates between 2012 and 2016. In Greece this decline must be seen in the context of the 18% reduction in the median income or poverty threshold.

The persistence of at risk-of-poverty is linked to the evolution of median income. Median income in the EU increased by 6.4% in real terms between 2013 and 2016, supported by improvements in all Member States. However, different distributional patterns

emerge when looking at disposable income in different quintiles of the distribution. In Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania and Poland the income of the richest quintile has increased faster than both median incomes and the income of the poorest quintile, while in Croatia, Greece and Portugal the opposite is the case. Overall, the income of the richest people has been 1.6 to 2.7 times higher than the median income in most Member States. These details of the income distribution are in line with developments in disposable income inequality, measured by S80/S20 and GINI, as well as in relative monetary poverty (AROP) in some Member States.

Higher median income raises the poverty threshold. To illustrate the point, the substantial rise of at risk-of-poverty rates (AROP) in the Baltic States and Romania was accompanied by an evident increase in median incomes, which lifted the poverty thresholds (*Chart 1.31*).

The trend in disposable income is forecast as stable in the short term. Flash estimates for 2016 indicate an overall increase in the equivalised disposable income across the distribution for almost

all Member States. These estimated changes were supported by the main trends in the labour market including the average gain in wages, as well as by the evolution of gross disposable income in Sectoral Accounts.

The decreases in severe material deprivation have been the main driver to reduce AROPE across Member States. Severe material deprivation has gone down in most member States since 2012, and has stayed constant in Denmark, Spain, Luxembourg, Portugal and the Netherlands. The only Member State where severe material deprivation has increased is Greece.

The decrease in low work intensity has contributed to reduce AROPE in many Member States. This third component of AROPE has declined in 12 Member States, has stayed constant in another 8 and has increased in 8 (*Chart 1.30*, the most right column).

The number of people living in social and material deprivation declined between 2014 and 2016. According to Eurostat's new measure of deprivation ⁽⁷⁸⁾, 15.7% of Europeans (75 million) were limited by lack of resources to cover material needs and ensure social participation in 2016, down from 19.3% in 2014. Only Belgium registered some increase between 2015 and 2016 (*Chart 1.32*).


Despite positive signs, the risk-of-poverty or social exclusion remains a challenge, especially in southern and Baltic Member States. The risk remains high in Bulgaria and Romania despite recent improvements, as well as in Greece – the only Member State where severe material deprivation has intensified since 2012. Between 2012 and 2016, AROP increased in the Baltics and Cyprus, Portugal and Spain to the levels of the most challenged countries mentioned above (*Chart 1.30*, second column). Together with an increase in inequality in many Member States, the persistence of the risk-of-poverty or social exclusion ranks at the top of the challenges to social cohesion in the EU.

⁽⁷⁸⁾ A new indicator on social and material deprivation relates to people who experience living conditions constrained by a lack of resources, i.e. they experience at least 5 out of the following 13 deprivations: i) face unexpected expenses, ii) one week annual holiday away from home, iii) avoid arrears (in mortgage, rent, utility bills and/or hire purchase instalments), iv) afford a meal with meat, chicken or fish or vegetarian equivalent every second day, v) keep their home adequately warm, vi) a car/van for personal use, vii) replace worn-out furniture, viii) replace worn-out clothes with some new ones, ix) have two pairs of properly fitting shoes, x) spend a small amount of money each week on him/herself ("pocket money"), xi) have regular leisure activities, xii) get together with friends/family for a drink/meal at least once a month, xiii) have an internet connection

Chart 1.31

Increase in risk-of-poverty sometimes coupled with increase in income

Poverty threshold (in real terms) and at-risk-of-poverty rate (%), EU Member States



Note: The year refers to the EU-SILC survey year, income measured is from the previous year. Breaks in series: BG LU NL 2016. Changes in AROP for these Member States are indicative, based on EMPL estimation.


Source: Eurostat, EU SILC [ilc_li02, ilc_di04]; DG EMPL calculations

[Click here to download chart.](#)

Chart 1.32

Social and material deprivation continued to decline in most Member States in 2014-2016

Social and material deprivation rate (% of population), EU Member States, 2014-2016



Note: This new indicator of social and material deprivation relates to people who have experience living conditions constrained by a lack of resources, as explained in the footnote. The year refers to the EU-SILC current survey year. Breaks in series: BG 2016, LU 2016, NL 2016, SE 2015. These Member States are classified based on EMPL estimation.

Source: Eurostat, EU SILC [ilc_md07]

[Click here to download chart.](#)

5. CONVERGENCE IN THE EU

5.1. The political and economic relevance of convergence

Convergence across Member States, including through the single market and the economic and monetary union, has from the outset been at the heart of the EU integration process. ⁽⁷⁹⁾ It is therefore unsurprising that EU primary law, notably the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), abounds with references to (economic)

⁽⁷⁹⁾ At least since the Single European Act (1986), convergence has been considered as the fundamental economic mechanism and precondition for achieving socio-economic cohesion in the Union. See Alcidi et al. (2018), and LSE Enterprise (2011).

convergence and to balanced economic development more broadly.⁽⁸⁰⁾ Additionally, some of the Union's hallmark policies, such as cohesion policy with its financial instruments, have been put in place precisely in order to foster and monitor balanced economic development and to combat socio-economic disparities at the level of sub-national territories, i.e. to promote the desired (upward) convergence not only between but also within Member States.⁽⁸¹⁾ In this context, the relationship between integration and convergence has been two-way. An initial trend of (at least *nominal*) convergence was considered as an enabling, if not necessary, prerequisite for stable and socio-politically relevant integration,⁽⁸²⁾ which, in turn, feeds strongly back into the process of *real* convergence.⁽⁸³⁾ Additionally, for countries participating in a monetary union, real convergence was implicitly assumed to work towards making the structures of their economies more similar.⁽⁸⁴⁾

Much of economic literature has framed real convergence as the hypothesis that living standards in poorer economies will tend to grow faster than those in richer economies. Poorer countries catch up with the rest insofar as they improve their human capital and achieve productivity gains due to capital and technology crossing borders. Thus economies in different territories should eventually achieve convergence in terms of narrowing differences of per-capita GDP, relative endowments of productive factors, and relative factor prices.⁽⁸⁵⁾ This convergence is mostly relevant, and therefore customarily measured, over the longer term, so as to capture the effects of labour market behaviour and social outcomes which may track but typically outlast short- and medium-term business cyclicity.

Measuring real convergence among Member States is relevant for evidence-based EU policy

⁽⁸⁰⁾ For instance, Article 121(3) TFEU concerns measures "to ensure coordination of economic policies and sustained convergence of the economic performances of the Member States..." while Art 140(1) TFEU on the euro sets out the criteria for assessing "the achievement of a high degree of sustainable convergence" by the Member States.

⁽⁸¹⁾ As stipulated in Articles 174 and 176 TFEU – the legal basis for cohesion policy – which mandate the Union to develop actions aimed at "reducing disparities between the levels of development of the various regions and the backwardness of the least favoured regions."

⁽⁸²⁾ In this respect, the so-called "Maastricht criteria" laid down by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union in 1992 are an example of criteria measuring nominal convergence in preparation for the launching of the advanced phases of monetary union. The elaborated "convergence criteria" were later enshrined in Protocol No. 13 annexed to the TFEU.

⁽⁸³⁾ This is consistent with the conclusion that greater economic integration is needed in order to support further the convergence process in European Central Bank (2015), p. 42.

⁽⁸⁴⁾ See Buti and Turrini (2015).

⁽⁸⁵⁾ This is what neo-classical growth theory predicts. See Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992), pp. 223–51. This evolution should take place as a result of productivity catching up as cross-border flows of capital and technology raise the quantity and quality of capital available to lagging economies, and insofar as the latter improve their human capital.

in various domains. For instance, within the euro area, the issue of convergence is crucial to assessing the overall smooth functioning of the currency zone and its vulnerability to asymmetrical shocks, given the absence of systemic fiscal transfer mechanisms.⁽⁸⁶⁾ It is also recognised that the establishment and deepening of the single market may be impeded by divergent economic development.⁽⁸⁷⁾ In a similar vein, convergence between the EU15 Member States and the central and eastern European countries in terms of citizens' welfare was a central expectation of the 2004 and subsequent enlargements of the EU and its internal market.⁽⁸⁸⁾

On 17 November 2017, the European Parliament, the Council and the European Commission jointly proclaimed the European Pillar of Social Rights at the Social Summit in Gothenburg, Sweden. The Pillar, which the European Commission had elaborated and presented in April 2017, is an example of an EU-level initiative aimed at focusing the efforts of Member States, EU institutions and social partners in order to achieve real and, tangible convergence in the rights EU citizens enjoy in the labour market and in welfare (centred around 20 principles), regardless of the state they live in.

Evidence suggests that real convergence took place within the EU from the 1960s to the onset of the crisis in 2009.⁽⁸⁹⁾ Studies attest to a relatively broad consensus regarding the long-term converging trends in living standards across Member States, regardless of the (changing) composition of the Union. Research also vindicates the expectations of stronger (catch up) dynamics in central and eastern European countries relative to the rest of the Union.⁽⁹⁰⁾ Economic theory's hypothesis of real convergence due to the dynamics of faster-growing (former) laggards found further confirmation in the short-lived yet vigorous catching-up process of Greece and Spain within the founding members of the euro area (EU12) up to 2007.⁽⁹¹⁾

⁽⁸⁶⁾ See, for instance, Berti and Meyermans, (2017), pp. 9-23 and European Central Bank (2015), p.31. Also, Article 121 (4) of the TFEU on economic policy is based on the premise that the economic policies of a single Member State "may risk jeopardising the proper functioning of economic and monetary union."

⁽⁸⁷⁾ Article 27 of the TFEU recognises indirectly the importance of convergent economic development by acknowledging that "economies showing differences in development" may present difficulties for the establishment of the internal market.

⁽⁸⁸⁾ See, for instance, the recent study by Tilford (2017).

⁽⁸⁹⁾ See European Commission (2017b), p.11.

⁽⁹⁰⁾ In specific terms, this outcome is substantiated by the observed decrease in the coefficient of variation in real GDP per capita for the group of 7 Member States that joined the euro area in 2007 or later, from 0.38 in 2000 to 0.13 in 2015, as calculated in European Commission (2017b), pp. 11-12. See also the concurring conclusions in the recent study by Alcidi et al.

⁽⁹¹⁾ See European Central Bank (2015), p. 32.

Box 1.3: Measuring convergence

Nominal convergence is convergence in nominal variables such as inflation and interest rates. **Real convergence** has been commonly understood primarily as convergence in economic and social performances. Real convergence across Member States has been generally analysed by two different measures: a) the so-called 'sigma-convergence', which measures the overall dispersion across countries, and b) 'beta-convergence' that occurs when countries with lower GDP per capita grow faster than those with higher (catching-up process).⁽¹⁾ Both concepts have been used to analyse convergence within and between Member-State groupings of particular functional relevance, as the EU aims to build a better and fairer economic and monetary union (EMU).⁽²⁾

This section will analyse only 'sigma-convergence' and its evolution over the last decade. Coefficients of variation will be the statistical tool to measure the evolution of EU Member States in terms of convergence/divergence.

The coefficient of variation is the ratio between the standard deviation and the mean of a given distribution, in this case all EU countries. Lower coefficients mean higher levels of convergence. If all countries evolve at the same pace, the coefficients of variation will remain stable. This approach yields consistent results with different types of indicators.

It is necessary to analyse not only coefficients of variation, but also the evolution of the mean of each indicator. If there are no signs of convergence but the average is nonetheless improving, the evolution can be considered as positive. At the same time, convergence combined with a worsening of the mean represents an unfavourable evolution, which can be defined as 'downward convergence'⁽³⁾. The best scenario is one in which convergence is increasing at the same time that the average is improving, 'upward convergence.'

⁽¹⁾ For a recent analysis based on evidence from the euro area, see European Central Bank (2015), 'Real convergence in the euro area: evidence, theory and policy implications,' Economic Bulletin, Issue 5/2015, pp. 30–45.

⁽²⁾ Commission priorities, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/priorities/deeper-and-fairer-economic-and-monetary-union_en

⁽³⁾ In this section the terms 'upward convergence' and 'downward convergence' will have always signify "positive" and "negative" respectively regardless of the type of indicator discussed. For instance, "upward convergence" in unemployment rates will signify convergence with falling unemployment rates although the values of the unemployment indicator actually decrease in this type of outcome.

However, the ascertained long-term convergence may have been destabilised by the crisis, skills-biased technological change, and globalization.⁽⁹²⁾ Additionally, the recent shocks may have affected Member States lagging behind the EU average to a larger degree: these Member States tend to have a lesser endowment in institutions, and may have been caught at lower, and therefore less resilient, base social situation conditions at the onset of the crisis. If these assumptions are even partly valid, the crisis may indeed have broken the long-term converging trend in social and employment characteristics.⁽⁹³⁾ Additionally, the accelerating changes in technologies and production processes (which Chapter 2 will analyse) may have also counteracted convergence in the EU. Indeed, some economic analysis posits that technological change

drives a wedge in product and labour markets by providing vast new opportunities for some firms, workers, and economies, while leaving others behind.⁽⁹⁴⁾

This section will review the entire period from just before the onset of the crisis through the recovery (2008-2017) in terms of upward convergence. The focus will be on the evolution of some of the most relevant economic, labour market and social situation indicators across the whole of the EU, without clustering Member States in particular sub-groups.⁽⁹⁵⁾

5.2. Economic performance and living standards improve without converging significantly

Real GDP per capita is improving but has not converged over the last decade. GDP per capita in the EU (based on constant euro) has increased by approximately 12% (i.e. by EUR 2 700) despite the effects of the crisis, as shown in *Chart 1.33*. This is a positive development for most European citizens. However, in terms of convergence, changes over the last decade have not been consistent with the clearly positive trend observed over the long term, starting

⁽⁹²⁾ For a discussion of the conditions for sustainable real convergence see European Central Bank (2015), pp. 40-44. Indeed, insofar as the aftermath of the crisis saw a substantial reduction of resources allocated to investment in the quality of labour and in R&D –identified as key determinants of productivity growth and therefore of convergence – the crisis can well be expected to have had a negative impact on the convergence trends of at least the hardest-hit countries.

⁽⁹³⁾ See European Commission (2013), *Employment and Social Developments in Europe – Annual Review 2013*, p. 21. Buti and Turrini (2015), who argue that convergence inside the euro area never stopped but the type of convergence (nominal, real and structural) differed across the main phases of the monetary union, and that structural convergence is ongoing. However, they concede that for this to lead to real convergence the right institutions and policies need to be in place at the EU, euro area and national levels.


⁽⁹⁴⁾ See Ridao-Cano and Bodewig (2018), pp. 19-20.

⁽⁹⁵⁾ For an analysis of convergence relative to wages see *Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe – Annual Review 2018* by the European Commission, forthcoming in early fall 2018.

with the 1990s and continuing up to the years immediately preceding the crisis. ⁽⁹⁶⁾

GDP per capita in PPS also shows the gain realised in living standards. At the same time, as was to be expected, measurement of GDP per capita in PPS shows a greater degree of convergence since the start of the crisis. ⁽⁹⁷⁾

Chart 1.33
GDP per capita is slightly growing and but not converging



The gap between the richest and the poorest countries remains large. GDP per capita in Luxembourg exceeds EUR 80 000, while in Romania and Bulgaria it is only just above EUR 10 000.

Gross Disposable Household Income (GDHI) has grown in the last decade, but has not converged substantially. This indicator should provide a picture similar to GDP per capita but more precise in terms of standards of living. The increase in GDHI over the last decade was more significant than in GDP per capita. Starting in 2012, there has been some convergence in the EU. The crisis induced some divergence that was subsequently offset by the recovery. ⁽⁹⁸⁾ Only some countries, such as Greece and Cyprus, registered strong drops in GDHI. As a specialised study on convergence has recently found, following the crisis, Mediterranean Member States saw a decline in income levels, while most Eastern European countries continued to grow but at a much lower rate than before. This, combined with income growth in the UK


⁽⁹⁶⁾ See European Commission (2017b), pp. 11, graph 1.3.

⁽⁹⁷⁾ The purchasing power standard (PPS) is essentially an artificial currency unit used for cross-country comparisons, based on the informed and calculated assumption that one PPS can buy the same amount of goods and services in each country.

⁽⁹⁸⁾ This finding is consistent with, among other things, the conclusion by Franks et al. (2018), who argue that lack of income convergence among the original euro area countries (including Greece) was due to limited or even eroding productivity catch-up by Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Spain, where the convergence of nominal interest rates faster than inflation rates fuelled credit flows from the core countries to the aforementioned Member States, reinforcing inflationary pressures, creating asset bubbles and undermining the latter's competitiveness.

and Germany, halted the process of income convergence in the EU. ⁽⁹⁹⁾

Chart 1.34
Household income has increased significantly without convergence over the last decade



5.3. Widespread improvements in labour market conditions do not always translate into convergence


The evolution of labour markets depends not only on the growth of economic activity. It also depends on other elements, such as legal frameworks and institutional capacity to enforce them, in the labour as well as in other policy domains (not least in taxation policy). ⁽¹⁰⁰⁾ A deep and complete internal market should in principle induce a more efficient allocation of resources, including labour, acting in the long run as an equaliser of employment opportunities and unemployment risks across the EU. However, language, mobility and legislation are some of the frictions and barriers impeding this sort of optimal allocation of labour resources. The evolution of employment and unemployment in the EU has differed in terms of convergence.

The employment rate has shown upward convergence since the recovery. Divergence and convergence in the employment rate was very much linked to the unfolding of the crisis and the subsequent recovery. Nevertheless, a coefficient of variation in 2017, similar to that of 2009 but with a higher mean, indicates a slightly improved situation.

⁽⁹⁹⁾ See Vacas-Soriano and Fernandez-Macias" (2017).

⁽¹⁰⁰⁾ For a discussion of the impact of legal frameworks and institutional capacity variables on the labour market and its segmentation, see European Commission (2017d), pp. 78-115.


Chart 1.35
Employment rate converging since the start of the recovery



Source: Eurostat, LFS [lfsi_emp_a]
[Click here to download chart.](#)

Convergence in the unemployment rate has not occurred yet, but it may soon be discernible. The crisis increased divergence, and despite very positive developments in the recovery years up to 2017, convergence is still not visible. The absence of faster convergence is explained partly by still high unemployment rates in Greece and Spain, and partly by further reductions in countries which already had very low unemployment rates, such as the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary. Indeed, although the unemployment rate in 2017 was similar to that of 2008, the degree of divergence was much higher in 2017. This is the legacy of the crisis, shown in *Chart 1.36*. However, based on data in the latest forecast, a converging trend can be expected to start appearing as of 2019 (see forecast part of *Chart 1.36*).

Chart 1.36
Unemployment rate is dropping but still diverging




Source: Eurostat, LFS [une_rt_a]
[Click here to download chart.](#)

5.4. The social dimension: a mixed picture

Convergence in the social dimension can be analysed by reference to poverty - either relative, as measured by the at-risk-of-poverty rate (AROP), or in standards of living, as measured by the severe material deprivation rate (SMD). Alternatively, it can be analysed by reference to inequality, which remains a challenge in terms of inclusive growth, especially in certain Member States.

The AROP rate has not converged over the last decade. As discussed in section 4, the average AROP in the EU increased over the last decade. Moreover, the trend has remained unchanged since the beginning of the recovery. In terms of convergence, the evolution has been stable, except during the first years of the crisis when some downward convergence was observed. This downward convergence can largely be attributed to exceptionally large reductions of the rate in Latvia and Estonia (-5.5 and -3.9 pps in 2010), but these reductions were linked to sharp declines in income.


Chart 1.37
Increases in the AROP rate did not translate into higher divergence across the EU



Source: Eurostat, SILC [ilc_li02]
[Click here to download chart.](#)

The negative evolution of relative poverty contrasts with positive developments in standards of living. Over the last decade living standards, measured by the SMD rate, showed clear upward convergence as the rate declined strongly in the EU. More recently, since 2014, while the average SMD rate continued to decrease in almost all Member States, there has been some divergence, explained by developments in particular countries: the speed of decrease has been especially low in some of the countries with the highest rates, namely Bulgaria, Romania and Greece.

Chart 1.38
Severe material deprivation converged across the EU




Source: Eurostat, SILC [ilc_mddd11]
[Click here to download chart.](#)

Inequality has shown some downward convergence. As measured by the GINI coefficient,

⁽¹⁰¹⁾ inequality remained stable during the crisis and deteriorated slightly during the recovery. During this time, the indicator moved in a pattern of long-term slow convergence.

Chart 1.39
Inequality remained unchanged during the recovery but its divergence across the EU has not increased



Source: Eurostat, SILC [ilc_di12]
[Click here to download chart.](#)

6. CONCLUSIONS

In 2017 the EU economy grew at its fastest rate since the crisis. This happened in a favourable context of global economic expansion. Nonetheless, important disparities persist despite the progress registered by all Member States in output expansion.

The labour market in the EU improved solidly but unevenly across Member States in 2017. Economic growth led to the highest ever levels of employment, rising employment rates and falling unemployment rates in the overwhelming majority of the Member States. However, there are still large disparities between Member States. For instance, over ten percentage points still separate the unemployment and long-term unemployment rates and up to thirty percentage points separate the youth unemployment rates of the worst performers from those of the best.

Despite five years of recovery, certain labour market challenges persist. New challenges will also require special attention in the near future. In relation to the future of work, the continuing ability of the EU economy to create more high-added-value jobs will depend, among other things, on more equitable access to well-functioning educational systems and skills training.

Member States could address the challenges of the labour market in line with the key principles of the European Pillar of Social Rights. In this respect, policy action could focus in particular on the right to inclusive and quality education, training and life-long learning; the right to equal pay for work of equal value regardless of gender; active support for employment; prevention of employment relationships

⁽¹⁰¹⁾ For the definition of GINI see footnote in section 4.2.

that lead to precarious working conditions; and social dialogue.

The social situation in the EU has improved, especially with regard to higher standards of living in most Member States. Over the last three years, incomes from work have continued to increase and, together with social transfers, have led to an increase in the disposable incomes of households. The risk-of-poverty or social exclusion in the EU has steadily declined from its 2012 peak. And, notably, severe material deprivation has decreased in all Member States except Greece.

However, progress in reducing inequality and relative poverty (AROP) has been modest. Inequality in the EU has been largely stable since 2014. Without the redistributive effects of tax-benefit systems, inequality and poverty in the EU would have been much higher. Additionally, evolution at the EU level conceals significant differences between Member States. The risk-of-poverty (AROP) has increased or stabilised in most Member States, while inequality has intensified in ten Member States and can therefore be considered one of the main socio-economic challenges in the EU. ⁽¹⁰²⁾ The risks of poverty or social exclusion are more pronounced for certain types of workers and vulnerable groups.

Improvements in labour markets should in principle translate into better social situations for more Europeans. Addressing the aforementioned challenges in social situations calls, among other, for more effective and efficient social protection systems, as discussed in Chapter 5. In this respect, there is scope for more effective policy action by the Member States. Such action could be focused on principles of the Pillar of Social Rights, particularly on: the right to adequate social protection; the right to adequate minimum income; facilitating access to housing and assistance for the homeless and to essential services for all.

It has taken most of the last decade to offset the effects of the crisis in terms of convergence. Convergence in labour market and social situations is either weak or imperceptible during this period, which spans both the crisis and the recovery. ⁽¹⁰³⁾ Very positive recent developments make it likely that all-encompassing convergence in unemployment rates

⁽¹⁰²⁾ While this statement is accurate in the EU context, Darvas and Wolff (2016), p. 2, remind that income inequality in the EU can be considered low by comparison with the USA and the emerging economies of Asia, Africa and Latin America and poverty defined as very low absolute income is rare in the EU.

⁽¹⁰³⁾ This is consistent with Darvas and Wolff (2016), pp. 2, 7-8, 67-69, who find that the EU economies diverged after 2008 in terms of social dynamics, as some southern countries in particular suffered increases in material deprivation, total unemployment and youth unemployment at the same time as they continued to register high income inequality as well. Also, Rusek (2015) argues that policy measures following the crisis restored nominal convergence but real divergence continued and posed a threat to socio-political stability in certain member States.

will be observable from 2019 on. Clear progress towards upward convergence has also been observed in severe material deprivation rates. In other indicators, such as the employment rate or household income, the crisis brought about some divergence, which was for the most part offset during the recovery. ⁽¹⁰⁴⁾

⁽¹⁰⁴⁾ This finding is consistent, in terms of income inequality, with Vacas-Soriano and Fernandez-Macias (2017). It is also broadly consistent with the conclusions of Ridao-Cano and Bodewig (2018), who, additionally, emphasise a growing divide in total factor productivity across national and sub-national territories (regions) in the EU. For a general analysis of how EU regions have fared in terms of socio-economic development up to 2017, see European Commission (2017e).

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A new labour market with new working conditions: future jobs, skills and earnings

1. INTRODUCTION ⁽¹⁰⁵⁾

Recent transformations are pushing the world's economies towards rapid restructuring. Global competition increases the pressure to optimise production processes. New information and communication technologies (ICTs) are quickly developed. Organisations and markets are globally intertwined through the internet while robots, other digital technologies and artificial intelligence (AI), keep revolutionising the way products are being designed, produced and consumed. These technologies create new markets and jobs while making some traditional ones obsolete. ⁽¹⁰⁶⁾ As a result, the structure of the EU's economy is changing rapidly.

These transformations favour services over manufacturing, as *Chart 2.1* shows. Since the turn of the century the EU's service sectors have outperformed manufacturing in terms of growth. Digitalisation supports the ICT sector, which has grown by 80%, but its impact extends far beyond it. Apart from finance, the strongest contributors to growth include professional, scientific and technical activities with their highly digitalised engineering and research branches. All these expanding branches tend to recruit skilled and well-educated workers.


⁽¹⁰⁵⁾ This chapter was written by Jörg Peschner, Giuseppe Piroli, Joé Rieff and Simone Rosini. Contributions by Enrique Fernández-Macías, Annarosa Pesole, Maria Cesira Urzì Brancati and Ignacio González Vázquez are gratefully acknowledged.

⁽¹⁰⁶⁾ For a comprehensive picture of the theoretical and empirical discussion on the so-called "fourth industrial revolution", see Chapter 4 in ESDE 2016. Regarding the impact of technology on work, see also Goos et al. (2018).

Chart 2.1

More services, less manufacturing.

Real value added, percentage change between 2000 and 2015, EU-28 and US



Source: EU KLEMS database

[Click here to download chart.](#)


It is not only capital-intensive sectors that have grown fast. The most significant contribution to growth comes from the labour-intensive Health and Social Work sector, which has gained 1.4 pps in total added value since 2000. The sector's expansion is closely related to rising longevity and demographic ageing. As the population over 65 years old is set to increase by 50% by 2060, the Health and Social Work sector is expected to continue growing fast, ⁽¹⁰⁷⁾ offering some reassurance to those who fear that an ever-rising number of machines will replace workers wherever technically possible.

Yet capital intensity has been rising for decades. Several indicators suggest that production in the industrialised world relies increasingly on capital. As *Chart 2.2* indicates, between 1980 and 2013 labour income fell as a proportion of total income in major EU

⁽¹⁰⁷⁾ Related professions such as nurses have in the meantime joined the list of top skill-shortage professions, which rely heavily on an adequate supply of qualified people. See CEDEFOP at <http://www.cedefop.europa.eu/en/news-and-press/news/skill-shortages-europe-which-occupations-are-demand-and-why>. See also Chapter 2.

Member States, ⁽¹⁰⁸⁾ as in the US. A long-term trend towards higher capital intensity can be interpreted in two ways. The first interpretation is that companies are equipping their workers with more and better capital so as to increase labour productivity and hence economic growth and welfare. In this scenario, capital investment and labour complement each other, and the better skilled and qualified workers are, the stronger the complementarity. The second is that workers are losing their jobs because robots and computers can perform their tasks more efficiently. In this scenario, companies substitute capital for labour wherever technically possible. If so, social welfare may be at stake: new inequalities may arise, as more income goes to the owners of capital rather than to workers.

Chart 2.2
A decreasing share of total income is labour income
Share of labour income in total gross value added.



Source: EU KLEMS database
[Click here to download chart.](#)

Capital will destroy jobs but also bring new ones.

This chapter shows that both scenarios will play a part in the future of work in the EU. Whether and to what extent they become reality will very much depend on the nature of tasks to be carried out. The relationship between capital and labour also depends on firms' and workers' potential for innovation and on the policy choices made by governments.

The nature of work is changing. Besides its link to capital, the world of work is shaped by the way work is being organised in a more service-oriented, digitalised economy. ⁽¹⁰⁹⁾ The impact of new forms of work, such as platform work, on non-standard work contracts is not yet clear. ⁽¹¹⁰⁾ However, one possibility that needs to be factored in is that permanent full-time employment may become less prominent in the

⁽¹⁰⁸⁾ Chart 2.2 shows those Member States where sufficiently long time series are available.

⁽¹⁰⁹⁾ The Annex 1 presents the categorisation of new forms of employment suggested by Eurofound (2015).

⁽¹¹⁰⁾ Part-time work, temporary employment, and self-employment are considered non-standard work here, while standard work is defined as an open-ended full time working relation with a single employer. Defining what is 'non-standard' may become more controversial in the future. For example, Eurofound find that boundaries between dependent and self-employed work may become more blurred (Eurofound (2017:1), p. 24; Eurofound (2017:2), p. 14).

future. ⁽¹¹¹⁾ Organising work with fewer permanent full-time jobs may offer greater flexibility to both firms and workers. However, it would bring about new challenges. Non-standard work may lower work satisfaction and be detrimental to workers' financial stability. ⁽¹¹²⁾ Furthermore, the design of today's social security insurance is still aligned to dependent standard employment.


After looking at how the conditions of work could change as non-standard forms of work emerge, this chapter will explore in detail the capital-labour relationship in the future, engaging in model projections for a selection of countries.

2. THE CHANGING FACE OF LABOUR IN A DIGITALISED WORLD

EU employment is at an all-time high. As mentioned in Chapter 1, in 2017 almost 236 million people were in employment, an increase of 19.5 million since 2002. This is mainly due to a strong increase in female employment (+15.3 million, or 15.3% between 2002 and 2017), population growth and increased employment rate of older workers. The number of employees has increased significantly (+20.2 million people in the same timespan).

In addition, workers have become better educated. For decades now the EU has seen strong educational progress. In all Member States young cohorts tend to be better educated than the generation before them. Today more than one third of the EU's employed people aged between 25 and 64 are highly educated, an increase of 12 pps since 2002. ⁽¹¹³⁾ Amongst young workers (aged 30-34) the increase is much stronger (+17 pps). At the same time, employment of low- and medium-educated people is on the decline.

Chart 2.3
Structural change towards higher education



Source: DG EMPL calculation based on Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS)

[Click here to download chart.](#)

⁽¹¹¹⁾ The long-term trend in the incidence of non-standard work is positive, see Eurofound (2017:2), p. 1-2.

⁽¹¹²⁾ This is a finding from Eurofound's 6th Working Conditions Survey, see Eurofound (2017:1), p 106, 107.

⁽¹¹³⁾ High education level corresponds to tertiary education (ISCED levels 5-8); medium education level to secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education (ISCED levels 3 and 4); and low education level to no more than lower secondary education (ISCED levels 0-2).

Box 2.1: Implications of temporary contracts and self-employment

Since 2000, younger people have been leaving parental homes later (especially in Eastern and Southern Member States), and the median age of women at childbirth has been increasing, lowering fertility in the short run. In the long run, pensions may be at risk. Moreover, in the absence of a long-term commitment between firms and their workers, temporary contracts demotivate firms from investing in people which, in turn, has an adverse impact on long-term productivity growth. ⁽¹⁾ At the same time, if agriculture is excluded, ⁽²⁾ strong increases in the number of employees coincided with the increasing significance of self-employment. This is primarily due to the rising proportion of solo-self-employed (those without employees).

⁽¹⁾ See ESDE2017 (Chapter 3) for an extensive discussion.

⁽²⁾ The agriculture sector has, together with manufacturing, seen the most significant employment losses since the turn of the century.

However, these figures hide the structural changes in the labour market which come with digitalisation. The next section reviews how jobs have changed in an increasingly digitalised environment.

Atypical work has become more significant.

Permanent full-time employment still represents by far the largest share of employment today. However, the rising incidence of non-standard forms of employment has brought with it structural changes in work patterns. *Chart 2.4* shows that permanent full-time employment as a proportion of total employment has declined by 4 pps during the last 15 years, to below 60% in 2016. Solo self-employment (without employees) has become more common, as have temporary and part-time contracts. The increase in non-standard work has disproportionately affected younger workers, many of whom would prefer not to be in that situation. ⁽¹¹⁴⁾


Working conditions may suffer. Technological progress and digitalisation led to new possibilities (EPSC, 2018) and labour market improvements in terms of autonomy, flexibility, and health and safety conditions. Yet, the structural changes following these trends impacted negatively on the working conditions and the quality of life of the people who were less equipped to reap the benefits of the changes. Similar results have been obtained for temporary workers, and the same may apply to many future workers who engage in new forms of work that have become more popular through digitalisation, such as platform workers (which have a high chance of being underemployed, as seen in Codagnone et al., 2016). The following section therefore gathers together what is known thus far about these new forms of work.

⁽¹¹⁴⁾ For involuntary non-standard work see ESDE 2017 (Chapter 3).

Chart 2.4

Permanent full time employees still is the largest part by far, but decreasing

Employment relationships - shares in 2016 and 2002



Source: DG EMPL calculation based on Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS)

[Click here to download chart.](#)

For example, the regression analysis based on Eurofound's European Working Conditions Survey (*Box 2.4* below) reveals that the statistical odds for self-employed workers of being satisfied with their working conditions overall is around half that of employees. ⁽¹¹⁵⁾

2.1. A new player on EU labour markets: digital labour platforms

As a concept, so-called 'platform work' does not lend itself to easy definition and categorisation.

⁽¹¹⁶⁾ The new collaborative economy has been described as an interaction of business models "where activities are facilitated by collaborative platforms that create an open marketplace for the temporary usage of goods or services" (European Commission, 2016). ⁽¹¹⁷⁾ Those services are usually provided online, by both professional service providers and private individuals. Prominent examples of internet-based 'platform work' or 'crowd work' include services provided from home (e.g. through Twago, Upwork or Clickworker), mobility services (e.g. through Uber), or

⁽¹¹⁵⁾ The average probably hides a heterogeneous situation. There is also evidence in literature showing that self-employed are more satisfied with their work (e.g. Millan et al., 2016). This may especially be the case for voluntarily self-employed, with more chance to gain satisfaction from the higher level of autonomy and flexibility. Conversely, the most negatively affected may be those who did not choose self-employment, such as the bogus self-employed.

⁽¹¹⁶⁾ European Parliament (2017).


⁽¹¹⁷⁾ European Commission (2016:2), p.3.

working in somebody else's home (ListMinut, Helpling, Myhammer or Taskrabbit). These companies, born in the last decade, have seen a marked growth in recent years, and a parallel increase of the heterogeneity of the services provided (Codagnone et al., 2016; Eurofound, forthcoming).

It is known that platform workers tend to be well-educated and are often male. Recently, the European Commission's COLLEEM online survey conducted a new analysis of frequent internet users aged 16 - 74 in 14 EU countries, providing some initial tentative evidence on the situation of platform workers. ⁽¹¹⁸⁾ According to the results, respondents who are platform workers (particularly those for whom platform work is their main activity), are much more likely to hold a tertiary education degree than non-platform workers (*Chart 2.5*). The numbers of highly educated people among platform workers are all the more remarkable given that the tasks performed by platform workers often do not require a high level of education. This may be the outcome of selection bias: highly educated people are more likely to use ICT applications.

Chart 2.5
More than half of platform workers have tertiary education

Average educational attainment in the 14 countries considered by the COLLEEM survey, by different categories, age 25 to 74 years.



Note: 1. Non-platform workers;
2. Those for whom platform work supplies less than 50% of income;
3. Those for whom platform work is their main job, supplying 50% or more of income.

Source: European Commission's JRC COLLEEM Survey 2017
[Click here to download chart.](#)


In addition, "access to certain global work platforms for non-native language speakers is likely to be associated with higher levels of educational attainment". ⁽¹¹⁹⁾ Platform workers are mostly men (*Chart 2.6*) and this gender gap widens with the relative importance of platform work to people's total income.

⁽¹¹⁸⁾ The COLLEEM survey is an online panel survey on digital platforms commissioned by DG EMPL and coordinated by the JRC. It was conducted in 14 European Member States: DE, ES, FI, FR, HR, HU, IT, LT, NL, PT, RO, SE, SK and UK. The survey was conducted in June 2017, on a sample of 32 409 people (each country contributing around 2 300 people). See Pesole et al., (2018).

⁽¹¹⁹⁾ European Parliament (2017), p. 31.

Chart 2.6
Platform workers tend to be male, especially if this is their main job.

Shares of respondents in the COLLEEM survey by age and gender



Note: 1. Those for whom platform work supplies less than 50% of income;
2. Those for whom platform work is their main job, supplying 50% or more of their income.


Source: European Commission's JRC COLLEEM Survey 2017

[Click here to download chart.](#)

Platform workers provide a wide range of services, typically performing a limited number of tasks. Almost 40% of them perform just one task, 20% perform two tasks and 15% three tasks. The tasks most commonly performed are clerical (including data entry, transcriptions and customer services), professional (including accounting, legal services and project management), sales and creative tasks.

Chart 2.7
Platform workers most commonly provide clerical or professional services

Types of services provided, by whether online or on location



Source: European Commission's JRC COLLEEM Survey 2017

[Click here to download chart.](#)

Chart 2.7 shows the marked heterogeneity which is a defining characteristic of platform work, and which is also reflected in the way in which services are provided. Half of platform workers provide services both online and on location; the other half split evenly between online and on location work.

One in ten adults has experience of platform work. Evidence about the platform economy (what tasks are performed on platforms, how workers are organised and protected) is extremely sparse. European Commission's COLLEEM online survey provided further evidence on the situation of platform workers. As *Table 2.1* shows, one in ten had had some experience of supplying goods or services on internet platforms. A majority of these people used platforms at least monthly or spent at least 10 hours a week on

platform work.⁽¹²⁰⁾ However, other surveys focusing on individual Member States suggest that the proportion of platform workers varies considerably. The CIPS survey for the UK reports a figure of 4% (CIPD, 2017), while analysis conducted by the British Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy gives a figure of 4.4% (BEIS, 2018). For Germany, recent evidence indicates a much lower figure of only around 0.5% (Maier et al., 2017), while a recent cross-national platform estimate at EU level hints at much higher shares of platform work in seven European countries,⁽¹²¹⁾ ranging from 9% in the Netherlands to 22% in Italy.

Only a minority of platform workers make a living from that work, and very few people draw more than half of their income from such activity. The COLLEEM survey indicates a range from 0.6% of the adult population in Finland to 4.3% in the UK, and an average of 2.3% across 14 EU countries (*Table 2.1*). Huws et al. (2017) suggest a range from 1.6% in the Netherlands to 5.1% in Italy. Those magnitudes are in line with recent US estimates, which looked at platforms as an alternative type of employment and focused on those who mostly did platform work as a means of earning a living: those estimates indicated that in 2016, fewer than 1% of the US workforce have platform as a main source of income.

However, the overall size and number of digital labour platforms are growing. Recent estimates indicate that the monetary value of transactions within collaborative platforms grew by 56% between 2013 and 2014, and that transactions increased by 77% between 2014 and 2015. These estimates include accommodation and financial services as well as transportation, household and professional services.⁽¹²²⁾ The latter more labour-intensive categories make up about 28% of transactions.⁽¹²³⁾ Overall, there appears to be an upward trend in services demanded and provided online. This trend seems to be strongest in the US, but can also be observed in Europe (Kässi et al., 2016).

⁽¹²⁰⁾ This is in line with other research on working hours of platform workers, highlighting that the majority of platform workers provide services for considerably less time than standard workers (e.g. 80% of UK platform workers working less than 16 hours per week, according to Balaram et al., 2017).

⁽¹²¹⁾ The countries analysed were AT, DE, IT, NL, SE, UK in the EU, and Switzerland. The number of respondents ranged from 1 969 (in Austria) to 2 238 (in UK).

⁽¹²²⁾ European Commission, (2016:3), p. 8.

⁽¹²³⁾ For the estimates, see Vaughan et al. (2016).

Table 2.1

One in 10 adults have experience of platform work

Adult population in 14 EU countries, by category

	Daily internet users	Has ever done platform work	Of those....		
			Monthly or more	10h per week or more	50% of income or more
UK	88%	12%	9.9%	6.7%	4.3%
ES	67%	12%	9.4%	6.6%	2.0%
DE	78%	10%	8.1%	6.6%	2.5%
NL	86%	10%	8.7%	5.4%	2.9%
PT	60%	11%	7.1%	6.0%	1.6%
IT	66%	9%	7.1%	5.4%	1.8%
LT	60%	9%	5.9%	5.6%	1.6%
RO	42%	8%	6.4%	4.5%	0.8%
FR	70%	7%	5.9%	4.2%	1.8%
HR	63%	8%	5.2%	5.2%	1.0%
SE	85%	7%	5.3%	3.5%	1.6%
HU	71%	7%	5.0%	4.1%	1.3%
SK	68%	7%	5.1%	2.7%	0.9%
FI	85%	6%	4.1%	2.9%	0.6%
Total		10%	7.7%	5.6%	2.3%

Source: DG EMPL calculations based on COLLEEM survey.

[Click here to download table.](#)

One reason is the rising demand for market coordination services. Platforms coordinate market supply and consumers' demand of specific goods and services, providing through their algorithms an immediate price for each transaction, and take a share of it as a fee for the transaction management. Platforms can therefore be defined as digital networks that coordinate transactions in an algorithmic manner (Fernández-Macías, 2018). While the coordination of goods transactions is an established reality, online platforms have recently gained a much greater market share in coordination of services.⁽¹²⁴⁾ Data available so far focus mainly on the US market, where the number of people providing services on online platforms has risen exponentially over the last 6 years.⁽¹²⁵⁾

As a result, platforms may blur the classical definition of a firm. Internet platforms play an innovative role in the fabric of today's world economy. They offer an alternative form of market coordination, which deviates from the classical distinction between markets and entrepreneurial undertakings. In "The Nature of the Firm" (1937), Coase argued that firms pool capital and labour under their 'roof' to reduce asymmetry of information and the costs of transactions. However, the logic behind establishing a firm may no longer hold today, as resources are increasingly pooled on digital platforms that may

⁽¹²⁴⁾ Uber arrived in Europe (more precisely in Paris) in December 2011, and it was not until July 2012 that it expanded into another EU Member State, the UK.

⁽¹²⁵⁾ Again for Uber, the number of active drivers-partners (defined as those providing a minimum of four rides a month) in the United States rose from less than 5 000 in July 2012 to above 150 000 in January 2016 (Hall and Krueger, 2015).

consist of an indefinite number of single, independent workers. ⁽¹²⁶⁾

But platforms can prevent market failures. Digitalisation may have made Coase's asymmetry argument outdated. Low quality suppliers typically sell at lower prices than high quality suppliers. If buyers cannot distinguish between good and bad quality of products or services, those suppliers offering good quality will be discouraged from market participation, as consumers become unwilling to pay for them. Hence situations might arise where only bad quality products or services are left in the market and therefore no trade takes place (Akerlof, 1970). By increasing transparency through providing more information to buyers, platforms (as intermediaries) may help to avoid this sort of market failure (Petropolis, 2017). As a result, platforms may reduce asymmetric information between buyers and sellers and thereby reduce the risk of market failure.

Therefore, platform workers may well increase productivity. New forms of work such as collaborative work on internet platforms may still be the exception today. However, the nature of these services is their global reach and easy availability at low transaction costs. Indeed, "with peer-to-peer platforms, activities are amenable to decentralised production, unlocking previously unused or underused assets." ⁽¹²⁷⁾ Accordingly, new forms of work can be expected to become more prominent in the future as they improve global resource allocation and increase productivity.

But who skims the corresponding welfare surplus? Typically self-employed, platform workers – or at least those offering standard products – may feel the pressure of global competition and may often accept low prices for their services, especially those providing offline services. The OECD concludes that "such work frequently has no social security coverage, can be terminated at will, and wages are low due to a high level of competition", so that its emergence risks a "race to the bottom in both pay and working conditions." ⁽¹²⁸⁾ This means that the surplus of higher productivity would not be appropriated by those providing services on platforms but by those demanding their services, who have "access to a much larger pool of skills and experience at a fraction of the cost of hiring workers on traditional contracts." ⁽¹²⁹⁾


Many platform workers are self-employed. It is difficult to classify platform workers by their employment status. The COLLEEM survey finds that half of those for whom platform work is their main activity see themselves as fully or partly self-employed (Chart 2.8) while 38% see themselves as

employees. There is evidence that workers on online platforms, in particular, see themselves as "typically freelancers or self-employed rather than employees." ⁽¹³⁰⁾ A first tentative analysis that combines COLLEEM data with longitudinal information from the Labour Force Survey shows evidence that self-employed platform work has during the last five years increased much more than self-employment in the entire economy. Annex 2 presents the details.

Chart 2.8

Not all platform workers see themselves as self-employed

Self-defined employment status of platform workers, compared with overall population data.



Note: "Self-employed": respondents declaring themselves to be self-employed as main occupation and nothing else;
 "Employee": respondents declaring themselves to be employee as main occupation and nothing else;
 "Employee and self-employed": respondents seeing themselves as employees in their main activity, and self-employed in their secondary activity;
 "Not employed": respondents showing the share of respondents who are unemployed, retirees, students, and homemakers
 "Not employed and self-employed": respondents not participating in the labour force as main activity, but who work as self-employed as secondary activity

Source: European Commission's JRC COLLEEM Survey 2017.

[Click here to download chart](#)

As a result, many platform workers may not be covered by social protection systems as they are now constituted. Platform workers are often not considered as employees (European Parliament, 2015), and, also due to its heterogeneity, challenges existing regulatory frameworks (de Groen et al., 2018). Given the lack of a formal employment relationship, they are likely to be categorised as self-employed ⁽¹³¹⁾ workers for whom access to social protection is often a problem. **Chapter 5** will point out that this gap may force social security schemes to re-invent themselves, and will highlight the Commission's recent policy response on access to social protection. ⁽¹³²⁾ Like other non-standard and self-employed workers, platform workers may not be legally entitled to be a member of a social protection scheme. Even those who are formally covered may have no effective access, either because coverage is too expensive in the absence of an employer paying a share of social contributions, or because they do not fulfil the eligibility criteria (European Commission, 2018). ⁽¹³³⁾ For instance, a

⁽¹³⁰⁾ European Commission (2016:3), p. 38.

⁽¹³¹⁾ This may, however, vary from country to country: some national authorities may assess employment status on the basis of the facts, others' assessments may rely on the formal contract of the worker with the platform (European Parliament, 2015).

⁽¹³²⁾ European Commission (2018:4).

⁽¹³³⁾ European Commission (2018:5).

⁽¹²⁶⁾ See Eurofound on <https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/industrial-relations-dictionary/crowd-employment>.

⁽¹²⁷⁾ Bakhshi et al. (2017), p. 25.

⁽¹²⁸⁾ OECD (2017), p. 14.

⁽¹²⁹⁾ Ibidem.

number of countries prescribe a minimum period for which an individual must have been employed before being able to claim benefits. ⁽¹³⁴⁾ 54.4% of the EU's self-employed are at risk of being excluded from access to unemployment benefits. ⁽¹³⁵⁾


As the collaborative economy becomes increasingly important, a larger number of people may not be covered against the risks of unemployment. This, when coupled with their low pay, may make platform workers one of the most vulnerable groups in the labour market. Their weak market power may reinforce current tendencies towards job polarisation, unless they benefit significantly from more efficient social dialogue (Chapter 6).

2.2. Accelerating job polarisation

Recent evidence suggests that the proportion of workers in mid-paid occupations is shrinking. To establish the relevance of job polarisation in European economies, the methodology suggested by Goos et al. (2014) is applied here. Using EU-LFS micro-data, occupations are grouped according to their mean wage in low, middle, and high-paying occupations. ⁽¹³⁶⁾ Chart 2.9 shows the change in the employment share of each wage group between 2002 and 2016 for EU Member States. It reveals that polarisation affected all countries, albeit to a different degree. Low-paying and high-paying jobs continue to increase, while middle-paying occupations seem to shrink fast. These findings are consistent with those by Goos et al. (2014). ⁽¹³⁷⁾

Chart 2.9
The proportion of middle wage workers is shrinking everywhere.

High, middle and low-paying jobs in the EU - change from 2002 to 2016 in pps.




Source: DG EMPL calculations based on EU LFS

[Click here to download chart.](#)

Low pay does not imply low qualifications, particularly for platform workers. Each of the three pay groups (high, middle and low paid) can be found in low, medium and highly educated jobs. ⁽¹³⁸⁾ Chart 2.10, 2.11 and Chart 2.12 show that there is a very clear trend towards highly-educated labour in all pay groups, while workers with only low level education are getting less of the work available, not only in high-pay occupations but also in medium and (especially) low pay occupations.

Chart 2.10
Highly paid jobs: the highly educated increase their share of work in all Member States

2016-2002 change in employment shares by education level in pps – high-paying occupations



Note: Czech Republic, Malta and Hungary excluded due to missing data.

Source: DG EMPL calculation based on Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS)

[Click here to download chart.](#)

⁽¹³⁴⁾ European Commission (2017): Access to social protection for people working on non-standard contracts and as self-employed in Europe. A study of national policies.

⁽¹³⁵⁾ Ibidem.

⁽¹³⁶⁾ The three categories are defined in the following way. **High-paying occupations:** Corporate managers; Physical, mathematical, and engineering professionals; Life science and health professionals; Other professionals; Managers of small enterprises; Physical, mathematical and engineering associate professionals; Other associate professionals, life science and health associate professionals. **Middling occupations:** Stationary plant and related, stationary plant and related operators; Metal, machinery and related trade work; Drivers and mobile plant operators; Office clerks; Precision, handcraft, craft printing and related trade workers; Extraction and building trades workers; Customer service clerks; Machine operators and assemblers; Other craft and related trade workers. **Low-paying occupations:** Labourers in mining, construction, manufacturing and transport; Personal and protective service workers; Models, sales persons and demonstrators; Sales and service elementary occupations.

⁽¹³⁷⁾ Some literature challenges this approach and its results "arguing that rather than a pervasive process of polarisation there was a plurality of patterns of structural employment change across Europe" (Fernández-Macias, 2012).

⁽¹³⁸⁾ High education level corresponds to tertiary education (ISCED levels 5-8); medium education level to secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education (ISCED levels 3 and 4); and low education level to no more than lower secondary education (ISCED levels 0-2).

Box 2.2: Job polarisation index (JPI)

JPI is composed of two terms. The first measures the growth in the share of “low-level” and “high-level” jobs (the negative of the change in the proportion of medium-level jobs). The second accounts for the imbalance, which is the greater the more the change in the proportions of low and high level jobs differ from each other:

$$JPI = \frac{1}{2} \times (\overline{\Delta_2 l} + \overline{\Delta_2 h}) \times (1 + |\overline{\Delta_2 l} - \overline{\Delta_2 h}|) \times 100,$$

where $\overline{\Delta_2 l}$ and $\overline{\Delta_2 m}$ are the change in the proportion of low-level and high-level jobs at year t compared with the average level of the previous two years. Hence, the value of the index is zero if the proportion of “medium-level” jobs has not deviated from its reference value.


JPI distinguishes two situations. Both have in common that the share of “medium-level” jobs declines.

1. **True polarisation: the proportion of both “low-level” and “high-level” jobs increases (first bracket).**
2. **Skill or wage upgrading: only the proportion of “high-level” jobs grows (second bracket).**

Chart 2.11

Middle-pay jobs: high and medium-educated work is increasing

2016-2002 change in employment shares by education level in pps – middle-paying occupations



Note: Czech Republic, Malta and Hungary excluded due to missing data.


Source: DG EMPL calculation based on Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS)

[Click here to download chart.](#)

Chart 2.12

Low-pay jobs: More highly educated, less low-educated work, even in low-paid occupations

2016-2002 changes in employment share by education level in pps – low paying occupations



Note: Czech Republic, Malta and Hungary excluded due to missing data.

Source: DG EMPL calculation based on Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS)

[Click here to download chart.](#)

There is an increasing demand for highly educated workers, even in low-paying jobs (Chart 2.12). This means that a growing number of workers with good qualifications are working below their qualification level (ILO, 2014), which is very likely to be the case for (typically well-educated) platform workers. Workers tend to be concentrated at the

extremes of the wage distribution. And within each pay segment, there is a general demand for higher qualifications. ⁽¹³⁹⁾

Job polarisation has been occurring for some time. Recent economic literature ⁽¹⁴⁰⁾ favours using a single index - the Job Polarisation Index (JPI), see Box 2.2 - to measure polarisation over time, for either skill level or pay level.

The JPI traces what happens to “medium-level” jobs. The index points to higher polarisation at a point in time if the proportion of “medium-level” jobs, relative to its average in previous years, has fallen (and vice versa). ⁽¹⁴¹⁾ The index also registers changes in the proportion of medium-level jobs that come about in a very imbalanced manner, e.g. if there is a strong change to *either* low *or* high-level jobs. Such an ‘imbalance effect’ would inflate the JPI. Using the three pay segments in Chart 2.9, it is possible to calculate the JPI since 2002.

The trend towards job polarisation peaked in 2011, as Chart 2.13 shows. The index shows positive values at the aggregate (EU-26) level for all years, but with a spike in 2011. The 2011 spike could be observed in all Member States. ⁽¹⁴²⁾

⁽¹³⁹⁾ Increased upward skill pressure is a finding that also holds if one ranks employees (instead of occupations) according to their wages.

⁽¹⁴⁰⁾ Sparreboom and Tarvid (2016) developed the polarization index using three groups of occupations categorised by skill level; we apply the index to occupational groups classified by pay level.


⁽¹⁴¹⁾ Sparreboom and Tarvid (2016) use the average of the five previous years to avoid cycle effects. In our application only the previous two years have been used due to the short time series available.

⁽¹⁴²⁾ Except Malta and Croatia, excluded due to missing data.

Chart 2.13

Job polarisation peaked in 2011

Job polarisation index (JPI) from 2002 to 2016



Note: Malta and Croatia are excluded due to missing data.

Source: DG EMPL calculation based on Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS), following Sparreboom and Tarvid (2016)

[Click here to download chart.](#)

While signals of job polarisation were present before the "Great Recession", such phenomenon strongly accelerated during 2011 and 2012. According to the literature on the topic, globalization, technological change and routinization are considered the main drivers (Goos et al., 2014; Autor et al., 2003). Since the onset of recovery in 2013, job polarisation has fallen close to zero, indicating that the tendency for different occupational groups to drift apart has stopped (at least for now).

A declining group of workers with "middle level pay" means that pay levels are becoming polarised, rather than generally upgraded. Wage polarisation is happening in a relatively balanced way: both low-paid and highly paid jobs are tending to increase, so that it is possible to speak of "true polarisation" of pay levels (see *Box 2.2*).

The declining share of work going to workers with middle levels of education is thought to signify that education is being upgraded, rather than polarised. Calculation of the index by reference to level of education (rather than pay) produces very different results. The last 15 years have seen a general upward trend in educational attainment. As a result, the polarisation index shows lower magnitudes (even negative change) despite a much more significant imbalance effect. This is because positive changes in the proportion of highly-educated workers tend to be larger than the negative changes in the proportion of workers with only low level education.

The increasing use of labour platforms could, in future, lead to greater polarisation of wages. Workers on collaborative platforms tend to receive low pay. If the future brings more of these platforms, this may therefore mean that 'true' wage polarisation will become a bigger problem. At the same time, workers on collaborative platforms are relatively well educated, leading to an overall upgrading of workers' education and, in combination with low pay, potentially aggravating skill mismatches (through over-qualification).

3. LESS LABOUR, MORE CAPITAL? EXISTING EVIDENCE

Historically, processes of technological change fuelled growth and improved workers' skills. The first and second industrial revolutions were pivotal moments in modern economic history. Sparked by major technological achievements (e.g. steam engines, telegraph, electrification, vulcanisation of rubber), large companies replaced small artisanal workshops. At the same time, tasks within these larger companies were simplified, and workers became more specialised so as to increase productivity.⁽¹⁴³⁾ Demand for workers increased, attracting rural populations to the cities. Later, full exploitation of increasingly complex new technologies required more and more new qualifications. As a result, the increasing demand for qualified workers drove the expansion of the education system; and many workers had the chance of upgrading their skills. This process has been called "Skills-Biased Technological Change" or SBTC (Katz and Murphy, 1992). Based on individual data, Biagi et al. (2018) find fresh evidence that the odds of being automatized is decreases quickly as people attain higher formal qualifications.⁽¹⁴⁴⁾

Today, technological change seems to be steered not only by qualifications but also by routines.

Another theoretical strand known as "Routine-Biased Technological Change (RBTC)"⁽¹⁴⁵⁾ looks at tasks and the degree to which they can be automated (and separated) from other tasks. Tasks which allow for automation are more likely to be allocated to "machines" than workers, where "machines" refer to hardware, software and combinations of the two (such as robots).

This implies that skilled workers are not safe from being displaced. Over the last three decades, capital has increasingly taken over routine tasks – not only from low-qualified workers but also notably from medium-qualified workers (e.g. numbers of plant and machine operators and assemblers declined by 13 pps between 2008 and 2016). The same phenomenon was seen in the service sector (e.g. numbers of clerical support workers fell by 10 pps in the same period).⁽¹⁴⁶⁾ Automation and digitalisation enabled these tasks to be performed more efficiently, while the price difference between labour and capital continued to increase.⁽¹⁴⁷⁾ The result was more substitution of

⁽¹⁴³⁾ Frey and Osborne (2017), p. 254-280.

⁽¹⁴⁴⁾ Controlling for other relevant variables such as the type of contract or migrant status, the odds for secondary (tertiary)-educated workers is 62% (95%) lower than the odds for the primary educated. Biagi et al. (2018), Table 3.

⁽¹⁴⁵⁾ Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003); Acemoglu and Autor (2011).

⁽¹⁴⁶⁾ Moreover, it has to be noted that even a constant number of workers in an occupational group translates into a relative decrease, due to the overall increase in the sheer number of workers in Europe in the last decade.

⁽¹⁴⁷⁾ Low-skilled workers suffered less from this process in more developed countries, given that technological change had already cut large numbers of them.

capital for labour. Economists refer to this development as “Routine-Replacing Technological Change” or RRTC (Acemoglu and Autor, 2011).

There are growing concerns about future technologies facilitating substitution of routine jobs as well as of some currently non-routine tasks. The combination of digital sensors and algorithmic control of machines is expected to expand further the range of tasks machines can perform. As a result, the effect on employment in the future may be different from what has been experienced so far. Today’s routine tasks, characterised by repetition and standardisation, may gradually disappear as machines are introduced to do them.⁽¹⁴⁸⁾ A similar fate may befall tasks which, though not routine by today’s standards, may become so in the near future as technology makes them routine.⁽¹⁴⁹⁾


Evidence about the extent to which people could be replaced by machines is controversial. A high level of uncertainty accompanies different authors’ estimates, as they are highly sensitive to the choice of data sources and the methods used to categorise tasks.⁽¹⁵⁰⁾ Arntz, Gregory and Zierahn (2016), using PIAAC data from 2012, estimated the automatibility of jobs for 21 OECD countries based on a task-based approach. This approach breaks down jobs into different kinds of tasks, categorising them into: routine versus non-routine tasks; manual versus abstract/cognitive contents; and more versus less interactive. Routine manual tasks involve repetitive and physical labour that could easily be replicated by automation, as could cognitive tasks requiring the collection and processing of information. Taking the heterogeneity of workers’ tasks within occupations into account, they found that relatively few jobs are automatable, ranging from 6% in Estonia to 12% in Germany and Austria. However Lordan (2018)⁽¹⁵¹⁾, using Autor and Dorn (2013) definitions of a ‘routine task intensity’ for each occupation (see *Box 2.3*), estimated that – with today’s technological frontier – the jobs that could be automated range from 37% of current employment in Norway to 69% in the Czech Republic.

Moreover, robots are becoming ever more intelligent. The potential for outsourcing tasks from people to machines depends mainly on the importance of human interactions in performing the tasks. Algorithms built into robots are increasingly performing like the perceptual parts of the brain, resulting in robots making large strides in their non-cognitive abilities, such as human interaction and perception.⁽¹⁵²⁾ This suggests that, in the long run, the

potential for automation is higher than current estimates suggest.⁽¹⁵³⁾

The number of robots keeps growing. The stock of industrial robots in the EU has increased impressively in the last 25 years. According to data from the International Federation of Robotics (IFR),⁽¹⁵⁴⁾ it has more than quadrupled, even though its growth slowed after the onset of the crisis (see *Chart 2.14*). The EU country with by far the most robots is Germany, with its highly automated automotive sector.

Chart 2.14
Robotisation is increasing
Level and growth of the operational stock of robots in the EU28



Source: DG JRC calculations based on data from International Federation of Robotics
[Click here to download chart.](#)

The markets for robotic technologies and Artificial Intelligence (AI) are growing fast.

According to recent forecasts,⁽¹⁵⁵⁾ global spending on robots will be USD188 billion in 2020, whereas in 2016 it was less than half that. By 2025 the worldwide AI market is expected to be worth around USD59 billion, which is a significant increase on the USD1.8 billion spent in 2016.⁽¹⁵⁶⁾ The extensive use of AI and robots is one of the megatrends most likely to generate the higher productivity growth which is so urgently needed in ageing societies,⁽¹⁵⁷⁾ but it will also put many of today’s jobs at risk while creating others.

Robots are becoming ever cheaper, compared with human labour. The cost of labour and the cost of capital seem to be diverging strongly. In the US the real price of robots has halved since 1990, while that of labour has nearly doubled (see *Chart 2.15*).

⁽¹⁵³⁾ Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2017) recently revived the debate on the possibility of modern robots and artificial intelligence automating non-routine labour tasks.

⁽¹⁵⁴⁾ The IFR defines an industrial robot as “an automatically controlled, reprogrammable, multipurpose manipulator programmable in three or more axes, which can be either fixed in place or mobile for use in industrial automation applications.”

⁽¹⁵⁵⁾ IDC, January 2017.

⁽¹⁵⁶⁾ Tractica, Artificial Intelligence Market Forecasts, September 2017.

⁽¹⁵⁷⁾ European Commission (2018:2).

⁽¹⁴⁸⁾ Fernández-Macías, 2018.


⁽¹⁴⁹⁾ Eurofound, 2016.

⁽¹⁵⁰⁾ Biagi and Lago, 2018.

⁽¹⁵¹⁾ This study has been carried out for the European Commission in the context of the Social Situation Monitor. See <http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=738&langId=en&pubId=8104&furtherPubs=yes>

⁽¹⁵²⁾ Pratt (2015).

Chart 2.15
Labour costs are increasing while robots become ever cheaper.




Source: McKinsey&Company, 2017
[Click here to download chart.](#)

Job losses due to robots have mainly occurred in manufacturing, where, according to available data, 85% of the operational stock of industrial robots is used. *Chart 2.16* shows, for a selected number of countries, a positive correlation (+0.58) in manufacturing between the robot intensity (number of robots/number of workers) and total factor productivity (value added per hour worked).

Chart 2.16
There is a positive correlation between the use of robots and productivity


Robot intensity and total factor productivity in Manufacturing between 2015 and 2010



Note: Limited selection of countries due to missing data.
 Source: DG EMPL calculation based on data from IFR and EU KLEMS
[Click here to download chart.](#)

Within manufacturing, the automotive industry employs most robots (see *Chart 2.17*), finding them particularly useful because much of that industry's work involves carrying out specific repetitive actions with little variation, but to a high degree of precision and accuracy.

Chart 2.17
The automotive sector is the main user of robots within manufacturing.



Source: DG JRC calculations based on data from International Federation of Robotics
[Click here to download chart.](#)

There are also concerns about the quality of work in the age of digitalisation. The digitalisation of processes and the changes brought by the 'Internet of things' (with sensors all along the production process, from inputs to outputs) make processing, storage and communication of information easier and faster. Several available forecasts point to the positive effects of digitalisation: estimates for Germany suggest EUR 30 billion per year, or 1% of GDP (Gerbert et al., 2015), while the potential for revenue growth would be close to 3% a year in cases of high digitalisation (Schrauf and Bertram, 2015). However, workers may lose autonomy. Entire production strands may disappear, while activities may be outsourced and subcontracted. Workers may then be pushed into self-employment with little social protection. In addition, the blurring of boundaries set by European labour law raises concerns about the representativeness and effectiveness of collective agreements (Fernández-Macías, 2018).

Consequently, working conditions may be affected by digitalisation. Indeed, the regression analysis presented in *Box 2.4* on the basis of Eurofound's 6th European Working Conditions Survey (2015) finds that prominent concomitants of digitalisation, such as dependence on machines and permanent exposure to electronic tools, clearly reduce overall job satisfaction. "New technology standardises the work to a degree and constrains the autonomy of high-skill professionals." ⁽¹⁵⁸⁾

⁽¹⁵⁸⁾ Kornelakis and Petrakaki (2017).


Box 2.3: Job displacement through machines could be significant – two concepts

Autor and Dorn (2013) define 'routine task intensity' (RTI) for occupations. Three types of tasks are distinguished: **Routine tasks** involve a predictable sequence of actions which are easily codifiable. Replacement of people by machines is relatively easy in this case. Conversely, **manual tasks** require actions that are not generally predictable, so substitution with technology has so far been limited. **Abstract tasks** require high-level thinking that is complementary with technology. Therefore, many routine tasks, but few manual and few abstract tasks involve low RTI. An occupation is defined as automatable if its RTI is in the top 30% of all occupations. Based on the Autor-Dorn definition, Lordan (2018) calculates the share of automatable jobs for the decades starting in 1990, 2000 and 2010.

Chart 1

Based on Autor and Dorn (2013), almost 40 % of jobs in Germany and Italy could already have been automatable in the past.

Share of automatable employment in selected countries following Autor and Dorn (2013)



Source: Lordan (2018), based on Autor and Dorn (2013)

Lordan (2018) re-calculates the proportions of automatable employment using the definition put forward by Lordan and Josten (2017) who considered jobs that are currently automatable, given the technologies that are now available. Those jobs are labelled **recently automatable**. The share of automatable jobs ranges from 37 % (Ireland) to 69 % (Czech Republic).


- Jobs that require interpersonal skills are unlikely to be automated (**non-automatable jobs**). Examples include aerospace engineers, mathematicians, nurses, teachers, economists, psychologists and hairdressers.

- Jobs requiring some interpersonal interaction but which are also characterised by a more predictable sequence of events. In this category of **polarised automatable jobs**, although the technology is available, it will be able to take on some tasks but not others. Human employees will be retained in establishments where personal interaction still holds some value and robots will be utilised where it does not. An example here is waiting staff where machines are unlikely to displace waiters offering a fine dining experience. Another is lawyers, where machines can substitute for synthesising large volumes of text from law books but cannot substitute for the abstract thinking evidenced by top barristers during serious trials.
- Fully automatable jobs** are usually those where previously high R&D investment (patents being an indicator) has resulted in machines being able easily to replace people and where personal interaction does not play an important role. In such jobs, customers may be unconcerned whether the job is done by a robot or a human being. Here, there have been significant developments to the extent that Lordan and Josten (2017) predict a cull of jobs in the next decade. Vehicle drivers, packers, power plant operators and mail carriers belong to this category.

Chart 2

With today's technologies the proportion of automatable jobs could reach 70 % in some countries.

Share of automatable employment in selected countries following Lordan and Josten (2017)



Source: Source Lordan (2018), based on Jordan and Josten (2017)

(Continued on the next page)

Box (continued)

These projections range at the upper margin of estimates on potential future job losses due to automatisisation. However, other authors confirm that losses could be significant.

Nedelkoska and Quintini (2018) find that 46% of jobs in 32 OECD countries have a probability of being automated of 50% or more ⁽¹⁾

⁽¹⁾ Nedelkoska and Quintini (2018), p. 47.

Box 2.4: Working conditions and digitalisation: Evidence from Eurofound's 6th European Working Conditions Survey


A logistic regression analyses the determinants of workers' job satisfaction, using micro data from the European Working Conditions Survey conducted in 2015 in 35 European countries. Taking into account a series of relevant control variables (see note below the chart), the chart shows the following facts:

- **Dependence on machines:** Exposure to machines while being dependent on their speed reduces workers' statistical odds of being overall more satisfied by one third.
- **Working with digital tools:** exposure to computers, smartphones etc. tends to increase job satisfaction somewhat. However, after a certain degree of exposure it starts to decline again.
- **Employment status:** The job satisfaction of the self-employed is below that of employees. ⁽¹⁾
- **Relatively low satisfaction in ICT:** Job satisfaction in the ICT sector is more than 20% lower than in manufacturing.

Chart 1

Job satisfaction strongly reduced by dependence on machines and much lower for the self-employed

Logistic regression, showing the odds of experiencing higher job satisfaction, relative to the reference group (=1 in dark bars)



Note: Controlled for age, sex, education, private/public sector, family context, migration background of parents, own migration background, country of observation
 **, * : significant at below 1%, 5%, resp.

Source: DG EMPL calculations based on Eurofound's 6th European Working Conditions Survey form 2015.

⁽¹⁾ The coefficient is not statistically significant due to the low number of self-employed in the sample.

Nonetheless, digitalisation may also create new jobs. Arntz et al. (2016) find that job destruction has so far been limited, as robots replace tasks rather than workers. They conclude that the human presence could never be replaced completely. The case of Germany supports this finding. Germany has the highest share of robots in the EU (almost 3 times the EU average), giving it a high potential to automate routine tasks. Yet there is little evidence of robots having a negative effect on jobs. Indeed, employment contractions in some sectors (especially manufacturing) have so far been compensated for by positive spill-overs into service sectors (Dauth et al., 2017).

Displacement of workers by machines is only the first-round effect on the labour market.

Digitalisation affects the economy, not only through its potential to automate routines, but also because it can yield significant cost savings and induce demand-side economies of scale through network effects. ⁽¹⁵⁹⁾ The cost savings and network effects give customers better value from digital products as the number of customers increases, ⁽¹⁶⁰⁾ potentially creating additional jobs. New technologies, even when

⁽¹⁵⁹⁾ "Size begets size: The more sellers [online platforms] can attract, the more buyers will stop there, which attracts more sellers, and so on." (The Economist, Jan 20, 2018, p. 11)

⁽¹⁶⁰⁾ Fernández-Macías (2018).

displacing workers in the first instance, can create jobs in the medium term by expanding demand for new machines and related services. They can improve labour allocation and increase productivity, as workers who are displaced (as their tasks are taken over by machines) are re-allocated to new tasks. ⁽¹⁶¹⁾ Much will depend on whether or not education and training systems are agile enough to respond appropriately to fast-changing technological opportunities. ⁽¹⁶²⁾ The following country-specific model-based case studies demonstrate these points.

4. JOB DESTRUCTION AND JOB CREATION: A MODEL-BASED PERSPECTIVE

4.1. Italy: capital deepening continues, substitution mainly occurs in manufacturing.

In a world where neither the emergence of new technologies nor exogenous shocks can be accurately predicted, it is increasingly complex to foresee the nature of future structural change and its implications for employment. This section attempts to look ahead to the year 2030. It uses the EU KLEMS growth and productivity accounts ⁽¹⁶³⁾ and adapts their projection methodology so as to make it simpler and more accessible. Given that EU economies differ greatly in terms of their sectoral composition, model simulations have been carried out for individual Member States, not for the EU-28 in aggregate. In this sub-section, the case of Italy is used as a proxy, based on the assumption that future structural changes are of vital importance to a country where “long-standing structural weaknesses contribute to high levels of poverty and income inequality.” ⁽¹⁶⁴⁾ The approach is validated by simulations for other EU Member States, which are largely in line with the results obtained in this section.

A baseline scenario until 2030

Since the year 2000, Italy has seen stagnating real GDP and low productivity growth. The building blocks of economic growth are capital, labour and total factor productivity (TFP) – a measure of how efficiently capital and labour are used in the production process. Efficiency gains may come from product innovations, technological progress or organisational improvements. ⁽¹⁶⁵⁾ Over the last 15


years, capital, labour and TFP have not expanded Italy's production: average annual economic growth has been nearly zero since the year 2000, dragged down by steep declines in two sectors that between them provide more than 20% of Italy's total production: manufacturing (-0.7% per annum) and transport/logistics (-0.4% per annum). The financial crisis has pushed the country into a double-dip recession so severe that today's production (real added value) is still considerably below the 2008 level. The same is true for overall employment, where manufacturing saw the strongest absolute decline following the crisis, although employment gains were realised in labour-intensive service sectors. Those include professional, scientific and technical activities, but also accommodation and health/social work.

Capital intensity is increasing. As is the case in many other EU countries, one decisive feature of Italy's long-term growth trend is an almost continuous deepening into capital. On average, workers are being endowed with more and more capital in the production process. Capital deepening had two faces though. Before the crisis, investment was in line with the euro area's average so that the capital stock grew faster than employment. During the crisis, capital intensity increased despite declining investment, as a result of layoffs. ⁽¹⁶⁶⁾ As capital intensity increased in most sectors, an extrapolation of this trend based on a log-linear regression seems an appropriate assumption for a base scenario which rests on continuously increasing capital intensity, but at a declining pace of 0.7% every year on average between 2015 and 2030, down from 1.7% during the period between 2000 to 2015 (Chart 2.18).

Chart 2.18

Rising capital intensity in most sectors

Capital per worker ratio, 1995 = 100, Italy (selected sectors)



Note: Projection: Log-linear trend regression.

Source: DG EMPL calculations based on EU KLEMS database

[Click here to download chart.](#)

Capital deepening can replace workers – and create jobs. The extent to which countries rely on capital in their production process strongly determines their long-term growth path and labour market conditions. However, looking to the future there are major uncertainties because important assumptions have to be made about the nature of physical investment. It can be hypothesised that, in an attempt to improve profitability, firms may deepen capital in order to replace workers wherever strong automation

⁽¹⁶¹⁾ Acemoglu and Restrepo (2017).

⁽¹⁶²⁾ Bakhshi et al. (2017), p. 89.

⁽¹⁶³⁾ Available online at http://www.euklems.net/project_site.html. For an overview see Timmer et al. (2007).

⁽¹⁶⁴⁾ European Commission (2018:3), p. 1.

⁽¹⁶⁵⁾ See <http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/total-factor-productivity-TFP.html>. Unlike EU KLEMS the simplified growth account does not explicitly consider intermediate input as a third production factor. Hence the concept of TFP (as the residual contributor to growth) used here is different from the original KLEMS database.

⁽¹⁶⁶⁾ European Commission (2018:3), p.11.

potential induces them to do so. On the other hand, physical and human capital may be complementary where physical investment leads to innovation⁽¹⁶⁷⁾, thereby lifting productivity and generating new jobs in newly developed markets.

Capital intensity and productivity are linked. A regression analysis (Annex 3) confirms that faster capital deepening tends to increase Total Factor Productivity (TFP). Endowing more workers with capital would improve resource allocation and thus be conducive to higher efficiency (TFP). On these projections, Italy's sluggish overall efficiency gains could continue until 2030 (+0.2% per year, see *Chart 2.19*).


Future employment growth depends on economic growth and on the technology applied in production. To answer the question of how the labour market (employment) will develop until 2030 in a base scenario, the following assumptions have to be made in addition to the assumption about the degree to which the economy will continue capital deepening (the Annex 3 presents the details):

- An assumption about future economic growth per sector, where the base scenario has been aligned to the overall (total-economy) growth rate as projected in the 2018 Ageing Report.⁽¹⁶⁸⁾ This assumes the economy will, on average, grow by 0.6% per year between now and 2030 (as opposed to the 0% growth which typified the last 15 years).

Chart 2.19

TFP is stagnant overall

Total Factor Productivity, 1995 = 100, Italy (projection based on a regression)



Note: Projection: A simple regression model with log (Capital Intensity) as independent variable. Controlled for sectoral specificities (sector dummy) and the year.

Source: DG EMPL calculation based on EU KLEMS data

[Click here to download chart.](#)

- An assumption about what production technology will look like: in particular, it is important to make assumptions about how the input of capital and labour and the degree of efficiency in production (TFP) will drive economic growth in each of the sectors. The technical link between output and those three contributors to growth is calculated with the help of one production function for each of the 16 sectors included in the analysis. This information is important as it defines the degree to

which capital can be substituted for labour without causing any loss in output.

Based on the assumptions about growth performance and capital intensity, it is possible to use the production function to work out the labour volume used in production from the level of production. The labour volume is the product of the number of workers (employment) and the number of hours worked per worker, the latter being influenced by the prevalence of part-time work.

The base scenario shown in *Chart 2.20* comes close to representing accurately Italy's growth and labour market performance before the onset of the crisis. Raising growth from stagnation levels⁽¹⁶⁹⁾ to 0.6% every year would require Italy's capital endowment per worker to continue increasing (by 0.7% per year) while total labour input to production (the number of hours worked in total) could grow by 0.1% every year on average – close to the 2018 Ageing Report's projected level of growth. The increase in the number of workers in employment would then be a bit higher: by 0.2% per year (+0.75 million in total until 2030). This is because the model predicts the trend towards reducing average working hours to continue. The two sectors gaining most employed workers are ICT and health/social work (more than 0.2 million each), while industry would lose half a million people in employment (more than 0.2 million each in manufacturing and construction).

Capital deepening is most prevalent in manufacturing.

A high share of automatable tasks can be found in Italy. Italy being one of the most automatable economies (*Box 2.5* below), numerous authors find evidence for a very significant risk that more tasks will be automated, particularly those requiring low and medium skills. On the basis of the PIAAC survey of 2012,⁽¹⁷⁰⁾ the OECD reckons that the likelihood of future automation for the job of today's average worker in Italy could be around 50%. Lordan (2018) confirms that a job's potential for automation depends on the skill level it requires. In the case of Italy, she finds that around 70% of low-skilled and some 60% of medium-skilled jobs are automatable. Likewise, Nedelkoska and Quintini (2018) look at 32 OECD countries and see the risk of automation decrease as people attain higher education and better skills.⁽¹⁷¹⁾ As impressive as these figures may seem, they represent *gross* job losses and do not imply a particular trend or scenario for the creation of new (especially high-qualification) jobs.

Based on Eurostat's 2016 Labour Force Survey, *Table 2.2* gives a distribution of employment per main sector in terms of the main occupations. Following the International Labour Office's International Standard

⁽¹⁶⁷⁾ Especially ICT investment is found to correlate positively to innovation. See Hall et al. (2010).

⁽¹⁶⁸⁾ European Commission (2017:2), European Commission (2018:1).

⁽¹⁶⁹⁾ Average growth rate between 2000 and 2015.


⁽¹⁷⁰⁾ PIAAC is the OECD's Survey of Adult Skills. See <http://www.oecd.org/skills/piaac/>

⁽¹⁷¹⁾ Nedelkoska and Quintini (2018), p. 50.

Chart 2.20

Services gain weight: a base scenario for Italy

Number of employed workers and value added in the base scenario



Source: DG EMPL calculations based on EU KLEMS
[Click here to download chart.](#)

Classification of Occupations (ISCO),⁽¹⁷²⁾ the table assigns each occupation to a skill level and finds that the proportion of workers in jobs that require skill level 1 or 2 (the lowest two out of four ISCO-levels) varies greatly across sectors.⁽¹⁷³⁾

The risk of automatisation is not only a question of low skills. Table 2.2 seems to confirm the OECD's and other sources' main finding that the risk of job automation would affect industrial sectors and agriculture in the first instance because their share of lower-skill jobs (at ISCED levels 1 and 2) is much higher than in services. However, other factors also influence job substitution. For example, agriculture has already seen large reductions in the number of workers over the last decades. Capital intensity in agriculture is currently among the highest across all sectors. The evolution of employment in agriculture suggests that the greater the reduction that has already occurred in a sector, the narrower the margin for further reductions. In addition, many of the remaining agricultural workers are rural families: the scope for incentivising them to substitute capital for labour is very limited.

Higher capital intensity has different implications in different sectors. The production function applied to each sector in the simple employment projection of Chart 2.20 takes into account that substitution is more difficult in some sectors than in others. In the following projection, with

given sectoral growth prospects, it is assumed that capital intensity shifts by another 30% between 2015 and by 2030, or 1.7% every year⁽¹⁷⁴⁾ as opposed to 0.7% in the base scenario.⁽¹⁷⁵⁾ This assumption implies an annual increase in capital intensity equal to the average shift seen since 2008; over this period capital deepening has accelerated while total employment has declined by almost 5%, i.e. by more than 1 million workers.

With capital intensity increasing fast, traditional sectors, manufacturing in particular, are expected to see most job displacements. According to Chart 2.21, while in the base scenario employment between 2015 and 2030 would increase by 3%, in this 'increased capital deepening' scenario it would decline by 8%. More than 40% of the predicted loss would be due to job losses in Italy's important manufacturing sector, where technical conditions for straight substitution of workers by capital (captured in the estimated production function) seem most valid. In this extreme scenario, by 2030 manufacturing alone would lose 20% of its 2015 employment (some 0.8 million workers), 15 pps more than in the base scenario. The three traditional sectors manufacturing, construction, and trade combine more than three quarters of the job losses in the increased capital intensity scenario while services such as ICT,

⁽¹⁷²⁾ ISCO-08, see <http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/stat/isco/isco08/index.htm>

⁽¹⁷³⁾ For the assignment of skill-levels to the respective occupations, see Annex 1 of Chapter 3 in this review.

⁽¹⁷⁴⁾ The real estate sector is excluded from the assumption. It would not make sense here as capital intensity in the real estate sector is already a large multiple of the average across sectors as the sector combines more than half of the overall capital stock - with mainly buildings, for which the notion of human capital substitution seems irrelevant.

⁽¹⁷⁵⁾ This increase is achieved by multiplying, for every sector, the projected (smooth) increase of capital intensity in the base scenario by a factor 3.4.

Table 2.2

Automatable jobs unevenly distributed across sectors

Employment 2016 in Italy, by sector and occupation

Sector	Occupation	Managers	Professionals	Technicians and associate professionals	Clerical support workers	Service and sales workers	Agricult., forestry, craft, trade, machine workers	Elementary occupations	Sum	Share Skill level 1 and 2
		Skill-level 4 (highest)	Skill-level 4 (highest)	Skill-level 3	Skill-level 2	Skill-level 2	Skill-level 2	Skill-level 1 (low est)		
		Agriculture etc.	4	4	16	15	7	522		
Mining	2	5	5	3	0	15	3	33	64%	
Manufacturing	142	214	855	419	48	2218	253	4149	71%	
Electricity, gas, water supply	10	18	95	64	2	75	96	360	66%	
Construction	67	23	102	66	1	1070	76	1405	86%	
Trade	160	108	445	303	1561	392	274	3243	78%	
Logistics	27	24	114	285	31	449	155	1085	85%	
Accommodation etc.	227	5	29	73	894	38	131	1397	81%	
ICT	21	204	230	82	7	14	4	562	19%	
Finance, insurances	21	80	363	182	1	0	2	649	29%	
Real estate	7	3	80	30	1	1	19	141	36%	
Science, technicians, professionals etc	43	781	512	425	136	119	437	2453	46%	
Public admin etc	33	150	222	353	214	26	31	1029	61%	
Education	16	1142	70	122	31	5	157	1543	20%	
Health, social work	36	429	698	179	381	32	76	1831	36%	
Others	43	132	146	119	364	105	81	990	68%	

Note: For the assignation of occupations to skill-levels see Annex 1 of Chapter 3 in this review.

Source: Eurostat EU LFS

[Click here to download table.](#)

science/technicians, and finance would still gain employment ⁽¹⁷⁶⁾.

Simulations for other EU countries confirm these findings, as do other sources. ⁽¹⁷⁷⁾ By 2030 the dimension of potential job losses due to capital deepening found by the sources mentioned earlier may be reached in the manufacturing sector, where the proportion of people working in 'lower medium' and low skilled occupations (the lowest two out of four ISCO skill-levels) is above 70% and technical conditions allow for easier substitution of capital for workers.

However, as the following sections will demonstrate, job destruction in manufacturing may be only part of a bigger picture in which new technologies and digitalisation become net job creators. Indeed, the OECD points out that "the automation of agriculture in the 1960s gave way to manufacturing and the automation of manufacturing gave way to services." Displacement of workers in manufacturing may thus reflect the re-allocation of productive resources towards higher productivity activities. ⁽¹⁷⁸⁾

⁽¹⁷⁶⁾ The three sectors mentioned would gain some 0.2 million jobs altogether in the increased capital deepening scenario.


⁽¹⁷⁷⁾ Most recently, Nedelkoska and Quintini (2018).

⁽¹⁷⁸⁾ Bessen (2015).

Chart 2.21

Substitution costs jobs mainly in manufacturing

Real value added and employment by sector in the Accelerated Capital Deepening scenario, Italy



Note: Index with total employment in 2015 normalised to value 100. Capital intensity of the whole economy in the base scenario increases by +0.7% per year, in the Accelerated Capital Intensity scenario by +1.7% per year.

Source: DG EMPL calculations based on EU KLEMS database

[Click here to download chart.](#)

Box 2.5: The Italian economy

That manufacturing sector still contributes one third of the country's non-financial business economy's value added, and provides 17% of its employment (currently almost 4 million people).⁽¹⁾ However, compared with the Italian economy as a whole the sector has been underperforming, with growth stagnating, and a loss of 16% of its employment over the last 15 years. Sources indicate that Italy's manufacturing sector may have suffered from a relatively strong specialisation on low-skilled labour intensive sectors for which the potential of automatisisation is high.⁽²⁾ The low 'sophistication level of its specialisation pattern'⁽³⁾ may thus induce firms to substitute jobs for capital when their overall productivity declines. In addition, strict employment protection legislation (firing and hiring rules) may dissuade employers from investing in human capital but instead induce them to invest in physical capital.⁽⁴⁾

⁽¹⁾ Eurostat (2008).

⁽²⁾ See, for example, Di Maio (2013).

⁽³⁾ Ibidem, p. 14.

⁽⁴⁾ Cingano et al. (2014).

4.2. Germany: low-qualified workers are at risk of being substituted but not only by capital

The sectoral model has its limits. In the previous section a sectoral growth accounting framework was used to explore the sectoral dimension of capital deepening. The analysis showed that capital deepening occurs not only for reasons of substitution; qualifications also play an important role in explaining the degree of substitution between capital and labour. To explore in greater depth the role that the nature of skills and education plays in investment, GDP and the labour market, it is necessary to turn to a different analytical framework. This should allow for the interplay between capital accumulation and workers' qualifications, and for endogenous growth that may raise (or depress) employment, as second-round effects following faster accumulation of capital. What will be the relationship between capital and labour in future labour markets?

Labour productivity (skills, education) will impact on how capital relates to labour. The Commission's Labour Market Model (LMM) is a general equilibrium model with a particular focus on the institutional framework and popular policy tools for the labour market.⁽¹⁷⁹⁾ It does not distinguish economic activities (sectors), but differentiates between age groups and, most importantly, between three different levels of workers' education: high (tertiary education), medium and low (up to lower secondary education).⁽¹⁸⁰⁾ In addition, the model takes into account that an individual worker's productivity at each level of education depends on their level of skills, which, in turn, may be formed through training.

Apart from capital replacing labour, labour also substitutes for labour. Unlike the simple sectoral model applied above, LMM incorporates a 'nested


⁽¹⁷⁹⁾ Berger et al. (2009), see the model description in Part II.

⁽¹⁸⁰⁾ See Eurostat's description of the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) on 'Statistics Explained'.

Chart 2.22

Employers switch to employing better qualified people and to higher capital investment, low-qualified workers lose out

Structural change away from low-educated labour towards higher education and capital, Germany



Note: Elasticity of substitution of low-educated workers increases from 1.3 to 1.6; Chart shows the change relative to no-change scenario.

Source: DG EMPL calculations based on LMM

[Click here to download chart.](#)

production function' ⁽¹⁸¹⁾ which is very important when it comes to exploring how labour reacts to capital accumulation. This has two implications. First, it means that capital can substitute to a different degree for each one of the three types of labour. The higher a worker's qualification, the lower is their probability of being replaced by capital. Moreover, according to specialised literature, ⁽¹⁸²⁾ qualified labour and capital complement each other in production. Secondly, the three qualification groups are imperfect substitutes for each other. For instance, in order to get a foothold in the labour market, highly educated workers may compete for jobs that only require lower qualifications, crowding lower-qualified people out of the market. An increasing proportion of tertiary-educated workers (some 23% of those in the EU today) works outside the three highest-qualified occupations, ⁽¹⁸³⁾ probably competing with lower-educated workers for lower-skilled jobs. ⁽¹⁸⁴⁾

Technically, these circumstances are taken into account by the model through the so-called 'elasticity of substitution' between the four factor inputs in production, i.e. the three types of labour and capital. The easier it is to substitute those inputs for each other, the more elastic is production. Under these conditions, if low-qualified workers become relatively more expensive firms will be more inclined to replace them by higher qualified workers or by capital.

The impact of accelerated structural change in Germany is skill-biased. Given its highly industrialised economic infrastructure, numerous authors consider Germany to be among those countries with the highest potential for automation, now as in the past. Germany has lost half a million jobs in manufacturing since 1995, while at the same

time services have gained more than 7 million new jobs. Furthermore, the transformation was accompanied by a changing mix of the qualifications needed in production. While Germany is in its 12th year of labour market recovery, with overall employment at all-time high levels, low-qualified employment is still well below the pre-crisis level, and has been static at around 5 million workers since 2011. ⁽¹⁸⁵⁾ Similarly, more complex occupations requiring higher skills have gained much more employment than activities with lower skill requirements. ⁽¹⁸⁶⁾

Germany's impressive labour-market recovery was therefore skill-biased. It is expected that digitalisation will reinforce the trend towards more complex activities, while others remain at risk of being automated. ⁽¹⁸⁷⁾ While the evidence on how this will impact on Germany's large and heterogeneous supply of medium-educated workers is mixed, the changes are likely to bring declining demand for (and supply of) low-qualified workers. ⁽¹⁸⁸⁾

Low-qualified labour is assumed to be substituted more easily. To model the economic impact of such trends, it is assumed below that future

⁽¹⁸⁵⁾ At the same time the number of low-qualified people in Germany has strongly declined during the crisis so that their employment *rate* went up.

⁽¹⁸⁶⁾ Occupations in the upper two skill level categories (see Table 2.2) have won 5 million workers while other occupations have increased by only 1 million since 1995 (army jobs excluded). Source: Eurostat EU LFS.

⁽¹⁸⁷⁾ Wolter et al. (2016), p. 10, reckon that in a fully digitalised working environment an estimated 1.5 million jobs will disappear by 2025, compared with a situation in which technical progress is based on past trends (baseline). However, there will be 1.5 million new jobs that would not exist in the baseline scenario.

⁽¹⁸⁸⁾ The group of medium-educated workers in Germany is very heterogeneous. For example, graduates from vocational schools (ISCED 4a), a particularity in Germany's education system, are counted as medium educated while German statistics include them as highly educated. Between 2018 and 2030, Cedefop (2018) projects the labour force to decline by only 2.4% for medium educated people, while for low-educated it falls by more than 14%.

⁽¹⁸¹⁾ The 'nest' referred to is the total input of productive factors in production: labour input at three different education levels and capital. See Berger et al. (2009), Part II, p. 45.

⁽¹⁸²⁾ For example, Krussel et al. (1997).

⁽¹⁸³⁾ See the first 3 columns in Table 2.2 for Italy.

⁽¹⁸⁴⁾ Eurostat EU LFS data (2016).

Box 2.6: Input factors in the model

For low-qualified workers the model assumes an elasticity of substitution equal to 1.3 in its initial situation. That is, as the average price of the other three input factors (called 'the nest') increases by 1%, the factor input of low-qualified workers, relative to the input of the nest, increases by 1.3%. Thus, it is assumed that firms react more sensitively to factor price/wage changes of the nest: the elasticity of substitution increases by around 25% - from 1.3 to slightly over 1.6.

structural change towards innovative products, increasingly efficient production processes and better-qualified workers will increase the elasticity of substitution away from low-qualified workers. In other words, it is assumed that firms' demand for low-qualified workers will be more sensitive to changes in the relative costs of capital and labour. How would an increase in the elasticity of substitution by 30%⁽¹⁸⁹⁾ shape the qualification mix of the country's workers in the long run, and how would that impact on Germany's wage profile and the economy's growth prospects?

The mix of workers' qualifications changes in favour of higher end skills, triggering investment. *Chart 2.22* shows that the demand shift towards higher qualifications would cause a decline of low-qualified employment by almost 20% in the long run. It would drag down their wages, causing supply of low-qualified workers to also decline. However, the impact on the labour market does not end there. Faster substitution of workers with only low-level education triggers demand for higher qualifications (reflected in the respective wage levels). The capital stock increases for two reasons: first, due to the direct substitution of higher-educated for low-educated workers; secondly, due to the better overall education mix of workers (inducing firms to deepen their capital, since higher qualification of workers is complementary to capital). A better-qualified workforce enables firms to be more innovative, hence more competitive. Both higher investment and the better qualification mix of workers push up average labour productivity. As a result, total employment increases despite the direct substitution of the low-qualified. GDP is pulled up by higher employment and the increased capital stock.

Employment of low-qualified workers will decline, as will their wages. There may be a social cost, in the form of massive job losses for low-qualified workers and downward pressure on their wages. In addition, as the capital-labour ratio in production increases strongly, so does capital income, relative to wages. Indeed, income from wages is projected to increase more slowly (by 9%) than capital income (by 10%). In most other EU countries the difference would be higher because they have a higher proportion of workers with low-level education.

In other words, despite the overall wage increase, in relative terms income will shift away from labour towards capital owners. This finding confirms Autor and Salomons who find for 18 OECD countries that

since 1970, automation has reduced the labour share in value added.⁽¹⁹⁰⁾

4.3. Czech Republic: developing human capital protects workers from direct substitution

Skilled human resources are in short supply. While noting that "skilled human resources are crucial to developing a well-functioning research and innovation ecosystem", the European Commission's 2018 Country Report on the Czech Republic concludes that skilled human resources "are in short supply." The proportion of tertiary-educated people aged 30-34 in the Czech Republic has increased strongly over the last ten years, surpassing the 32% national target for 2020. However, at 33% it is still one of the lowest in the EU. Moreover, the Country Report finds structural problems: relatively few people graduate in science and engineering, potentially leading to new shortages in these core disciplines.⁽¹⁹¹⁾

Simulated policy: investment in the education system. Future structural change will inevitably be accompanied by higher demand for well-educated people. Given the relatively low current proportion of highly educated employment in the Czech Republic, Cedefop projections see a need for highly educated employment to increase by 46%, double the EU average, between 2015 and 2025.⁽¹⁹²⁾

The higher education reforms of 2016 aimed to promote greater social diversity and increase attainment rates further. This will involve amending the system for funding scholarships for tertiary education students. Currently, only 1% of students receive a scholarship, based not on merit alone but on social grounds.⁽¹⁹³⁾

The additional supply of high-educated people would put downward pressure on the growth of their wages. One possible scenario is that the Czech government increases the current general government budget for tertiary education by 50%, investing

⁽¹⁹⁰⁾ Autor and Salomons (2018).

⁽¹⁹¹⁾ Country Report on the Czech Republic, p. 36.

⁽¹⁹²⁾ See the European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training (Cedefop), Skills forecast, available at <http://www.cedefop.europa.eu/en/events-and-projects/projects/forecasting-skill-demand-and-supply/data-visualisations>


⁽¹⁹³⁾ European Commission, Education and Training Monitor for the Czech Republic (2017), p. 10.

⁽¹⁸⁹⁾ See Box 2.7.

Chart 2.23

The benefits of supporting tertiary education: more investment, higher GDP

Long-term impact of a scholarship for taking up higher education (+0.35% of GDP), Czech Republic



Note: % change compared to the no-policy scenario.

Source: DG EMPL calculations with LMM

[Click here to download chart.](#)

another 0.4% of GDP⁽¹⁹⁴⁾ in scholarships in order to motivate more young people to engage in tertiary education. The long-term results of that policy initiative are modelled in *Chart 2.23*. The workforce composition will be shifted towards the high-education end. The additional supply of highly-educated people will cause their wages to decline. The decline shown in *Chart 2.23* appears massive, but it has to be remembered that at present in the Czech Republic only 24% of the working age population aged 20-64 are tertiary-educated, far below the EU average of 35%. Therefore, additional resources invested in this relatively small group can be expected to have a relatively strong impact on the group's opportunities and productivity potential.

Capital and qualified labour are complementary: higher physical investment follows. Moreover, as the workforce will be better educated on average, firms will change their investment plans, investing more in endowing their better-educated workers with more capital. In this case, capital deepening takes place not to substitute for labour, but to provide better-educated workers with the innovative technologies they need to reap the fruits of higher productivity. Capital accumulation (investment) will accelerate, pushing up GDP and demand (and wages) for low and medium-educated workers. However, the supply of low and medium-educated workers will decline, pulling down employment in those two groups despite higher demand. This is because the education subsidy will induce more young people to invest in higher education, abandoning initial plans to stay in the lower-level education groups. Finally, despite average wages increasing, the wage component within total income will decline slightly, pulled down by strongly increasing capital income which is being fuelled by the growth in investment.

Incentives will lead to a better education mix.

What occurs in this scenario may be interpreted as

⁽¹⁹⁴⁾ Currently (2016) the general government spends 0.7% of GDP for tertiary education (EU average). See Eurostat table gov_10a_exp.

substitution of low- and medium-educated workers by highly educated workers, rather than by capital. People are not being pushed out of the labour market by better-educated workers. Instead, they decide for themselves to invest in higher education, supported by new incentives. Rather than waiting for structural change to allow capital to operate as a mere substitute for people, governments can decide to be proactive and invest in human capital, so as to equip people with the qualifications which are increasingly needed in the changing world of work. Nevertheless, the phenomenon of over-qualification and over-skilling may demand more attention and monitoring, so to avoid ineffective investment in human capital and the lower productivity associated with skills mismatch.⁽¹⁹⁵⁾

What if the Czech government decides also to invest in job-related training for low and medium-educated workers? While the level of education is important, so is the level of people's job-related skills, beyond the education level one may have attained formally. The simulation above channels all additional resources into tertiary-level education. However, governments may decide to diversify, also stepping up investment in training for job skills. In Italy, for example, training intensity is very low, especially amongst low-educated workers who would be in need of such training in the first place.⁽¹⁹⁶⁾ In order to improve the latter's labour market prospects, that country's government may want to support firms in sponsoring the training of workers with low and medium levels of education.

Investment in training for job skills will mean less substitution of low and medium educated workers as they become more productive. *Chart 2.24* shows an alternative scenario for the Czech Republic. Instead of investing 0.4% of GDP solely in increasing the take-up of tertiary studies, the


⁽¹⁹⁵⁾ European Commission (2017:3), p. 10.

⁽¹⁹⁶⁾ While this is particularly true for Italy, Chapter 3 (section 3) finds that EU-wide take-up of lifelong learning measures is generally low amongst low-qualified workers, those in small firms, and those who work in jobs requiring low skills.

Chart 2.24

The benefits of supporting both education and training: more neutral for low and medium-educated workers

Long-term impact of a tertiary education scholarship, plus a training subsidy for low and medium educated workers (0.18% of GDP each), Czech Republic



Note: % change compared to the no-policy scenario.

Source: DG EMPL calculations with LMM

[Click here to download chart.](#)

government is assumed to decide to spend half this budget on supporting firm-sponsored training for the two lower-educated groups. The effect on overall employment is nearly the same as above. But the positive impact on investment and GDP is smaller than in the tertiary-education-only case, because the change in workforce composition towards better-educated workers is less strong than in the previous scenario. The impact on the employment situation of low and medium-educated workers is therefore more neutral. Some will still invest in higher education. Others will stay in the low and medium-educated section of the labour force as training improves their productivity, and consequently their wages. In this scenario, involving lower additional investment in formal education alone, overall wages increase but labour income as a percentage of total income improves only slightly (by +0.1 pp).

4.4. Investing in education and skills favours net job creation

Demand for well-educated workers should continue to increase. The demand for well-educated workers with particular skills is expected to pick up within the next 10 years. It is impossible, even in the medium term, to forecast in which direction product and factor markets will move. Nonetheless, the model simulations presented in this section on the basis of simple scenarios provide some insight into how labour could relate to capital in the future world of work.

Job substitution in manufacturing is set to continue. Workers who lack the necessary skills and qualifications will be competing with capital on unfavourable terms. Firms will feel more pressure to deepen their capital, replacing labour whenever they can expect a return for this. A simple sectoral growth-accounting has shown a moderate growth scenario for Italy until 2030 where capital intensity would continue increasing. Total employment would increase as well. However, jobs displacements are likely to continue in the industrial sector. Assuming faster increasing

capital intensity (at given economic growth), the pressure on jobs will be strongest in the manufacturing sector where the conditions for substituting capital for labour are best fulfilled (i.e. where substitution can take place at low cost).

Substitution will occur within groups of workers as well as between labour and capital.

A model simulation shown for Germany assumes that some new technology will make substituting low-qualified workers easier. In the long run this would lead not only to more capital investment to replace those workers but also to higher employment of medium and highly qualified workers. As a result, the qualification mix of workers changes to the higher end. Thus, the structural change would speed up firms' preferences for better-qualified people while accelerating capital investment and overall productivity. Production will consequently become more efficient and GDP will increase. However, low-qualified individuals could suffer great losses. Their employment and their wages would decline. In addition, the scenario implies that more better-qualified workers would compete with those holding low qualifications for low-profile jobs. Indeed, over-qualification in the EU is already a widespread phenomenon. ⁽¹⁹⁷⁾

Job substitution is not the only motivation for capital investment.

To avoid the social cost imposed on low-qualified workers, governments may proactively invest in training and better education in order to facilitate economic transition towards innovative technologies. In a corresponding scenario shown for the Czech Republic such investment will increase productivity of workers and stimulate both labour demand and capital investment. Capital deepening in this scenario occurs not to replace labour but to enable better-qualified workers to get full value from more efficient, innovative technologies. In fact, a better-qualified labour force is complementary to

⁽¹⁹⁷⁾ For example: ESDE 2015, Chapter III.1, see European Commission (2016:1).

capital, and an increase in physical capital can be stimulated by an upgrade of human capital.

Investment in education and training (skills formation) will help turn structural change into growth. Therefore, governments may decide to invest in people's education and their skills in order to prepare them for the future world of work. Rather than accepting that growth will only benefit some while others become victims of structural change, government spending on education and skills should improve productivity and support wage growth, producing increases in GDP per capita (greater welfare) and better employment prospects. In this scenario, the nature of capital deepening is radically different from the pure substitution scenario. More and better-qualified workers will require more capital investment so as to improve firms' competitiveness and increase society's welfare. While this is the macro-economic role of investment in skills and education, Chapter 3 will look at their role from the individual's perspective.

5. CONCLUSION: STRUCTURAL CHANGE CALLS FOR INVESTMENT

Ever fiercer competition in global product and factor markets is expected to increase the pressure on firms to launch innovative products in new markets. Thus globalisation brings new technologies, with new opportunities for firms, workers and consumers. However, many workers fear losing out as a result of technological change which may take their jobs.

Work organisation is changing. While collaborative platforms have been growing fast, they do not yet constitute a significant share of the EU's workforce. However, these non-standard forms of work are expected to grow faster. Major social challenges may emerge in the future. Firstly, non-standard workers stand significantly higher risk of working on a job with high automation potential.⁽¹⁹⁸⁾ Secondly, as many platform workers are not covered by social insurance and their earnings tend to be low. Evidence suggests that many workers, including well-qualified ones, have been pushed into the low-pay segment of the labour market over the last 15 years. Platform workers stand a great risk of joining them - adding to on-going job polarisation, which is already reducing the middle-paid segment of workers. All workers are feeling stronger pressure to upskill.

Current high employment levels may suggest that there is little need for concern about the displacement of workers, but the future may be rather different. EU employment is indeed at all-time high levels, but there is a growing risk that in years to come, human labour could be replaced by machines on a massive scale. European labour markets are not yet signalling any such major change.

⁽¹⁹⁸⁾ Biagi et al. (2018), esp. Table 3.

However new types of business, such as collaborative internet platforms, have yet to show their full potential. The net employment effect of structural change remains uncertain.

Digitalisation and capital deepening, in combination with the process of globalisation, have brought about the disappearance of many traditional jobs in Europe. Workers performing routine tasks, mainly in the manufacturing sector, continue to be displaced by capital, while services have been expanding for decades. Capital intensity per worker has increased and is expected to increase further, a situation carrying the risk of further job displacements, especially in manufacturing, where the technical conditions for increased substitution of workers by self-learning and ever more intelligent machines seem to be optimal. Tasks requiring human interaction and creativity tend to run a much smaller risk of being assigned to machines.

At the same time, digitalisation and capital deepening are creating new jobs. There has been direct job creation in robotics industries, and the loss of 'old' jobs is often accompanied by the creation of new employment opportunities. Capital deepening entails opportunities for job creation in innovative industries and services where workers are complementary to physical capital. Model simulations confirm that (1) workers are being replaced not only by capital, but also by other workers with a different profile of qualifications; and (2) qualifications are key to making labour more complementary to physical capital, thus increasing productivity and accelerating the demand for well-qualified workers.

Investment in education helps Member States develop their human capital so as to complement new technologies and improved processes. As well as investing appropriately in physical and human capital, Member States also need to ensure that the benefits from new technologies and new ways of working are fairly shared between their citizens. The following chapters will analyse the consequences of this transformation and the related political challenges.

While better education remains a priority, matching labour demand is necessary to avoid over-qualification. As many earlier analyses have shown, ⁽¹⁹⁹⁾ resources could be better used and lead to higher growth if the EU managed to reduce the number of people who are working below the level of their formal qualifications. The impact of a better-educated labour force on long-term growth will depend on how efficiently the new supply of better-educated workers matches labour demand. Preventing early school leaving, facilitating upskilling, promoting skill-intensive industries and reducing barriers to firm

⁽¹⁹⁹⁾ The Commission has devoted much research recently to qualification mismatches. See European Commission (2014), p. 124-126 and esp. ESDE 2015. See European Commission (2016:1), p. 236-250.

entry, exit and growth are found tools to address over-qualification. ⁽²⁰⁰⁾

⁽²⁰⁰⁾ Vandeplas and Thum-Thysen (forthcoming).

Box 2.7: The effect of technological progress on EU and national policies

The chapter analyses the effects of technological development on the tasks required in the labour market. The consequence is a change in the skillset required by European workers. First, this Box aims to identify the main policy areas which are relevant to tackling some of these challenges, in particular education and training policies, labour market policies and income redistribution policies. Secondly, it describes recent policy initiatives adopted at both European and national level to tackle the challenges identified in the fields of education, labour market and social protection policies. The focus here is on policies that directly stem from the substitutability between new technologies and differently-skilled workers and its equilibrium effects through consequent changes in labour supply and product markets. The most important policy challenge is to European education and training policies. A majority of highly skilled workers receives substantially higher wages, suggesting that these workers are in short supply (Autor, 2014). Investing more and more efficiently in education will address this issue by increasing the supply of high-skilled workers and dampening the rise in the skill premium, which is itself a major component of overall rises in wage inequality (Autor, 2014).

More STEM graduates and more digital skills are needed. The EU and its Member States seek to encourage young people to choose scientific, technical, technological and mathematical (STEM) university majors and professions and to improve their digital skills.⁽¹⁾ STEM graduates on average earn more than other graduates (Daymont and Andrisani, 1984; James et al., 1989; Grogger and Eide, 1995; Arcidiacono, 2004) and are less likely to be overqualified for the work they do (Dolton and Vignoles, 2000; Frenette, 2004; McGuinness, 2006). There is also evidence that the social returns to STEM graduates exceed their private returns through human capital externalities (Winters 2013). This suggests that the policy focus should remain on raising the proportion of graduates in STEM fields and on improving the matching of skills between curricula and business practice. Furthermore, there is a need to strengthen digital skills horizontally across all skills levels (a recently published communication by the European Commission on the Digital Education Action Plan reports that 90% of jobs require some level of digital skills).⁽²⁾

Non-cognitive skills are becoming ever more crucial. There is an increasing demand for workers with creative and social intelligence, such as entrepreneurship, leadership or interaction skills. The latter are "engineering bottlenecks", i.e. difficult to codify in computer language and embed in digital applications.⁽³⁾ Demand for these non-cognitive skills exists across many different occupations and sectors, including many low-paid service jobs. A first policy implication is therefore to measure more effectively which non-cognitive skills are key to being successful in the labour market.⁽⁴⁾ If the speed of technological change accelerates further, then workers will be forced to adjust their skills to meet changing requirements more frequently. Research concerning the development of non-cognitive skills is less abundant in comparison with their cognitive skills counterpart, but there is evidence that early interventions (Heckman, 2008), lower dimension of classes (Dee and West, 2008), positive attitude from the teachers (Behncke, 2009), particular institutional design in the education system (Woessmann et al., 2009), and work based learning (Green et al., 2001) seem to have positive effects on the development of non-cognitive skills (Brunello and Schlotter, 2011).

Training and education systems must adapt to meet changing needs and improve job matching. This requires education and training systems to adapt their curricula to changing skill requirements. Moreover, workers require not only educational and training opportunities but potentially also the financial support and incentives to participate in such opportunities (Arntz et al., 2016). Policy measures can train workers preventively i.e. to equip them for changing skill requirements before they become unemployed. This is particularly important for low-skilled workers and older workers who – despite typically being those who are most exposed to automation – are on average the least likely to undertake training (Albert et al., 2010; Bassanini and Ok, 2004). Studies show that training raises the employability of these workers (Sanders and de Grip, 2004). As regards labour market policies, Autor (2009) shows how labour market intermediation can help to provide job seekers with information about relevant vacancies (and vice versa) to make the matching process more efficient. It is important therefore that PES and other market institutions collaborate to facilitate job matching and reduce adjustment costs for both workers and firms.

The European Pillar of Social Rights addresses these problems. The following paragraphs aim to illustrate the policy instruments to tackle these policy challenges, following the 20 principles listed in the European Pillar of Social Rights, especially those in chapter 1 (equal opportunities and access to the labour market) and chapter 3 (Social Protection and inclusion).⁽⁵⁾ Mirroring the order of the section above, the starting point is education and training policies, the importance of which have been confirmed at EU level through the New Skills Agenda and the European Education Area (especially in the first package of measures, addressing key competences for lifelong learning and

⁽¹⁾ For example: <https://rio.jrc.ec.europa.eu/en/library/stem-action-plan>.

⁽²⁾ See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-102_en.htm

⁽³⁾ Creative and social intelligence and interaction skills are the automation bottlenecks identified by computer scientists in the study by Frey and Osborne (2017).

⁽⁴⁾ The PISA and PIAAC surveys are good examples containing non-standard skill measures, but fall short of adequately capturing the non-cognitive skills that matter in labour markets.

⁽⁵⁾ The initiative, launched in November 2017, was jointly proclaimed by the European Commission, and the European Council. Further information is available at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/priorities/deeper-and-fairer-economic-and-monetary-union/european-pillar-social-rights_en

(Continued on the next page)

Box (continued)

digital skills). This foresees specific action to strengthen the presence of digital skills (action 3), and the Blueprint for Sectoral Cooperation on Skills⁽⁶⁾ (action 4) to address sector skills mismatches and improve digital skills, given their relevance in an evolving world of work.⁽⁷⁾ These changes require first of all policies to improve the quality and labour-market relevance of education systems at all levels. This has also been discussed at EU level through the 2018 Council Recommendation on Key Competences for Lifelong Learning, focused on improving the development of key competences (for all people) and changing labour markets (for the Member States).

Member States are adapting their education and training systems. Several Member States have worked to modernise their education systems in recent years,⁽⁸⁾ as well as to meet the high-skilled labour shortage through changes in their higher education systems and by achieving the target set by the Education and training in Europe 2020 strategic framework.⁽⁹⁾ Similar actions have been undertaken to improve the attractiveness of STEM,⁽¹⁰⁾ to reduce skills mismatch between education and businesses,⁽¹¹⁾ and (in a smaller number of Member States) to develop VET systems.⁽¹²⁾ More broadly, responsive and well connected means of assessing and preparing for future skill needs and skills governance systems have to be developed in all Member States, so they can react promptly to labour market changes. Finally, ten Member States⁽¹³⁾ have legislated to strengthen lifelong learning and take into account the new skills needs created by the digital revolution, also thanks to the recommendations on key competences for lifelong learning proposed within the European Semester.⁽¹⁴⁾

Further EU initiatives for redistributive policies: as regards labour market policies and redistribution policies, the flagship EU initiative in the field is the European Pillar of Social Rights. Its 20 principles reaffirm rights already present in the Union acquis and add new ones to address the challenges arising from social, technological and economic developments, including the digital revolution. Moreover, the European Network of Public Employment Services⁽¹⁵⁾ should facilitate the comparison of public employment services' performance across Member States and facilitate and support the transition between jobs and strengthen occupational mobility. Several countries at national level have undertaken reforms to improve the effectiveness of their public employment services.⁽¹⁶⁾ More specifically, EU and national initiatives for redistribution policies will be analysed in the "Access and sustainability of social protection in the age of new forms of work" chapter.

⁽⁶⁾ See <http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=738&langId=en&pubId=7969>

⁽⁷⁾ See <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52016DC0381>.

⁽⁸⁾ Latvia through a change in its teacher remuneration model, the raising of teaching salaries in Lithuania, professional development programmes in Italy and Denmark, education policy measures in Luxembourg, and incorporating transferable skills in Croatia.

⁽⁹⁾ Estonia revised their tertiary education funding system model, the foreseen launch of the Teaching Excellence Framework in UK to align funding and teaching quality, and an independent national accreditation agency in Lithuania.

⁽¹⁰⁾ The Netherlands plans to tackle the issue through their National Technology Pact 2020, Latvia introduced diagnostic tests in these fields, and in the UK new funding to reduce the STEM skills shortages were proposed in the Industrial Strategy green paper.

⁽¹¹⁾ Poland and Estonia have introduced public systems for monitoring and forecasting labour market needs and skills, in Ireland an expert group has an advisory role with the government on future skills needs, while Lithuania adopted actions in the higher education and research system to achieve better results in skills matching.

⁽¹²⁾ Bulgaria promoted dual training, Czech Republic involved employers in designing curricula, new types of apprenticeships closer to labour market needs were introduced in Ireland and Cyprus, and Spain took steps to improve cooperation between universities and business.

⁽¹³⁾ Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, France, Ireland, Malta, Portugal and Sweden.

⁽¹⁴⁾ <https://ec.europa.eu/education/sites/education/files/swd-recommendation-key-competences-lifelong-learning.pdf>

⁽¹⁵⁾ <http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=1100&langId=en>

⁽¹⁶⁾ Greece and Hungary have introduced new profiling systems to allow a better targeting of active labour market policies. Cyprus increased the number of counsellors, and many countries have launched activation programmes targeted on young people (Cyprus, Bulgaria, Latvia, Estonia and the Netherlands), or the long-term unemployed (Denmark, Spain, Portugal).

Annex 1: Recent forms of employment call for more flexibility

European stakeholders in the labour markets reacted to the changes in the economy with the introduction of new forms of employment, especially in the services. ⁽²⁰¹⁾ Since 2000, most Member States faced the challenge of to react to broad changes in the economy; in addition to that, the crisis caused high unemployment level, which European stakeholders were willing to reduce. Against this background, labour market innovation led to the creation of a plethora of new employment forms. These recent developments were thoroughly studied, identifying nine recent forms of employment, and categorizing them based on their implications for working conditions and the labour market (Eurofound, 2015). In the following paragraphs an analysis will be presented, going through the outcome of their research, to provide a quick yet comprehensive overview of the recent developments in the labour market concerning new forms of employment. The guidelines to identify new forms of employment listed, as indicators of a potential new form, the following features:

- A workplace different from the employer's premises;
- A marked presence of ICT, that can help spatial and temporal flexibility (Popma, 2013);
- An employment relationship that goes beyond the classic: one to many/many to one/many to many;
- Intermittent, discontinuous or non-conventional provision of work;
- Networking elements and unconventional cooperation arrangements between self-employed and SMEs ⁽²⁰²⁾;
- The new employment forms reported had to be present in a number of Member States to be relevant, the figure ranging between six and sixteen. Also, all Member States but Estonia and Malta registered the presence of at least a new form of employment at the time of the survey (which conducted by national experts network referring to the Public Policy and Management Institute), in 2013; and
- As from the presence of these new forms of employment in the sectors, these forms of

employment are quite horizontal, but tend to be more present in the services.

Eurofound listed nine new forms of employment in Europe, namely:

- Employee sharing: an employment form characterised by the presence of several employers jointly hiring one worker and being responsible for her/him, resulting in an open ended full-time employment for the worker;
- Job sharing: where an employer hires more workers (normally two) to jointly fill a specific job, combining more part-time jobs into a full-time position to ensure that the job is constantly staffed;
- Interim management: a form of employment tailored for highly skilled profiles, hired temporarily for specific purposes (e.g. technical, economic or management challenges) and integrating in house management on an ad hoc basis;
- Casual work, a neither stable nor continuous employment form, where the employers have the possibility of calling employees in on demand, without being obliged to provide a regular workflow;
- ICT-based mobile work: where workers can perform their job everywhere and anywhere, thanks to the use of modern technologies;
- Voucher-based work: where the employers use vouchers rather cash as a payment for workers. Vouchers are normally purchased from governmental authorities, and include the payment of social security contributions for the employee, on top of money;
- Portfolio work: these workers are defined as freelancers, self-employed individual or microenterprise doing small-scale jobs for a large number of clients;
- Crowd employment, or crowd work: where an online platform is used for the matching of employers and workers. Quite often larger tasks are divided among several virtual workers; and
- Collaborative employment: this is understood as a form of collaboration among freelancers, self-employed and/or micro cooperate (going beyond standard business partner relationships or supply chain) and overcome their size limitations and professional isolation.

⁽²⁰¹⁾ See Lang et al., 2013.

⁽²⁰²⁾ The interested reader is invited to read the methodology section in the introduction of the research report "New forms of employment" (Eurofound, 2015) for a detailed explanation of the selection criteria constituting a new form of employment.

The new forms of employment are characterised by a more pronounced flexibility, which often reflects a requests from both sides of the labour market, and sometimes is imposed from one side to the other. All the above mentioned employment forms respond to a renewed demand for more flexibility, coming from employees, employers, or both. Labour market reacted to this demand with new business models leading to these nine new clusters of employment relationships. Yet, for one of the two sides, flexibility can be more a necessity rather an opportunity (e.g. casual work for employees or job sharing for employers). *Figure A1.1* provides a graphic representation of the implications of these new forms of employment in terms of working conditions and labour market. The first group encompasses categories such as social protection, health and safety, income, bonus and fringe benefits, length of working time, flexibility, work-life balance, stress and work intensity, career development, training and skill development, content of tasks and responsibilities, autonomy and control, integration in work organization, and representation. The labour market axis synthetize the performance of the new employment forms in terms of job creation/job retention/crowding out of standard employment, labour market integration, segmentation of the labour market and social polarisation, legalisation of employment, increased attractiveness of the labour market, and upskilling of the labour force.


especially regarding working conditions of casual work. Of the 14 categories ⁽²⁰³⁾ used to assess working conditions, ten were considered disadvantageous for casual workers. Moreover, from a horizontal perspective, all the new forms of employment but job sharing and interim management were found to have disadvantageous working conditions in terms of representation, contributing to the erosion of trade unions. Also the categories of “bonus and fringe benefits” and “stress and work intensity” recorded poor results in working conditions for six out of the nine new forms of employment. For this reason, it may be worth considering providing new legal frameworks (or strengthening existing ones) for some of these new forms of employment, in order to shield the side of the employment relationship with less bargaining power from unwanted and/or excessive risks.

⁽²⁰³⁾ As a reminder, these are: social protection, health and safety, income, bonus and fringe benefits, length of working time, flexibility, work-life balance, stress and work intensity, career development, training and skill development, content of tasks and responsibilities, autonomy and control, integration in work organization, and representation.

Figure A1.1

The new forms of employment have heterogeneous working conditions and labour market implications

Categorization of new forms of employment following the categories of working conditions and labour market implications



Source: Eurofound, 2015.

[Click here to download figure.](#)

As a whole, job sharing and employee sharing show remarkable beneficial effects for both the labour market and working conditions categories. Interim management seems also an interesting development, although some country experts flagged the risks entailed by higher level of stress faced by these workers. From a horizontal perspective moreover, the great majority of the new forms of employment show beneficial effects for the workers in terms of flexibility and autonomy, which are appreciated.

Yet, not all the developments seem positive. Among new employment forms, some generate concerns,

Annex 2: Potential development of employment in the platform economy - an estimate

Online platforms tend to trade individual tasks.

The COLLEEM survey ⁽²⁰⁴⁾ provides some initial tentative evidence on the situation of platform workers. While in 'regular' employment bunches of different tasks are bundled to occupations, online platforms tend to trade specific, individual tasks. Hence, the International Standard Classifications of Occupations (ISCO) cannot be applied to platform workers. In order to estimate what types of work are contracted out to platforms, COLLEEM uses a classification different from ISCO, based on *tasks* rather than occupations. These categories include clerical, professional and creative tasks as well as software development, transport and on-location (offline) services (see table).

Employment around typical platform-tasks has been growing faster than overall employment in the entire EU-28 (5 vs. 4%). This is particularly true for professional service and tasks related to software development which tend to require higher skills have expanded fast.

Most importantly, while in the EU self-employment grew only by some 1%, in the platform economy growth was much faster: 7%.

As a pilot survey, the 2017 COLLEEM survey provides a snapshot about the platform economy rather than a fully-fledged picture of its development over time. To better understand the growth potential of the platform economy, this section makes an attempt to combine cross-sectional evidence from COLLEEM with longitudinal data from the Labour Force Survey (LFS) which follows the ISCO classification of which there is data since 2011. ⁽²⁰⁵⁾ Occupations according to the ISCO-categories are then re-grouped so that the occupations best fits the respective tasks according to the COLLEEM categories. Importantly, both COLLEEM and the LFS distinguish self-employed workers from employees. Indeed, many of the platform workers are self-employed.

Table A2.1

The number of self-employed platform workers has been growing fast recently.

Percent employment growth between 2011 and 2016 by categories of platform work, 14 EU countries

Type of tasks provided according to Colleem	Growth 2011- 2016	
	Self-empl.	Total empl.
1. Clerical	-17%	-11%
2. Professionals	10%	14%
3. Creative	9%	20%
4. Software	27%	28%
5. Transport	1%	8%
6. On location	8%	4%
All 1-6	7%	5%
Entire economy, EU-14 (LFS)	1%	4%

Note: Self-employment and total employment: percent change for the six categories of platform work; last row: employment growth overall across all sectors.

Source: DG EMPL calculations based on COLLEEM and EU LFS

[Click here to download table.](#)

The table summarises two main findings concerning the development since 2011:

⁽²⁰⁴⁾ Pesole, A., Brancati, C. U., Fernández-Macías, E., Biagi, F., González Vázquez, I. (2017): Platform workers in Europe Evidence from the COLLEEM Survey. JRC, European Commission.

⁽²⁰⁵⁾ There has been a major revision of ISCO-data in 2011.

Annex 3: Sectoral production in Italy, capital intensity and total factor productivity

The model uses data for Italy from the 2017 edition of EU KLEMS Growth and Productivity Accounts. ⁽²⁰⁶⁾ It includes data from 1995 to 2015 at sectoral level on the real value added (Y), employment (E), hours worked per worker (H), and the capital stock (K). A simplified production function is being used here. It considers two production factors: capital stock (K) and labour input $E \cdot H$, i.e., the volume of labour in total hours used in production.

16 broad sectors are explicitly taken on board by the model. They correspond to the NACE 2 industry classification at one-digit level:

A: Agriculture, forestry and fishing

B: Mining and quarrying

C: Total manufacturing

D-E: Electricity, gas, water supply

F: Construction

G: Sales, trade, repair of vehicles etc.

H: Transport, storage

I: Accommodation, food services

J: ICT

K: Finance, Insurance

L: Real Estate

M-N: Professional, scientific, technical, administrative and support services

O: Public administration and defence

P: Education

Q: Health and social work

R-S: Arts, entertainment, other services

In each of these sectors, production can increase because factor input (E, H, or K) increase or as a result of higher total factor productivity (TFP). The contribution of TFP is that share of growth of real value added that is due to efficiency gains, as opposed to pure factor (capital or labour) input growth. ⁽²⁰⁷⁾

⁽²⁰⁶⁾ See <http://www.euklems.net/>.

⁽²⁰⁷⁾ Growth can increase due to higher efficiency of factor use as a result of technical progress, better skills, or more efficient organisation of production. This part of growth is attributed to TFP.

A simplified two-factor ⁽²⁰⁸⁾ Cobb-Douglas production function is used for each of the 16 sectors considered:

$$(1) Y = K^\alpha \cdot (E \cdot H)^{1-\alpha} \cdot TFP \text{ for each sector, } ^{(209)}$$

where α and $(1-\alpha)$ denote the output elasticities of capital and labour, respectively. These production functions describe how K, E and H technically interact in order to generate a given output Y. The output elasticities are equal to the factor compensation shares in output (capital and labour share, resp.). ⁽²¹⁰⁾

Building the total differential on the natural logarithm of (1) gives:

$$(2) \Delta \ln Y = \alpha \cdot \Delta \ln K + (1-\alpha) \cdot \Delta \ln(E \cdot H) + \Delta \ln TFP$$

The scenario for production Y is exogenous. The purpose of the model is thus to establish what happens to the number of people in employment (E) if the speed of capital (K) accumulation changes at given output.

Re-arranging (2) gives:

$$(3) \Delta \ln(E \cdot H) = \Delta \ln Y - \alpha \cdot \Delta \ln c - \Delta \ln TFP,$$

for the change in the logarithm of the labour volume ($E \cdot H$), where $c \equiv \frac{K}{E \cdot H}$ denotes the sectoral capital intensity defined as real gross fixed capital divided by the labour volume (the total number of hours worked by employed people).

That is, to solve the equation for (the growth of) E, information is needed on the sectoral growth scenario (Y), the number of hours worked per worker (H), capital intensity (c) and Total Factor Productivity (TFP).

A growth scenario (Y) until 2030 is aligned to the assumptions made in the 2018 Ageing Report of the European Commission and the Economic Policy Committee for the entire economy. ⁽²¹¹⁾

Hours worked per worker (H) are projected up to 2030, using a log-linear trend-projection based on data for the period 1995-2015 over which H had declined by -0.5% every year on average. This implies a further

⁽²⁰⁸⁾ EU KLEMS takes into account changes in the use of intermediate inputs (energy, intermediate materials etc) as explicit third production factor, see Timmer et al (2007), S. 3.

⁽²⁰⁹⁾ See also Jäger (2017), p. 5. Sector indices are omitted. With empirical data on Y, E, and H, TFP is calculated as a residual using (1) for the period 1995-2015.

⁽²¹⁰⁾ In the widely used case of Cobb-Douglas production functions, and assuming perfect competition, output elasticities are constant and equal to factor income shares. See, for example, Raurich et al (2012), p. 181.

⁽²¹¹⁾ European Commission (2017:2), European Commission (2018:1).

decline of -0.1% every year until 2030 for the entire economy.

The same approach (log-linear trend projection) is used for the development of capital intensity (c) which is thus assumed to increase by another +0.8% every year overall, down from +1.8% between 1995 and 2015 for the whole economy.

The assumption for TFP results from a regression analysis. Assuming a non-linear link between TFP and capital intensity, the following simple regression has been used for sectoral TFP:

$$(4) \ln TFP = \vartheta \cdot \ln c + A + B + C,$$

where ϑ is the estimated elasticity, A and B are multipliers specified as:


$$(5) A = \sum_{i=1}^{15} \beta_i \cdot dum_sec_i$$

$$(6) B = \sum_{i=1}^{15} \gamma_i \cdot dum_year_i$$

C is a constant. 15 (out of 16) ⁽²¹²⁾ sectors are taken into consideration by sector-specific dummy-variable (sum_sec_i) set equal to one if sector i is considered, zero otherwise. A time dummy is introduced to capture the year of observation (to control for cyclical differences).

The result of the regression of equation (4) is shown for the three biggest sectors in terms of employment. As capital intensity (the main driver of TFP in (4)) is projected to only slightly increase, so is TFP.

Chart A3.1
A projection of TFP in Italy, based on a simple regression
Total Factor Productivity in Italy



Note: Original values normalised to 1 in 1995.

Source: DG EMPL calculations based on EU KLEMS

[Click here to download chart.](#)

⁽²¹²⁾ In total there are 16 sectors, one was left out of the regression due to multi-collinearity.

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Equal opportunities: skills, education and overcoming disadvantages

1. INTRODUCTION ⁽²¹³⁾

The EU is undergoing rapid economic transformations which are accelerating the demand for skills. The shift towards digital product and factor markets, together with globalisation and population ageing, will continue fuelling the demand for people who are better educated and more appropriately skilled. The speed of these transformations defines the pace at which workers must adapt to the new working environment. Workers are confronted with major restructuring of jobs ⁽²¹⁴⁾ and the need to develop new skills in a short time. The demand for information processing as well as for high-level cognitive and interpersonal skills is growing rapidly. ⁽²¹⁵⁾ Workers who can supply the skills relevant to these professions are in short supply, ⁽²¹⁶⁾ and the shortages are projected to aggravate.

These transformations will create winners, while others are at risk of being left behind. Firms in certain sectors struggle to recruit skilled staff, especially in office professions and computer-related, engineering and other maths-intensive jobs. ⁽²¹⁷⁾ In addition, the health and social care professions as well as teaching have entered the list of occupations facing

bottlenecks. ⁽²¹⁸⁾ Those able to adapt quickly to the permanent changes and to supply the skills needed in these jobs stand a good chance of gaining high returns for themselves as well as for their employers. This is because highly skilled labour attracts capital investment in new technologies. Skilled labour and capital are complementary: their combination delivers higher productivity growth. By contrast, those who are unable to improve on skills and qualifications are at risk of being crowded out of the labour market, both by better-skilled labour and by physical capital. ⁽²¹⁹⁾

Many Europeans face difficulties in keeping up with the new skill needs. It is important to help all Europeans acquire the relevant skills and qualifications (formal education) to cope with these transformations. The most recent (2015) PISA survey ⁽²²⁰⁾ again revealed that too many young Europeans lack basic skills such as reading or maths. As for education, despite recent progress, more than one in ten still leaves school early, and 17% of those aged from 30 to 34 years did not progress beyond lower secondary education. Both in skills and education there are differences related to Member State, gender, age group, social background and other individual characteristics. Not least because people's labour market prospects depend heavily on their education

⁽²¹³⁾ This chapter was written by Jörg Peschner. Contributions by Petrica Badea are gratefully acknowledged.

⁽²¹⁴⁾ More than one in five workers in the EU have been confronted with major restructuring at their workplace during the last three years. Eurofound (2017), p. 95.

⁽²¹⁵⁾ OECD (2016:1), *The Survey of Adult Skills: Reader's Companion*, OECD Publishing, p. 127.

⁽²¹⁶⁾ See OECD (2017:1).

⁽²¹⁷⁾ World Economic Forum (2016), p. 4.

⁽²¹⁸⁾ This is true especially for jobs requiring high skills, see Cedefop (2015), p. 49.


⁽²¹⁹⁾ See Chapter 2.

⁽²²⁰⁾ The OECD's Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) is a triennial international survey which aims to evaluate education systems worldwide by testing the skills and knowledge of 15-year-old students. See <http://www.oecd.org/pisa/aboutpisa/>. The OECD's Programme for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC) developed and conducts the Survey of Adult Skills. See <http://www.oecd.org/skills/piaac/>

Chart 3.1

Many young people lag behind their Asian peers

PISA scores in different disciplines, 2015, by country



Note: EU countries in dark bars

Source: OECD PISA

[Click here to download chart.](#)

and on having relevant skills, unequal opportunities leave their scars on the labour market.

Opportunities in life are strongly linked to social origin. The results of the 2015 PISA survey on students' competences provide fresh evidence that a person's parental background is a major predictor of their skills which are relevant for the labour market. ⁽²²¹⁾ This problem affects not only people with a migrant background. ⁽²²²⁾ Further analyses show that those who inherit social disadvantage from their parents stand a high risk of lacking more than just core competences. They also achieve lower social and labour market outcomes. ⁽²²³⁾

Along with inherited social disadvantage, gender inequality stands out, as it affects half of the EU's population. The EU has long been promoting greater gender equality in both education and the labour market through a series of initiatives and legislation. ⁽²²⁴⁾ But despite progress over the last two decades, ⁽²²⁵⁾ with the gap in formal education being reversed and employment rates increasing, women's labour market performance is still lower than men's. In the age group 20-64 there are 17 million fewer

women than men in employment. Once in employment, women have lower pay (Chapter 4). Moreover, they are still under-represented and face various disadvantages in key occupations such as ICT and STEM (sciences, technology, engineering and mathematics) ⁽²²⁶⁾ where growth prospects are bright. Indeed, addressing the gender gap in these technical activities is often seen a necessity to broaden the pool of potential recruits in STEM occupations. ⁽²²⁷⁾ Intervention at early age has positive effects in creating an interest in these occupations and addressing stereotypes. ⁽²²⁸⁾

Section 2 of this chapter will examine how the existing skill level of Europeans is influenced by inherited social disadvantage (both when people are young and later as adults) and how it compares with the skills currently needed in the labour market. It then turns to the role of social background in formal education. Section 3's focus is the labour market. To what extent can individual success in education compensate for inherited social disadvantage? Section 4 analyses policy options for alleviating the consequences of social inequalities and increasing people's employability. Section 5 looks at gender equality in education and in the labour market. Conclusions are summarised in section 6.

⁽²²¹⁾ European Commission (2017:1), Chapter 3, Section 5.3.

⁽²²²⁾ See OECD (2017:2) and OECD (2018:1) for the social disadvantage of children with a migrant background, especially second-generation migrants (born in the EU).

⁽²²³⁾ European Commission (2017:2), p. 9. Indeed, inherited disadvantages go beyond education and the labour market. For example, the European Commission's Joint Research Centre (European Commission, 2017:3) finds that they stretch out to health-related problems.

⁽²²⁴⁾ See the Commission's website on Equal economic independence: https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/combating-discrimination/gender-equality/equal-economic-independence_en#what-is-the-eu-doing

⁽²²⁵⁾ Eurofound (2016).

⁽²²⁶⁾ The employment rate of female STEM graduates is 76% (86% for men). "At tertiary level, only one third of women STEM graduates work in STEM occupations, compared to one in two men". European Commission (2018:1), p. 21.

⁽²²⁷⁾ EU Skills Panorama (2014), p. 5.

⁽²²⁸⁾ European Commission (2017:1).

2. SOCIAL DISADVANTAGES: HOW DO THEY PREDICT SKILLS AND FORMAL EDUCATION?

2.1. Social disadvantage and skills: lessons from PISA and PIAAC

Many people need to make an effort to keep pace with the new skill needs of the labour market. Since the turn of the century, a series of surveys has been carried out by the OECD with the aim of assessing the core competences of both pupils (PISA survey) and adults (PIAAC) Most recently, the PISA survey of 2015, like its predecessors, sent alarming signals about the competence level of 15-year-old Europeans in the core disciplines of reading, science and maths. In all three disciplines, one in five is a low achiever, i.e. they achieve proficiency levels of less than 2 on a scale that goes up to 6.⁽²²⁹⁾ The proportions of low achievers have increased since 2012. Looking at average score by country, 15-year-olds in most EU countries (dark bars in *Chart 3.1*) perform less well in all three disciplines than their peers in many of our fast-advancing Asian competitors.


Social background has a strong effect on skills performance everywhere in Europe. A person's skills *performance* cannot be entirely explained by their school system or other institutions. Individual factors play a major role, and people seem to inherit a certain social advantage or disadvantage from their parents. OECD's Economic, Social and Cultural Status index (ESCS)⁽²³⁰⁾ is a measure of socio-economic advantage or disadvantage: in PISA 2015 the proportion of low-achieving students in the bottom, least advantaged quartile (33.8%) was more than four times the proportion in the top quartile (7.6%).⁽²³¹⁾

Parents' low education levels and low occupational skill levels have a negative influence on students' performance in PISA tests. The left column in *Chart 3.2* is the coefficient of a regression. It shows how much the maths score in PISA 2015 increased for every single step up the parental education ladder, on average in each country. According to the ISCED classification scale⁽²³²⁾ those steps range from ISCED 0 (pre-primary education) to 6 (advanced studies). The regression assumes no difference in other relevant characteristics, such as

gender and migration status. Under these "everything else being equal" conditions, climbing one step of parents' education level in Sweden would, on average, yield an 1.1-point increase in the score. This means that those at the bottom of the scale, i.e. the children of parents with very low levels of education (ISCED level 0), will be, on average, only 8 points below the children of very well educated parents (1.8% of the average score in Sweden). In Poland, the impact of parental education is a multiple of that. Each step up the parental education ladder yields 17 points and 120 points at most (30% of Poland's average score). Also in other, especially Eastern EU countries (and in a number of Asian countries) parental education tends strongly influence students' scores in maths. The picture does not change if, instead of the highest level of parental education, the focus moves to parental occupation status (on a scale from 0 to 99, see right-hand column of *Chart 3.2*). In all countries students perform better as their parents' occupational status increases. Control regressions have shown similar results for reading and science.

Chart 3.2
Social disadvantage has a decisive impact on people's basic skills at the age of 15

PISA 2015: additional maths score per step of parental education (left) and occupation (right)



Note: Education level ranges from 0 to 6; occupation level ranges from 0 to 99; controlled for gender, immigration status

Source: DG EMPL calculations based on OECD's PISA survey 2015

[Click here to download chart.](#)

⁽²²⁹⁾ Level 2 is associated with 'basic procedural knowledge' enabling students to 'draw on everyday content'. See <http://www.oecd.org/pisa/summary-description-seven-levels-of-proficiency-science-pisa-2015.htm>.

⁽²³⁰⁾ The OECD's Social and Cultural Status (ESCS) index is composed of 5 variables that reflect parents' occupational status, parents' education, the family's wealth, resources for home education and family culture'. See OECD under <http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=5401>

⁽²³¹⁾ European Commission (2016:1), p. 16.

⁽²³²⁾ See [http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/International_Standard_Classification_of_Education_\(ISCED\)](http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/International_Standard_Classification_of_Education_(ISCED))

Low achievement is not confined to the school years but persists into adult life. OECD's second big exercise in comparing achievement across countries, the PIAAC survey, aims to assess adult competences, covering the age range 16-65. In terms of the proportion of low achievers, the most recent (2012) PIAAC exercise produced results similar to PISA. In a considerable number of EU countries (²³³) about one fifth of adults aged 16-65 had only basic skills in literacy and numeracy. In addition, one in four adults lacked the digital skills needed to use ICT effectively. In other words, there is evidence that skills disadvantages sustained at a young age persist as youngsters become adults. Indeed, "these young people are likely to face significant, lifelong obstacles to social inclusion and employability." (²³⁴) For example, unemployment and inactivity are more common among the low performers in PIAAC. (²³⁵) There is, therefore, an employability threshold that many people do not manage to pass. What is more, the threshold is not static, but moves quickly as skill needs evolve in the digitalised environment.

The influence on young people's skill levels of inherited social disadvantage also tends to persist into later life. A regression analysis on PIAAC data confirms this finding. *Chart 3.3* (left-hand side) shows mean numeracy scores per country in the 2012 edition of PIAAC. As with PISA scores, PIAAC scores appear to indicate considerable cross-country differences in people's average competence levels. On the right side of the chart, blue bars show by how much the numeracy score increases, on average, for every step up the parental education scale. Low level parental education seems to hamper core competences not only at school, but also later in life. All countries' coefficients remain positive and highly significant. Parental educational attainment accounts for a substantial proportion of adults' average scores in the numeracy test.

(²³³) 17 EU Member States have participated in the PIAAC wave of 2012. See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-922_en.htm


(²³⁴) European Commission, (2017:2), p. 86.

(²³⁵) OECD (2013), p. 227/8.

Chart 3.3

A person's own education cannot fully compensate for the consequences of negative social heritage

Survey on adult competences (PIAAC 2012). Average numeracy scores by country (left) and the contribution of higher parental education (right)



Note: Controlled for age, employment status, sex

Source: DG EMPL calculations based on OECD's PIAAC data

[Click here to download chart.](#)

Hence, low performing teenagers stand a serious risk of remaining low performers when they become adults. OECD (2013) confirms this finding that social advantage and disadvantage persist into later life. The scores 15 year-olds achieved for proficiency in literacy and numeracy (reading and maths) in PISA 2000, 2003, 2006 and 2009 correlate with the scores young adults achieved in PIAAC 2012. The OECD finds that "the proficiency of an age cohort in reading and mathematics provides a reasonably good predictor of the subsequent performance of the same cohort as it moves through post-compulsory education and into the labour market." (²³⁶)

Special studies tested the same people in PISA and (later) PIAAC. They confirm the persistence of low performance. A sub-sample of Danish participants in the 2012 PIAAC literacy assessment had also undergone the PISA literacy test 12 years earlier. A strong positive correlation was found between how they performed as 15 year-old pupils and as 27 year-old adults (see *Table 3.2*). 62% of the lowest third of performers in PISA 2000 were also among the lowest third of performers in PIAAC 2012, while only 11% managed to climb to the level of the top third of performers as young adults. In addition, the study finds a strong link between the reading proficiency as a young student (in PISA 2000) and later receipt of transfer income (unemployment or sickness). This finding indicates the delayed yet highly probable economy-wide impact of early and persistent disadvantage in educational attainment. (²³⁷)

Moreover, higher education may not fully compensate for the burden of inherited disadvantage. As *Chart 3.3* (right column) illustrates, if a person whose parents had only a low level of education manages to attain higher education, this is

(²³⁶) OECD (2013), p. 205. European Commission (2014), p. 116.

(²³⁷) Note by The Danish Ministry of Education, Summary of the Danish PISA-PIAAC survey. (²³⁷)

Table 3.1

Basic skill shortages persist in all Member States

OECD Skill Needs indicator (x 100), 2013, index points; positive values (red colour) indicate a shortage

	Basic content skills						Other skills	
	Reading	Writing	Speaking	Problem Solving	Maths	Science	Social Skills	Technical Skills
Finland	4.50	3.90	3.40	3.10	2.90	2.70	2.20	-0.10
Luxembourg	3.80	3.40	2.90	2.20	2.10	2.40	1.70	-0.30
Spain	3.40	3.20	2.90	1.80	1.60	0.80	1.80	-0.20
Estonia	2.70	2.70	2.40	1.70	0.80	1.10	1.50	-0.60
Germany	2.50	2.20	2.10	1.80	1.70	1.00	1.70	-0.20
Netherlands	2.50	2.50	2.10	2.30	1.10	2.20	1.80	-0.30
Ireland	2.40	2.70	2.90	2.00	0.90	1.30	2.40	-0.50
Belgium	2.30	2.20	2.10	1.40	0.70	1.80	1.30	0.00
Austria	2.20	2.00	1.40	1.30	1.10	1.00	0.60	-0.10
Sweden	2.20	1.90	1.60	1.40	1.10	0.90	1.00	-0.30
Bulgaria	2.20	1.80	1.70	1.30	1.20	1.20	1.10	0.00
Italy	2.10	1.80	1.30	1.10	1.30	0.90	0.40	0.40
United Kingdom	2.00	2.00	1.70	1.60	1.30	1.10	1.30	0.20
Slovak Republic	1.90	1.50	1.50	1.40	1.30	1.60	1.10	0.50
Poland	1.80	1.90	1.50	1.60	0.80	1.30	0.80	0.40
Latvia	1.60	1.40	1.30	0.80	0.70	0.50	1.00	-0.30
Greece	1.50	1.60	1.70	1.40	0.40	1.70	0.90	0.20
Cyprus	1.50	1.40	1.10	0.50	-0.50	1.00	0.30	-0.60
Romania	1.50	1.40	1.10	0.60	1.00	0.00	0.80	-0.70
Denmark	1.30	1.10	0.80	1.20	1.00	1.20	0.20	0.70
France	1.10	1.10	1.10	1.00	0.80	0.90	0.60	0.80
Portugal	1.00	1.30	1.10	0.80	-0.30	1.00	0.50	0.30
Slovenia	1.00	0.60	0.70	0.10	0.40	0.70	0.50	-0.40
Czech Republic	0.90	0.70	0.60	0.60	0.50	0.90	0.40	0.30
Hungary	0.60	0.80	0.90	0.20	-0.20	0.10	0.70	-0.50
Lithuania	0.40	0.20	-0.10	0.40	0.30	-0.10	-0.30	0.20

Note: Positive values indicate a shortage, negative values a surplus. The index is composed of five sub-indices that take into account how the long-term trend in wages, employment, hours worked, (the reverse of) unemployment and under-qualification deviate from economy-wide averages for each occupation. In a second step it looks at what skills are needed in the same occupation in order to derive the shortage index for these skills. See OECD.

Source: OECD Skills for Jobs database. See <http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?QueryId=77642>. See OECD (2017:1), esp. p. 40 and chapter 3.

[Click here to download table.](#)

not generally sufficient to overcome all the disadvantages caused by low parental education. The red bars show the number of points gained by higher level parental education, controlled for people's own education level.⁽²³⁸⁾ It thus assumes no difference in education between respondents. By controlling for people's own education all countries' coefficients decline, but remain positive and highly significant. This is strong evidence that when building the core competences needed for the labour market, better education can to some extent, but not fully, neutralise the negative influence of low level parental education.

⁽²³⁸⁾ People's level of education strongly correlates with the PIAAC numeracy score.

Table 3.2

Evidence from Denmark: Low-performing pupils in reading tend to remain low-performing adults in reading

Danish sub-sample from PIAAC 2011/12 who also did PISA reading test in 2000: % of low, middle, high performers

		Reading test in PISA 2000		
		Lowest third	Middle	Best third
Reading test in PIAAC 2011/12	Lowest third	61,5	27,4	10,7
	Middle	27,4	38,4	31,0
	Best third	11,4	34,2	58,3

Source: Danish Ministry of Education

[Click here to download table.](#)

The most disadvantaged group are migrants⁽²³⁹⁾.

A regression analysis shown in *Box 3.1*, based on PISA data about individual mathematics scores, shows that foreign-born people score significantly worse than those who take the test in their EU country of birth. This finding holds even assuming the same socio-economic background, gender, education and parental

⁽²³⁹⁾ Migrants in this chapter are people born in a country different from their current country of residence (foreign-born people).

Box 3.1: Systematic skills disadvantage for migrants


A regression analysis on PISA 2015 micro data confirms the finding of systematically lower skill levels in the case of migrants (foreign-born people). The regression presented in *Chart 1* shows that young pupils of same gender and with the same parental background score systematically lower than their native-born peers. Even in overall well-performing countries like Germany, Denmark, or Sweden the difference is around 60 points, making 11-12% of the countries' average scores. Since 2003 there is no clear tendency of a reduction in that gap. Worryingly, the gap seems to be transferred to later stages in life as the PIAAC-assessment of adult competences confirms the skill gap between migrants and native-born people in all participating EU countries.

In other words: third-country migrants living in the EU face a massive educational disadvantage. These results still hold if one exchanges the country-of-birth variable in the regression by mother's country of birth. That is, second generation migrants who went through the same education system as did the native population, face similar, albeit somewhat lower education-related disadvantages as those who crossed EU borders themselves.

Chart 1

In some countries being a migrant reduces PISA 2015 scores substantially

Average loss of mathematics score (points) due to being foreign-born.



Note: Regression based on PISA 2015 micro data, controlled for sex, parental education, parental occupation.

Source: DG EMPL calculations based on OECD PISA 2015

social background. Second-generation migrant pupils (with their better language skills) still perform significantly lower. The OECD (2017) outlines the importance of schooling systems in this context. Those generally producing more resilient students also increase immigrants' chances to perform well despite unfavourable social heritage.⁽²⁴⁰⁾ However, there is evidence that the EU's school systems does often not succeed in supporting better education outcomes for migrants effectively. Even taking account of migrants' very different socio-economic background, there is still severe under-performance in most Member States.⁽²⁴¹⁾ These disadvantages have been traced back to very specific problems within the school systems, such as class compositions favouring social segregation, but also persisting stereotypes in the school environment.⁽²⁴²⁾ Indeed, there is evidence that a 'certain sense of belonging at school' is less likely to be developed by students with a migrant background⁽²⁴³⁾.

Gender differences in likelihood of low performance are narrowing, but boys still lag behind in reading. PISA 2015 has shown that in all countries the difference between the proportion of low-performing girls and boys in reading is declining, but is still considerable. 24% of boys in the EU are low achievers, compared with 16% of girls.

Overall, Europeans lack the skills which are in high demand in EU labour markets. As a result of the economic transformations described in Chapter 2,

⁽²⁴⁰⁾ OECD (2017:2), p.11.

⁽²⁴¹⁾ European Commission (2017:4).

⁽²⁴²⁾ De Paola and Brunello (2016), p. 2.

⁽²⁴³⁾ Willms (2003), p. 38, OECD (2018:2), p. 64.

the labour market is constantly evolving, and so are the tasks carried out by workers. To be able to adapt to rapid change, workers need to be equipped with a variety of basic skills, including literacy, numeracy and sciences. The OECD's Skills for Jobs Database first looks at occupations and identifies whether these occupations face labour market pressure, i.e., a shortage (or a surplus) situation.⁽²⁴⁴⁾ Then, given the skills that are used in every occupation, it derives an indicator for skills shortages or surpluses. The resulting Skill Needs indicator is presented in *Table 3.1* for a number of selected skills, red (green) cells signalling shortages (surpluses) in the respective country. The table shows that literally all basic content skills are in short supply in almost all Member States. This is because almost all occupations require workers to make use of basic skills such as reading or writing. On the other hand, maths, sciences and problem-solving skills are intensively applied in the science/engineering, teaching and ICT professions which - the OECD finds - have critical skill shortages.

There is strong demand in all Member States for cognitive and social skills. Shortages reported for problem solving or social skills are linked to the ongoing automation processes that make many routine tasks redundant⁽²⁴⁵⁾ and non-routine cognitive and social skills more important - a phenomenon.

⁽²⁴⁴⁾ The Skill Needs indicator groups occupations on the basis of growth of variables, relative to the entire economy. Those are wages, employment, (the reverse of) unemployment, hours worked and the degree of under-qualification. The higher these indicators the more the occupation is considered in shortage. Next, given the skills used in the respective occupations, it assesses whether there are shortages or surpluses of different skills. See OECD (2017:1), esp. chapters 2 and 3.

⁽²⁴⁵⁾ See Chapter 2.

Chapter 2 refers to as 'routine-biased technological change'. In addition, there is a critical shortage in professions such as teaching or health, which use these soft skills at a high level of intensity. No skill shortage is reported in technical skills, which include operation and control or repairing skills with relatively high outsourcing and automation potential. ⁽²⁴⁶⁾

2.2. Social background and equal opportunities in formal education

Many factors have an impact on people's educational achievements. There is excess demand for basic content skills in the EU while, on the supply side, many Europeans struggle to keep pace with the new skill needs. It is clear that social origin plays a major role in explaining the overall skills performance of young and adult Europeans. This section extends the analysis in that context, to explore the extent to which people's social origin predicts their chances of improving their formal education. The analysis uses the Labour Force Survey, which has detailed information on people's formal educational attainment level rather than their skills. ⁽²⁴⁷⁾

The regression model in this section explains people's opportunities in terms of education. More concretely, it explains their statistical odds ⁽²⁴⁸⁾ of improving their education. For people aged 25-64, the model calculates the average odds of moving from a low to a medium or from a medium to a high education level. ⁽²⁴⁹⁾

Focussing on the black bars in *Chart 3.4*, an individual's odds of moving upwards depend on a number of factors. Everything else being equal:

- There is a strong age component: the younger people are, the higher tend to be their odds of achieving higher education. The odds of people aged 30-34 doing so is three times higher than for those aged 60-64 years. This finding reflects the educational progress being achieved from one cohort to the next.
- Women tend to achieve higher education levels than men (see gender section below).

⁽²⁴⁶⁾ OECD (2017:1), p. 9 and p. 51.

⁽²⁴⁷⁾ The OECD defines skills as a person's "capacities that facilitate learning or performance", OECD (2017:1), p. 43.

⁽²⁴⁸⁾ The expressions 'odds' and 'chances' are used synonymously in this chapter. One must distinguish them from 'probabilities'. The odds of an event happening is the event's probability relative to the counter-probability. The concept 'ratio of odds' used in the analyses below relates the odds of a group to a reference group, for example: the odds of men, relative to women, of improving the education level.

⁽²⁴⁹⁾ A low level of education means education to no more than lower secondary level. Being 'highly educated' means having a tertiary degree.


- Despite recent progress in educational achievements of third-country migrants ⁽²⁵⁰⁾, their odds of attaining higher education are 25% below those of native-born people. On the other hand, there is no (significant) gap between the latter and most mobile EU citizens (i.e. EU citizens living in an EU country other than their country of birth). ⁽²⁵¹⁾

The red bars in *Chart 3.4* show the odds of increasing the education level, but taking into account one more control variable: the highest parental educational attainment level. Controlling for parental education captures people's social background to some extent.

Chart 3.4

Decisive impact of parental education on own education

The odds of having attained higher education, 24 EU countries, age 25-64 years, 2014



Note: Significant at level below 1% except 1): at 5%. Logistic regression with the odds of transit into higher education (from low to medium, from medium to high) as the dependant variable; controlled also for the individual family context and for country-specific effects. 24 EU countries are included (see Chart 3.5).

Source: DG EMPL calculation based on EU-LFS, 2014 ad hoc module

[Click here to download chart.](#)

Parents' education largely predicts an individual's own level of educational attainment.

Other things being equal, people with highly-educated parents have 10-fold better odds of being highly-educated themselves than the offspring of parents with only low level education. In addition, there is strong evidence that disadvantage is transmitted from one generation to the next – this is illustrated by the difference between the black and the red bars on the 'age' variable. This difference captures the impact of parental education on someone's own education for each age group. It tends to be higher the younger people are. ⁽²⁵²⁾ This means that much of the better

⁽²⁵⁰⁾ For example: In 2016, 39% of those third-country migrants established since less than 10 years had tertiary education level, compared to 25% in 2008. (Eurostat LFS).

⁽²⁵¹⁾ EU-15: The 15 Member States that made up the EU before 2004. EU-10: Those 10 eastern Member States that joined in 2004. EU-3: Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia. The difference in the performance between non-EU-born people and mobile EU citizens


⁽²⁵²⁾ The youngest age group considered is the exception. At the age of 25 not everyone has yet finished their education.

educational performance of today's young Europeans is explained by social capital they inherited from their parents. The younger people are, the higher is the likelihood that already their parents had progressed in terms of education, compared with the generations before them.

Social heritage is thus an inter-temporal multiplier of education policy. In a number of EU Member States the multiplier is positive as it carries educational progress from one generation to the next. *Chart 3.5* shows the country variable of the same regression. The black bars show the odds of attaining higher education in each country, relative to Finland, which is taken as a reference and normalised to one (vertical line). The red bars show the same odds but taking parental education into account as an additional explanatory variable. The difference between the two bars signifies the extent to which parental education contributes to higher education levels in each country. In those countries where the educational mix is relatively favourable, the inter-temporal multiplier tends to have a positive impact on the current level of education (the black exceeding the red bar). In other countries, relatively low parental education tends to also lower people's own educational performance.

Chart 3.5
Socio-economic background helps people in some countries to perform well in education

The odds of attaining higher education in a country, relative to Finland (=1), 24 EU Member States



Note: Logistic regression: the odds of having attained higher education, equalised to one for Finland. Country effects as further control variable to the regression shown in Chart 3.4.

Source: DG EMPL calculations based on EU LFS 2014 ad hoc module
[Click here to download chart.](#)

3. SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND – HOW DOES IT AFFECT THE LABOUR MARKET?

Good formal education and the availability of core competences are not sufficient conditions for good labour market performance, especially as the additional supply of highly educated people has to be matched by the demand for them. ⁽²⁵³⁾ However, there is a consensus that they are necessary conditions, as "higher education offers the best employability." ⁽²⁵⁴⁾ So it is not a surprise that negative (positive) social capital transmitted via low (high) parental qualification is a burden (advantage) on an individual's own position in the labour market.

The following regression exercise was carried out on data from the 2014 Labour Force Survey. It measures elementary indicators of individual labour market performance:

1. the odds of being in employment, as opposed to being unemployed or inactive;
2. the odds of moving from low-growth to high-growth sectors ⁽²⁵⁵⁾;
3. the odds (risk) of becoming unemployed when working.

Those odds are shown in *Chart 3.6*, and depend on the level of parental education. People with highly educated parents are the reference group. Their odds are normalised to one, and depicted by the horizontal black line. Relative to the reference group, the black dots show the respective odds of people with parents educated to a low and to a medium level. Again, the analysis assumes that no differences in relevant variables other than parental education disturb these odds. In other words, it assumes that everything else is equal in terms of age, sex, migration background or being located in different countries.

Parental education makes a significant difference. Indicators 1 and 2 above have a positive connotation, indicating either a favourable current labour market situation (1) or positive labour market dynamics and better self-fulfilment in the labour market (2). The black dots indicate that, compared with the offspring of highly educated parents, the

⁽²⁵³⁾ The Commission has devoted much research recently to qualification mismatches. See European Commission (2014), p. 124-126 and esp. European Commission (2016:2), p. 236-250.

⁽²⁵⁴⁾ European Commission (2017:2), p. 65.

⁽²⁵⁵⁾ Sectors are grouped according to the NACE classification of economic activities according to Eurostat, see also Chapter 2. 'High growth' sectors of destination regroup the NACE activities J (ICT), K (Financial and insurance activities), M (Professional, scientific, technical activities) and P (Education). Though this regrouping is arbitrary it combines the activities that have seen the fastest growth EU-wide since the year 2000 and those that usually require higher qualification levels. The origin sector combines all remaining activities except public administration (O) and extraterritorial organisations (U).


performance of the children of parents with a low level of educational attainment is significantly lower on the first two indicators. For people whose parents have a low level of education, the odds of having a job are just 53%, and the odds of moving from a low-growth to a high-growth sector just 44%, relative to the odds of the offspring of highly-educated parents. The third indicator has a negative connotation. It reflects an employed worker's risk of losing job. The odds of being dismissed are 60% higher for the offspring of parents with a low level of education than it is for highly-educated parents' offspring, all else being equal.

disadvantaged socio-economic backgrounds. However, as is the case with skills, the disadvantage in formal education does not fully disappear. As with the findings shown earlier for adult competence levels, the disadvantage remains significant, especially for the second variable - the odds of progressing to a job in a high-growth sector. An individual's scope for success in the labour market thus remains significantly influenced by their family background.

Chart 3.6

All else being equal, parental education still has a strong impact on labour market performance

The odds of having employment, falling into unemployment and moving into a high-growth sector, by parental education (high = 1), 24 EU countries, 2014



Note: Dotted frame: significant at 5% level; all else: significant below 1%.
How to read this chart: compared with the offspring of highly educated parents, having low-level educated parents reduces one's odds of being in employment by almost one half. Offspring of low-level educated parents working in lower-growth sectors stand 56% lower odds of moving to high-growth sectors than those with highly-educated parents. Likewise, the odds of people losing their job are more than 60% higher if their parents have low-level education, compared with highly-educated parents. Controlled for age, sex, migration background, country effects.

Source: DFG EMPL calculations based on EU LFS 2014 ad hoc module

[Click here to download chart.](#)

An unfavourable parental background can be offset to some extent by a better education. The red dots in *Chart 3.6* make the assumption of everything else being equal for one more variable: the individual's own education. This means that the red bars take into account a person's own efforts to attain higher education when assessing the impact parental education can have on their labour market performance. As expected, all dots move towards the 1-line. It means that the difference in the performance of those with low/medium level education and those with highly educated parents becomes smaller. In other words, it may be very difficult for an individual with parents educated to a low level to reach higher education, as shown in the previous section. But if they manage to climb the education ladder against the odds, then the impact of parental education on their labour market situation becomes less significant. To some extent, therefore, it is possible to break the vicious circle of low performance resulting from

Table 3.3

Socio-economic background also impacts on the skills level of one's job

Odds of attaining higher occupation level, relative to a reference group (=1), age 25-64 years, EU countries, 2014

		The chances of improving the job's skill-level of...			
		...everybody			... native-borns
		Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Own education	Low	0.04	0.04	not	0.03
	Medium	0.10	0.10	controlled	0.09
	High (reference)	1	1	for	1
Parents' EDUC	Low	0.42	0.41	0.14	0.41
	Medium	0.61	0.61	0.34	0.61
	High (reference)	1	1	1	1
Country of birth	EU15	1.20	(0.94)	(1.02)	-
	EU10	0.33	0.19	0.21	-
	EU3	0.34	0.21	0.21	-
	Extra_EU	0.56	0.39	0.39	-
	Native born (reference)	1	1	1	-
Sex	Males	1.31	1.30	(0.99)	1.24
	Females (reference)	1	1	1	1
Also controlled for ..	Age	yes	yes	yes	yes
	Family context	yes	yes	yes	yes
	Language skills	yes	no	no	no
	Country effects	yes	yes	yes	yes

Note: Numbers in brackets are not significant. All else is significant at a level below 1%.

Occupations are grouped according to the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-08). ISCO level ranging from 1 (elementary occupations) to 4 (managers, professionals etc.). See the Annex 1 below. The table shows the odds to move, for example, from occupation level 1 to 2, from at least 2 to 3, or from at least 3 to 4.

How to read this table: It shows the odds for a worker aged 25 to 64 years of increasing the skill-level of one's job. A number of relevant variables are included in the analysis.

Three of them are shown in the first three rows: one's own education, one's parents' education, and one's country of birth (migrant status). Other variables complement the list of control variables and are summarised in the last row. The columns show people's odds for the respective variables in four alternative models. Those differ with respect to the control variables they take on board.

Source: DG EMPL calculations based on Eurostat EU LFS

[Click here to download table.](#)

Inherited social advantage is important for successful labour market outcomes.

This important finding will be explored more in depth in *Table 3.3* which looks at one core indicator for a person's job-related opportunities, i.e. the skill level their job requires from them (see the Annex 1 below for the classification of occupations by of skill-levels). The table shows the statistical odds of increasing the skill-level of one's job for workers aged 25 to 64. What are the chances for a person currently working in a lower-profile job of proceeding to higher skill levels? ⁽²⁵⁶⁾ Relative to offspring of highly-educated parents, low parental qualification reduces someone's odds of improving the jobs' skill-level to 14% (i.e. by 86%), see second row of Model 3 in *Table 3.3*. Again, controlling for someone's own education reduces the difference, but is far from eliminating it (Model 2): compared with highly educated parents, low-level educated parents still reduce an individual's odds of improving their job status considerably (by around 60%).

Foreign-born people from Central and Eastern European Member States and third countries are particularly disadvantaged.

The coefficients for the impact of parental education remain virtually unchanged if the regression is restricted to native-born people (Model 4 as opposed to Model 2). This implies that social disadvantage which reduces someone's job prospects is by no means a problem only for migrants. However, in the case of migrants it becomes very

significant, as shown in coefficients for the 'country-of-birth' variable in Models 1 to 3. Model 1 takes account of the fact that foreign-born people may have language problems, that they are more likely to have parents with low levels of education, and that their own educational profile is different from that of native populations in the EU. Yet their chances of obtaining a higher-profile job are very much lower than that of native-born people. This affects people from outside the EU but, even more, mobile EU citizens from Eastern EU countries (EU-10, EU-3). By contrast, people from the 'western' EU countries that entered the EU before 2004 (EU-15) tend to have even better chances, everything else being equal, confirming earlier analysis. ⁽²⁵⁷⁾

Training helps to overcome the influence of a disadvantaged socio-economic background.

The findings outlined above strengthen the need to break the vicious circle of low social mobility in the labour market. Evidence is strong that, apart from improving someone's education, undergoing training helps workers significantly to improve their chances of finding employment in high-growth sectors (see *Chart 3.6*) and their chances of having a job with higher skills content (see *Table 3.3*).

But people with low level education and those working in low-skilled jobs undertake training less frequently.

A separate regression explored levels of participation in lifelong learning, using evidence on whether people had recently undertaken a training or education programme. The regression indicates that among workers with only low level

⁽²⁵⁶⁾ See Annex 1 on the classification of occupations with respect to the level of skills they require. There are four skill-level groups: low skilled, lower medium, higher medium, and high-skilled jobs. The odds reflect the chance to move from a lower to the next higher job-skill level.


⁽²⁵⁷⁾ European Commission (2016:2), Chapter 2.2, deals with mobility and migration in the EU.

education, the take-up of lifelong learning is limited. Everything else being equal, their highly educated colleagues have odds twice as high of undertaking training. In addition, workers' odds of undertaking training increases steeply as the job's skill level increases. In other words, those who need the training the most stand a lower chance of actually receiving it, a paradox which may lead to further skills polarisation. Furthermore, confirming recent findings of Biagi et al (2018) ⁽²⁵⁸⁾, the prospect of lifelong learning for workers in firms with fewer than 11 employees is 25% lower than for workers in firms with at least 50 employees. It is another paradox that opportunities for upskilling are particularly restricted in those firms which are most hurt by skills shortages, i.e. small and medium-sized companies. ⁽²⁵⁹⁾ However, the importance of lifelong learning seems to increase over time. Compared with older cohorts, youngsters participate much more frequently in lifelong learning measures. ⁽²⁶⁰⁾

Chart 3.7

Workers' recourse to training depends on many factors.

Odds of recently having attended lifelong learning, 2016



Note: All odds rates are significant at a level below 1%.
Controlled for country differences, sex, type of contract

Source: DG EMPL calculations based on Eurostat EU LFS

[Click here to download chart.](#)

4. POLICIES PROMOTING EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES

A person's social origin is his or her starting position in life. The role of policy intervention is to smooth out the consequences of different starting positions, to improve educational outcomes and to invest in people's employability, enabling them to escape a

⁽²⁵⁸⁾ They find a strongly significant positive link between workers' likelihood of undergoing training and the size of the organisation they work in (Biagi et al (2018), esp. Table 4).

⁽²⁵⁹⁾ European Commission (2018:2), p. 12.

⁽²⁶⁰⁾ ESDE 2017 attributes this finding to young people's continued participation in initial education (European Commission, 2017:1, p. 103).

vicious circle of low skills, low level education, low labour market performance and the transmission of an unfavourable socio-economic background to following generations.

Schools play a key role in promoting equality through inclusive education. Inequalities in schooling outcomes are reflected in unequal opportunities throughout society. However, schools "can work to reduce the impact of these inequalities on students' lives by creating a school environment that is welcoming, stimulating and inclusive for all teachers, staff members and students." ⁽²⁶¹⁾

Inclusive education favours better outcomes. Northern European Member States could serve as benchmarks. The average PISA scores in Northern European Member States are relatively favourable. Sources attribute this finding to specific features of their schooling systems. For example, Nordic ⁽²⁶²⁾ education systems favour a certain 'collective spirit', rather than promoting competition amongst students. ⁽²⁶³⁾ This may be an explanation for their pupils' above-average performance in solving problems by collaboration. ⁽²⁶⁴⁾ Lundahl (2016) finds that despite recent tendencies towards stronger marketisation and privatisation within their education systems, Nordic students still show comparably low degrees of social and academic division. Social justice, equality and inclusiveness are strongly emphasised as education systems make an effort to reach everyone at as early an age as possible. Indeed, the principle of free-of-charge education and the emphasis on early schooling are major common characteristics of Nordic countries' education. ⁽²⁶⁵⁾ Another key to educational success seems to be greater autonomy of educational institutions and greater flexibility of students when choosing study programmes and changing between them. The latter is a key feature which Nordic education tends to have in common with Singapore, the best-performing country in PISA in all major disciplines. Greater flexibility may "encourage [pupils] to take greater ownership of their learning" ⁽²⁶⁶⁾ and best enable them to develop their talents.

Measures targeted at promoting equity and inclusiveness in education are strong success factors for a country's educational performance.

Estonia, like most Nordic EU Member States, combines a below-average proportion of low-performers in PISA with a low influence of social background on

⁽²⁶¹⁾ OECD (2018:3), p. 18.

⁽²⁶²⁾ Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden are considered 'Nordic countries' here.

⁽²⁶³⁾ Bishop (2010).

⁽²⁶⁴⁾ Denmark, Sweden and Finland perform significantly above the OECD average here. OECD (2018:3), p. 25.

⁽²⁶⁵⁾ Equality, inclusion and marketisation of Nordic education: Introductory notes, Lundahl (2016), with reference to Nordic countries.

⁽²⁶⁶⁾ Singapore Government, Ministry of Education, see www.moe.gov.sg/education/education-system

performance. ⁽²⁶⁷⁾ Measures include “counselling and personalised support for weaker students. [In addition], tracking into different educational pathways takes place later than on average in the OECD.” ⁽²⁶⁸⁾ A special focus of teachers’ education is collaborative work as well as “career-long professional development for dealing with diversity in the classroom”, ⁽²⁶⁹⁾ a feature they have in common with other Northern EU countries.

Early intervention yields the highest returns.

Earlier analyses have illustrated that early childhood education and care (ECEC) has a strong positive gender dimension because it facilitates women’s labour market participation. It also helps to improve child development considerably, especially for children from socially disadvantaged groups. It prevents early school leaving and improves the child’s skills and education outcomes. ⁽²⁷⁰⁾ The latest evidence has found strong positive links between the quality and duration of ECEC measures and important outcome variables such as literacy at school entry, school performance and social behaviour. ⁽²⁷¹⁾

A model-based illustration of the effects of early intervention

More generally, policy interventions have a higher return the earlier they occur in a person’s life. ⁽²⁷²⁾ This finding will be illustrated from a macro perspective, i.e. that of the whole economy, using the Labour Market Model (LMM) of the Directorate General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion (DG EMPL). ⁽²⁷³⁾

Sharpening young people’s skill profiles improves their chances of finding a match on the labour market. *Chart 3.8* illustrates an intervention designed to improve young people’s employability, applied to unemployed young people aged from 15 to 24. The model assumes that the training will improve young people’s skill profiles and thereby enhance their chances of achieving a successful match in the labour market. The model further assumes that the investment made at a young age has a positive (albeit somewhat lower) impact on the likelihood of successful matching at older ages.

It is assumed that the match-enhancing training measure will be implemented for an unlimited

⁽²⁶⁷⁾ European Commission (2016:1), p. 17.

⁽²⁶⁸⁾ European Commission (2017:2a), Country Report on Estonia, p. 7.

⁽²⁶⁹⁾ European Commission (2017:2), p. 93.

⁽²⁷⁰⁾ European Commission (2014), p. 111, 112.

⁽²⁷¹⁾ European Commission (2018), Proposal for a Council Recommendation on High Quality Early Childhood Education Systems (draft).

⁽²⁷²⁾ Heckman Equation (2013).


⁽²⁷³⁾ LMM is a general equilibrium model with a particular focus on labour market institutions (Berger et al, 2009, Part II). It covers 15 EU countries but for the current illustration the case of France is used. However, the results are very similar across countries.

period. ⁽²⁷⁴⁾ The cost of the measure is set at 0.5% of GDP. ⁽²⁷⁵⁾ In France, this corresponds to EUR 11 billion per year, or EUR 16 400 per year per unemployed youngster aged between 15 and 24. Annex 2 explains the technical details and the reasoning behind the assumptions made for the simulation.

Chart 3.8

Helping young people to improve their employability pays.

Long-term impact of training given to young unemployed workers (15-24 years), compared to reference (do nothing) scenario



Source: DG EMPL calculations based on LMM

[Click here to download chart.](#)

The simulation shows strong employment gains across all ages.

Although the impact of such investment depends on a number of technical assumptions, ⁽²⁷⁶⁾ the results demonstrate significant long-term effectiveness of early intervention for disadvantaged young people. More of them find a job thanks to the early investment in skills. Employment at a young age increases strongly, by 4%, compared with the ‘do nothing’ scenario. As early intervention is assumed to have a sustainable impact on a person’s employability throughout their life, employment will increase across all age groups. Higher employment pulls up wages, and both trigger tax revenue for the government and for social insurance which, in turn, allows labour tax rates to be lower. The initial cost of the measure has thus been more than offset, given the improvement in people’s labour market performance. As a result of lower wage taxes, workers’ take-home pay will rise, further increasing labour supply. Labour costs will decline (despite increasing gross wages), further fuelling labour demand. Higher employment triggers investment as new workers need to be equipped with capital. Finally, GDP will be higher by 0.8%, relative to the ‘do nothing’ scenario.

The European Pillar of Social Rights promotes equality of opportunities.

The Pillar, in its first chapter, promotes the principle of equal opportunities and access to the labour market. In its very first

⁽²⁷⁴⁾ In the model, which focuses on long-term change, a policy measure implemented for only a limited period of time will necessarily have a zero long run impact.

⁽²⁷⁵⁾ This is modelled here as a corresponding increase of government consumption, funded by an increase of income taxes.

⁽²⁷⁶⁾ These include, most importantly, the assumption about the depreciation over time of skills acquired at a young age. A degressive depreciation rate is assumed here: half of the additional human capital will be depreciated at age 25-39, 67% at age 40-54, 75% at age 55-69.

Box 3.2: Statistical chances and employment rates: Explaining the concept

The analysis about equal opportunities largely relies on the concept of odds rates. Those are statistical chances that a person fulfils a certain criterion, relative to a reference group. Consider the variable 'sex' in Chart 3.11. It says that men's chance of being employed is more than double the chance of women, all other variables being equal. That is, women are the reference category, normalised to 1 (100%). How do those statistical chances relate to standard employment rates (the share of men and women in employment)?

In the age group 25 to 64 years, men's employment rate is 77.6%, for women it is women: 65.3% (EU-28). The odds (chance) of being employed are then:

Men: 3.5 to 1, that is: $\frac{77.6\%}{100\% - 77.6\%}$, Women: 1.9 to 1, that is: $\frac{65.3\%}{100\% - 65.3\%}$.

Thus, odds-ratio men/women is $3.5/1.9=1.84$ in the completely uncontrolled model (which reflects exactly the employment rate difference). The odds rate climbs to 2.13 if, as in the chart, the impact of all other variables are taken into account. This is mainly because women are better educated, which in itself would push their employment rate.

principle the Pillar calls for everyone to have "the right to quality and inclusive education, training and lifelong learning in order to maintain and acquire skills that enable them to participate fully in society and manage successfully transitions in the labour market." In addition, in order to ensure that everyone has access to education and training and receives support to improve their labour market performance, it calls for equal treatment, "regardless of gender, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation." (277)

The Skills Agenda for Europe: Action at EU Level will improve the quality and relevance of training. The recommended action includes, inter alia, upskilling pathways for adults (especially those with low skills), promoting digital skills, improving the sectoral cooperation in addressing skill shortages and promoting vocational education and training (VET). (278)

5. EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES FROM THE GENDER PERSPECTIVE

The regression analyses above indicate that there is no genuine gender dimension to the impact of socio-economic background on the level of skills, qualifications and labour market performance: a disadvantaged background seems to affect women and men alike. (279) The gender perspective in equal opportunities is therefore a separate dimension, and deserves a separate analysis.

Women are better educated than men. There are fewer early leavers from education and training (280) among women (9.2% in 2016 for the EU-28) than

(277) The Pillar's third principle (Equal Opportunities).

(278) See <http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=1223>.

(279) Odds rates calculated for Chart 3.4 are largely the same if the analysis is restricted for men and for women. Other regressions based on PIAAC data confirm this finding.


(280) Source: Eurostat Labour Force Survey. Early school leavers are aged 18-24, having completed at most a lower secondary education and are not in further education or training during the four weeks preceding the survey.

among men (12.2%). This pattern is remarkably consistent across Member States and results in better formal education outcomes for women. Indeed, regression analysis in Chart 3.4 above shows that women of the same age, country of origin and parental education tend to attain a better education than men. This finding has therefore already taken into account that migrant women often have only low education levels. The gender difference in Chart 3.4, while statistically significant, seems relatively small. However, this is only because part of the gender effect is captured by the "age" variable.

Chart 3.9

Women have made more progress than men in education

Odds of increasing one's educational attainment level, by gender (regression), 2016



Note: Odds ratio relative to the age group 60-64 (=1), Controlled for socio-demographic characteristics and country effect. All odds ratios are significant at a level below 1%.

Source: DG EMPL calculations based on EU LFS 2016

[Click here to download chart.](#)


Women have been the driver of educational progress. Chart 3.9 shows the age variable by gender. Relative to men aged 60-64, the odds for those 30 years younger are double as high of having attained a higher education. (281) For women the odds is four times greater and hence they have been the main drivers of educational progress. (282)

(281) Having a better education means progressing either from a low to a medium or from a medium to a high level of educational attainment.

(282) One has to take into consideration that women had started from a lower level. The share of those with at least upper secondary education within the birth cohort 1953-57 is 64% of

However, women's better education does not translate into better labour market performance overall. There is a persistent employment gap between men and women. Since the turn of the century, the gap has narrowed by one third, as shown in *Chart 3.10*. But convergence seems to have come to a halt more recently, at a point where the gap is still 12 pps or the age group 25 to 64. Various well-documented factors explain the difference. Family and household circumstances, policy regimes and institutions, macroeconomic conditions and also cultural attitudes and gender stereotypes cause the gender employment gap to persist. ⁽²⁸³⁾ According to the OECD these findings hold also for second-generation migrants (born in the respective EU country) and sees non-EU born mothers' low educational performance as one explanation. ⁽²⁸⁴⁾

Chart 3.10
The gender employment gap persists
Employment rate by sex, age 25-64



Note: *Migrants* refer to nationals from third countries.
Source: Eurostat EU LFS
[Click here to download chart.](#)

Everything else being equal, men's odds of being employed are more than double those of women.

Chart 3.11 shows that women's odds of being in employment are less than half those of men (see explanatory *Box 3.2*). This finding holds not only for women's chances of having a job (as shown in the *Box*), but also for their chances of finding a job when unemployed or inactive. Here again, after allowing for numerous relevant characteristics, women's job-finding odds are only half those of men.

The family context plays a role. If there are children below the age of 15 in the household, the probability of someone aged 15-64 being in employment (and of moving into employment from being unemployed or inactive) falls significantly, by more than 10% (*Chart 3.11*). If there are elderly people (65+) living in the same household women again have significantly lower odds of being in employment (26% lower). ⁽²⁸⁵⁾ This survey question

women, but 71% of men (EU-28). Amongst the 1983-87 cohort these shares have strongly increased. What is more, the gap has reversed in favour of women. The shares are 85% and 81%, resp. (Source: EU LFS for 2017).


⁽²⁸³⁾ Eurofound (2016).

⁽²⁸⁴⁾ OECD (2017:2), p. 12.

⁽²⁸⁵⁾ These findings are not age biased as the quoted odds are controlled, inter alia, by the person's own age.

was posed to men and women alike, and both tended to answer positively if children or elderly people were in the household. However, as women are much more affected by informal care activities, there is a strong gender component to this finding. Among those not working or only working part-time because of a lack of care facilities (for children, sick people or the elderly), 93% are women. ⁽²⁸⁶⁾

Chart 3.11
Significant employment gap between men and women
Odds of being in employment, relative to reference category (dark, =1)



Note: Logistic regression controlling for age, country differences, education, country of birth.

Source: DG EMPL calculations based on EU LFS

[Click here to download chart.](#)

However, there is a significant gender difference as a result of factors other than socio-demographic characteristics.

The finding of less favourable female labour market performance already takes account of highly relevant gender differences such as care obligations. It also factors in cultural employment obstacles, where those are due to differences in the surveyed countries or to being a migrant (captured by the 'country' and 'country of birth' variables in the regression). In fact, neither socio-demographic characteristics nor cross-country differences can fully explain the gender employment gap. Thus, as is the case with earnings differences (Chapter 4), a big part of the gender employment gap remains unexplained by the usual set of observable explanatory variables used in the analysis underlying *Chart 3.11*.

National institutions and culture explain much of the gender employment gap.

After controlling for all the observable factors, the following potential explanations are likely to describe the remaining gender employment gap: ⁽²⁸⁷⁾

- Cultural attitudes which are not fully explained by country differences or migrant status, for example stereotypes such as the 'breadwinner' mentality that affect women's labour market participation.
- Institutional conditions that may favour in all (or most) EU countries the employment of men rather than women. This may include the design of the tax-benefit system creating high marginal effective tax rates for second earners (the majority of whom

⁽²⁸⁶⁾ Eurostat EU LFS, variable NEEDCARE, 2016., EU-28.

⁽²⁸⁷⁾ Eurofound (2016).


are female) when moving from inactivity to work, or increasing working hours. ⁽²⁸⁸⁾

Moreover, while analyses of the odds of being in employment cover all types of employment, they give no information about the types of jobs people have or about their quality.

Women are overrepresented in jobs requiring a lower level of skills and responsibility. One third of managers are women (*Chart 3.12*), but women are overrepresented in clerical support jobs (68%) and in elementary occupations that require no specific skills (57%). Likewise, women are often forced to organise their work differently from how they would prefer. For example, in the industrial cleaning sector and in house care the majority of workers are women (60% and 90% respectively). About one in three workers in these sectors work part-time and would like to extend their working hours. ⁽²⁸⁹⁾

Chart 3.12
Fewer women in managerial positions, more in low-skilled jobs

Proportion of women, by occupation, 2016 (%), EU-28



Source: Eurostat EU LFS

[Click here to download chart.](#)

Women face a disadvantage when it comes to make progress towards higher-profile jobs.

Women face more problems when it comes to attaining jobs that require higher skills or imply taking more responsibilities. The regression analysis shown in *Table 3.3* above explained an adult person's chances of progressing to a job which requires higher level skills. Numerous individual characteristics have a strong impact on a person's chance of attaining a higher-profile job, including age, education, a migrant background, the household context (care obligations) and parental education. Taking the gender-differences in all these variables into account, the analysis finds that men's odds of progressing to jobs requiring higher skill levels are 30% greater than those of women. This significant gender difference disappears if one does


⁽²⁸⁸⁾ The problem is usually referred to as "implicit taxation of labour" which creates an employment barrier. It usually happens in taxation systems where married partners are taxed jointly.

⁽²⁸⁹⁾ One explanation is clients' preference for having cleaning done outside office hours, leading to relatively small part-time jobs either before or after office hours. See Eurofound (2014).

not control for a person's education ⁽²⁹⁰⁾. In other words, women are better educated than men. It is only for that reason why their odds of improving the skill-level of their job is not lower than men's. Women thus face a systematic disadvantage in achieving individual fulfilment in the labour market. Assuming equal education makes the disadvantage visible.

Chart 3.13
Fewer women in science and ICT, more in health and social work, in education and working in households

Proportion of women in sectors in 2016 (%), EU-28



Source: Eurostat EU LFS

[Click here to download chart.](#)


⁽²⁹⁰⁾ See difference in the "sex" coefficients between Models 1 and 2 in *Table 3.3*.

Box 3.3: Girls lag behind in maths

Chart 1

Girl's disadvantage persists later on

Score difference in maths between girls and boys (% of average score in country)
- controlled for socio-demographic characteristics



Note: 1) PIAAC: "UK" includes Northern Ireland and England only
2) PIAAC: "Belgium" includes Flanders only.

Source: DG EMPL calculations based on OECD PISA 2015, PIAAC 2012

Women lag behind in maths, and the disadvantage persists at older ages.

The Chart's black bars display, for selected countries, the result of a regression analysis based on the 2015 PISA study. It shows the score gap between girls' PISA results in maths and those of boys, by country, taking into account socio-demographic characteristics⁽¹⁾. In most countries girls lag behind. The lighter bars show the corresponding difference in the 2012 PIAAC numeracy test for adults. Though there are limits to the comparability of PISA and PIAAC, in almost every country the school girls' competency gap in maths seems to increase rather than to disappear at higher age.

⁽¹⁾ The regression is controlled for sex, age, employment status, education, and parental education.

This finding is relevant to future skill needs in technical occupations. Cedefop finds that "the supply of ICT and STEM⁽²⁹¹⁾ graduates from upper secondary and higher education is insufficient to meet demand. Too few young people are studying STEM subjects."⁽²⁹²⁾ Indeed, notwithstanding the fact that the health sector is one of the fastest growing occupations for which skill bottlenecks are foreseen in the future,⁽²⁹³⁾ it is the projected shortage of ICT and STEM⁽²⁹⁴⁾ graduates which creates the most urgent need for more female students.⁽²⁹⁵⁾ Especially the ICT sector is largely dominated by men (see *Chart 3.13*). Cedefop suggests that too few people now have the right skills to engage in these studies.⁽²⁹⁶⁾ It is therefore very important for secondary schools to impart knowledge which is relevant to these occupations (*Box 3.3*).

More women than men work part-time. Part-time work is a female phenomenon (*Chart 3.14*). Nearly one third of working women work part-time (31.9% in 2016 for the EU28), while for men part-time work remains marginal (8.8%). The decision whether to work full- or part-time is very different for men and for women. Men tend to work part-time because they cannot find a full-time job or because they are in education and training. For women, the main reason is to look after children or adults.

⁽²⁹¹⁾ STEM subjects include sciences, technology, engineering and mathematics.

⁽²⁹²⁾ Cedefop (2016) and Chapter 2 above.

⁽²⁹³⁾ Cedefop (2016).

⁽²⁹⁴⁾ STEM subjects include sciences, technology, engineering and mathematics.


⁽²⁹⁵⁾ Cedefop (2016).

⁽²⁹⁶⁾ Ibidem

Chart 3.14

Women mainly work part-time to combine with care, men because they could not find full-time work or are in education or training

Main reasons for part-time employment, EU-28, 2016



Source: Eurostat EU LFS
[Click here to download chart.](#)

Women are more likely to work on fixed term contracts. Almost 15% of female workers work on fixed term contracts, 1 pp more than men.⁽²⁹⁷⁾ Temporary agency work is slightly more common among men (2%) than among women (1.3%). Sectors relying on temporary agency workers such as the construction and manufacturing sectors employ a relatively large proportion of male workers.

While men are more likely to be self-employed, women are more likely to have a second job (17.8% of employment of which 10.0% is done by women; EU28, 2016).⁽²⁹⁸⁾ Among the female self-employed, 24% have employees. For men the rate is significantly higher (30%). This may be to some extent because women face more difficulties in gaining access to finance in order to start a business.⁽²⁹⁹⁾

⁽²⁹⁷⁾ Eurostat EU LFS, series [lfsa_etpgacob] among employees aged 15-74.

⁽²⁹⁸⁾ Eurostat EU LFS, series [lfsa_egaps] of those aged 20-64, to ensure consistency.

⁽²⁹⁹⁾ OECD (2016:2).

4.3% of employed women aged 15-64 have a second job, compared with 3.6% of men. This rate has increased among women, but has remained stable among men.

6. CONCLUSION

Improving the supply of skills is necessary for growth. As discussed in Chapter 2 in the context of technological change, globalisation and demographic developments, it is important to upgrade the education and skills levels of the European population and to ensure that the best use can be made of the complementarity between qualifications and physical capital. Reaping the benefits of a larger and better-skilled workforce, combined with more capital investment, will allow for higher GDP growth as opposed to a situation where potential growth and future welfare are limited by a large scale substitution of capital for labour.

Many Europeans risk being left behind as rapid economic transformation creates new needs in terms of workers' adaptability. Good, up to date skills are needed more than ever. Indeed, firms struggle to find workers with the right skills. Almost all EU Member States face serious shortages in skills as basic as reading and writing and as necessary as maths, sciences and cognitive skills. One in five young Europeans are low achievers, according to the latest PISA assessments, and evidence is strong that low-performing students often become low-performing adults. Inadequate skills performance, in turn, has a strong negative impact on the labour market. There is a dynamic employability threshold that many Europeans do not manage to pass. It is dynamic because it is expected to change rapidly, in line with fast-evolving skill needs of digitalised economies.

Social disadvantage weighs on the supply of skills and the chances of attaining higher education. Already the 2017 edition of this review found that the impact of parental background on education and skills outcomes is a major concern from the perspective of equal opportunities.⁽³⁰⁰⁾ This chapter has focused in particular on social mobility. A large proportion of potentially qualified human capital is currently unavailable to firms because part of the workforce is de facto excluded as a consequence of their disadvantaged socio-economic background. The chances of attaining higher education, or being equipped with the skills most relevant for the labour market, are significantly greater for those with highly educated parents than for those whose parents have only a low level of education. While lifelong learning helps to upgrade people's skills, its take-up by people with only a low level of education and by those in low-skilled jobs is poor. In other words, those who need training most are least likely to make use of it.

In the labour market better education alone cannot fully compensate for inherited social disadvantage. Even socially disadvantaged young people who manage to succeed in the education system against the odds do not, on average, achieve the same success in the labour market as those not burdened with similar disadvantage. Thus, they face a double challenge: they need to overcome disadvantages both in the education system and in the labour market.

Social disadvantage is transmitted to subsequent generations. The close link between people's parental background and their own education is reflected in "the correlation of activities and attitudes of parents that improve their children's educational achievements with the parents' own education."⁽³⁰¹⁾ Thus, educational achievements are transmitted across generations and values and attitudes to education and work are passed on to their children by parents. This chapter has demonstrated that socially inherited disadvantages in skills performance as well as educational or labour market attainment function as inter-temporal multipliers of under-achievement.

However, the inter-temporal multiplier of achievement can work positively if the necessary policy action is taken. This finding has important implications insofar as it suggests broad margins for policy action. Reversing the impact of social disadvantage on education and labour market situations may help many more people to pass the employability threshold. It will yield benefits not only for individuals but also for their children and following generations. The earlier in life action is taken, the better it works.

Early intervention is key for breaking the vicious circle of low performance. The positive long-term impact of early childhood education and care (ECEC) on people's school and labour market performance is already well documented. A model simulation shows that improving young workers' employability yields high returns from the macro-economic perspective. Helping young unemployed through targeted training sharpens their skill profile, so that they are more likely to match the skill requirements of the labour market. As a result, employment increases (at older ages as well), as do wages, productivity, investment, and GDP.

Women's unequal opportunities in the labour market are all too evident A good education is not enough. Despite being better educated, women's odds of being in employment are less than half those of men. Confirming earlier evidence, this finding demonstrates that good education is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for performing well in the labour market.⁽³⁰²⁾ Once in employment, there is a

⁽³⁰⁰⁾ European Commission (2017:1), Chapter 3.

⁽³⁰¹⁾ Ermisch and Pronzato (2010)

⁽³⁰²⁾ This had already been found true for migrants in ESDE 2015 and 2016, see European Commission (2016:2) and European Commission (2017:1).

distinctive female job profile. Women stand less chance of working in jobs that require higher level skills and responsibility. In addition, at the same age, with the same or better education and with the same family and other circumstances, women still have 25% lower odds than men of progressing to higher-profile jobs.

The institutional setup and cultural factors keep women's employment rate low. Apart from education, there are other observable socio-economic characteristics that have a strong impact on performance in the labour market, such as age or care responsibilities. But they fail fully to explain the female employment gap. Other factors which keep female employment below the average include cultural habits, and the design of the tax-benefit system creating high marginal effective tax rates for second earners. In addition, the legal framework may often provide limited incentives for men to assume an equal share of caring responsibilities (family-related leaves). A lack of affordable childcare and long-term care services may force women rather than men to not participate in the labour market.

Annex 1: Skill level classes of occupations

The International Labour Office (ILO) has classified occupations according to the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO, version 88). In terms of each occupation's level of skill requirements, the ILO distinguishes four different groups. ⁽³⁰³⁾

Skill level ⁽³⁰⁴⁾:

1. (lowest): Elementary occupations (ISCO group 9).
2. Clerks (ISCO 4), service and sales workers (5), skilled agricultural and fishery workers (6), craft and trade-related workers (7), plant and machine operators and assemblers (8).
3. Technicians and associate professionals (ISCO 3), hospitality, retail and other service managers (ISCO 1), sub-group 4)
4. (highest): Professionals (ISCO 2), managers (ISCO 1) except sub-group 14 (hospitality, retail and other service managers).

For the sake of simplicity, this review assigns the entire ISCO group 1 (Managers) to the highest skill-level (4).

⁽³⁰³⁾ See International Labour Office (2012), p. 14

⁽³⁰⁴⁾ The ILO defines a skill level "as the ability to carry out the tasks and duties of a given job". Ibidem, p. 11.

Annex 2: Matching elasticities in the Labour Market Model

The Labour Market Model incorporates such matching function. The effort workers make to find a job (search intensity) is a determinant of labour supply, whereas the number of vacancies posted by firms reflects the demand side. Frictions in the market imply that only a certain proportion of the vacancies posted and of the search units supplied will actually lead to a match. The proportion obviously depends on the tightness of the labour market: the smaller the number of vacancies per job-searching young worker, the more difficult it will be for job searchers to find a match. The modelled reform hence seeks to improve the efficiency of job matching, especially for young people ⁽³⁰⁵⁾.

Following Berger et al, the improved matching efficiency is technically built into the model as follows:

It is assumed that the government spent 0.5% of GDP for training offered to young unemployed people. This amount is an equivalent to EUR 11.1 billion, or EUR 16 400 for each of the 681.000 unemployed person in France in the age between 15 and 24 years. ⁽³⁰⁶⁾ This amount is equivalent to 49% of GDP per capita in France.

The question is: by how much can the number of matches be improved through spending EUR 16.400 for training on every unemployed young worker? The elasticities found by Bassanini and Duval ⁽³⁰⁷⁾ for 21 OECD countries are applied to the Labour Market Model's matching efficiency: They find that if the government spends an amount equalling 4% of GDP per capita on every unemployed person, the result would be that unemployment declined between 0.2 and 0.6 percentage points. Assuming a reduction at the lower margin (0.2 percentage points), an amount of 49% of GDP per capita spent on every unemployed young worker would thus reduce young people's unemployment by some 2.5 percentage points. The matching efficiency parameter for young people in the model has thus been increased until the reduction of unemployment for people aged between 15 and 24 reaches this benchmark.

⁽³⁰⁵⁾ Berger et al (2009), Part III, pp. 11-13. Also: European Commission (2017:1), Chapter 4 (esp. Box 4.5) follows the same approach for older people.

⁽³⁰⁶⁾ Source: Eurostat LFS for 2016.

⁽³⁰⁷⁾ Bassanini and Duval (2006), p. 32.

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Inequality of outcomes

1. INTRODUCTION ⁽³⁰⁸⁾

Changes in the world of work offer new opportunities but also raise challenges that could increase inequality. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the European labour markets are evolving quickly as a result of the growth of the service-oriented and digitalised economy, of globalisation and of population ageing. All these factors and the way they interact with labour market institutions in turn affect the market distribution of earnings and the distribution of labour and capital. As discussed in Chapter 5, the rise of platform work and other forms of atypical work may also mean that fewer people pay social security contributions.

These changes create winners and losers. For some sectors they imply job destruction while for other sectors they create new employment opportunities. In particular, changes in skills and in routine-based technology can intensify inequality by favouring specific groups of the workforce while reducing the employability of others, particularly lower-skilled workers.⁽³⁰⁹⁾ Changing forms of employment may also provide more flexibility for a better reconciliation of work and private life, notably by making the access of women to the labour market easier. Moreover, new forms of work have the potential to facilitate the employment of disadvantaged groups such as disabled or older workers.

Social disadvantages related to labour market outcomes tend to persist across generations and to perpetuate inequalities. Concerns over the inter-generational transmission of inequality, as discussed in Chapter 3, stem from the finding that inequality and social mobility are negatively correlated, generating an inter-temporal 'multiplier effect' that intensifies social divergences over time. In countries with a high level of inequality parental background is a central determinant of children's social outcomes.⁽³¹⁰⁾ From a social justice perspective, an increasingly uneven distribution of resources in the economy may threaten social cohesion.

Tackling new potential sources of inequalities and supporting fair and well-functioning labour markets is high on the EU's agenda. The European Pillar of Social Rights proclaimed in November 2017 aims to promote equality of opportunity and supportive social services, as well as the right to fair wages and minimum incomes which provide for a decent standard of living. Other dimensions of inequality tackled by the Pillar are the gender pay gap and the right of people with disabilities to a work environment adapted to their needs.

Changes in the organisation of labour are likely to affect the composition of the labour force and the extent of non-standard employment. Although standard employment remains by far the most prevalent employment type, firms have increasingly relied on certain types of non-standard contracts such as short-term temporary and part-time contracts. The proportion of permanent full-time employment, henceforth standard employment, has declined from 62% to 59% in the EU-28 over the

⁽³⁰⁸⁾ This chapter was written by Stefano Filauro and Gilles Thirion with contributions from Tim Van Rie. Valuable data support was provided by the European Central Bank and EUROSTAT.

⁽³⁰⁹⁾ OECD (2015).

⁽³¹⁰⁾ Corak (2013).

period 2002–2016, although this proportion seems rather stable from 2010. ⁽³¹¹⁾

Non-standard forms of work have implications for workers' wellbeing. ⁽³¹²⁾ Non-standard workers, in particular temporary employees and the self-employed, tend to experience higher income volatility and uncertainty. In addition, new forms of work challenge social protection models that were primarily designed to meet the needs of standard workers. Similarly, non-standard forms of work should take account of the need to reduce barriers to employment access for people with disabilities.

Against this background, this chapter intends to examine three dimensions of inequality:

- In view of the changes in the world of work described in Chapter 2, **to what extent are income inequalities increasingly determined by labour market forces, especially earnings and income from self-employment?** What is the role played by hourly wages and hours worked in the context of changing forms of employment?
- Shifts away from traditional forms of employment have various social consequences. Beyond challenges to income inequality and social protection, ⁽³¹³⁾ **do material deprivation and income poverty vary significantly across different forms of employment?** If non-standard workers face a greater risk of income poverty, does household wealth tend to reinforce or reduce the risk of material deprivation?
- Even if there have been important improvements ensuring greater equality between women and men in education and labour market participation, gender differences remain a significant source of inequality today. As Chapter 3 demonstrates, equality of opportunities, notably in terms of improving educational achievement, does not necessarily translate into equal labour market outcomes and equal access to social protection. **How large is the gender pay gap and what have been the key drivers of this gap?** To what degree have recent changes in the world of work affected gender segregation in the labour market?

⁽³¹¹⁾ Standard work has declined from 62% to 59% of all work over the period 2002–2016 as more workers have flexible contractual arrangements – see Chapter 2 and European Commission (2017a, p.79) for an assessment over the last decade with LFS data.

⁽³¹²⁾ Non-standard workers are broadly defined as temporary full-time employees, self-employed and part-time workers.

⁽³¹³⁾ Challenges for social security schemes that will be discussed in Chapter 5.

2. INCOME INEQUALITY

2.1. How different income components shape income inequality

Addressing inequality is one of the priorities of the EU reform agenda and the European Pillar of Social Rights. Overall, the promotion of equality of opportunity and the right to decent wages affect inequality from the market side, while access to social services and the right to a minimum income tend to reduce inequality from the welfare side.


The income distribution is more unequal today than in the 1980s in almost all Member States, ⁽³¹⁴⁾ although, on average, income inequalities in the EU as a whole in recent years have been lower than in other advanced economies and world regions, for example the US (see *Chart 4.1*). ⁽³¹⁵⁾ From the most recent available data (2016), income inequality in the EU is stabilising, although at higher levels than before the crisis. ⁽³¹⁶⁾

However, the recent evolution of inequalities observed across the Member States is the result of different structural and cyclical forces which have led to inequality trends differing from country to country in the aftermath of the crisis. ⁽³¹⁷⁾

Chart 4.1

Disposable income inequality in the EU-28 is lower than in the US.

Income inequality in the EU-28, the euro area and the US. Gini index (%)



Note: Income distribution in the EU-28 and the euro area is considered among the EU-wide population, after applying purchasing power parities. Market income is considered without taxes and transfers, including public pensions. Equivalence scale: square root of the household size.

Source: Own calculations. EU-SILC data. US data from the OECD Social and Welfare Statistics. DOI: 10.1787/socwel-data-en

[Click here to download chart.](#)

⁽³¹⁴⁾ European Commission (2018a).

⁽³¹⁵⁾ See Filauro (2018) for an estimate of income inequality at the EU level. However, in the rest of the chapter inequality is examined at the country level given that most policy levers to reduce disposable income inequality are at the level of the Member States.

⁽³¹⁶⁾ See also European Commission (2017b) and European Commission (2018b). More recently, S80/S20 reduced from 5.2 in 2015 to 5.1 in 2016 and the Gini index from 31.0 to 30.8, although the significance of these small changes should be further examined (ilc_di11 and ilc_di12).

⁽³¹⁷⁾ See Chapter 1 for an assessment of income inequality changes in the period 2012–2016.

Box 4.1: Inequality decomposition by income components

The following analysis considers the contribution of different income components ⁽¹⁾ to overall income inequality in order to investigate the impact of market components such as **earnings** and **self-employment income** as opposed to pensions and benefits.

According to Shorrocks (1982) there is a unique 'decomposition rule' by which overall income inequality may be expressed as the sum of inequality contributions from each of the income components. The components considered are: i) labour earnings; ii) self-employment incomes; iii) public pensions; iv) unemployment benefits and v) other benefits and social contributions. Capital income is not considered as its reliability differs significantly across countries. ⁽²⁾ The income concept used is therefore gross income because social contributions and personal income taxes are not available for all components and all countries in the EU-SILC data. ⁽³⁾

According to this rule the proportion of total income inequality contributed by component k can be computed as:

$$s_k = \frac{\text{cov}(Y_k, Y)}{\sigma^2(Y)}$$

That is, the covariance between income component k and overall gross income over the variance of gross income.

This decomposition rule has useful properties such as the independence of the choice of the inequality measure and a straightforward interpretation. Income components with a positive contribution to inequality ($s_k > 0$) have a "disequalising" impact and the converse is true for components with a negative contribution ($s_k < 0$). Intuitively, if an income component is positively correlated with overall household income, it contributes positively to income inequality, and conversely if this is negatively correlated (e.g. in the case of benefits: those who receive higher benefits are usually those with lower household income, thus the correlation with household income is negative and the effect of benefits on inequality is mitigating).

Inequality contributions are expressed in proportionate terms, normalised to 100%, or in absolute terms, as contributing to inequality as measured by the Gini index. In addition, the proportions of earnings and self-employment income are presented to assess how relevant they are to overall household gross income. Each income component is examined separately and no indirect effect is taken into account in the decomposition; indeed no intuitive counterfactual income distribution stems from the decomposition exercise. ⁽⁴⁾

This decomposition is different from the exercise in Section 4.2 of Chapter 1 as here the "true" income distribution is taken as it is and decomposed by income components, while Chapter 1 shows the reduction in inequality from a counterfactual income distribution without welfare benefits to the "true" income distribution with benefits.

⁽¹⁾ Sources, components or factors are used interchangeably.

⁽²⁾ Countries which derive capital income from tax registers record it more accurately than countries with survey data.

⁽³⁾ Many countries in the EU-SILC report income sources recorded gross of personal income taxes and social contributions, therefore a decomposition of disposable household income may be biased (as the values for the income components are not net, some countries may record social contributions in the labour earnings, others in the personal income taxes).

⁽⁴⁾ See Shorrocks (1982): in the case of social transfers, the decomposition identifies the contribution of social transfers to disposable income, while a certain benefit system may also affect substantially the individual choices that shape market incomes – e.g. working more hours to earn more as opposed to being able to receive some benefits.

Changes in the labour market influence income inequality. Economic inequalities can be thought of as the result of different forces. First, the distribution of labour and capital income at the individual level results from market forces. Second, individuals pool and share resources into the household, so the household composition contributes to determine market income distribution. Third, the redistributive impact of the welfare state is delivered through taxes

and benefits to shape disposable income inequality. ⁽³¹⁸⁾ These three forces can be briefly summarised as: i) market outcomes, which are mainly the result of labour and capital income; ii) the household context and iii) the tax-and-transfer system. Clearly, all three forces interact in many ways.

⁽³¹⁸⁾ Raitano (2016).


Box 4.2: Contribution of pensions to income inequality.

The contribution of public pensions to inequality has increased recently. At the same time, the pensions have generally increased as a proportion of gross incomes ⁽¹⁾ for most countries and up to 17% for the EU in 2015.

Chart 1

Pensions contribute significantly to inequality in many EU countries

Pensions' contribution to inequality (%), 2015



Note: Proportionate contribution of pensions to inequality. Gross incomes. Reading example: in Ireland public pensions contribute to ca. 2% of the overall income inequality.
Source: Own calculations. EU-SILC data.

If pensions make a negative contribution to inequality it means they have an "equalising effect" while a positive contribution to inequality is to be interpreted as "disequalising". Whether public pensions have an equalising impact on inequality – or the reverse – on inequality depends on the link they have with the previous contributory history of the workers. The more the pension systems are linked to previous earnings, the more pensions are likely to reproduce the same inequalities as those created in the earnings distribution. Conversely, public pensions disconnected from previous working history can even be inequality-mitigating, if those who receive higher pensions are not those at the top of the income distribution.

Overall, the more pensions are correlated with gross incomes (i.e. high pensions go to high-income individuals and low pensions go to low-income individuals), the more they contribute to inequality. However, no clear-cut conclusions can be drawn on the redistributive impact of pensions from this analysis because it would be necessary to look within cohorts at the contributions made from and the replacement levels of initial market income (pre-retirement) and this is beyond the analysis presented here. Moreover, due to data limitations, the incomes considered in this analysis are gross of personal income taxes, so no inference on the contribution of pensions to post-tax income inequality can be made from this chart. Recent evidence on the redistributive impact of pensions is presented in the Report on Public Finances in the EMU 2017 (European Commission 2018a – see Part III).

⁽¹⁾ See also Chapter 1

Within this framework the forecast of future income inequalities is a complex exercise.

Two distinct phenomena are emerging. First, the combination of new technologies and globalisation may lead to occupational polarisation accompanied by increasing wage inequality. Second, the shift in the balance between the inputs of labour and capital may result in greater income inequality between capital owners and workers.⁽³¹⁹⁾ However, these two phenomena could be either intensified or mitigated by the two forces mentioned above, household structure and composition and tax-and-benefit systems. While the trends in the labour market and in household composition seem to push in the direction of greater

⁽³¹⁹⁾ See Chapter 2, Sections 3.4 and 4.2 respectively.

inequality, ⁽³²⁰⁾ tax-and-benefit systems may well exert a countervailing influence.

This section analyses the extent to which labour market forces have shaped and contributed to income inequality over the last decade.

⁽³²¹⁾ To this end, a decomposition technique is applied to assess how far market income components, as opposed to welfare sources, contribute to determine

⁽³²⁰⁾ Recent evidence as regards assortative mating, the fact that people choose their partner from the same socioeconomic group, seems to suggest that household formation exacerbates inequality in some EU countries (Eika *et al.* 2014).

⁽³²¹⁾ Labour market forces are intended as channel i) in the previous scheme. The income considered in the following analysis is gross household income as defined in the Box 4.1.

income inequality. ⁽³²²⁾ Market components are defined as earnings and income from self-employment, while pensions are considered mainly as deferred earnings. Welfare components consist of unemployment benefits and other benefits (grouped together). Income inequality thus depends on how equally distributed is the income from the different components and on how big they are, i.e. the effect of the income components on the overall income distribution depends on their size and progressivity (see *Box 4.1*).

Changes in the world of work shape income inequality via earnings from paid employment and income from self-employment. In view of the stabilisation of non-standard work over the last decade ⁽³²³⁾ it is instructive to observe how much the contributions to inequality of self-employment income and of earnings from paid employment have changed as a result.

In turn, labour market changes are likely to be accompanied by changes in benefit systems. The impact of the benefit systems on the income distribution can be assessed through the contribution that the welfare components make to income inequality. In the following analysis the results of the decomposition are presented with a particular focus on the contribution of labour earnings and income from self-employment to income inequality. These are complemented by an analysis of changes in their relative importance.

Labour earnings are quite stable after a decline in the crisis years (see *Table 4.1*). ⁽³²⁴⁾ The general trend in the EU-28 over the last decade ⁽³²⁵⁾ has been for labour earnings as a proportion of gross income to remain broadly stationary, while the contribution of self-employment income has fallen by 1.7 pp ⁽³²⁶⁾ and that of public pensions has increased by 2.6 pps.

⁽³²²⁾ Raitano (2016) has carried out a similar analysis for clusters of countries analysing changes in the period 2008–2011.

⁽³²³⁾ See Chapter 2 for an assessment of changing working relationships in the period 2002–2016.

⁽³²⁴⁾ EU-SILC years refer to the previous income year, e.g. 2012 refers to 2011 incomes, except for the UK and IE.

⁽³²⁵⁾ These figures refer to unweighted averages of country shares.

⁽³²⁶⁾ This is in line with Chapter 2's finding that the proportion of self-employed in the labour force is not increasing significantly, though there are country differences.

Table 4.1

Labour earnings have remained broadly unchanged as a proportion of disposable income since the crisis years

Income components as percentages of gross income. EU-28

	Earnings	Self-employment income	Public pensions	Unemployment benefits	Other benefits
2007	67.98%	9.15%	14.54%	1.55%	6.61%
2008	68.04%	8.94%	14.32%	1.45%	7.04%
2009	67.73%	8.48%	14.89%	1.44%	7.25%
2010	66.14%	8.33%	15.71%	1.92%	7.67%
2011	65.92%	8.04%	16.25%	1.93%	7.63%
2012	66.01%	7.95%	16.57%	1.79%	7.43%
2013	65.77%	7.76%	17.06%	1.82%	7.37%
2014	65.63%	7.84%	17.21%	1.86%	7.20%
2015	66.05%	7.98%	17.00%	1.75%	6.97%
2016	66.17%	7.83%	17.12%	1.61%	7.02%

Note: The components sum to 100%. Other benefits include sickness, disability benefits and educational allowances. Private pensions are not shown as they make up less than 1% of household income.

Source: Own calculations, EU-SILC data.


[Click here to download table.](#)

While labour earnings as a proportion of household income have been fairly constant, the contribution of earnings to inequality has increased slightly over the last decade. Labour earnings accounted for about 86% of income inequality in 2007 and about 88% in 2015. Meanwhile the impact of income from self-employment fell, from about 15% of income inequality in 2007 to about 12% in 2015. ⁽³²⁷⁾ Also the contribution of pensions increased slightly (from a neutral contribution in 2007 to approaching 3 pps in 2015) while that of social benefits has remained almost unaltered (see *Chart 4.2*).

Chart 4.2

Labour earnings' contribution to income inequality has increased slightly over time

Income components' contribution to income inequality (%). EU-28



Note: The sum of the proportionate contributions adds up to 100%. Gross income. Reading example: in 2015, 86.8% of inequality came from earnings, 12.4% from self-employment income, 2.7% from pension, while the inequality-reducing contribution of social benefits was around 2.3%. 2016 figure does not include Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg and Malta.

Source: Own calculations, EU-SILC data.

[Click here to download chart.](#)

Over the EU as a whole, labour earnings as a proportion of total household income tended to decrease during the crisis as unemployment

⁽³²⁷⁾ However, survey data may not be ideal for recording self-employment income. Indeed, it is not ideally recorded in EU-SILC in some countries and its volatile nature prevents it from being the best proxy for the wellbeing of the self-employed, as discussed in the next section.

rose. However there are important differences at country-level as indicated by the red cells in *Table 4.2*.

Table 4.2

Some countries have seen a significant reduction in labour earnings as a proportion of total household income (EL, ES, FI) while others have seen an increase (DE, HR, HU)

Earnings share over gross household income (%)

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
AT	64.1%	63.6%	62.1%	60.9%	61.4%	62.5%	62.2%	61.9%	62.5%
BE	68.8%	68.9%	68.6%	69.5%	69.5%	69.4%	69.5%	68.1%	67.5%
BG	69.0%	69.9%	67.0%	68.7%	66.4%	67.8%	63.0%	65.9%	66.8%
CY	68.7%	69.1%	69.2%	69.8%	70.2%	68.3%	65.2%	65.5%	65.4%
CZ	63.6%	64.1%	62.8%	62.9%	62.7%	62.5%	62.6%	63.1%	63.4%
DE	66.9%	68.6%	68.6%	68.4%	69.2%	68.9%	69.7%	69.5%	70.2%
DK	73.2%	73.8%	72.5%	71.4%	71.1%	70.3%	69.5%	69.5%	71.3%
EE	81.7%	79.3%	75.1%	75.1%	76.3%	77.3%	77.2%	79.7%	77.7%
EL	54.5%	54.1%	53.7%	51.8%	50.5%	48.2%	46.4%	46.2%	47.5%
ES	70.9%	71.0%	69.3%	68.0%	66.8%	64.4%	63.5%	64.3%	64.6%
FI	68.1%	68.7%	67.4%	66.7%	67.0%	66.9%	66.2%	65.8%	65.2%
FR	64.4%	64.5%	63.6%	63.1%	63.2%	63.1%	63.2%	63.4%	63.7%
HR			64.2%	65.3%	64.7%	65.5%	66.1%	66.9%	67.7%
HU	60.5%	59.1%	58.5%	57.8%	59.3%	60.6%	61.9%	62.9%	63.6%
IE	64.1%	61.6%	59.9%	62.4%	63.4%	63.3%	64.1%	65.0%	66.4%
IT	51.9%	51.8%	50.4%	51.6%	51.4%	51.7%	51.6%	52.0%	51.7%
LT	74.2%	72.4%	67.4%	65.1%	68.5%	66.6%	67.6%	68.3%	66.7%
LU	71.4%	69.2%	68.9%	68.3%	67.7%	67.1%	68.2%	68.1%	66.9%
LV	81.3%	80.0%	72.2%	69.5%	71.9%	73.3%	74.6%	75.8%	71.6%
MT	69.5%	69.6%	69.2%	70.6%	71.0%	71.4%	71.6%	72.4%	75.9%
NL	70.6%	70.8%	70.2%	69.2%	69.1%	69.1%	66.8%	66.1%	66.9%
PL	65.1%	65.9%	64.0%	64.2%	64.3%	63.1%	64.0%	63.7%	64.9%
PT	65.7%	66.3%	66.6%	67.6%	66.4%	64.5%	64.3%	64.7%	64.7%
RO	66.9%	65.3%	63.4%	62.2%	63.4%	64.4%	65.8%	67.2%	66.5%
SE	70.4%	71.0%	70.4%	70.0%	71.7%	71.3%	70.8%	70.5%	70.7%
SI	70.6%	70.6%	69.8%	69.4%	69.1%	69.3%	68.7%	69.3%	69.5%
SK	69.4%	69.8%	68.1%	67.1%	65.8%	63.4%	65.7%	66.7%	66.2%
UK	71.4%	69.3%	69.0%	69.3%	66.6%	66.6%	67.9%	67.1%	67.2%

Note: Bright green marks each country's peak year, when earnings as a % of gross household income were highest. Bright red marks each country's trough year, when earnings as a % of gross household income were lowest. E.g. DE had its trough in 2008 (earnings = 66.9% of gross income) and its peak in 2016 (earnings = 70.2% of gross income).

Source: Own calculations, EU-SILC data.

[Click here to download table.](#)

To sum up, over the last decade in the EU:

- labour earnings as a proportion of gross income have stayed almost unchanged over the period 2008–2016
- but the contribution of labour earnings to income inequality has increased slightly (from 86% to 88%), while
- self-employment income, which made up less than 8% of gross income in 2016, accounted for around 12% of inequality in that year.

2.2. The role of hours worked in shaping earnings inequality

Inequality in annual earnings, which represent two thirds of gross household incomes, depends partly on the distribution of hours worked. In theory, if the hours worked are unequally distributed among workers with the same pay, this may significantly affect the earnings distribution and hence overall income inequality. ⁽³²⁸⁾ Recent evidence shows that hours of work have steadily declined over the last three decades: in the EU average weekly hours have fallen by one hour since 2008, both as a coping mechanism for firms facing a slump in demand during the crisis ⁽³²⁹⁾ and also as a result of a structural trend

⁽³²⁸⁾ See Eurofound (2017) for an assessment of earnings inequality in the Member States.

⁽³²⁹⁾ European Commission (2017a), Part I.1.

towards more part-time work and greater flexibility in the labour market. ⁽³³⁰⁾

Changes in the world of work that affect the distribution of hours among workers are likely to have an impact on earnings inequality. Hours of work may contribute to the overall earnings dispersion, depending on how unequally distributed they are among workers and how correlated they are with wages. In general, policies which are designed to provide incentives for those who earn little to work more hours tend to reduce earnings inequality. Conversely, policies that tend to reduce the working hours for those who earn less may increase inequality. ⁽³³¹⁾

Hours and wages contribute significantly to inequality in Germany, France and the United Kingdom. *Table 4.3* illustrates the contributions of wages and hours and their correlation to overall earnings inequality in these three countries for which some evidence has recently come out. ⁽³³²⁾ In Germany and France the correlation between hours worked and hourly wage is becoming positive and larger, along the lines of what has been happening in the United Kingdom since the 1990s.

Table 4.3

Correlation between hours worked and hourly wage is increasing over time in DE and FR

Earnings inequality and its decomposition by hourly wage, hours worked and their correlation (%)

		Inequality	Hourly wage	Hours worked	Correlation
UK	1991	0.255	51.4%	37.0%	11.6%
	1995	0.260	52.4%	35.0%	12.6%
	2000	0.226	55.4%	34.3%	10.3%
	2007	0.227	59.2%	28.2%	12.6%
	2012	0.248	59.3%	29.4%	11.2%
DE	1991	0.174	68.0%	31.9%	0.1%
	1995	0.147	70.2%	40.9%	-11.1%
	2000	0.185	54.3%	36.7%	9.0%
	2007	0.230	53.5%	35.8%	10.7%
	2012	0.229	53.4%	33.7%	12.9%
FR	1991	0.118	81.8%	29.2%	-10.9%
	1995	0.133	75.9%	30.0%	-6.0%
	2000	0.131	70.7%	30.2%	-0.9%
	2007	0.119	66.4%	34.6%	-1.0%
	2012	0.137	62.6%	30.3%	7.1%

Note: Earnings inequality measured with the mean logarithmic deviation. Earnings inequality ranking: the UK is the most unequal country, followed by DE and then FR as the most equal one.

Source: Checchi, García-Peñalosa and Vivian (2016).

[Click here to download table.](#)

If non-standard forms of employment result in low paid workers working fewer hours, they may make the earnings distribution more unequal. In other words they fail to compensate for low earnings through more hours worked. ⁽³³³⁾

⁽³³⁰⁾ See Chapter 2.


⁽³³¹⁾ This is relevant in view of the increase in the proportion of temporary contracts which are of short duration, up to 56% in 2016 (European Commission 2017a – Part II).

⁽³³²⁾ Checchi *et al.* (2016).

⁽³³³⁾ Inequality in hours worked may derive from the increasing use of part-time work that may help reconcile work and private life, especially for women. However, Checchi *et al.* (2016) notice that this is just one driver of the greater role of hours inequality to explain earnings inequality.

Figure 4.1 shows country-level general trends over the last decade for the EU as a whole and for three specific clusters of countries: the North-Western (NW), Mediterranean (MED) and Central-Eastern European countries (CEE).⁽³³⁴⁾ While for the EU as a whole⁽³³⁵⁾ the earnings dispersion seems to have been stable over the last decade, it has followed different paths within the three clusters of countries.⁽³³⁶⁾

Figure 4.1
Earnings inequality



Note: Inequality measured as variance of log earnings.

Source: Benczur P., Cseres-Gergely Z. and Harasztosi P. (2018). JRC publication using EU-SILC data.

[Click here to download figure.](#)

- In all regions, earnings inequality depends on the hourly wage in the first place, while in NW countries working hours play a relatively strong role in making earnings unequal. Also, the reduction of hours in NW countries tends to affect those whose earnings are already low, as the positive covariance implies, thus further increasing inequality. All in all, structural changes in the labour market have led to a reduction in hours because employment gains have occurred in

⁽³³⁴⁾ This analysis is based on Benczur *et al.* (2017). This paper considers as North-Western countries: Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom; as Mediterranean countries: Cyprus, Greece, Spain, Italy, Malta and Portugal and as Eastern European countries: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia.

⁽³³⁵⁾ Both EU-wide and cluster-wide figures result from making individual incomes comparable via purchasing power parities, so the meaning of the supranational figures is to be considered as if they were a single entity. NB.: This is not the praxis of averaging country-specific figures across the different countries.

⁽³³⁶⁾ The Structure of Earnings Survey (SES) is considered better suited than the EU-SILC for this decomposition. This is because earnings and the working status of the respondent are recorded for the current time in SES, while in the EU-SILC information on the working status refers to the current year but earnings usually refer to the previous year. However, SES is available only every four years (last wave 2014), while the EU-SILC is an annual data collection.

sectors where greater proportions of non-standard jobs are concentrated.⁽³³⁷⁾ On the other hand, it is likely that these changes have led to productivity gains.⁽³³⁸⁾

Table 4.4
Earnings inequality decomposition by hourly wage, hours worked and their covariance (%)

Contributions to earnings inequality												
		EU				MED				CEE		
		Hourly wage	Hours worked	Covariance		Hourly wage	Hours worked	Covariance		Hourly wage	Hours worked	Covariance
EU	2006	84.7%	24.5%	-9.2%	NW	2006	61.4%	39.6%	-1.0%			
	2007	83.9%	24.9%	-8.7%		2007	62.3%	37.5%	0.2%			
	2008	82.7%	24.1%	-6.8%		2008	61.6%	35.7%	2.7%			
	2009	83.0%	23.5%	-6.5%		2009	62.4%	35.3%	2.3%			
	2010	81.4%	24.0%	-5.4%		2010	62.8%	34.2%	2.9%			
	2011	80.0%	24.2%	-4.2%		2011	61.6%	34.4%	4.0%			
	2012	80.1%	24.2%	-4.2%		2012	62.9%	33.0%	4.2%			
	2013	80.3%	25.0%	-5.2%		2013	65.9%	33.9%	0.1%			
	2014	80.5%	24.3%	-4.8%		2014	65.0%	33.3%	1.7%			
	2006	86.8%	25.9%	-12.8%		2006	88.0%	14.2%	-2.2%			
	2007	85.1%	25.3%	-10.4%		2007	89.1%	14.0%	-3.1%			
	2008	85.9%	20.3%	-6.2%		2008	90.1%	13.7%	-3.8%			
	2009	84.9%	22.0%	-6.9%		2009	89.0%	13.6%	-2.6%			
	2010	84.5%	21.4%	-5.9%		2010	87.7%	15.2%	-2.8%			
2011	84.3%	20.8%	-5.1%	2011	88.0%	14.3%	-2.3%					
2012	80.7%	25.0%	-5.7%	2012	89.4%	14.1%	-3.5%					
2013	77.6%	25.7%	-3.4%	2013	87.6%	14.0%	-1.6%					
2014	80.1%	24.0%	-4.0%	2014	88.8%	12.9%	-1.8%					

Note: Hours worked refer to the interview year, while wage data to the year before (except the UK and IE). The authors have checked the effect of this misalignment using panel data and found that its effect is likely to be small on the level of aggregation used here.

Source: Benczur P., Cseres-Gergely Z. and Harasztosi P. (2018). JRC publication using EU-SILC data.

[Click here to download table.](#)

New forms of work that imply fragmented careers and frequent periods of inactivity may lead to greater earnings inequality. In general, flexible contractual arrangements are useful tools for firms to cope with a slump in demand⁽³³⁹⁾ and to reconcile work, private and family life. However, open-ended forms of employment are those that regularly lead to greater equality in hours worked. The European Pillar of Social Rights therefore provides policy guidance stating that "the transition towards open-ended forms of employment shall [be] fostered."⁽³⁴⁰⁾

3. NON-STANDARD WORK AND INEQUALITY: A MULTIDIMENSIONAL VIEW

Tackling labour market segmentation and differences in living standards between standard and non-standard workers is a key priority of the EU reform agenda.⁽³⁴¹⁾ The Pillar states that every worker has the right to fair and equal treatment regarding working conditions regardless of the type and duration of the employment relationship. However, this objective must be reconciled with

⁽³³⁷⁾ See Chapter 2.

⁽³³⁸⁾ European Commission (2017a), Part I.1.

⁽³³⁹⁾ Boeri and Jimeno (2016). Usually firms may decide to react to output shocks adjusting directly the total employment or acting on the intensive margins, i.e. the hours worked by the employees.

⁽³⁴⁰⁾ The European Pillar of Social Rights: Principle 5 (European Commission 2017c).

⁽³⁴¹⁾ This section follows the International Labour Organisation's definition of "non-standard", and refers to non-standard work as temporary and part-time workers, as well as the solo self-employed.

another Pillar objective: providing the necessary flexibility for employers to make changes for economic reasons, while encouraging innovative forms of work such as entrepreneurship and self-employment.

Permanent full-time employment may continue to decrease in the future. While the extent of the impact of technological change and new forms of work on non-standard contracts is not yet clear, permanent full-time employment has decreased by 4 pps over the last 15 years (59% in 2016). As discussed in Chapter 2, the rise of new forms of employment reflects structural transformations in the world of work which have tended to lead to increasingly flexible work arrangements. These include changing trends in women's labour market participation, increasing competition from globalisation and technological change. The link between new technology and changing labour markets is particularly evident for platform workers, most of whom are solo self-employed. Solo self-employment has increased by 2 pps over the last 15 years and now accounts for 11% of total employment. There is a real possibility that this group will continue to increase with the advent of platform work, thus posing important challenges, notably in ensuring fair working conditions and adapting social protection systems. Another challenge is to ensure inclusive education and training for people with disabilities so that they can reap the potential benefits of new forms of work. ⁽³⁴²⁾

The standard of living of individuals working in new forms of employment requires close attention. In order to obtain an accurate picture of the standard of living across these different types of work, this section considers evidence on income poverty and material deprivation – two key indicators of the EU social inclusion targets in the EU 2020 strategy ⁽³⁴³⁾ – as well as wealth measures. Taking into account dimensions other than income is crucial for non-standard types of work, for the following reasons.

- Comparing the income poverty risk of the self-employed with that of other types of workers poses some challenges. One is the blurred distinction between personal and business income and assets, and the degree to which the self-employed may use physical assets that the enterprise owns – such as a car or electronic devices – as a coping strategy in hard times. Another issue is the reliability of income data for the self-employed collected in surveys, because of higher non-response rates and under-reporting of variations in income. ⁽³⁴⁴⁾
- Another challenge is the importance of wealth and precautionary saving behaviour as buffers in the face of higher income uncertainty. A divergence between income poverty and material deprivation

⁽³⁴²⁾ Young people and older workers with disabilities are over-represented among those who lack basic skills.

⁽³⁴³⁾ These indicators are computed on the basis of the EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) data.

⁽³⁴⁴⁾ Hoeremans, and Marx (2017).

measures may occur because some categories of non-standard workers may adjust their living standards during good times in order to cope with higher expected income volatility. Conversely, they may be able to accept such uncertainty because other household members have stable jobs or because they can draw on savings and wealth in case of hardship.

- There may also be important self-selection effects among the self-employed. It is possible that some people are more likely to become self-employed because their existing wealth and savings make this possible.

Against this background, income-based analyses may fail to capture relevant aspects of non-standard workers' wellbeing. In particular, an increase in non-standard forms of work may further distort the relationship between income-based indicators and material deprivation. Sections 3.1 and 3.2 take a multidimensional view of wellbeing by assessing the incidence of income poverty, material deprivation ⁽³⁴⁵⁾ and wealth distribution for workers on non-standard contracts (including part-time workers), comparing them with workers on 'standard' contracts (i.e. full-time permanent contracts). Section 3.3 considers the extent to which differences in wellbeing between non-standard and standard workers can be explained by socio-economic characteristics.

3.1. Living standards of non-standard workers: income poverty

Higher reliance on non-standard forms of work could increase living standard differences among workers. This could occur as a result of two types of distributive effects: the impact on the distribution of income between capital and labour (as discussed in Chapter 2) and the remuneration of labour across employment types. The impact on workers' wellbeing of a possible shift towards a dominance of non-standard forms will ultimately depend on the types of new non-standard jobs that are created or destroyed, and the policy response to these changes, such as investment in education, training and social security. ⁽³⁴⁶⁾

Non-standard workers are not a single homogenous group in terms of age, education, occupation and sector. While the likelihood of being in temporary employment is higher for younger and less educated workers and women, the solo self-employed tend to be older and are predominantly men. ⁽³⁴⁷⁾ Jobs in new forms of work related to

⁽³⁴⁵⁾ A few country-specific studies have raised this issue (Hoeremans and Marx 2017), but a systematic treatment is still lacking. Seva and Larsson (2015) show that in Sweden, the self-employed tend to have a higher AROP compared with employees, but that the degree of material deprivation does not differ significantly.

⁽³⁴⁶⁾ See Chapter 2.

⁽³⁴⁷⁾ European Commission (2017a – part II).

technological change, such as platform work, tend to go to the well-educated. In particular, platform workers currently represent a relatively small, but growing, proportion of non-standard workers. Thus categorising non-standard workers as on part-time or full-time temporary contracts, or as self-employed with or without employees, does not fully reflect the increasing complexity of the different types of non-standard forms of work. For example, much of the rise in part-time work is related to labour market participation choices by women because it can be a way to reconcile work and family life, but part-time work can also be involuntary, imposed upon the worker by the employer and, in some instances, facilitated by in-work social benefits meant to increase labour market participation.

Standard workers face a much lower risk of income poverty than that of non-standard workers. Chart 4.3 shows the risk of income poverty by employment type in the EU-28 from 2008 to 2016⁽³⁴⁸⁾, indicating that this risk is strongly related to the type of employment contract. In 2016 poverty rates varied from just 5% for standard workers to 20% for full-time temporary employees, 24% for the self-employed and 26% for part-time workers.

Growing poverty rates among non-standard workers during the crisis are symptomatic of labour market segmentation, i.e. the existence of a persistent divide between workers holding different types of contracts. Whereas poverty rates among employees on open-ended contracts have remained stable at about 5 percent over the last decade, poverty increased among all types of non-standard workers in 2009-2014. This development coincided with the economic downturn, as labour markets adjustments and high economic uncertainty affected firm's willingness to hire workers on full-time open-ended contracts. The rise of in-work poverty among non-standard workers underlines the challenge of ensuring that flexible labour market arrangements do not disproportionately affect the most vulnerable workers.⁽³⁴⁹⁾ This in turn emphasises the need to address in-work poverty, which is a core principle of the Pillar of Social Rights.


⁽³⁴⁸⁾ Individuals are deemed to be at risk of poverty (AROP) if their equivalised household income is below 60% of the median household income. This chapter refers to AROP using 'risk of poverty' and 'income poverty' interchangeably throughout the text. As the analytical focus of this chapter is on differences by employment type, it considers only the employment status of the head of household, i.e. the household member with the highest individual income.

⁽³⁴⁹⁾ Two examples are the risk of poverty for people with disabilities, which is much higher than that for people without disabilities (11.5% as against 9.1% in 2016 for the EU-28), and the risk of poverty for workers with a non-EU origin (26.9% in 2016 for the EU-28) (ilc_iw15).

Chart 4.3

The risk of income poverty (AROP) for standard workers is substantially lower than for non-standard workers.

At-risk-of-poverty rates by contract type in the EU, 2008-2016



Note: The analysis is conducted on household's heads aged 18-69, which are identified as the individual with the highest income within the household.

Source: EU SILC, own calculations.

[Click here to download chart.](#)


The solo self-employed faces a higher risk of poverty than the self-employed with employees.

Chart 4.4 illustrates this sharp difference in the poverty risk of different categories of self-employed people. The solo self-employed, who, unlike the self-employed with employees, have increased in number in recent years, have been facing a growing risk of poverty since 2009. At the same time, the risk of poverty among the self-employed with employees has risen only moderately over the last decade.

Chart 4.4

Self-employed workers without employees face a substantially higher poverty risk (AROP) than self-employed worker with employees.

Poverty rates among the solo self-employed and self-employed with employees, 2008-2016.



Note: The analysis is conducted on household's heads aged 18-69, which are identified as the individuals with the highest income within the household.

Source: EU SILC, own calculations.

[Click here to download chart.](#)


Households headed by part-time workers face the highest risk of poverty, at 25% in 2016.

It is important to note that this analysis focuses on heads of households, the individuals with the highest income within each household. Hence, by definition, households headed by part-time workers tend to feature a significantly higher risk of poverty than those headed by someone who works full-time. This is confirmed by additional analyses that reveal higher poverty rates for part-time workers in general. Poverty increased relatively steadily over the last decade among this group, which may reflect the rise in

Chart 4.5

The risk of poverty (AROP) among standard workers is generally very low across all Member States but the living standards of non-standard workers tend to display very large variations, across both countries and types of contract.

At-risk-of-poverty rates in the EU28 Member States, by type of contract



Note: Poverty rates are based on the official Eurostat threshold, namely 60% of the national median income. They are based on the period 2014-2016 so to ensure sufficient observations for each contract type. Estimates are based on household's heads aged 18-69. The head of household is the individual with the highest income within the household.

Source: EU SILC, own calculations
[Click here to download chart.](#)

involuntary part-time work. This trend appears to have been reversed in 2016, possibly due to better cyclical conditions.

Poverty rates among non-standard workers vary deeply across Member States. Chart 4.5 shows that while the risk of income poverty among full-time employees is below 10% in all Member States, it tends to be significantly higher for the solo self-employed and to vary widely across Member States. In most cases, poverty rates range between 10% and 40% for the self-employed and temporary employees. Despite the wide range of poverty risk across different contract types in many Member States, part-time employees face the highest risk of poverty in most of them.

3.2. Living standards of non-standard workers: material deprivation

Material deprivation is measured on the basis of whether households can afford certain material items that are typically needed to participate in society. According to Eurostat's definition, an individual is considered as materially deprived when living in a household that lacks 3 or more of 9 specific items. ⁽³⁵⁰⁾

The risk of material deprivation faced by non-standard workers remains above that of standard workers but the gap is less pronounced. Chart 4.7 shows that the risks of poverty and material

deprivation are similar for workers overall in the EU, at 10%. However, this masks important differences in the rates of material deprivation and poverty between different employment types. On the one hand, temporary workers face a high risk of both material deprivation and poverty (20%), which suggests that these two indicators lead to consistent conclusions. On the other hand, material deprivation among the self-employed and part-time workers is substantially lower than the poverty risk, while the opposite is true for standard workers who face a relatively higher risk of material deprivation (9%, against 5% for the poverty rate).

Chart 4.7

The risk of poverty (AROP) and material deprivation are similar for workers overall in the EU, at 10%, but this masks important differences in the rates of material deprivation and poverty between employment types.

At-risk-of-poverty (AROP) and material deprivation rate by employment type in the EU-28, 2015-2016.




Note: The analysis is conducted on household's heads aged 18-69, which are identified as the individuals with the highest income within the household.

Source: EU SILC, own calculations
[Click here to download chart.](#)

⁽³⁵⁰⁾ The items a deprived household may not be able to afford include: a one week annual holiday away from home; face unexpected expenses; avoid arrears (mortgage or rent payments, utility bills or hire purchase instalments); afford a meal with meat, chicken or fish every second day; afford to keep the home warm; afford to have a car for personal use (if wanted); phone; washing machine; and colour TV.

Chart 4.6
Material deprivation rates by contract type, average 2014–2016



Note: Material deprivation rates are computed on the basis of the period 2014–2016 so to ensure sufficient observations for each contract type. Estimates are based on household's heads aged 18–69. The head of household is the individual with the highest income within the household.


Source: EU-SILC, own calculations

[Click here to download chart.](#)

Material deprivation is more sensitive than income poverty to the economic cycle, and this is true across all types of contract. Unlike poverty, there was a significant upturn in material deprivation rates during the crisis. However, material deprivation has decreased steadily across all forms of employment since the peak of the crisis, reaching an all-time low in 2016. The results displayed in *Chart 4.8* suggest that material deprivation rates among temporary employees decreased rapidly after the crisis and are now at a lower level than before 2008.

Chart 4.8
Households headed by a self-employed worker are significantly better off in relation to the risk of material deprivation than they are in relation to the income-based poverty risk (AROP)

Material deprivation rates by contract type, EU-28, 2008–2016




Note: Standard employee: full-time employees on permanent contract, Non-standard employee: Part-time workers and full-time employee on temporary contract, Self-employed.

Source: Own calculation, EU-SILC

[Click here to download chart.](#)

Chart 4.9
Solo self-employed face a higher risk of material deprivation

Material deprivation rates in the EU: solo self-employed vs self-employed with employees



Source: EU SILC, own calculations.

[Click here to download chart.](#)

Distinct developments across social indicators reflect the sensitivity of poverty rates to the income distribution. The different dynamics of the at-risk-of-poverty rate compared to material deprivation is explained by the nature of these two indicators. The risk of poverty is measured on the basis of a household's disposable income relative to (60% of) the national median disposable income. As a result, poverty rates over time are primarily driven by developments in the income distribution rather than living conditions per se. For instance, if all households experience an income contraction by 5 percent, poverty rates remain unchanged while material deprivation would most likely surge more or less rapidly depending on household's degree of financial resilience.

The EU-28 Member States exhibit a high degree of variation in material deprivation rates (see *Chart 4.6*). Material deprivation among the solo self-employed in the years 2014–16 was lower than for standard workers in 15 Member States. In most

Member States, with the exception of Cyprus and Greece, and more significantly Romania, where solo self-employment is prevalent in the farming and agriculture sectors, the disadvantage of the self-employed relative to standard workers is fairly limited.

3.3. Impact of socio-economic factors on risk of poverty and material deprivation of non-standard workers

The policy implications of inequality of outcomes across employment types depend crucially on the factors which are behind the risk of poverty and material deprivation. The socio-economic characteristics of non-standard workers may explain the differences in material deprivation and poverty across employment forms. Workers employed on non-standard contracts are more likely to be young or to have only low level education ⁽³⁵¹⁾ and hence are more likely to be materially deprived or at risk of poverty. In turn, this could indicate that the socio-economic background of the individuals working under different types of contract is the main source of inequality across contract types rather than the type of employment itself. To reduce such risks, as discussed in Chapter 5, policy intervention could take the form of expanding the social protection coverage of non-standard workers.

Macroeconomic and labour market conditions as well as labour market regulations play a role in determining the standard of living across employment types. For instance, adverse macroeconomic conditions and high youth unemployment can result in a higher concentration of young overqualified non-standard workers. In contrast, decisions to work under non-standard contracts, in particular to become self-employed, may well depend on the availability of other financial resources, for instance on holding sufficient savings or other assets or on the income of other household members.

Taking into account socio-economic factors partly explains the living standard gap between standard and non-standard workers. Adjusted gaps between standard and non-standard workers are obtained by estimating a probit model that takes into account specific individual factors such as education, sector of activity, age, and household structure characteristics. *Chart 4.10* and *Chart 4.11* respectively compare the non-adjusted and adjusted gaps across employment types relative to standard employees. The difference between adjusted and non-adjusted gaps captures the higher risk of poverty or material deprivation incurred by workers under non-standard contracts everything else being equal (i.e. education, age, economics sector, gender, household structure). These estimates taking into account the different profile of non-standard workers confirm that these workers remain disadvantaged compared to standard full-time employees irrespective of key workers and

household's characteristics. Nevertheless, the adjusted gaps are significantly lower for temporary employees, and solo self-employed workers.

Chart 4.10

The risk of poverty (AROP) and material deprivation are generally higher for non-standard workers.

Unadjusted gap in the risk of poverty (AROP) and material deprivation between non-standard and standard workers in the EU-28, pp (2014-2016)



Note: The bars refer to the difference in material deprivation and poverty rates between non-standard employment (i.e. temporary, part-time workers, and self-employed) and standard workers (full-time permanent employees).

Source: EU-SILC, own calculations.

[Click here to download chart](#)

Chart 4.11

Taking into account socio-economic characteristics leads to a smaller but still non-trivial gap between temporary, part-time, solo self-employed and standard workers.

Adjusted gap in the risk of poverty and material deprivation between non-standard workers and standard employees, pp (2014-2016).



Note: The adjusted gap captures the likelihood of material deprivation among non-standard workers as compared to standard workers, controlling for individual and households' socio-economic characteristics. The adjusted gap is estimated using a probit model which estimates the effect on the probability of poverty and material deprivation of being under a certain form of employment, controlling for age, education, economic activity, and household structure. The reference group is standard workers.

Source: EU-SILC, own calculations.

[Click here to download chart](#)

Solo self-employed have nearly the same likelihood of being materially deprived than standard workers once socio-economic characteristics are taken into account, but still face a higher risk of income poverty (*Chart 4.11*). While the risk of poverty and the material deprivation rate for the solo self-employed are respectively 23 pps and 5 pps higher than for standard employees, this gap reduces to 14 pps and 2 pps once the different socio-economic characteristics between these groups are taken into account (compare *Chart 4.10* with *Chart 4.11*). Comparing adjusted gaps with unadjusted gaps shows that the likelihood of being materially deprived or at risk of poverty is clearly linked with personal

⁽³⁵¹⁾ European Commission (2017a).

characteristics such as the age or the education attainment.

The adjusted gap for non-standard workers with respect to standard employees remains larger in terms of income poverty than material deprivation. This trend is most visible in the case of the self-employed, where the two measures convey apparently contrasting messages even after correcting for socio-economic characteristics; the difference is significantly less pronounced for full-time temporary employees and part-time workers, especially after the adjustment.


The implications of these findings are twofold. On the one hand, they suggest that workers' characteristics explain a substantial part of the lower living standards of the solo self-employed, in particular when it comes to the risk of material deprivation. On the other hand, the fact that the solo self-employed face a relatively high risk of income poverty but a low risk of material deprivation after controlling for socio-economic characteristics may reflect the difficulty of income measurement for these self-employed workers.

Beyond the role of different employment types, material deprivation is strongly associated with the level of education and age. As shown in *Chart 4.12* individuals who have benefited from secondary and tertiary education have, respectively, a 7 pp and a 16 pp lower probability of being materially deprived than individuals who have had only primary education. The risk of material deprivation decreases progressively over a worker's lifetime, reflecting the fact that, over time, incomes tend to increase and that households can draw upon a larger stock of assets. The results of the regression analysis of the determinants of poverty emphasise the crucial role of education.

Chart 4.12

The risk of material deprivation decreases with age and the level of education attainment.

Determinants of the likelihood of material deprivation, probit regression estimates, 2016



Note: Probit estimates of the determinants of material deprivation in the EU (2016), controlling for age, education, economic sectors, household structure. The reference group is standard workers.

Source: EU-SILC, own calculations.

[Click here to download chart.](#)

3.4. Wealth distribution across employment types

Differences between income poverty and deprivation rates among non-standard workers are related to household's savings and wealth. Thus, we further document the distribution of wealth by contract type. Data on net wealth distribution from the household finance and consumption survey (HFCS) compiled by the European Central Bank (ECB) reveal that the distribution of wealth varies strongly across employment types in the EU (see *Chart 4.13*).

Chart 4.13

The self-employed have the highest average wealth in selected EU countries

Wealth distribution across types of contract, 2014-2016



Note: The countries available in the HFCS database are: Belgium, Germany, Estonia, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta, the Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia, Finland.

Source: European Central Bank, Household Financial Consumer Survey (HFCS).

[Click here to download chart.](#)

The self-employed are the group with the highest average wealth even though there are significant differences within this group. The self-employed with employees hold nearly twice as much net wealth as the solo self-employed, but there is evidence of much greater variation among the self-employed than among standard employees.

Employees on permanent contracts have higher average net wealth than those on temporary contracts. This is consistent with evidence of the extent to which young people are more likely to be on temporary contracts. ⁽³⁵²⁾

These findings underline the vast diversity of forms of non-standard work. On the one hand, they may partly reflect the difficulty of measuring the income of the self-employed mentioned above. On the other hand, the discrepancy between income poverty risk and material deprivation risks among the self-employed may to some extent result from the ability of the self-employed to draw on other assets in order to maintain their standard of living as their income fluctuates. However, given the wide variation among

⁽³⁵²⁾ Due to lack of information on contract types in certain countries (e.g. Finland), drawing a distinction between employees on permanent and temporary contracts is not always possible. Hence, certain employees are reported to as 'form of contract NA' (Not Available).

the self-employed, aggregate figures may well hide significant inequalities within this group.

4. GENDER

The EU and its Member States have a long-standing commitment to the principle of equal pay for male and female workers. ⁽³⁵³⁾ This principle is enshrined in the EU Treaties ⁽³⁵⁴⁾ and has been reaffirmed by the recast Directive on gender equality in the area of employment and occupation (2006/54/EC). Furthermore, the European Pillar of Social Rights states that women and men have the right to equal pay for equal work or work of equal value.

4.1. Recent developments and drivers of the gender pay gap

Despite significant improvements in gender equality in recent decades, the pay gap between men and women persists in the EU. The unadjusted gender pay gap, which measures the difference between average male and female earnings as a percentage of average male earnings amounted to 16.3% in 2016 in the EU (see *Chart 4.14*). ⁽³⁵⁵⁾ Although the pay gap has narrowed by nearly 1.5 pp since 2006 in the EU as a whole, the degree of improvement has varied across Member States, as shown by the large differences in the pay gap that continues to prevail in 2016 (*Chart 4.15*). At the same time, female employment continued to increase slowly but steadily, reaching 67% in 2017 from 63% in 2013 according to Eurostat figures.



Note: EU-27, data on the pay gaps in 2015 and 2016 are provisional.
Source: Eurostat based on the Structure of Earnings Survey (wave 2014).
[Click here to download chart.](#)

The unadjusted pay gap differs from the concept of 'equal pay for equal work'. Making the

⁽³⁵³⁾ In the Treaties since 1957 (today: TFEU art. 157).

⁽³⁵⁴⁾ The Principle 2 states: "Women and men have the right to equal pay for work of equal value."


⁽³⁵⁵⁾ Estimates of the gender gap are published by Eurostat [sdg_05_20]. Earnings are measured as average gross hourly earnings of paid employees based on data from the Structure of Earnings Survey.

distinction between the different sources of the gender pay gap is crucial in order to design policies addressing it. The overall unadjusted gender pay gap includes differences in hourly wages for work of 'equal value' (unexplained gap) together with the effect of differences in the average (observable) labour market characteristics of men and women (explained gap). The unexplained pay gap is obtained by taking into account differences in the average socioeconomic characteristics of men and women in the labour market.

Women still earn 11.5% less than men once the pay gap is adjusted to account for average gender specific characteristics. *Chart 4.15* displays the results of a recent Eurostat study ⁽³⁵⁶⁾ which decomposes the difference in hourly earnings between men and women. Results show that, on average in the EU, 31% of the pay gap can be attributed to the difference in average characteristics between men and women such as age, educational attainment, occupation, sector, working hours, and other observable worker's attributes. The size of the 'corrected pay gap' (the 'unexplained' gap) varies however across Member States, ranging from 2.5% in Belgium and 7.8 in Germany to 24.2% for Lithuania.

Chart 4.15
Average socio-economic characteristics of women participating in the labour market do not account for a large portion of the pay gap in most Member States.

The gender pay decomposed: explained, unexplained and total pay gap (2014)



Source: The decomposition was performed by Eurostat (2018) based on data from the Structure of Earnings Survey (wave 2014).

[Click here to download chart.](#)

The explained part of the gender pay gap is the largest in Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, Finland, and Denmark. In these Member States a large portion of the overall gender pay gap is explained by differences in the characteristics of males and women in these labour markets (*Chart 4.15*). In contrast, taking into account the differences

⁽³⁵⁶⁾ Eurostat (2018). The explained part of the gender pay gap is the result of an Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition and is to be interpreted as the pay gap in place if the average woman had its observable characteristics such as occupation, years of experience, education remunerated at the same rate as the average man. Therefore, this is the component of the gap which stems from female and male workforce having, on average, different characteristics (average occupation, years of experience, education).


in the average characteristics of women and men in Italy, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Lithuania, Croatia, and Slovenia leads to a corrected pay gap that is higher than the overall pay gap.

Sectoral segregation is the key driver of the explained gender pay gap in the EU. Above 30% of the total gender pay gap is explained by the overrepresentation of women in relatively low paying sectors. As shown in *Chart 4.16*, labour market participation of women tends to be higher in low paying sectors such as primary education, health and social work activities as well accommodation and food services. On the other hand, women tend to be underrepresented in better paid sectors such as information and communication and electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply, which feature a strong male overrepresentation. Working time (full-time/part-time) accounts for an additional 11% of the gender pay gap, but education attainment, enterprise size, and occupation have a negative explanatory power, reducing the explained part of the gap.

Chart 4.16

Male workers are overrepresented in construction, manufacturing and certain utilities sectors; female workers in education, social and household services

Share of female workers (%) and mean hourly earnings (Euro) by economic sector, EU28, 2016



Note: Selected sample of sectors from NACE rev. 2 classification.

Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey [lfsa_egan2] and Structure of Earnings Survey [eam_ses14_47].

[Click here to download chart.](#)

The gender pay gap is also driven by segregation effects in the labour markets which are not captured by standard decomposition methods.

This implies that a gender pay gap subsists within sectors, occupations, and education attainment groups. In terms of sectors, education is an example of a female-dominated domain in which the top-paying jobs are largely held by men. Indeed the share of female teachers is highest in early childhood education (over 85% for each of the Member States where data are available), which pays lower wages. Women also tend to represent a majority of secondary teachers in most Member States but the share of women teaching in tertiary education is typically below 50%. ⁽³⁵⁷⁾

⁽³⁵⁷⁾ Eurostat (2016).


Women continue to be under-represented in economic and political decision-making positions

The Gender Equality index computed by the European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE), reveals that, although the biggest gains for gender equality in the past 10 years have been in access to decision-making positions, the lack of access to power positions remains an outstanding form of gender inequality. ⁽³⁵⁸⁾ For instance, the share of female ministers in national governments across the EU amounted to 27.7% in November 2017, slightly below their representation in national parliaments (29.3%). As regards corporate leadership, women accounted for about a quarter (25.3%) of board members in the largest publicly listed companies in EU Member States in October 2017 (*Figure 4.2*). France (43.4%) is the only Member State featuring at least 40% of women (or men) in boards as legislative quota were introduced in 2011 to require companies to meet such 40% target. The only nine Member States with at least 25% women in corporate boards are mostly North-Western countries along with Italy and Lithuania.

Figure 4.2

Women account for 25.3% of board members in the largest publicly listed EU companies

Representation of women and men on the boards of the largest listed companies in the EU, October 2017



Source: European Institute for Gender Equality, Gender Statistics Database.

[Click here to download figure.](#)

Institutional and wage-setting mechanisms are also likely to contribute to the pay gap in female-dominated sectors. This is especially the case in countries where women are concentrated in sectors such as health and social work activities services (see *Chart 4.16*) with limited collective bargaining. ⁽³⁵⁹⁾

The higher incidence of women employed in non-standard employment widens the pay gap.

This phenomenon largely stems largely from the fact that women experience a higher risk of career interruption which makes them relatively less likely to be on permanent contracts. As discussed in the previous Section, temporary and part time workers tend to be disadvantaged compared to standard workers and translates into lower expected hourly wages. Temporary workers also tend to accumulate less job-specific human capital because employers are reluctant to grant access to training to employees with a higher likelihood of changing their jobs.


⁽³⁵⁸⁾ European Institute for Gender Equality (2017).

⁽³⁵⁹⁾ European Commission (2018c).

Chart 4.17

Women perform more hours of unpaid work in all EU Member States

Paid and unpaid working hours, by sex and by Member State



Note: Countries ranked by the size of the gap in unpaid working hours.

Source: Eurofound, 2015 European Working Condition Survey.

[Click here to download chart.](#)

The gender pay gap tends to translate into a pension gap. This is particularly the case in countries where pensions are based on contribution records.⁽³⁶⁰⁾ Pension gaps and the risks that women may face in terms of lower unemployment entitlements due to their greater presence in part-time work will be further explored in Chapter 5.

Once unpaid work is included, women work more hours than men on average.⁽³⁶¹⁾ Considering only paid work, men work on average 39 hours per week as opposed to the 22 hours worked by women. However, women spend 22 hours in unpaid work compared with less than 10 hours for men.⁽³⁶²⁾ Therefore, gender gaps in total hours worked tend to be larger in those countries where unpaid work among women is the highest. Nevertheless, there are Member States where men and women perform nearly similar hours of paid and unpaid work, e.g. Denmark and Sweden (see *Chart 4.17*). Another reason for the gender pay gap lies in women being more frequently employed in part-time and temporary employment which is associated with lower hourly wages.

Member States with low wage gaps tend to feature low female labour market participation.

This suggests that the factors which explain women's decisions to enter the labour market, such as their expected earnings, are crucial in determining pay gaps. For instance, in countries with low pay gaps like Italy and Poland women tend to work in better-paid occupations, whereas lower-skilled women have low labour market participation rates. At the same time certain low-paid work such as nursing and cleaning is

⁽³⁶⁰⁾ European Commission (2018d): In 2016, the gender gap in pensions (65+) stood at 36.6% in the EU.

⁽³⁶¹⁾ For instance, unpaid care or assistance (other than childcare) is mainly provided by women.


⁽³⁶²⁾ Eurofound (2015).

usually carried out within the household rather than delegated via formal work contracts.⁽³⁶³⁾ The positive association between the gender pay gap and female employment shares suggests that the factors which explain women's decisions to enter the labour market, such as their expected earnings, are crucial in determining pay gaps.

Chart 4.18

There is a positive correlation between female labour market participation rates and the gender pay gap

Women's labour market participation and gender pay gap, 2016



Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey [lfsi_emp_a] and the Structure of Earnings Survey.

[Click here to download chart.](#)

In Member States that have achieved higher female employment rates, women still tend to face hurdles in accessing well-paying jobs.

While family-compatible work arrangements may enable women to enter the labour market, this possibly comes at the cost of reduced access to high-paying jobs, promotions and skill development. Hours worked also tend to exacerbate the pay gap in Member States in which a significant proportion of women work part-time (e.g. Germany and the Netherlands).

⁽³⁶³⁾ Boll *et al.* (2017).

5. CONCLUSIONS

Income inequality in the EU-28 has remained fairly constant over the last five years after a slight increase in the aftermath of the crisis. ⁽³⁶⁴⁾

In the context of a relatively small but potentially growing proportion of non-standard workers in the future labour force, the contribution of labour earnings to inequality has increased slightly. In parallel, labour earnings as a proportion of household income have returned to approximately pre-crisis levels, albeit with differences across countries. On the other hand, the impact of income from self-employment on income inequality seems to be declining: it has fallen both as a proportion of household income (to less than 8%) and as a contribution to inequality.

Non-standard types of employment are likely to affect the way earnings inequality develops because of the distribution of working hours.

This may be the case especially as a result of the increase in temporary contracts with a short duration. Hourly wages are the main source of earnings inequality in Eastern European countries, while in North-Western European countries earnings inequality depends on the distribution of working hours. Hours worked appear to be unequally distributed among workers and they are correlated with wages: those who earn higher hourly wages tend to work more. This pattern is becoming increasingly visible in Mediterranean countries. New types of work may often help to reconcile work and family life and they may be a key element of economic resilience in crisis times, but if they result in fragmented careers and frequent periods of inactivity, they may lead to greater earnings inequality through greater inequality in hours worked.

Inequality in the new world of work may also emerge from increased reliance on flexible work arrangements, such temporary work and self-employment, which in turn lead to higher income volatility. Since these flexible workers, especially the self-employed, may draw on accumulated wealth and savings to smoothen their consumption over time, it is important to consider their living standards from a multi-dimensional viewpoint.

The analysis in this chapter reveals the importance of complementing income-based assessments of wellbeing with material deprivation and wealth measures.

While poverty rates are higher for the self-employed than for standard workers, the self-employed are not significantly more at risk of material deprivation than standard workers. Self-employment is however a very heterogeneous category of employment, encompassing business owners, the highly educated solo self-employed and more disadvantaged workers in, for instance, agriculture, retail and tourism sectors. Wealth distribution across employment types reflects

this heterogeneity: the self-employed with employees hold nearly twice as much net wealth as the solo self-employed. Overall, despite the evidence of a non-standard contracts 'penalty', the welfare gap across employment types is partly explained by workers' individual socio-economic attributes. It is likely that the growth of non-standard types of employment will affect both the distribution of wealth and the risk of material deprivation.

Gender inequality has broader socio-economic dimensions.

Despite major increases in female labour market participation and higher levels of educational attainment for recent female cohorts, certain obstacles to gender equality remain. Gender pay gaps persist, even after controlling for occupational and sectoral differences and women's generally shorter working hours. These inequalities for women of working age are likely to translate into gaps in social protection coverage, including pensions, as Chapter 5 will show.

The European Pillar of Social Rights identifies gender equality and the segmentation in the labour market as challenges

and encourages Member States to promote actions that mitigate within-country inequality. The principles promoting fair wages and minimum income (Principles 6 and 14) address these issues as well as the recognition of gender equality in monetary terms.

⁽³⁶⁴⁾ European Commission (2018a); European Commission (2018b).

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Access and sustainability of social protection in a changing world of work

1. INTRODUCTION ⁽³⁶⁵⁾

In the European Union, economic and social progress are intertwined and complementary.

Well-designed social policies enable workers to make the most of new opportunities in the labour market and contribute to economic prosperity. Social protection and inclusion policies provide workers with security and income predictability when moving to a new job or facing life cycle risks. Enabling services allow workers to acquire new skills, remain in good health or stay at work when relatives need care. ⁽³⁶⁶⁾ By contrast, if social policies do not enable Europeans to fulfil their potential at school and in the labour market, there will eventually be negative consequences for the sustainability and the adequacy of social protection.

By international standards, European societies have very high levels of social protection and social inclusion.

Despite substantial national differences in the organisation and effectiveness of their welfare systems, European countries rank among the most equal and inclusive in the world. ⁽³⁶⁷⁾ The recent proclamation of the European Pillar of Social Rights underlines the shared ambition to uphold and further enhance these high standards in a changing world of work and to improve equality of opportunity.

Many Europeans are concerned about the future, and particularly about the prospects of the younger generations. ⁽³⁶⁸⁾

Many common challenges are linked to societal and demographic change, including population ageing. ⁽³⁶⁹⁾ While increased life expectancy is a great achievement in itself, ageing populations will have a major impact on pension and health care expenditure. This extra cost will be borne by a shrinking workforce. ⁽³⁷⁰⁾ Population ageing will also bring increasing demands for long-term care, while changing family and household structures affect the provision of informal care. Policies to improve work-life balance through care services, leave and flexible work arrangements can foster labour participation.

Technological change and globalisation create new opportunities, but also call for modernising welfare systems and the provision of public goods and services.

Technological innovations and global information flows have created employment opportunities that would have been difficult to imagine even two generations ago. At the same time, these developments create new needs, such as access to digital communications. Moreover, welfare systems that are tailored to traditional labour markets (in terms both of coverage and financing) may be suboptimal in a new context of more diverse employment relations and frequent career changes.

⁽³⁶⁵⁾ This chapter was written by Endre György, Jörg Peschner, Simone Rosini and Tim Van Rie. Contributions by Petrica Badea, Annelisa Cotone, Lucie Davoine, Bettina Kromen, Alberto Tumino and Eurofound are gratefully acknowledged.

⁽³⁶⁶⁾ Annual Growth Survey 2018 "Social protection systems should provide adequate and well-targeted income support, foster labour market participation and ensure equal access to quality services."

⁽³⁶⁷⁾ ILO (2017); European Commission (2017a).

⁽³⁶⁸⁾ European Commission (2017b).

⁽³⁶⁹⁾ European Commission and Economic Policy Committee (2018); Social Protection Committee (SPC) and European Commission (2018).

⁽³⁷⁰⁾ Tightening labour supply may be partly offset by automation, see Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018), as well as by migration and – in the longer term – higher fertility rates (European Commission 2017b).

This chapter provides an overview of how social protection systems interact with the changing world of work. First, it discusses access to social protection benefits, in particular for non-standard employees and the self-employed. Secondly, it surveys the role of means-testing, the debate on universal basic income, activation requirements and access to services. The third section assesses recent trends in the financing of social protection, including the roles of social security contributions and of general government contributions, as well as the outlook for social protection financing in a changing world of work. The final section sets out conclusions.

1.1. Social protection expenditure

Social protection helps individuals and families to cope with social risks or needs through income support, cost compensation or social services. It provides support to households and individuals who face unemployment, sickness or injury, disability, old age or the death of a spouse or a relative. Social protection systems also help to meet the cost of housing and address the specific needs of families, particularly those with children. In addition, they seek to prevent the social exclusion of marginalised groups. ⁽³⁷¹⁾

Social benefits can be provided by public authorities or private actors such as civil society or charity organisations, trade unions or employers. Social protection includes both schemes where coverage is mandatory and those where it is voluntary, as long as they are based on the principle of social solidarity. Individual arrangements which operate solely in the interest of the insurance taker (such as private life insurance) are not considered as social protection. Direct exchanges, such as care facilities run by employers and only accessible to children of their employees, are not included in social protection either. Nor is the share of health care costs that recipients pay out of their own pockets considered as social protection (as opposed to the part covered by social insurance). ⁽³⁷²⁾

The social protection systems of EU Member States are very diverse, in line with their different traditions. They differ with regard to "the size of the budget and the way it is allocated, the sources of financing, the degree of coverage of risks in the population." ⁽³⁷³⁾ Whereas certain social protection systems focus on protecting the general population, others provide insurance to workers or target the neediest. Many features of national systems can be traced to specific historical circumstances and political

⁽³⁷¹⁾ Education and training are not included in this concept, unless they are directly linked to any of the aforementioned risks (e.g. training for the unemployed).

⁽³⁷²⁾ For additional information, see Eurostat (2016).

⁽³⁷³⁾ From European Commission (2017a).


preferences, including the organisation of public finances. ⁽³⁷⁴⁾

The total size of the social protection budget differs across countries. In general, countries with higher levels of GDP per capita tend to spend a larger share of GDP on social protection (*Chart 5.1*). However, a substantial variation remains even within low- and high-spending groups. ⁽³⁷⁵⁾

Chart 5.1

The overall budget for social protection benefits varies across Member States

Expenditure on social protection benefits and GDP/capita, 2014



Note: GDP per capita in Purchasing Power Standards; Expenditure on social protection benefits as % of GDP

Source: Eurostat: National accounts for GDP per capita [tec00114]; ESSPROS for social expenditure [spr_exp_gdp] [Click here to download chart.](#)

[Click here to download chart.](#)

There is also a large variation in the relative size of specific social protection functions across countries. Old-age and survivors' pensions tend to be the largest spending item, followed by sickness, health care and disability (except for Ireland, Croatia and Germany where sickness, health care and disability are larger). There is a substantial variation in the relative proportions of expenditure devoted to unemployment, children/family benefits, housing and social exclusion (*Chart 5.2*). To some extent, these differences are the result of policy choices, but they also reflect different population and risk profiles across countries, including cyclical conditions for risks such as unemployment.

The relative weight of cash transfers – as opposed to benefits in kind – varies across countries as well as between different functions. Benefits in kind are provided either in the form of goods and services, or reimbursement of expenses (where the beneficiary needs to provide proof of


⁽³⁷⁴⁾ Preamble 19 of the European Pillar of Social Rights states "In particular, the establishment of the European Pillar of Social Rights does not affect the right of Member States to define the fundamental principles of their social security systems and manage their public finances, and must not significantly affect the financial equilibrium thereof."

⁽³⁷⁵⁾ Ireland and Luxembourg are notable outliers. This is at least partly due to the specificity of GDP measurement in these countries. In Luxembourg, many cross-border workers contribute to the economic output of the country. For Ireland, the effects of globalisation and relocation of multinational companies may distort measurement of aggregate domestic economic activity (see Box 1.1. in Country Report 2018, SWD(2018) 206 final).

Chart 5.2

Depending on the country, old age and survivors' pensions represent one to two thirds of social protection expenditure

Expenditure on social protection benefits by function, 2014



Source: Eurostat, ESSPROS.


[Click here to download chart.](#)

payment to qualify for the benefit). Cash benefits are provided mainly as a periodic payment, ⁽³⁷⁶⁾ in many cases as income replacement to compensate for a loss of labour market earnings.

Chart 5.3

Two thirds of social expenditure is on cash benefits, with major differences across functions

Percentage of cash benefits, by function, EU25, 2000-2014



Note: The complement of the cash benefits are in-kind benefits.

Source: Eurostat, ESSPROS.

[Click here to download chart.](#)

Over the past 15 years, several Member States have seen a relative increase in expenditure on in-kind benefits as compared with cash transfers. These include several 'Continental' Western European countries (Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria), as well as Sweden. On the other hand, the proportion of spending on cash benefits increased in Ireland, Greece and Portugal mainly due to spending on old age pensions. At EU level, there has been a slight trend towards more expenditure on in-kind (care) benefits within functions related to family, children and disability (Chart 5.3).

⁽³⁷⁶⁾ While cash benefits may also include lump sum payments paid on a single occasion, these typically represent less than 10% of cash benefits and tend to be concentrated in specific programmes such as maternity benefits, redundancy payments or small pensions.

For people with disabilities, expenditure on cash benefits is much greater than expenditure on rehabilitation, which is however key to integration into the labour market and retaining employment positions. In 2014 expenditure on cash benefits (EU average) was EUR 380 per inhabitant and EUR 206.4 billion in total. By comparison, expenditure on rehabilitation (EU average) was only EUR 34 per inhabitant and EUR 18.6 billion in total. Differences among Member States are very large in this respect.

1.2. Social protection in a changing world of work

1.2.1. Changing social risks and opportunities

Social protection benefits are conditional on the occurrence of specific risks or events, the incidence of which may change in the new world of work.

Labour market changes have the largest impact on social protection functions that compensate for loss of earnings. This applies notably to income replacement benefits for the inability to work as a result of sickness or disability, old age or unemployment. Jointly, social contributions (paid in good times) and social benefits (received in bad times) help to smooth and redistribute workers' income over the life course. Many social protection systems were designed on the assumption of stable contractual employment. Changes in the labour market which make workers' careers less predictable (with more frequent breaks and changes of job and occupation) and incomes more volatile pose significant challenges to social protection systems.

If workers are displaced as a result of technological innovation and structural change, this creates additional demands for social protection (see Chapter 2). Such developments may lead to a higher risk of temporary or long-term

unemployment, with an additional demand for income replacement benefits and active labour market policies, including re-training and job search assistance.

Certain forms of non-standard employment blur the boundaries between being in and out of work. An employee who is working part-time but who would prefer to have a full-time job could be considered as partially unemployed. In certain Member States, such workers are already subject to specific regimes within unemployment insurance. Newer forms of work, for example very short term assignments that are mediated by on-line platforms, could raise further questions about the provider's employment status. Such developments may also require adjustments to social protection rules in certain Member States.

Changes in the world of work bring new opportunities as well. Voluntary part-time work may enable families to achieve a better balance between their professional and private lives, in some cases complemented by child care services. The age at which workers are deemed 'too old' to work may be redefined by changing working conditions as a result of technological improvements and shorter working hours. In many countries, an increase in retirement ages is not only desirable but even imperative because of delayed entry to the labour market and increased longevity. At the same time, increases in overall longevity are not always fully matched by gains in healthy life years,⁽³⁷⁷⁾ while occupational health and safety hazards and chronic diseases still affect a substantial proportion of the population. A key challenge is to design disability benefits which promote active participation, social inclusion and social protection. The design of disability benefits can lead to benefit traps reducing the motivation to seek work, for example when benefits are withdrawn immediately and entirely after (re-) entering employment.

Where work is less physically demanding longer careers may be more feasible. In several Member States where income from old age pensions and from work were traditionally mutually exclusive, there are possibilities for complementing old age pensions with a limited amount of labour market earnings. Recent reforms across Europe have increased the pension age and at the same time introduced partial early pension schemes. These are established at the sectoral level, i.e. in the form of collective agreements covering specific sectors, as well as at the national level.⁽³⁷⁸⁾ Germany and Finland have recently enacted reforms in respect of such 'flexible' pensions.⁽³⁷⁹⁾

For a number of social protection benefits, changes in the labour market have no impact or only an indirect one. In several Member States,

⁽³⁷⁷⁾ European Commission (2017a).

⁽³⁷⁸⁾ Eurofound (2016).

⁽³⁷⁹⁾ Social Protection Committee (SPC) and European Commission (2018).

families with a new-born baby may receive a birth grant. However, neither costs linked to childbirth nor the relevant benefits are directly affected by changes in employment status. Broadly the same applies to social protection schemes that provide support for housing,⁽³⁸⁰⁾ in case of bereavement,⁽³⁸¹⁾ for sickness and severe disability at birth or when young.

Poverty and social exclusion which are not directly or exclusively linked to any of the aforementioned labour market risks may be addressed by last resort safety nets. These programmes, including minimum income schemes,⁽³⁸²⁾ may signal needs or challenges that are not (or insufficiently) covered by other schemes. This includes situations where social protection systems are not well enough adapted to the changing world of work. In many instances, such last resort safety nets are conditional upon a means test.

1.2.2. Diverse employment relations

Increasingly diverse employment relations pose challenges to welfare systems that were designed to protect workers in 'standard' employment. Where new forms of employment emerge, this can create an (at least temporary) uncertainty as to where a form of work should be classified in existing social protection systems. The emergence of online platforms, for example, has raised questions about the social protection rights of the platform workers, as well as about the respective obligations of these workers, their clients and the platform.

Non-standard work is highly diverse and implications for social protection differ according to employment status. Key characteristics of the standard employment relationship include a bilateral relationship between worker and employer (rather than third parties), personal subordination of the employee (working under the authority of the employer), and economic dependency (pay from employment being the main or single source of income), involving an open-ended cooperation, working full-time,⁽³⁸³⁾ with corresponding social security contributions being paid by the employer and employee. Where forms of work deviate from this standard, they generally receive less protection from social security. Across Member States, specific groups of workers are systematically at a disadvantage as regards social protection, whereas

⁽³⁸⁰⁾ Unless new forms of work reduce demands for physical presence, thus reducing the need to live in expensive urban centres.

⁽³⁸¹⁾ Spasova et al. (2017).

⁽³⁸²⁾ Principle 14 of the European Pillar of Social Rights on Minimum income states: "Everyone lacking sufficient resources has the right to adequate minimum income benefits ensuring a life in dignity at all stages of life, and effective access to enabling goods and services. For those who can work, minimum income benefits should be combined with incentives to (re)integrate into the labour market."

⁽³⁸³⁾ Schoukens and Barrio (2017).

Box 5.1: Social protection and new forms of employment

Several important developments in the field of social protection refer to new forms of employment. Member States have not always been able to ensure a comparable level of social protection for different categories of workers. Eurofound (2015a) identified nine new forms of employment in European labour markets, classifying them according to their implications for labour market performance, working conditions and social protection. ⁽¹⁾

Certain innovative forms of employment combine a high level of flexibility with social protection coverage. *Employee sharing* is a practice where several employers jointly hire an employee full-time on an open-ended contract. The worker has social protection coverage which is similar to that of standard workers. Alternatively, several *job-sharing* workers may combine their working hours to perform a (full-time) job for a single employer. These workers are entitled to a level of social protection similar to that of part-time employees. *Voucher-based workers* provide their services to users in return for a document purchased from a third party, usually a public authority. The worker exchanges the voucher for a payment and remuneration may include social security contributions.

Several new forms of employment have a neutral or diffuse impact on workers' social protection. *ICT-based mobile workers* use information technology to work from different locations. Their employment conditions and social protection coverage rely largely on the specific agreement concluded with their employer. *Interim managers* tend to have high wages and good working conditions to compensate for the insecurity of their jobs.

Where work flows are unstable, or no employer is identified, gaps in social protection are more likely to occur. *Casual workers* can be called in on demand by their employer, who is not obliged to provide a regular workflow. Their social protection coverage is often piecemeal and for a limited amount of time (though national exceptions apply, for example in Belgium or Slovakia). *Portfolio workers* provide their services to a large number of clients. In many cases, there is no employer contributing to their social protection. The same applies to *crowd workers* who are active on on-line platforms. Typically, neither the client nor the intermediary platform contributes to workers' social protection. *Collaborative employment* is a form of collaboration among freelancers, the self-employed and/or micro enterprises who jointly organise to overcome limitations of scale. While these workers are usually considered self-employed, in some countries, such as France, umbrella organisations may take on an active role in their social protection.

⁽¹⁾ Although not explicit in the publication, according to the Eurofound website the definition of social protection is: "Social protection provisions are key instruments for reducing social risks, combating poverty and promoting greater social cohesion. They are also contributing factors to a person's quality of life."

other novel forms of employment have fewer implications for the social protection of workers (Box 5.1).

As individual workers change and also combine jobs more frequently, transferability of social protection rights becomes more important. ⁽³⁸⁴⁾ ⁽³⁸⁵⁾ This may arise, for example, in relation to the pension entitlements of someone who has worked as an employee but who then becomes self-employed. It may also affect the rights of workers changing to different sectors. Portability of social protection entitlements is essential if modern welfare systems are to support dynamic labour markets and job transitions, in the spirit of the European Pillar of Social Rights. Specific social security coordination rules apply to mobility across borders within Europe (Box 5.2).

⁽³⁸⁴⁾ Annual Growth Survey 2018: "Social protection systems should adapt to new ways of working and ensure that entitlements are portable from one job to the next, make it easier to cumulate contributions from multiple jobs, and secure transitions between jobs."

⁽³⁸⁵⁾ The European Pillar of Social Rights, Principle 4 "Active support to employment", states that "Everyone has the right to transfer social protection and training entitlements during professional transitions."

Box 5.2: EU social security coordination

Free movement in the EU could not take place without the guarantee that people will not lose their social security protection when moving to another Member State. When a person travels or moves to another Member State (whether for a holiday, study, temporary work or to settle permanently), there is a need to create bridges between national systems so as to guarantee uninterrupted cover.

The EU provides common rules to protect social security rights when moving within Europe (EU 28, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland). These rules do not replace national systems with a single European one. They are about coordination, not harmonisation. All countries are free to decide who is to be insured under their legislation, which benefits are granted and under what conditions.

The EU Treaty requires the EU to adopt measures in the field of social security as are necessary to provide free movement of workers (article 48 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union). Consequently, EU social security coordination was put in place at the start of the European Economic Community as early as 1958 and has been modernised in subsequent years. The current version of the rules has been in force since 2010 (with Regulations (EC) 883/2004 and 987/2009).

The essence of social security coordination at EU level is 'linking' a person to a social security system of a Member State. This link determines where he or she needs to pay social security contributions and claim social security benefits if needed. It also ensures that previous periods of insurance, work or residence in other countries are taken into account when a person claims benefits.

The main principles are:

- One country only: a person is covered by the social security system of one Member State at a time so that he/she only pays contributions in one country. The person is entitled to benefits, if any, in the country where he/she pays contributions;
- Equal treatment or non-discrimination: a person moving to another EU Member State has the same rights and obligations as the nationals of the country where he/she is insured;
- Aggregation: when claiming a benefit, previous periods of insurance, work or residence in other countries are taken into account if necessary (for example to demonstrate that the person satisfies a minimum period of insurance required under national law in order to be entitled to benefits);
- Exportability: if a person is entitled to receive a benefit in cash from one Member State, he/she may generally receive it even if he/she is living in a different Member State.

The rules cover the whole range of social security benefits: sickness benefits; maternity and equivalent paternity benefits; old-age pensions; pre-retirement and invalidity benefits; survivors' benefits and death grants; unemployment benefits; family benefits; and benefits related to work accidents and occupational diseases.

In December 2016, the Commission proposed targeted adjustments to these rules to ensure that they remain fair and clear and are easier to enforce. This proposal is a key element of this Commission's agenda for fair labour mobility.

2. ACCESS TO SOCIAL PROTECTION

2.1. What gaps in coverage are there for non-standard workers and the self-employed?

Access to social protection depends on the formal coverage, effective coverage and transferability of social protection schemes. In order to be covered by a given scheme, someone must be formally entitled to participate in that scheme, if not mandatorily, then at least voluntarily. In order to accrue and access benefits, that person must meet the scheme's conditions relating to contributions or entitlements. And if that person is not to lose accrued benefit entitlements when changing jobs, scheme rules must allow existing entitlements to be preserved and transferred.

Non-standard and self-employed workers may have certain disadvantages in gaining access to social security cash benefits. These include unemployment benefits, sickness benefits, maternity and paternity benefits, invalidity benefits, old-age benefits and benefits in respect of accidents at work and occupational diseases.⁽³⁸⁶⁾ In line with the principle on social protection in the European Pillar of Social Rights,⁽³⁸⁷⁾ the Commission proposal for a Council Recommendation on access to social protection for workers and the self-employed⁽³⁸⁸⁾ aims to secure such access across groups, social security branches and Member States. This section builds on the analytical work underpinning that proposal.

⁽³⁸⁶⁾ Note that this section mainly considers access to cash benefits, which are mostly income replacement benefits. For access to benefits in kind, such as health care, see section 2.6.

⁽³⁸⁷⁾ "Regardless of the type and duration of their employment relationship, workers, and under comparable conditions, the self-employed, have the right to adequate social protection."

⁽³⁸⁸⁾ COM(2018) 132 final.

2.1.1. Gaps in formal coverage

Individuals without formal coverage are neither covered on a mandatory basis, nor can they join corresponding schemes on a voluntary basis. A group can be identified as formally covered by a specific social security provision (e.g. old age pension, unemployment protection, maternity protection) if the existing legislation or collective agreement specifies that this group is entitled to participate in the scheme.

In certain Member States, specific categories of non-standard workers are not formally covered for certain risks. Formal social security coverage is usually the same for employees in non-standard employment and those in standard employment. There are exceptions, however: most notably, casual and seasonal workers, apprentices or trainees, on-demand workers and those on temporary agency contracts, as well as people working on certain contracts defined at the national level. Such coverage gaps are widespread geographically (*Table 5.1*).

The situation regarding formal coverage tends to be critical for the self-employed. There are fundamental gaps in the formal coverage of three core elements of social protection (unemployment, sickness, accident and occupational injuries), where the self-employed as a group are excluded from membership in some Member States, in the sense that they cannot join the scheme. In particular, self-employed workers in general - or certain categories of them - do not have any formal access to unemployment benefits in eleven Member States (*Table 5.2*).

In some countries there are voluntary social security schemes. These may be supplementary to the existing mandatory schemes or may apply only to categories of workers who are not mandatorily covered by the main schemes. Such voluntary schemes are generally more common for self-employed workers than for non-standard employees.⁽³⁸⁹⁾ For Member States with voluntary schemes for all self-employed workers or for some sub-groups, there is generally a low rate of enrolment, varying from less than 1% to below 20%.

2.1.2. Gaps in effective coverage and lack of transferability

Even when non-standard workers and the self-employed have formal coverage, they may experience gaps in effective coverage. In such cases, they are prevented from accruing and taking up adequate entitlements. This may be because specific, less favourable rules apply to them, or because uniform eligibility criteria are more difficult to meet for people outside standard employment. For instance, given that temporary employees move more

frequently into unemployment than standard employees,⁽³⁹⁰⁾ it can be more difficult for them to accumulate a given qualifying period. Similarly, the methods for calculating the income base or the reference income may be unfavourable to the self-employed where they assume long previous periods of earnings, or where they do not take account of the volatility of self-employment incomes.

The criteria most frequently associated with gaps in effective coverage for non-standard workers and the self-employed are:

- Long waiting periods i.e. a particularly long period of time between the occurrence of the risk and the receipt of the benefit;
- Minimum qualifying periods i.e. the minimum period for which people have to contribute to a scheme before they can start to receive benefits;
- Duration of benefits i.e. the length of time during which the individual receives the benefit, which may differ from that of standard workers;
- Minimum working periods i.e. if someone is required to have worked a minimum of hours/months/years in order to be eligible to receive the benefit in case of need. This criterion is stricter than a minimum qualifying period, since a person can, for instance, be unemployed, but still have the possibility of contributing to the system, whereas a requirement for a minimum working period means that someone who is not in (self-) employment is ineligible for the benefit.

Transferability of rights refers to the possibility of either transferring accumulated entitlements to another scheme following a change of employment, occupation or sector,⁽³⁹¹⁾ or allowing previous work history to count towards the minimum period required in the new employment status. Contribution histories are particularly important for the adequacy of benefits because, for instance, the time profile of benefit levels in unemployment insurance may depend on the contribution history.

⁽³⁹⁰⁾ European Commission (2017b).

⁽³⁹¹⁾ This implies that entitlements can only be transferred when the individual has formal coverage (and chooses to be enrolled in the case of voluntary coverage) before and after the transition.

⁽³⁸⁹⁾ For a detailed overview, see the impact assessment accompanying the Proposal for a Council Recommendation on access to social protection for workers and the self-employed, SWD(2018) 70 final.

Table 5.1

Specific groups of non-standard workers cannot access the social security schemes of certain Member States

Lack of formal social security coverage for non-standard workers

	Casual workers	Seasonal workers	National specificities	Freelance	Apprentices	Trainees	Vocational trainees
Unemployment benefits	RO, HU, MT, LT	BG, RO, LV, HU, MT, LT	AT ^a , CZ ^b , DE ^c , PL ^d , SK ^e		BE, EL, HR, MT, NL, PL	EL, FR, IT, LT, MT, NL, PL, RO	
Sickness benefit	HU, LT, LV, RO	HU, LT, LV, RO	CZ ^b , SI ^d		BE, HU, NL, PL	DK, FR, HU, LT, NL, PL	DK, EL, FR, HU, PL
Maternity benefit	LT, RO	BG, LT, LV, RO	CZ ^b , PL ^d , UK ^h	BG, FR	BE, MT	FR, HU, IT, LT	EL, FR, HU, IT
Accident and occupational injuries	RO, HR, LT	BG, LT, LV, RO	CZ ^b , ES ^f				
Old age/survivors' pensions	MT, LT	BG, HU, RO, LT	CZ ^b , HU ^g , LU ^g , MT ^h , PL ^d		BE, HR, MT	EL, FR, HU, IT, LT, MT	
Invalidity	HU, LT	HU, LT	AT ^a , PL ^d				

Note: The table reports in which branches and in which Member States non-standard workers are excluded from formal coverage in the sense that they have no mandatory coverage and cannot opt -into voluntary schemes.

National specificities: a) Marginal part-timers; b) Agreement to perform a job; c) Mini-jobs; d) civil law contracts; e) employees on 'work agreement' with irregular income; f) domestic workers; g) on-call jobs; h) temporary agency work

Source: Impact assessment accompanying the Proposal for a Council Recommendation on access to social protection for workers and the self-employed SWD(2018)70 final.

[Click here to download table.](#)

Table 5.2

In several Member States, self-employed workers cannot gain access to social security schemes

Lack of formal social security coverage for the self-employed

Unemployment benefits	BE ^a , BG, CY, DE, FR, IE, IT, LV, MT ^b , NL, UK ^b
Sickness benefits	EL ^a , IE ^b , IT ^a
Accident and occupational injuries	BE, BG, CY, CZ, IE, LT, LV, NL, SK, UK

Note: The table reports in which branches and in which Member States at least one sub-group of the self-employed is excluded from formal coverage in the sense that they have no mandatory coverage and cannot opt -into voluntary schemes. a) Only one or more sub-groups of the self-employed are not formally covered. b) In these Member States only means-tested benefits are available to the self-employed while they are excluded from contributory schemes.

Source: Impact assessment accompanying the Proposal for a Council Recommendation on access to social protection for workers and the self-employed, SWD(2018)70 final.

[Click here to download table.](#)

A lack of transferability can hinder the build-up of adequate entitlements over the course of a career. This may mean lower old age pensions for workers who have made frequent job changes, for example as a result of administration costs. Gaps in transferability may discourage individuals from moving, for example between employment and self-employment when these two statuses are covered by different schemes. Obstacles to transferability can arise from a lack of regulation in this area, from extremely high administrative costs, or from different rules governing different schemes which prevent people from transferring accumulated rights.

2.1.3. Transparency of entitlements

Gaps have also been identified in the information provided for the general public on social protection scheme rules, obligations and entitlements. Transparency of information is increasingly important because of the growing number of changes between different types of employment status, contract forms and social security schemes. Guidance available on scheme websites, or through simulation tools providing personalised information, may be incomplete or lack transparency.

A lack of simple and transparent information reduces people's awareness of their rights and obligations to social security and prevents them from taking informed decisions. A significant proportion of self-employed and non-standard workers is unaware of their social security coverage (up to 20% for some categories) - much higher than in standard employment. Although generic information about social security schemes is provided in most Member States, for instance via dedicated websites, this information may not always be available broken down by employment status or contract. Personalised information for at least one scheme is available only in about half of Member States. This is true of both an overview of individual rights and obligations and of obtaining information through online simulation tools.

2.2. Behavioural effects

The discussion above explained the disadvantages experienced by non-standard workers and the self-employed with respect to social security coverage. For a more complete picture, it is important to review the challenges of establishing social protection systems that allow for the specificities of various forms of work.

First, fair systems rely on the verification of both the correct level of contribution payments and the occurrence of the risks they are designed to protect against. Assessing the income base for social contributions is more difficult for self-employed people than for standard employees. As the personal income of the self-employed cannot be easily disentangled from earnings intended for retention to finance their business activity, they may legitimately use their discretion in setting their contribution base. This opens the door to unwarranted under-reporting of income. Moreover, verifying the unemployment status of the self-employed is particularly difficult, given the volatility of work volumes and the absence of an employer (see below).

Second, social security systems can only function if the risks of the insured are pooled and balanced. Arrangements that create particularly strong incentives for riskier clients to enter a social security system could challenge its financial sustainability. Careful design choices, possibly including subsidies, are therefore needed to ensure the viability of schemes with voluntary participation. The individualisation of schemes would equalise disbursements and the contributions paid by individuals, arguably increasing incentives to contribute/save. However, such schemes would not pool risks, would be incompatible with insurance against risks such as disability, and would fail to achieve the redistributive objectives of social security.

Third, the limited contributory capacity of workers and the self-employed is a constraint. Many non-standard and self-employed workers (especially those without employees) are low-paid. Equal social security treatment would require payments equivalent to the sum of the employees' and employers' contributions for standard workers. Many of the self-employed simply could not afford the resulting contribution burden. Government subsidies could be a remedy, but at the risk of adverse selection (mainly lower earners attracted to participate) or of income being reported only at the minimum level required for qualifying.⁽³⁹²⁾ Employers might also have a stronger incentive to encourage bogus self-employment.

Finally, where workers have a large degree of choice over social protection, they may underestimate future risks or needs. The career paths of non-standard workers are less predictable than those of standard workers, with more frequent unemployment spells and re-training needs. It is therefore arguably fair to give non-standard workers with accrued entitlements greater control over the timing and purpose of benefit withdrawals. They could then spend the funds on other job-related benefits, for example professional training or early retirement. However, this could lead to entitlements being used up too early, resulting in inadequate benefits in later years, or even endanger the financial health of the funds. The challenge would be how to introduce mechanisms to mitigate such weaknesses, without making the system too complex.

2.3. How many workers are covered by social insurance?

Estimating the social protection coverage of workers requires detailed information on their employment status and history and this needs to be combined with policy rules.⁽³⁹³⁾ For some policy rules (notably where

a system is voluntary and requires opting into), large scale surveys may not provide the required information. This warrants some caution in interpreting and comparing research results, particularly when they are based on different assumptions (see Annex 1). However, several robust findings emerge.

A sizeable proportion of workers in the EU is at risk of not being entitled to unemployment benefits. According to Matsaganis et al. (2015), in the EU more than one worker in seven (12.9%) was at risk in 2014 (*Table 5.3*). The lack of coverage is concentrated among family workers and self-employed people, who either lack formal coverage or are assumed not to opt into voluntary systems. Employees on short-term contracts or working part-time are also relatively exposed. For most countries, the number of workers at risk of not being covered increases further if account is taken of the short work history of certain workers with open-ended contracts and if stricter assumptions are made about self-employed people not opting into voluntary systems.

A substantial proportion of workers is at risk of not being entitled to sickness benefits and maternity benefits. EU-wide in 2014, this affected more than 7% of the relevant workers: in some Member States it affected 15% or more (*Table 5.3*). The risk of not being entitled to different social protection benefits varies across countries, as well as across social protection schemes. Member States that have a high level of coverage for one risk do not necessarily achieve this for other risks. However, it is common to find that the self-employed and non-standard employees are less likely to be covered. Even where workers are covered, the impact and strength of such coverage (in terms of benefit levels) vary among Member States.

The risk of not being covered by unemployment or sickness benefits tends to be higher for working men than for working women. The risk of poor social protection coverage is particularly concentrated among the self-employed – of whom many are men. Persons working in a family-owned business or farm without pay – a group with low coverage – are mostly women. The self-employed constitute a relatively small proportion of female employment.

Part-time workers tend to be covered to the same extent as full-time workers, although in some Member States, part-time workers receive lower amounts of social benefits. However, unemployment and sickness benefits may not be available for women re-entering the labour market after a career interruption as they may fail to fulfil the eligibility conditions for benefits, despite having an open-ended contract.

⁽³⁹²⁾ See the example of German Social Insurance for Artists in OECD (2018).

⁽³⁹³⁾ Note the distinction between workers' coverage rates and the coverage rates of the unemployed. Workers' coverage rates simulate how many workers would receive a benefit if they became unemployed. Coverage rates of the unemployed

measure how many of those who are unemployed receive a benefit (for example among short-term unemployed, see Joint Employment Report 2018).

Table 5.3
Substantial proportions of workers are at risk of not being entitled to social protection benefits, with large differences between countries.

Risk of not being entitled to social protection benefits among workers, by type of benefit and Member State, 2014

	Maternity	Sickness	Unemployment
LU	6.9	1.5	2.5
EE	0.2	0.5	3.2
IE	6.9	5.5	4.1
CZ	11.9	14.2	4.9
UK	8.3	0.2	5.0
LT	15.5	9.8	5.0
HR	11.4	6.4	6.4
HU	11.2	0.3	7.1
SK	3.9	0.1	7.4
SE	7.4	0.1	8.1
DE	2.6	3.5	9.5
AT	0.9	3.7	9.8
FI	1.3	0.3	9.9
SI	12.6	4.5	10.1
PT	3.0	13.2	11.0
ES	7.4	6.4	12.4
PL	13.2	17.1	12.7
EU	7.6	7.7	12.9
LV	0.5	0.7	13.2
FR	4.1	3.3	13.8
BG	9.3	9.4	15.1
MT	3.8	2.6	15.4
DK	11.5	6.9	15.4
CY	2.9	3.0	17.2
NL	0.7	12.7	17.9
BE	9.3	2.8	18.4
IT	15.0	23.7	24.6
RO	15.1	11.2	28.7
EL	9.2	19.7	35.8


Note: Maternity: female workers aged 15-49; Sickness and unemployment: workers aged 15-64. Countries ranked according to risk of unemployment.

Source: Matsaganis et al (2015).

[Click here to download table.](#)

Chart 5.4
Employees with low work intensity and the self-employed have lower coverage by unemployment insurance

Potential coverage of unemployment insurance schemes in EU Member States, 2016



Note: Potential coverage measures the proportion of workers who would be covered by unemployment insurance schemes if unemployed, based on their previous work history (months of work over the last year). There is no coverage rate for the self-employed in AT, BE, PT and EL due to specific rules that cannot be simulated. 'Ind wi' refers to individual work intensity.

Source: Jara Tamayo and Tumino (2018), based on EUROMOD H1.0+, input data EU-SILC 2016, except Germany (EU-SILC 2014) and UK (FRS 2014/15). Policy rules 30 June 2017.

[Click here to download chart.](#)

Across Europe women tend to have lower pension entitlements in terms both of access to benefits and pension levels. ⁽³⁹⁴⁾ The gap in access

⁽³⁹⁴⁾ The European Pillar of Social Rights, Principle 15 'Old age income and pensions' states that "Women and men shall have equal opportunities to acquire pension rights."

to pensions is particularly pronounced for occupational pensions (based on professional activity) where men are more likely to be covered by second pillar pension systems than women. Even if the gender gaps for public pensions are typically lower than for occupational pensions, these gaps can be sizeable in certain Member States. At the age of 65 to 79, women in the EU28 have pensions that are on average 40% lower than those of men. This gap ranges from 0% in Estonia to 52% in Spain. ⁽³⁹⁵⁾

In general, gender pension gaps reflect gender differences in the labour market. Lifetime earnings and duration of working life tend to be lower for women. These differences interact with entitlement conditions, particularly where public pensions are insurance-based and entitlements are conditional upon a contribution record.

2.4. The role of means-testing

Means-tested social benefits are social benefits that are conditional on the beneficiary's income and/or wealth falling below a specified level. ⁽³⁹⁶⁾

The main rationale for means-testing is that it enables resources to be targeted on the most needy groups. In a context of public finance constraints (and with ageing populations), directing scarce resources to the most vulnerable groups can be considered an efficient social policy intervention. ⁽³⁹⁷⁾ Moreover, the beneficiaries of means-tested benefits may include 'outsiders' who do not qualify for benefits based on other criteria. This may include non-standard workers who do not qualify for contributory benefits or whose entitlements based on contributions are very limited.

However, means-tested benefits also have drawbacks. ⁽³⁹⁸⁾ They require substantial administrative efforts to establish the level of income or wealth. Moreover, a substantial proportion of those who fulfil the conditions do not claim means-tested benefits. ⁽³⁹⁹⁾ Even though this 'non-take-up' is not restricted to such benefits, ⁽⁴⁰⁰⁾ it is more common in their case than in others. Means-testing adds complexity to claiming procedures (particularly for vulnerable populations). The receipt of such benefits can be considered stigmatising. ⁽⁴⁰¹⁾ Also, means tests

⁽³⁹⁵⁾ Social Protection Committee (SPC) and European Commission (2018).

⁽³⁹⁶⁾ Eurostat (2016).

⁽³⁹⁷⁾ Korpi and Palme (1998) stated "the more we target benefits at the poor, the less likely we are to reduce poverty and inequality", due to limited public support and lower overall welfare spending. Recent studies, however, (Marx et al., 2013) no longer find empirical grounds for this statement, as outcomes of universal versus targeted benefits are contingent on many other policy parameters, including activation requirements.

⁽³⁹⁸⁾ Van Oorschot (2002).

⁽³⁹⁹⁾ Matsaganis et al (2008).

⁽⁴⁰⁰⁾ Eurofound (2015b).


⁽⁴⁰¹⁾ Atkinson (2015).

can create benefit traps in cases where an increase in income from other sources (for example work) makes the beneficiary's household ineligible for the means-tested benefit. ⁽⁴⁰²⁾

Chart 5.5

Most housing and social exclusion benefits are means-tested, whereas very few sickness benefits, old age and survivor benefits are

Expenditure on means-tested benefits as % of all social protection benefits, by function, EU25




Source: Eurostat, ESSPROS

[Click here to download chart.](#)

Chart 5.6

Means-tested social benefits represent 11% of overall EU expenditure, with large variation across Member States

Expenditure on means-tested benefits as % of social protection benefits (total; cash; in-kind), by Member State, 2014



Source: Eurostat, ESSPROS [spr_exp_fto]

[Click here to download chart.](#)

The proportion of means-tested benefits in social expenditure varies across functions and across Member States. Means-tested expenditure typically constitutes a small proportion of expenditure on sickness and health care, as well as on old age and survivor benefits. By contrast, means tests are very common for social exclusion benefits, and housing benefits are generally conditional on low income or wealth. Means-testing has gained ground in disability, while it has become relatively less common in child/family benefits (Chart 5.5). EU-wide, means-tested benefits accounted for approximately 11% of social expenditure in 2014. At Member State level, the proportion varies from less than 3% in Estonia, Latvia,

⁽⁴⁰²⁾ Note that such a trap is in many ways similar to other incentive 'traps' linked to tax benefit systems, such as inactivity traps, low wage traps and unemployment traps.

Sweden and the Czech Republic to more than 30% in Ireland and Denmark (Chart 5.6).

2.5. Activation requirements

Certain income replacement benefits are conditional upon the recipients' availability for work and job search. Such requirements in many cases complement other criteria regarding prior work history or contribution record (for insurance benefits) or criteria regarding financial resources (for means-tested benefits). Unemployment benefits may be made conditional on job-search requirements, including frequency of job search reporting, as well as documentation of job search. ⁽⁴⁰³⁾ Availability requirements for the unemployed include conditions regarding their availability for work or participation in active labour market policies. 'Suitability requirements' specify the occupational or geographical mobility that can be expected from job searchers, along with the definition of valid reasons for refusing job offers. Sanctions may apply for 'voluntary' unemployment, related to the refusal of job offers, or participation in active labour market policies or cooperation with public employment services.

Several Member States have defined stricter criteria in recent years. For unemployment benefits, no country relaxed its requirements in the period 2011-2014 (the years of the two available OECD surveys on the topic covering all Member States but Cyprus) while 6 countries made them more strict (Belgium, Croatia, Greece, Latvia, Malta and the UK). Longer-term data from a smaller set of countries likewise point towards a trend of increased strictness in eligibility criteria. ⁽⁴⁰⁴⁾ While it is more difficult to assess the effects of entitlement and eligibility criteria on non-standard workers, flexible labour and mini-jobs are likely to lead to partial exclusion. ⁽⁴⁰⁵⁾

2.6. How accessible and affordable are public services?

Enabling social services such as child care, health care or long-term care can play an important role in the changing world of work. Wide provision of quality childcare services ⁽⁴⁰⁶⁾ is associated with higher rates of female participation in the labour market. Older workers are also more likely to extend their careers if they do not need to take care of young or elderly relatives and if they are in good health. ⁽⁴⁰⁷⁾

⁽⁴⁰³⁾ Langenbucher (2015).

⁽⁴⁰⁴⁾ Venn (2012).

⁽⁴⁰⁵⁾ Schoukens (2018).

⁽⁴⁰⁶⁾ The European Pillar of Social Rights, Principle 11 'Childcare and support to children' states that "Children have the right to affordable early childhood education and care of good quality."

⁽⁴⁰⁷⁾ European Commission (2015a), chapter III.2 The efficiency and effectiveness of social protection systems over the life course.

Access to such enabling services may be limited for specific groups of workers, depending on national systems. Whereas several Member States grant access to health care based on residence status (i.e. not linked to labour market status), others link access to being in gainful employment. In several Member States, specific groups of workers (such as seasonal and casual workers or workers on civil law contracts) are not mandatorily covered by health care.⁽⁴⁰⁸⁾ In addition, the cost of premiums or contributions may lead to effective coverage gaps, particularly for low income groups. Access to health care is not only a matter of eligibility, but is also determined by the scope of coverage (the extent of services included in the benefit package) and its depth (the share of the health care cost covered). Along with limited availability of health care (waiting lists or travel), this may lead to unmet needs for health care. Among workers, those who do not have the status of employee (mainly self-employed) tend to report higher rates of unmet need for health care compared to employees (Chart 5.7).

There are large differences across Member States as regards the perceived quality of public services, with some recent improvements. Quality ratings of public services differ depending on their nature. Across EU countries, citizens' quality ratings of services tend to be highest for health care, then education, public transport, child care and long-term care, and lowest for social housing. All in all, the highest average quality ratings across services can be found in Luxembourg, Austria, Malta, Finland and Denmark. The lowest overall quality ratings of public services are recorded in Cyprus, Latvia, Italy, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Greece. Overall the quality rating of public services in the EU improved over the period 2007-2016, particularly in some Member States that previously had lower levels of satisfaction. This is not the case, however, for several Member States, including Cyprus and Greece.⁽⁴⁰⁹⁾


⁽⁴⁰⁸⁾ For a detailed overview, see Spasova et al. (2017).

⁽⁴⁰⁹⁾ Eurofound (2017).

Chart 5.7

Across the EU, employees are the least likely to have unmet needs for health care, whereas the unemployed have the highest risk

Unmet need for health care among population aged 16 to 64, by labour status, EU28, 2016



Note: Self-reported unmet needs for health care, because it is too expensive, too far to travel or because of waiting lists.

Source: Eurostat, based on EU-SILC [hlth_silc_13]

[Click here to download chart.](#)

Differences in the accessibility of public services may also result from physical and non-physical barriers limiting access for certain people, such as those with disabilities or elderly people. In this respect the European Commission has proposed a European Accessibility Act,⁽⁴¹⁰⁾ a directive aimed at improving the accessibility of certain products and services (such as transport or telecommunications) which could foster participation in the labour market for people with disabilities.

⁽⁴¹⁰⁾ COM(2015)0615.

Box 5.3: The debate on universal basic income

Universal basic income refers to periodic payments from the state to all citizens so that everyone has an income, regardless of their contribution record, personal or family needs, wealth or income from other sources, job search requirements or any other conditions. It has gained renewed attention in the context of the changing world of work. A number of entrepreneurs, international institutions ⁽¹⁾ and social scientists ⁽²⁾ have discussed the potential merits and drawbacks.

Proponents of a universal basic income highlight its all-encompassing coverage. The beneficiaries would include non-standard workers who are not eligible for social insurance benefits. The neediest citizens who do not take up means-tested benefits, despite being eligible, would be automatically covered. ⁽³⁾

Universal basic income is seen by some as facilitating adjustments in the labour market. It would provide income security to workers who are displaced (whether permanently or not) by technology ⁽⁴⁾ and would sustain aggregate demand. Some have argued that a universal basic income would have a positive effect on individual creativity and entrepreneurship. ⁽⁵⁾

The lack of targeting is one of the main criticisms of universal basic income. All citizens would receive the benefit, including high-income groups. Particularly where the benefit replaced existing social protection benefits, the negative impact on the most vulnerable groups could be large.

In terms of financing, universal basic income at a meaningful level of income would require a major increase in state spending. It is at least questionable whether Europe's shrinking workforce and its ageing society will generate the productivity gains necessary to fund such unconditional benefits.

Unconditional transfers may reduce the incentive to work, particularly for low-skilled workers and low wage earners. ⁽⁶⁾ The absence of reciprocity or of any link between reward and effort may limit public support for such schemes. ⁽⁷⁾

The possible effects of universal basic income on gender equality remain disputed. Some scholars argue that a universal basic income would make women more financially independent, enhancing their ability to choose which job to take and also acknowledging explicitly the role of unpaid care work. ⁽⁸⁾ ⁽⁹⁾ Others argue that a universal basic income scheme would reinforce existing gender inequalities and norms, widening gender gaps in labour market participation, working hours or unpaid work. ⁽¹⁰⁾

Currently, several experiments with basic income schemes are underway, both in and outside Europe. Notably, at the beginning of 2017 Finland launched an experiment on basic income. The experiment is due to last until the end of 2018 and analysis based on the evidence collected should be available at the beginning of 2019. After a debate on the constitutional and legislative requirements for conducting such an experiment, its target group was composed of 2000 people between 25 and 58 years old who were receiving the basic unemployment benefit. The amount paid during the experimental period of two years is EUR 560 per month, which is equal to basic unemployment insurance. This is paid without any means-testing and recipients are allowed to work without losing the benefit.

The effects of a universal income scheme such as this, its distributional implications, financing, and work disincentives are likely to be limited because of the narrow population group included in the experiment. Indeed, the extent to which the effects of relatively small-scale programmes can inform large-scale policy reforms remains open to debate. ⁽¹¹⁾

⁽¹⁾ IMF (2017); OECD (2017).

⁽²⁾ See for example the Basic Income Earth Network.

⁽³⁾ Van Parijs (2016).

⁽⁴⁾ Painter and Thoun (2015); eBay founder Pierre Omidyar; Elon Musk of Tesla; Richard Branson of Virgin.

⁽⁵⁾ Mark Zuckerberg of Facebook referring to a "cushion to try new things" in a changing economy that relies on entrepreneurship and new ideas.

⁽⁶⁾ Studies on guaranteed income schemes found a decrease in work incentives related to these schemes (Forget, 2011).

⁽⁷⁾ Van Oorschot (2006).

⁽⁸⁾ Christensen (2002).

⁽⁹⁾ McLean (2016).

⁽¹⁰⁾ Robeyns (2001).

⁽¹¹⁾ Ravallion (2012).

Box 5.4: Benchmarking Member States in terms of minimum income, unemployment benefits and active labour market policies

Since 2015 the European Commission in cooperation with Member States has undertaken benchmarking exercises in the field of employment and social policies. The objective of these benchmarking exercises is to support mutual learning, promote structural reforms and foster upward convergence among Member States.

The benchmarking exercises follow an approach agreed by the Social Protection Committee (SPC) and the Employment Committee (EMCO). The approach is based on three identification processes. The first refers to key challenges and outcome indicators, the second to performance indicators, and the third to policy levers that can lead to better outcomes. The policy levers refer to general principles for policy guidance, and – where available – specific indicators which allow comparisons of Member States. ⁽¹⁾

Two ongoing benchmarking exercises for the social protection sphere, focus, first, on minimum income, and, secondly, on unemployment benefits and active labour market policies (ALMPs).

The following dimensions were chosen for the benchmarking in the area of minimum income:

- 1) Outcome indicators: the relative median poverty risk gap, the material and social deprivation rate, and the at-risk-of-poverty rate of the population living in (quasi-) jobless households.
- 2) Performance indicators: the impact of social transfers (excluding pensions) on poverty, the persistent at-risk-of-poverty rate, and the coverage rate of social benefits for people at risk of poverty in (quasi-) jobless households.
- 3) Policy levers: the adequacy of benefits, ⁽²⁾ the eligibility conditions, and the activation requirements.

The dimensions analysed in the benchmarking on unemployment benefits and ALMPs ⁽³⁾ are the following:

- 1) Outcome indicators: the unemployment rate, the long-term unemployment rate and the at-risk-of-poverty rate of the unemployed.
- 2) Performance indicators: the proportion of people willing to work taking part in activation measures, and the coverage of the unemployment benefits targeting people unemployed for less than 12 months.
- 3) Policy levers for unemployment benefits: duration, replacement rates, eligibility conditions. For policy levers on activation, discussion is currently ongoing.

Within the context of the European Pillar of Social Rights, the Commission intends to continue working with the Member States to promote benchmarking and exchanges of best practice.

⁽¹⁾ See Joint Employment Report 2018, Box 1.

⁽²⁾ Two indicators for this policy lever have been identified for the measurement of adequacy: minimum income as a proportion of the poverty threshold (an average of the last three years would be used to smooth the abrupt change in the threshold), or as a proportion of the income of a low wage earner (defined as someone earning 50% of the average wage).

⁽³⁾ This label covers different categories of activation measures: training, employment incentives, job rotation, job sharing, supported employment and rehabilitation, direct job creation and start-up incentives.

3. THE FINANCING OF SOCIAL PROTECTION

Social protection receipts as a proportion of GDP remained stable between 2000 and 2006 in the EU as a whole, ⁽⁴¹¹⁾ then grew by over 10% from 2006 to 2009, stabilising at a higher rate until 2015 (the latest year available for most Member States). All but two Member States (Hungary and Greece) saw an increase in social protection receipts in real terms between 2006 and 2015. As a result, the GDP proportion of social protection receipts across the EU grew from approximately 27% at the beginning of the millennium to about 30% in 2015. As mentioned earlier, this increase is mainly associated with growing demand for social protection triggered by demographic changes and the Great Recession.

⁽⁴¹¹⁾ No data for BG and HR.

3.1. What are the main forms of social protection financing?

Social expenditure can be funded through different types of receipts. A key distinction can be made between social contributions and general government contributions. ⁽⁴¹²⁾

Social contributions are key features of Bismarckian ⁽⁴¹³⁾ social insurance systems. They provide specific, dedicated means to finance the system, establishing who is eligible to receive benefits. Reducing the social contribution burden has been an important policy endeavour in Bismarckian welfare states. Facing increased demand for social protection

⁽⁴¹²⁾ Two additional categories of financing, transfers from other schemes and other receipts, play a smaller role.

⁽⁴¹³⁾ Named after the 19th century German chancellor Otto von Bismarck who oversaw the introduction of the world's first contribution-based social insurance schemes. This arrangement forms the basis of existing social security systems in many continental European countries. DICE Database (2016).


benefits following the Oil Shock of the early 1970s, Continental European countries reacted by promoting early exit from the labour market. By the 1980s, the resulting burden on labour costs was recognised as a brake on employment creation.

Financing from general government contributions is typically associated with the more universal provision of benefits. ⁽⁴¹⁴⁾ As well as country-to-country differences, financing structures tend to vary across expenditure functions: the proportion of social contributions in total financing tends to be lowest for housing, social exclusion and sickness/health care, whereas it is typically highest for unemployment insurance and old age pensions. ⁽⁴¹⁵⁾

Chart 5.8

A large increase in social protection receipts in 2008-2009 was followed by a stabilisation at a higher share of GDP.

Social protection receipts at 2010 prices and as % of GDP (2000 = 100), EU26



Note: Not including BG and HR


Source: Eurostat ESSPROS and national accounts

[Click here to download chart.](#)

Chart 5.9

The proportion of general government contributions in social protection financing increases

Social protection receipts by type (total = 100), EU25



Source: Eurostat, ESSPROS

[Click here to download chart.](#)

Increased reliance on general government revenues accompanied the overall growth of social protection receipts in 2006-2015. In most Member States, the largest source of this growth in social protection financing was general government

contributions, which grew from around 10% of GDP in 2000-2006 to over 12% by 2012. Social contribution receipts grew overall, but at a slower pace.

Accordingly, the relative weight of social contributions has gradually declined, with general government revenues providing a growing proportion. Employers' contributions, which typically represent the largest proportion of contributions, have declined most strongly. However, the contributions by protected persons (employees, to a lesser extent the self-employed, pensioners) have also tended to decline relative to funds contributed by general government.

3.2. Why is the proportion of general government contributions increasing?

The growing proportion of general government contributions in social protection financing is explained by several factors. The demand for social protection expenditure increased as a consequence of the Great Recession and of demographic trends, while at the same time governments were not in a position to increase social contributions. Attempting to do so through contribution rate hikes would have had an adverse effect on work incentives, put recession-stricken employers at the risk of going out of business and, in general, harmed competitiveness. In this context, the European Commission has recommended a shift away from labour taxation as a measure to regain competitiveness and support workers' employability, beginning with the 2010 Annual Growth Survey and continuing in country-specific recommendations issued as part of the European Semester. ⁽⁴¹⁶⁾ Governments have resorted to complementing the budgets of social protection schemes through general government receipts. The most important elements of the policy context are reviewed below.

First, general government financing may cover deficits in social insurance schemes. The Bismarckian model of exclusively contribution-financed social benefits rarely exists in a pure form. Instead, state budgets tend to contribute to the funds, with the role of the state ranging across the EU from no financial participation at all, through providing fixed contributions or subsidies, to the state covering deficits. As regards benefits linked to old age, eight Member States take on the broadest responsibility for covering deficits. For unemployment benefit, this figure is twelve. Most remaining Member States contribute to the funds to a smaller extent. ⁽⁴¹⁷⁾ The institutional conditions for general government participation are therefore in place. Moreover, general government contributions have a stabilisation function, as revenue shortfalls and heightened demand for expenditure by social security funds occur simultaneously during economic downturns, particularly in the case of unemployment benefits.

⁽⁴¹⁴⁾ This solution was first adopted in post-war Britain and it has influenced the social protection system of Scandinavian countries too. DICE Database (2016).

⁽⁴¹⁵⁾ Social Protection Committee and European Commission (2015).


⁽⁴¹⁶⁾ See European Commission (2015b).

⁽⁴¹⁷⁾ Authors' calculation based on Social Security Administration (2016).

Chart 5.10

Social protection receipts grew significantly in most Member States, and the largest source of this growth was general government contributions

Percentage change in social protection receipts, by type, 2006-2015



Note: EUR, 2010 prices

Source: Eurostat: ESSPROS and national accounts

[Click here to download chart.](#)

Second, expenditure on functions that are typically funded from general government revenues has increased markedly. As mentioned above, some social protection functions, namely housing, social exclusion, family/children benefits and sickness/health care, are mostly financed by general government contributions. These four categories were responsible for almost half (47.5%) of the growth in total social protection expenditure between 2006 and 2015 in the EU. ⁽⁴¹⁸⁾

Third, social contribution rates and revenues stagnated in the EU during 2006-2015, the time when social protection expenditure was rising. In line with country-specific recommendations of the Council, several Member States have adopted measures to reduce labour costs through social contribution or personal income tax cuts, often targeted on vulnerable groups of workers. Taking the EU as a whole, the social contribution burden remained relatively stable, as measured by the most important indicators: the tax wedge, the implicit tax rate on labour and the share of labour taxation in GDP or total taxation. ⁽⁴¹⁹⁾ Yet another type of indicator shows that between 2000 and 2014, the majority of reforms linked to employers' contributions resulted in reductions (*Chart 5.11*). The overall volume of reforms to social contributions paid by employees and the self-employed has been smaller and the direction of the reforms more evenly split between increases and decreases.


⁽⁴¹⁸⁾ Data not available for HR and PL.

⁽⁴¹⁹⁾ Even if there may be substantial differences for specific countries. OECD Revenue Statistics; European Commission (2018), p.30.

Chart 5.11

Most reforms of employers' social contributions and income taxes resulted in a decrease, whereas the picture is more mixed for other labour taxes

Reforms of labour taxation by field and by direction, EU, 2000-2016



Source: European Commission, LABREF

[Click here to download chart.](#)

3.3. Financing social protection in a changing world of work

The prevalence of non-standard forms of work is likely to put additional pressure on the financing of social protection in the future. Certain new forms of work blur the distinction between employees and the self-employed with the result that non-standard workers' contribution levels are on par with those of the self-employed. The self-employed typically pay lower contributions than employees. While no direct evidence is currently available, simulations in *Box 5.5* show that shorter working hours, and an increase in self-employment with little connection to the EU Member States' social insurance schemes, may put these systems under strain, aggravating the challenges associated with ageing.

Further sources of financing may become necessary if the contributory base is shrinking.

Theoretically, one solution is to raise contribution rates. However, many Member States appear to have levels of labour tax burden that are already harming competitiveness and warrant contribution or tax cuts. As detailed in the following subsection, under a future scenario where standard employment is to a significant extent replaced by alternative employment forms with lower social protection coverage, a downward pressure on contribution rates will be even more pronounced. First, non-standard forms of employment may attract workers for various non-fiscal advantages they provide, such as flexibility. Second, where different rules apply, this may incentivise (genuine) changes towards forms of employment with the lowest rates. ⁽⁴²⁰⁾ Third, in the absence of suitable enforcement mechanisms, undeclared or falsely declared work may increase, particularly in jurisdictions where administrations currently face difficulties. ⁽⁴²¹⁾ These challenges point to a shrinking taxable income base. As a result, new sources of funding, including non-labour tax bases, may need to be found.

Considerations related to the future of work are important elements in the discussion of optimal taxation, particularly for the funding of social protection.

Traditionally, discussion of optimal taxation has focused on both efficiency and equity. The problem is to find a tax mix that maximises efficiency (understood as minimising economic distortions while generating a given level of revenue) and at the same time contributes to equity goals (such as mitigating inequality). Implicit in this discourse is that the optimal tax mix needs to be administratively feasible. ⁽⁴²²⁾ With non-standard forms of work gaining prominence, the feasibility of labour taxation comes to the forefront of policy considerations. The following sub-section reviews a major strand of the optimal taxation discussion: the rebalancing of the tax mix by shifting the tax burden away from labour. It then extends the discussion by investigating the impact of non-standard employment.

Shifting the tax burden from labour to other tax bases is a practicable element of policy packages designed to regain competitiveness, but it is no panacea.

The rationale for revenue-neutral tax shifts away from labour (including social contributions) towards more 'growth-friendly' tax bases is that, through the reduction of the tax wedge, both labour supply and labour demand can be boosted. ⁽⁴²³⁾ However, this approach is beset by a number of difficulties. First, certain more growth-friendly types of tax, such as recurrent taxes on property and environmental taxes account for a relatively low share of overall tax revenue, potentially limiting their scope to be used as part of a tax shift. Second, while consumption taxes appear to be the most plausible candidate for a tax shift, benefits of such a shift depend on specific circumstances. ⁽⁴²⁴⁾ In addition, distributional considerations may affect the feasibility and desirability of a tax shift to consumption taxation. ⁽⁴²⁵⁾ Where tax revenue is used to finance social protection benefits, this can be overcome if the tax-contribution-benefit system overall is designed to mitigate inequalities. Third, some recent economic literature points to heterogeneity of responses, non-linear effects and differences in amplitude between the short-term and long-term effects in the impact on growth of different tax types. ⁽⁴²⁶⁾ The detailed design of a tax is at least as important as the type of tax.

In the traditional framework, with employees working for a single employer under a standard contract, labour taxation has an advantage in terms of administrative feasibility.

Through a third-party declaration (prepared by the employer), labour income is easily verifiable. As this is the main source of income for the large majority of taxpayers, it serves as the prime indicator of ability to pay, and is therefore well-suited to redistributive taxation. Moreover, with particular relevance for financing social protection, it is compatible with the accumulation of individual rights on which social protection benefits are based.

⁽⁴²⁰⁾ A tax and contributions system can be said to be neutral between various forms of employment if workers' and employers' choices between each form is driven by market forces (which encompass efficiency and equity considerations as well as the technology), as opposed to fiscal considerations.

⁽⁴²¹⁾ The association between the labour taxation advantage of the self-employed compared with employees, and the level of self-employment without employees is noteworthy in this respect. An outflow of standard workers in response to social contribution hikes is a plausible risk, particularly in jurisdictions where (perceived) tax enforcement is weaker. (European Commission 2017c, p.96).

⁽⁴²²⁾ For a presentation of the efficiency-equity trade-off, as well as the administrative constraints, see: Diamond and Saez (2011).

⁽⁴²³⁾ For an international comparison in the choice between various tax types to finance social protection, see Olivier (2015).

⁽⁴²⁴⁾ Cost competitiveness gains for a given country are smaller if several countries implement such a shift simultaneously European Commission (2013).

⁽⁴²⁵⁾ European Commission (2012); Thomas (2018).

⁽⁴²⁶⁾ Baiardi et al. (2017).

Box 5.5: New forms of work and financing social security

More part-time and more self-employed workers may pose new challenges

ESDE 2017 showed that demographic ageing will bring a double burden for today's young people and future generations. Compared with current pensioners, they will pay higher contribution rates during their working careers and receive lower pensions during their retirement. This is because the EU's working-age population will decline. At the same time, the number of elderly people will increase strongly. In a very simple model, ESDE 2017 showed that, in the absence of any government measures to cut pensions, the contribution rates to the EU's pension system may be double today's average. In addition to the double burden caused by demographic change, the effect of more fragmented working careers may further reduce future pensions. A refined version of this model shows how new forms of work may exert additional reform pressure on tomorrow's social security schemes.

In the following paragraphs it is assumed that a single EU contribution rate for social security⁽¹⁾ balances out the volume of benefits and revenues of the EU's income-replacing benefit schemes: pensions and unemployment benefit/social assistance. Both are funded by employee's contributions and paid to people not in employment in a pay-as-you-go social security scheme.⁽²⁾ It is assumed that non-working people of working age do not pay any social contributions. Yet they will acquire pension rights worth half of those who do work.

Apart from this re-distributive element in the pension system, pension rights follow contributions paid by employees. Thus, person's biography in a certain year has an impact on the pension right acquired in that year: The person can be employed or not. If in employment they can be self-employed or employee. Self-employed workers are assumed not to be insured in the social security scheme. Finally, workers decide on the number of hours worked. Everything else being equal, social security contributions (and pension rights) will change in parallel to the number of hours worked, since the latter define the assessment basis on which contributions are paid (the insured income).

The following will show how new forms of work may impact on the EU's social security contribution rates. A number of assumptions need to be made.

A standard scenario


First, the **employment rate of people aged from 20 to 64 (72% in 2017) will increase** in line with the High-Activity scenario as defined in ESDE 2017 which assumes that by 2030 the EU manages to use its human resources fully and has achieved an

(1) Consider an "EU contribution rate" equal to the average across 28 EU countries.

(2) See European Commission (2017b), Chapter 4, Box 4.2 on pp. 122-123.

employment rate of almost 87%.⁽³⁾ It is assumed that this employment rate will not change after 2030.

Chart 1
High uncertainty about the number of hours worked in the future.



Source: AMECO database, DG EMPL projections

Secondly, **hours worked will decline**. In the absence of solid estimates of how the number of hours worked per person will be affected by new forms of work over the next decades, a number of assumptions are made. The negative trend as observed and forecast⁽⁴⁾ for the period 2000 – 2019 is extrapolated. It is assumed that it will continue, but the pace of the decline will diminish (log-linear trend-regression): see the blue line in Chart 1.

Thirdly, the **nominal pension level is 47% of average wages**. In line with ESDE 2017, all people aged 65 and older receive a pension equal to 47% of average gross wages (today's average pension benefit rate). This is the nominal overall pension level that is kept constant over time, while *individual* pension rights may vary with respect to a worker's biography. In the long run, the volume of pensions will increase due to demographic ageing.

Fourthly, **people aged 20-64 not in employment receive some kind of a benefit**, either unemployment or some other social assistance, if they are not working. Both have to be financed out of contributions paid by current employees. The level of this benefit is calibrated as 18% of average gross wages (today's average unemployment benefit).⁽⁵⁾

(3) The scenario assumes full activation of women and older workers by 2030 and further educational progress. For detail see European Commission (2017b), Chapter 2, pp. 58-59, especially Box 2.1.

(4) For the period 2017 to 2019 the Commission's Winter Forecast assumption is being used.


(5) Per unemployed and per year this is €6.667 per year, or 18% of the EU's average wage level.

(Continued on the next page)

Box (continued)

Chart 2 Future forms of work may make social protection more costly.

Contribution rate in three scenarios, % of gross wages



Source: DG EMPL calculations based on Eurostat 2015 Population Projection, Eurostat EU LFS, Eurostat National Accounts

Chart 2 shows the contribution rate for income-replacing social security schemes, as a percentage of wages earned by those in employment. In the standard scenario it will decline up to 2030 due to the assumed strong increase in the employment rate. In the very long term, demographic ageing will pull contribution rates up, as discussed in ESDE 2017. ⁽⁶⁾

New forms of work may impact on both the number of hours worked and the future incidence of self-employment (Chapter 2). Three additional scenarios are therefore plotted.

A faster hours-reduction scenario

A higher incidence of part-time work and new forms of work-sharing may depress hours per workers faster than assumed in the standard scenario. A linear trend-prolongation of the decline seen since the year 2000 would reduce hours worked as marked by the red curve in Chart 1. In 2060 people would work 90 hours fewer compared with the standard scenario (-6%). The contributory base would shrink accordingly, forcing the social insurance contribution rate to climb by 1.5 pps, compared with the standard scenario, to balance out revenue and expenditure.

⁽⁶⁾ European Commission (2017b), Chapter 4.

An hours-recovery scenario

However, in order better to harmonise the assumption on working hours with the optimistic High Activity scenario on employment as outlined in ESDE 2017, the (log-linear) trend-projection can be assumed to start only from the period since 2013 (instead of 2000) when the EU saw its labour markets recover (see Chapter 1). Such an increase could be linked to labour shortages, in combination with policy measures to facilitate work-life balance. The assumption is that people work 70 hours more on average per year (+4%), compared with the standard scenario. The contribution rate could thus be lower by almost 1 ppt.

A doubling of self-employment scenario

Chapter 2 indicates that self-employment as a proportion of total employment is one of the labour market trends which is hardest to project. There is evidence that new forms of work, including self-employment, may shape the future world of work to a much greater extent than they have done so far. In a third scenario it is thus assumed that the proportion of self-employed (aged 20-64 years), which is 15% today, will double by 2060 as more and more people work on the internet or other collaborative platforms. As self-employed are not part of the social security insurance system, the increasing share of self-employed implies that the volume of contributions paid to social security declines. Under these circumstances, the social security contribution rate would climb by 4.6 pps by 2060, compared with the standard scenario.

In the very long run, contribution rates in the alternative scenarios would converge towards the standard scenario because individual pension entitlements follow the contributions paid as employee. ⁽⁷⁾ For example, as today's self-employed workers are not entitled to a pension, this lowers the amount of pensions to be paid in the future, so that contribution rates can be lowered again. However, the simulation shows that a higher share of self-employed would lower the contributory base, thus drive up contribution rates for a long time. This is relevant for the labour market as social security contributions are usually paid by employers and employees. Higher contribution rates would increase labour costs and reduce workers' take-home pay.

⁽⁷⁾ However, as there are re-distributive elements in the pension system there will not be full convergence.

However, the changing world of work poses feasibility challenges in the area of labour taxation, which may reinforce the need for a tax shift away from labour. With the emergence of new non-standard forms of work, certain administrative advantages of taxing labour income are fading. Under existing tax administration methods, labour income becomes less traceable for workers who have several employers, often earning smaller amounts per individual contract. ⁽⁴²⁷⁾ The employment status becomes more difficult to verify. Third-party reporting

⁽⁴²⁷⁾ European Commission (2017c).

is harder to enforce, as both the users of labour as a service and the intermediaries are difficult to pin down, unlike employers with reporting obligations. Moreover, as explained in Chapter 2, certain new forms of work are associated with a weakening of the bargaining power of workers, due in part to cross-border competition between workers. Therefore, even those workers for whom participation in social protection schemes through the payment of contributions would be individually desirable may be unable to secure it, when bargaining with (non-standard) employers.

Neutrality between various forms of work might be achievable only at a lower contribution rate which would however leave a funding gap that would need to be filled by alternative means.

Contribution rates might need to adjust to the optimum level of those subgroups of labour income earners who have more options to adjust their declared income in the face of higher rates, notably non-standard workers and the self-employed. The ensuing revenue shortfall would then have to be covered through other taxes. In this regard, there has been renewed attention to capital taxation, including taxes on (labour-displacing) robots and technology ⁽⁴²⁸⁾ to finance social protection. Still, some would argue that such a tax may stifle innovation and investment, while the international mobility of capital and technology may limit its feasibility at national or local level. ⁽⁴²⁹⁾ Therefore, shifting the tax burden to less mobile bases, such as consumption appears to be a viable alternative, although its regressive nature has to be borne in mind. Additionally, the modernisation - in particular the digitalisation - of tax administration may gain an important role. This would allow more effective accounting for income earned in the new economy. Furthermore, institutional changes that offset the weakening of the market power of workers may help to maintain a higher level of contributory benefits.

4. CONCLUSIONS

Social protection is a key component of Europe's model of a highly competitive social market economy. Modern social protection systems enable workers and their families to make the most of the new opportunities emerging from a changing world of work and to contribute fully to economic and social progress. As this report has shown, future shifts in the labour market are very likely, but their precise direction, scale and timing remain uncertain. In such a dynamic context, social protection can provide (income) stability for those who are forced to change jobs in an increasingly diverse and dynamic labour market, or who actively choose to pursue new career paths. As welfare and work are closely linked, changes in the world of work can have major impacts on the existing welfare systems.

First, along with new opportunities, structural changes in the labour market may generate additional demands for social protection. Flexible new forms of work can offer the unemployed or the inactive new entry points into the labour market. At the same time, workers that are displaced by new technologies may require support via income replacement benefits or retraining. The same applies to workers who make more frequent transitions throughout their careers. A large proportion of social protection benefits consists of replacement incomes

for jobless individuals. Non-standard employment may partly come to redefine the notion of being 'out of a job'.

Second, in many Member States, specific groups of (non-standard) workers have reduced access to social protection. Rights and obligations associated with social protection have been developed primarily for workers employed on standard contracts. Workers in non-standard employment or the self-employed may be formally excluded from specific social security benefits. Alternatively, such workers - despite being formally covered - may find it more difficult to fulfil the criteria regarding work history or prior contributions. As workers' careers become less linear, the transferability and transparency of entitlements become more important if comprehensive coverage is to be ensured. While there have been policy initiatives to address coverage gaps in several Member States, the recent proposal for a Council Recommendation on access to social protection ⁽⁴³⁰⁾ aims for comprehensive and systematic improvement. Meanwhile, the new developments have sparked renewed debates about last resort safety nets and benefit conditionality, including means-testing, universal benefits or job search requirements.

Third, changes in the world of work will have major implications for the financing and sustainability of social protection. In many Member States, employers' and workers' social contributions remain an important source of funding for social protection systems (even if general government contributions constitute a growing share). In addition to a shrinking contribution base due to population ageing, challenges to the financing of social protection are reinforced where new forms of work do not generate (sufficient) receipts for social protection. To ensure the sustainability of social protection, several routes can be explored. Ensuring that all forms of work contribute to social protection could help to sustain finances. Revenue from sources other than labour could gain a more important role. Investing in people by ensuring access to effective and efficient social protection for all is at the heart of the European Pillar of Social Rights and of European initiatives on access to social protection.

⁽⁴³⁰⁾ COM(2018) 132 final.

⁽⁴²⁸⁾ Oberson (2017).

⁽⁴²⁹⁾ ILO (2018).

Annex 1: Methodologies used to estimate coverage rates

Table A1.1
Comparison of methodology used in Matsaganis et al (2015) and Jara Tamayo and Tumino (2018)

	<u>Matsaganis et al (2015)</u>	<u>Jara Tamayo and Tumino (2018)</u>
Microdata	EU-Labour Force Survey 2014	EU-Statistics on Income and Living Conditions 2015, except Germany SILC 2014 and UK 2014/5 FRS
Policy rules	MISSOC (policy rules July 2015)	EUROMOD (policy rules 2017)
Risks covered	- Unemployment - Sickness - Maternity	- Unemployment
Standard workers	Employees, working full-time, open-ended contract	Employees with individual work intensity $\geq 33\%$ Work intensity defined as months worked over the year (over 12), multiplied by number of hours worked in the week (by the individual) over median hours worked during the week (at country level)
Non-standard workers	- Self-employed - Family workers - Employees, working full-time, fixed-term contract - Employees, working part-time, open-ended contract - Employees, working part-time, fixed-term contract	- Self-employed (income from self-employment, not as employee) - Employees with low work intensity ($<33\%$)
Coverage concept	Risk of not being entitled to benefit	Potential coverage: share of workers who would be covered by unemployment insurance schemes in case of unemployment based on their previous work history (months of work over the last year)
Criteria self-employed	Number of months worked Voluntary: opt in if self-employed with employees Voluntary: opt out if solo self-employed	Work history (months worked) Voluntary: (Not simulated)
Criteria employees	- Employees on open-ended contracts are assumed to be eligible, regardless of number of months worked. - Workers on fixed-term contracts are assumed to be at risk of not being eligible to benefit if their contract expires before the number of months required for entitlement.	Work history (months worked), regardless of contract type

Source: /

[Click here to download table.](#)

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Social dialogue for a changing world of work

1. INTRODUCTION ⁽⁴³¹⁾

The world of work is changing rapidly and in many ways. Digitisation and the associated organisational changes are often cited as key drivers. However, these technological drivers for change are interacting closely with others such as globalisation, demographic shifts and the increased participation of women in the labour market. Together they provide the framework for the future of work and the context for social dialogue. The previous chapter has shown that these changes have implications for the public insurance systems in the Member States. This Chapter will look into the consequences for the organisation of work and the role social partners play in shaping it.

The European Pillar of Social Rights stresses the importance of social dialogue for addressing the challenges triggered by the aforementioned drivers of change. For the purposes of this chapter the following three clusters of challenges have been identified. In each case the social partners, potentially with the support of governmental authorities, are asked to shape the future.

- Adaptation of skills to cope with and prepare for the effects of digitisation in the labour market and maintaining European competitiveness in a globalised economy. As Chapter 2 points out, the digitised economy is increasingly demanding more workers with ICT skills, social and communication skills and new combinations of skills. Frequent updating of skills and lifelong learning are expected

to gain prominence. Achieving high education and skills levels appears to be more important than ever;

- Greater flexibility of employment through changes to time and place of work: Increasing numbers of employees are working part-time or have flexible working times, adjusting to meet the needs of the employer or employee; teleworking, i.e.; work undertaken outside the employer's premises, usually from home or while travelling, is becoming more frequent and provides challenges and opportunities for employers as well as trade unions. If the new technical possibilities are to be used to the full, to what extent can a (clear) distinction between professional and private life be maintained?
- More diverse employment relations. More flexible working time and workplace arrangements can be seen as stepping-stones towards a diversification and individualisation of the employment relationship. Management loses immediate control over the worker and has to focus on results instead of being merely narrowly focused on presence and hours worked. The autonomy of workers increases, which can lead to more diverse employment relationships, ranging from standard employment contracts, to results-oriented forms of employment and to self-employment.

This increasing diversity makes it more difficult for the social partners to defend the interests of all workers and employers. Traditionally, trade unions and works councils have been there to help employees voice their ideas and concerns about what is happening in the companies that employ them and

⁽⁴³¹⁾ This chapter was written by Sigried Caspar, Katarina Jaksic and Evi Roelen with contributions from Tim Van Rie, Emelie Lindstrom and several EMPL colleagues providing country related or sectoral information.

to increase their motivation and commitment. ⁽⁴³²⁾ But can they still fulfil this role? Does social dialogue deliver on the challenges of today?

This chapter considers the consequences for social dialogue of digitisation, digitalisation and the emerging new forms of work. First the chapter looks at the positions taken by social partners on these changes. Secondly, it explores how social dialogue has addressed the challenges mentioned above: changing skills requirements, changes to time and place of work, including consequences for health and safety, and more diverse employment relations. Finally, the chapter considers the organisational strength and capacity of social partners to deliver on these challenges.

2. SOCIAL PARTNERS' STATEMENTS ON DIGITALISATION

On the occasion of the Tripartite Social Summit ⁽⁴³³⁾ on 16 March 2016, the European Social Partners issued a joint statement on digitalisation. ⁽⁴³⁴⁾ In this document they underlined the impact of digitalisation on employment and the important role to be played by Europe and the European Commission in particular. They requested jointly that employment policy should 'underpin the digital transformation'. Public authorities and social partners at various levels should assess how to adapt skills policies, labour market regulations and institutions, as well as work organisation and information, consultation and participation procedures. The objective is to obtain maximum benefits for all from the digital transformation. The social partners at the sectoral level agree even more than at the cross-industry level that the need for joint action.

European sectoral social partners have highlighted the specific impact of digitalisation on their sectors. For instance, social partners from the chemical sector stated in November 2016 ⁽⁴³⁵⁾ that a targeted sectoral approach towards digitalisation would be needed. They agreed on three main points: a) technological change will affect working patterns, b) skills and anticipation of changing skill needs will play a key role and c) the social partners should help to shape the transformation process. They are developing this sector-specific approach in a joint project. The social partners from the metal sector highlighted the

impact of digitalisation on the employment relationship. ⁽⁴³⁶⁾ They stated that the technological possibility of engaging workers on individualised contracts at very low transaction costs created challenges and opportunities for collective bargaining. They see a need for both employers and trade unions to reflect on their roles and whether these may need to evolve. Existing labour laws may need to be adapted to meet the new challenges. It is the task of social partners to use their room for manoeuvre to uphold their autonomy. They also raise general as well as sector-specific challenges in relation to occupational health and safety and organisational security, such as the use of IT devices where private and professional use overlap and autonomous machines or vehicles with new forms of man-machine interfaces.

Table 6.1
European Social Partners' adopted texts on digitalisation and new technologies (2010-2017)

Sector	Title	Date
Metal sector	The impact of digitalisation on the world of work in the metal, engineering and technology-based industries	08/12/2016
Chemical industry	Joint position on social and employment-related aspects of digitalisation	22/11/2016
Insurance sector	Joint declaration on the social effects of digitalisation by the European social partners in the insurance sector	12/10/2016
Cross-industry	Statement of the European social partners on digitalisation	16/03/2016
Local and regional government	Joint declaration on the opportunities and challenges of digitalisation in local and regional administration	11/12/2015
Telecommunications	Joint UNI Europa – ETNO declaration on future ICT skills needs	28/11/2014
Postal Services	Joint Declaration on Matching Skills and Jobs in the European Postal Sector	21/11/2014
Commerce	Common contribution of the social partners for commerce to some flagship initiatives of the 'EU 2020: A European strategy for a smart, sustainable and inclusive growth'	04/08/2010

Source: Social dialogue texts database, DG EMPL.

While the service sector as a whole is less at risk of job cuts due to digitalisation than manufacturing, some service sectors are experiencing massive transformation. As explained in Chapter 2, some services are heavily affected. In the insurance sector digitalisation is already having a huge impact on the operation of companies: an increasing proportion of the market is being served by call-centres and websites, supported by centralised back offices. Social partners in the sector ⁽⁴³⁷⁾ consider the existing labour and social law a good basis for the digitalised world of work, because it is seen as flexible while providing a high level of protection for employees' rights. They argue that rapid technological changes and the uncertainties brought about by digitalisation make social dialogue even more relevant. Timely consultation and information for workers, as well as collective bargaining and employee representation, are jointly seen as contributing to good management of transitions. Social partners also agree on the need to find a new balance between changing customer expectations (such as 24/7 availability) and the work-life balance of the employees in the sector. The need to ensure long-term sustainable working

⁽⁴³²⁾ Freeman and Medoff (1984) and ETUI/ETUC (2018), p 75.

⁽⁴³³⁾ The Tripartite Social Summit is a forum for dialogue between the EU institutions at presidential level and the European social partners at top level. It is co-chaired by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission and the Head of State or Government of the rotating Presidency. The participating social partners are BusinessEurope, the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), the European Centre of Employers and Enterprises (CEEP), the European Association of Craft, Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (UEAPME) and Eurocadres.

⁽⁴³⁴⁾ ETUC, BusinessEurope, CEEP, UEAPME (2016).

⁽⁴³⁵⁾ ECEG, industriAll (2016).

⁽⁴³⁶⁾ CEEMET, industriAll (2016).

⁽⁴³⁷⁾ UNI Europa finance, insurance Europe, amice, bipar (2016).

Box 6.1: Digitalisation and sectoral restructuring in the postal sector

Digitalisation has caused significant restructuring of existing sectors. For instance, it has had an important impact on the postal sector because of the continuous decrease in mail volumes and the simultaneous large increase in the parcel market. The different proportions of revenue since 2014 (44.8% mail, 21.6% parcels & express, 16.5% financial services, 11.8% logistics & freight and 4.5% retail) show that activities in the postal sector have become more diversified. The change in the sector has led to a decrease in employment on mail delivery, but has stimulated other employment activities. Because of e-commerce and the growing volume of parcel deliveries, employers now need to provide technical devices for their postal delivery men which require training in IT skills, as well as continuous training to prepare them for future changes. The European social partners PostEurop and UNEuropa have established a partnership with IT schools in order to upskill internal employees. Consumers' increased demand for rapidity, flexibility and delivery choice has led to more flexible working arrangements with extended delivery time across the day and at the weekends.

conditions and to adapt managerial styles to the new forms of work is also identified as important. Similar fundamental changes can be observed for the postal sector as described in detail in *Box 6.1*

The importance of cooperation and negotiation in managing transitions is better developed in joint than in unilateral statements. Unilaterally, BusinessEurope issued a statement on successful digital transformation in Europe.⁽⁴³⁸⁾ The statement stresses the need for a strategy for digital transformation in order to avoid fragmentation and to steer public investment as well as entrepreneurial efforts into the most promising areas. While the document contains a section entitled "Seize the opportunities of digitalisation at the workplace" it mainly stresses the need for flexibility and to adapt. It does not consider the question of where employers may have to change their approach. In June 2016, the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) adopted a resolution on digitalisation,⁽⁴³⁹⁾ developing a position towards digitalisation which stresses the need to ensure the inclusiveness of the transition while acknowledging its advantages. ETUC also comments on the strengths and weaknesses of the Commission's policy efforts, emphasising that digitalisation on its own will not produce socially desirable outcomes. Compared to these unilateral statements the bilateral documents are far more balanced and self-critical.

EU-level activities relate to national activities. Therefore a targeted sectoral approach towards digitalisation is also considered at national level. For instance, social partners in the chemical industry in Belgium have jointly set up a demography fund to encourage enterprises to adapt and improve work organisation, occupational health and safety, lifelong learning and career development; after one year around 150 enterprises with 42 000 employees have asked for support from the fund.⁽⁴⁴⁰⁾ In Austria, social partners have agreed on a labour foundation to support structural changes in the banking sector.⁽⁴⁴¹⁾

In Germany's Stuttgart region, which has a strong industry base, an example of regional dialogue on digitalisation between the social partners and public authorities can be found in the metal industry.⁽⁴⁴²⁾

The joint statements at national level show that social partners agree that structures will change and that cooperation would facilitate necessary transitions. There is an understanding at national level that the upcoming changes will be fundamental. In some Member States, comprehensive tripartite discussions on the future of work are already taking place. For example the white paper *Arbeiten 4.0*,⁽⁴⁴³⁾ published by the German labour ministry in 2016, is the result of a broad discussion to which social partners, representatives of civil society, the self-employed and other economic actors have contributed substantially. The document provides guidance for policy priorities and creates a common understanding of the main challenges among stakeholders. In Portugal, the government published in December 2016 a green book on Labour Relations to discuss with the social partners how to tackle labour market segmentation and to look into limiting the use of fixed-term contracts, which led to a Tripartite Commitment in 2017.⁽⁴⁴⁴⁾

Industry 4.0 initiatives provide platforms to discuss and prepare for the technological and organisational aspects of digitalisation. Such initiatives are recorded for Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Spain, France, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and Sweden.⁽⁴⁴⁵⁾ In most cases these initiatives are driven by public authorities and enterprises and they focus on the technical and skills-related challenges. A key purpose of Industry 4.0 is to raise awareness. Involvement of workers and workers' representatives differs, reflecting different industrial relations traditions in the Member States. In some countries, like Belgium, employee involvement is seen

⁽⁴³⁸⁾ BusinessEurope (2015).

⁽⁴³⁹⁾ ETUC (2016).

⁽⁴⁴⁰⁾ Presentation at the Sectoral Social Dialogue Committee 'Chemical Industry' Meeting on 22/02/2018.

⁽⁴⁴¹⁾ E.g. in April 2018 a sectoral labour foundation in the banking sector has been set up.

<http://www.fondsprofessionell.at/news/maerkte/headline/befuerchtete-abbauwelle-bei-banken-arbeitsstiftung-steht-142637/>

⁽⁴⁴²⁾ Dispan, J. et al. (2017).

⁽⁴⁴³⁾ Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (2017).

⁽⁴⁴⁴⁾ Lima and da Paz (2017).

⁽⁴⁴⁵⁾ <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/cordination-european-national-regional-initiatives>

as an objective. In other countries, like the Czech Republic, trade unions were involved only after some complaints from their side. ⁽⁴⁴⁶⁾ These initiatives provide a starting point for discussions on skill needs and on adaptation challenges.

3. SKILLS AND SOCIAL DIALOGUE

Digitalisation and globalisation bring growing demands from both employers and employees for new skills. Chapter 2 has pointed out how upgrading skills and investing in education can turn digitalisation into job creation because highly-qualified human capital and physical capital are complementary. Technical skills are particularly needed, ranging from those that enable workers to use new technologies fully and efficiently, to specialised profiles that can develop and support digital infrastructures. These technical skills should be complemented by "soft" skills which cannot (yet) be replicated by robots, such as communication, interpersonal and leadership skills. The proportion of workers who perceive that they need further training to cope well with their duties is already as high as 30% in some Member States today (see *Chart 6.1*). This requirement is expected to grow with the further digitalisation of the economy and as the skills that are needed for increased transitions between jobs become ever greater. Social partners have an important role to play in addressing these skills gaps.

The Commission's new Skills Agenda for Europe (2016), to which European and national social partners have contributed extensively, recognises the need for enhanced digital skills. It aims to improve the skills of IT professionals and the wider population. Moreover, it encourages and monitors the development of national digital skills strategies. ⁽⁴⁴⁷⁾

In this context, the European Council adopted a recommendation establishing a European framework for quality and effective apprenticeships on 15 March 2018. ⁽⁴⁴⁸⁾ The recommendation is based on a Commission proposal from October 2017 which builds on important contributions from the European Social Partners. ⁽⁴⁴⁹⁾ Its aim is to encourage a better fit between labour force skills and labour market needs. Hence it supports a partnership approach between Member States, social partners and other key stakeholders.

⁽⁴⁴⁶⁾ Vogel (2017).

⁽⁴⁴⁷⁾ European Commission (2016).


⁽⁴⁴⁸⁾ European Council (2018).
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/03/15/quality-and-effective-apprenticeships-council-adopts-european-framework/>

⁽⁴⁴⁹⁾ European Commission, COM (2017)563 final.

Chart 6.1

More training is needed

Workers who perceive that they need further training to cope well with their duties (%), 2015



Source: European Working Conditions Survey 2015, Eurofound calculations

[Click here to download chart.](#)

EU governments and social partners regard the lack of adaptable skills as one of the most important challenges in the years to come. This concern is in particular driven by digital skills mismatches in the labour market. In most EU Member States, it is expected that suitable candidates for vacant positions will become increasingly scarce. ⁽⁴⁵⁰⁾ This will increase competition for those who have acquired the necessary skills, but may leave others behind. To address these issues, the French government, for example, recently launched the Big Investment Plan, with the paramount aim of creating a skilled society and a digital state. From a total of EUR 57 billion over 5 years, EUR 14 billion will be devoted to vocational training and apprenticeship over the next five years via the "Plan d'Investissement Compétence" (PIC). Its objective is to ensure the long-term inclusion of unemployed and young dropouts in the labour market. The PIC amounts to an average annual increase in spending on vocational training and apprenticeship of almost 12% by the French public authorities. ⁽⁴⁵¹⁾ Its implementation is now being discussed with the social partners. While this is a good example, it will be important that all Member States and social partners continue their efforts to reduce skills mismatches.

⁽⁴⁵⁰⁾ Eurofound (2016c), pp. 7-8.

⁽⁴⁵¹⁾ République Française (2018).

The digital skills gap provides a strong impetus for joint action by social partners. Trade unions want to ensure that no one is left behind: digitalisation should avoid reinforcing the uneven distribution of wealth. For them, therefore, the need for accessible and good quality training programmes, addressing the lack of digital skills for workers and the self-employed, is an absolute priority for ensuring greater equality of opportunity. ⁽⁴⁵²⁾ Employer organisations approach the challenge from a different angle. They see the adaptation of skills as essential for meeting the needs of enterprises and of the economy as a whole. ⁽⁴⁵³⁾

Various examples for joint action against a skill-gap can be found at the European level. Jointly the cross-industry European Social Partners have highlighted the importance of scaling-up digital skills. ⁽⁴⁵⁴⁾ European sectoral social partners have also addressed changing skills requirements (see *Box 6.1*) by undertaking joint projects and declarations, in the telecom and postal sectors for example. ⁽⁴⁵⁵⁾ ⁽⁴⁵⁶⁾ Similarly, the European social partners in the metal sector underlined the importance of upskilling in their joint position on the major transformation caused by digitalisation. ⁽⁴⁵⁷⁾ The European social partners in the commerce sector have been one of first to address this issue at the European level. In 2010 they outlined in their European Strategy for a Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive Growth how new technologies create challenges for social partners in the commerce sector, showing themselves very conscious of what this new era of commerce (e-commerce) would bring in terms of skills needs for the primarily female workforce. ⁽⁴⁵⁸⁾ At the beginning of 2018, the European social partners in the food and drink industry launched a joint project ⁽⁴⁵⁹⁾ on the need to upskill the workforce in their sector in order to meet the challenges posed by automation as well as to mitigate the risk of job losses.

Social partners at the national level can play a crucial role in skills upgrading throughout working lives. Employer and worker organisations are well placed to recognise evolving skills needs and design training programmes that match these needs. As a result they can participate constructively in the design of vocational training policies or develop on-the-job training. ⁽⁴⁶⁰⁾ Several successful initiatives already exist at the national level. The apprenticeship system in Austria and Germany, where the apprentice

⁽⁴⁵²⁾ ETUC (2016).

⁽⁴⁵³⁾ Business Europe (2015).

⁽⁴⁵⁴⁾ Business Europe, CEEP, ETUC, UEAPME (2016).

⁽⁴⁵⁵⁾ ETNO, UNI Europa (2014).

⁽⁴⁵⁶⁾ POSTEUROP and UNI Europa Post & Logistics (2014).

⁽⁴⁵⁷⁾ ECEG, industriAll (2016).

⁽⁴⁵⁸⁾ EuroCommerce and UNI Europa Commerce (2010).

⁽⁴⁵⁹⁾ New professions and career paths in the food and drink industry – Delivering high level food industry skills in the digital economy (VS/2017/0381).

⁽⁴⁶⁰⁾ See for example: [www.etf.europa.eu/webatt.nsf/0/45A9C75B6AA860E1C1257B6C0056EB64/\\$file/INFORM_15_Social%20partners.pdf](http://www.etf.europa.eu/webatt.nsf/0/45A9C75B6AA860E1C1257B6C0056EB64/$file/INFORM_15_Social%20partners.pdf)

is linked to a company from the first day of training, is based on job profiles. These profiles are developed and modernised in working groups where representatives from employers (including chambers of commerce and industry), trade unions and government meet with experts to put together the most relevant content. ⁽⁴⁶¹⁾ While these systems have existed for a long time, they were modernised around the turn of the century to speed up the process of reforming professional training curricula. ⁽⁴⁶²⁾

In Slovenia, a number of competence centres ⁽⁴⁶³⁾ have been developed with the support of the European Social Fund (ESF) in order to boost human resource development. Enterprises, often in emerging sectors such as sustainable construction and the circular economy, set up competence centres to upgrade existing skills and develop new ones in cooperation with other organisations in the sector such as employer and business associations.

4. INCREASED FLEXIBILITY OF PLACE AND TIME OF WORK

Social dialogue is important to make sure that employers and workers benefit securely from the increase in flexibility linked to telework. New technologies allow many employees – and in particular so-called knowledge workers – to work from (almost) anywhere and at any time. The distinction between the place of work and private life is becoming less clear. ⁽⁴⁶⁴⁾ Telework/ICT-based mobile work which allows working from home or (for example) while on a business trip, are becoming increasingly common. In addition, the time available for work has evolved, with the possibility of working from different locations and across different time zones. ⁽⁴⁶⁵⁾ ⁽⁴⁶⁶⁾

Social partners are reluctant to use the full potential for flexibility. *Chart 6.2* shows that the use of telework varies from more than 30% of workers in the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Sweden, to 5% or less in Bulgaria, Greece, Croatia, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania. For some countries, notably Belgium, Estonia, Luxembourg, Portugal, Slovenia, Finland and Sweden, the increases between 2008 and 2016 are remarkable. While some of the discrepancies may be explained by the structure of national economies, different management cultures also play a role. For Germany, analysis indicates that employers are reluctant to allow telework. ⁽⁴⁶⁷⁾ While around 40% of employees could perform (part of) their duties from home, only about 12% do so, while

⁽⁴⁶¹⁾ see e.g. https://www.wko.at/service/bildung-lehre/Wie_entsteht_neuer_Lehrberuf.html

⁽⁴⁶²⁾ see e.g. BMBF (1999), p. 11.

⁽⁴⁶³⁾ <http://www.sklad-kadri.si/si/razvoj-kadrov/kompetencni-centri-za-razvoj-kadrov-koc/predstavitev-kompetencnih-centrov/>

⁽⁴⁶⁴⁾ The National Academies Press (2017).

⁽⁴⁶⁵⁾ European Economic and Social Committee (2017).


⁽⁴⁶⁶⁾ Eurofound (2015).

⁽⁴⁶⁷⁾ Brenke (2016).

Chart 6.2

More workers work from home

Employed persons working from home sometimes/usually, as a percentage of total employment (%), 2008 and 2016



Note: Data for DK 2015, data for NL not available before 2015

Source: Eurostat, LFS [lfsa_ehomp]

[Click here to download chart.](#)

about 30% would like to do so. These 30% correspond to the share of telework in the Netherlands, Luxembourg or Sweden. So far in Germany, telework is often seen as an option only for highly skilled workers; as a result the telework potential of medium skilled workers remains largely untapped. The position is different in the Netherlands where since 2015 employees have been legally entitled to telework unless the employer can prove that this is not possible.

While flexibility can bring advantages, there is a risk of additional stress with potentially substantial negative impacts. ⁽⁴⁶⁸⁾ Flexible working may make it more challenging to abide by certain rules, e.g. on working time. It is therefore a topic for social dialogue, but it is important for social partners to have a scientifically underpinned understanding of the consequences of different forms of flexibility, before entering into negotiations. Negative health impacts can be reduced by allowing workers to foresee and influence the timing of their work. The chance to rest mentally from work is important to health as well as to improving work-life balance and productivity. Telework alternating with work in the enterprise is in most cases positive, because it gives the worker a feeling of autonomy and facilitates work-life balance, whereas extensive teleworking can make it more difficult to reconcile work and private life and can lead to exhaustion. Having to be constantly available and working outside usual working hours are likely to impair private life, to reduce workers' ability to detach themselves from the demands of work and to increase stress levels and the risk of burnout and other health issues. ⁽⁴⁶⁹⁾ Episodes of work during rest times hinder recreation. The voluntary efforts of employees to stay connected to work during rest time, or excessively long working hours, can have a negative impact on their

long-term performance and fitness. Such negative consequences seem to depend only to a limited extent on whether the workers are acting voluntarily or at employer's request.

Building on evidence from studies and intensive discussion by social partners, a right to disconnect from the demands of work has been established in France. ⁽⁴⁷⁰⁾ In other Member States, this topic is also under discussion: in Luxembourg it is a subject of collective bargaining in the insurance and banking sector, ⁽⁴⁷¹⁾ in Spain a company level agreement has been registered ⁽⁴⁷²⁾ and in the Czech Republic social partners are working on an ESF project to investigate the possibility of shorter and more flexible working hours without reducing wages. ⁽⁴⁷³⁾

Employees see advantages and disadvantages in digitalisation. Asked about the impact of digitalisation on their work, in a representative survey by the German trade union federation (DGB), German employees responded that overall digitalisation has increased workload and the intensity of work. ⁽⁴⁷⁴⁾ On the positive side, the respondents saw digitalisation as

⁽⁴⁷⁰⁾ As from 1 January 2017 for firms with more than 50 employees and a trade union representative a right of being 'non-reachable' (right to disconnect from the use of digital tools) is to be included in collective agreements – Art. L.2242-8 French Labour Code).

⁽⁴⁷¹⁾ See at: <https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/articles/luxembourg-social-partners-begin-renegotiating-collective-agreement-in-banking-sector>

⁽⁴⁷²⁾ For information on AXA (Spain): <https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/articles/spain-axa-recognises-workers-right-to-turn-phones-off-out-of-working-hours>

⁽⁴⁷³⁾ <https://www.cmkos.cz/obsah/755/projekt-esf-zkracovani-pracovni-doby>

⁽⁴⁷⁴⁾ DGB-Index Gute Arbeit: Digitale Arbeit – Arbeitshetze und Arbeitsintensivierung bei digitaler Arbeit – Mai 2017 www.dgb-index-gute-arbeit.de

⁽⁴⁶⁸⁾ Bundesanstalt für Arbeitsschutz und Arbeitsmedizin (2017).

⁽⁴⁶⁹⁾ Ibid, p. 27.

bringing more leeway in decision-making, a better work-life balance and an increased proportion of work which can be done outside the workplace. The survey also shows that moderate levels of digitalisation, and digitalisation which allows the employee to influence the volume of work and to manage it instead of being at the mercy of it, are perceived as positive. A European opinion poll conducted by the European Agency for Safety and Health at work (EU-OSHA) shows that about half of workers consider work-related stress to be a common problem in their workplace.⁽⁴⁷⁵⁾ The problem of increased workload was confirmed by the 6th European Working Conditions Survey, conducted in 2016 by Eurofound. The survey found that, in spite of the increased technological possibilities, work-life imbalances, such as being too tired from the job to do household work, had increased as compared with previous surveys in 2007 and 2011. A particularly strong increase was observed for women in the age group 35-49: from 48% in 2007 to 58% in 2011 and then to 62% in 2016. The situation is best in countries which are generally recognised as having a functioning social dialogue, namely the Netherlands, Denmark, Finland or Germany, whereas Croatia, Malta, Cyprus and Bulgaria rank at the lower end of the spectrum.⁽⁴⁷⁶⁾

Increased flexibility requires employers to manage differently: management must focus on the outcome while having less control over the process, which can be challenging for some organisations and managers.⁽⁴⁷⁷⁾ This implies more responsibility and freedom for workers to organise their work, possibly leading to higher levels of motivation for employees, but also requiring higher skills from employees. However, where the management style is not supported by mutual trust, IT tools can be put in place to ensure greater surveillance and control. Trade unions see the risk that this can result in excessive control and reduced employee motivation.⁽⁴⁷⁸⁾

Trade unions and employer organisations agree that the increased flexibility linked to digitalisation provides an opportunity to make progress on gender equality and to promote women's participation in the labour market. While employers' priority is to use the female workforce to close or reduce skill gaps, trade unions see opportunities for more equality, better work-life balance, greater fairness, and tackling the gender pay gap. As a result there is an increasing consensus that to reap these benefits flexible arrangements must be made available to men and women alike.⁽⁴⁷⁹⁾ Building on these discussions, several sectoral social partners

(e.g. social partners from local and regional administration) have revised (2017) their guidelines for gender equality action plans.⁽⁴⁸⁰⁾

The understanding that increased flexibility is a joint challenge has led European social partners to adopt a number of joint documents. In 2002 cross-industry social partners successfully negotiated a Framework Agreement on Telework, which is considered to have been a success, in the sense of being largely implemented; the agreement focuses on regular telework and therefore does not provide much guidance on e.g. mobile or occasional telework. At the sectoral level, European social partners in the insurance sector have, through a joint declaration, confirmed that a change in working arrangements (time and place) is necessary for companies to remain competitive and for employees to keep their jobs. As the line between private and professional life gets increasingly blurred, employers need to ensure that health and safety aspects are taken into account, especially when it comes to the employee's availability. The European social partners in the telecom sector highlight the importance of a fixed timeframe which lays down working hours, thus ensuring that work is not done in a borderless manner, and safeguarding work-life balance and the right to disconnect. The social partners also emphasise that employees still have to perform parts of their work at company premises, encouraging social contacts and increasing the quality of the information flow. They also stress that telework should be voluntary, so that employees wishing to return to the workplace are able to do so. In a joint declaration on ICT-based mobile work these social partners provide health and safety recommendations. Moreover, European social partners in the metal sector have identified opportunities to foster health and safety, particularly in the area of ergonomics and physical and mental stress, through the emergence of digitally-controlled assistance systems.

Working time rules are again on the agenda of social dialogue, triggered by new technological possibilities, changing life-styles and economic considerations. While in the past trade unions argued in favour of a general reduction in working time,⁽⁴⁸¹⁾ now discussion is increasingly about solutions tailored the needs of companies and employees.

⁽⁴⁷⁵⁾ <https://osha.europa.eu/en/themes/psychosocial-risks-and-stress>

⁽⁴⁷⁶⁾ <https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/data/european-quality-of-life-survey>

⁽⁴⁷⁷⁾ E.g. CEPS (2017), p. 37.

⁽⁴⁷⁸⁾ CEPS (2017).

⁽⁴⁷⁹⁾ e. g. <https://www.theguardian.com/women-in-leadership/2016/apr/28/flexible-working-secret-women-success-pay-gap> or: <https://hbswk.hbs.edu/archive/flexibility-key-to-retaining-women>

⁽⁴⁸⁰⁾ CEMR, EPSU (2017).

⁽⁴⁸¹⁾ E.g. the discussion on the 35-hour week particularly in France but also in Germany and Italy. For an overview of working time developments see http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/international/arbeitszeiten-so-arbeitet-die-welt/v_detail_tab_print/13379278.html

Table 6.2
European Social Partners' adopted texts on telework

Sector	Title	Date
Banking	Telework in the Banking Sector	17/11/2017
Telecommunications	Joint Declaration on ICT-based mobile work	02/02/2017
Insurance	Joint declaration on the social effects of digitalisation by the European social partners in the insurance sector	12/10/2016
Telecommunications	Joint Declaration on Telework	09/06/2016
Local and regional government	Joint declaration on the opportunities and challenges of digitalisation in local and regional administration	11/12/2015
Insurance	Joint declaration on telework by the European social partners in the insurance sector	10/02/2015
Railways	Practical guide on Employability in the face of demographic change - prospects for the European rail sector	24/02/2011
Private security	Development of a European Educational Toolkit for three Private Security Activities/Profiles: 1. Mobile Patrolling, 2. Alarm Response Centres, 3. Airport Security	15/12/2006
Cross-industry	Implementation of the European Framework Agreement on Telework - Report by European Social Partners	28/06/2006
Electricity	Eurelectric/EPSU/EMCEF Joint declaration on telework	13/11/2002
Cross-industry	Framework agreement on telework	16/07/2002
Commerce	European Agreement on Guidelines on Telework in Commerce	26/04/2001
Telecommunications	Guidelines for Telework in Europe	07/02/2001
Telecommunications	Opinion on telework	23/11/1998

Source: Social dialogue texts database, DG EMPL.

At the **Member State level**, in early 2018 the German IG Metall Baden-Wuerttemberg (metal workers' trade union) agreed with the Arbeitgeberverband der Metall und Elektroindustrie in Baden-Wuerttemberg, (the employer association of the metal industry) that it should be possible to reduce or increase working time on an individual basis. This agreement is considered to be a pilot agreement with relevance for the whole country. Such arrangements are seen to serve mutual interests in organising working time in a way that ensures the best possible match between the individual needs of employees and the economic interests of the enterprise.⁽⁴⁸²⁾ From a trade union perspective, however, this is accompanied by the risk that solidarity among employees will be undermined and therefore that mobilisation for industrial action will become structurally more difficult. Furthermore, greater complexity of collective bargaining may make it more difficult to explain overall strategy to their affiliates and to mobilise those who have other priorities. This is one aspect of any renegotiation of working time. Comparable discussions around a revision of the working time regime are also taking place in other Member States.

In Bulgaria, important steps to address new forms of employment were taken after EU accession in 2007, when two agreements were implemented; the European level social partners' agreement on telework and the ILO convention on home-based work. These agreements were the first bipartite agreements at national level introduced in Bulgarian legislation, and represented an important step for social dialogue.

At **EU level**, the social partners of the chemical industry have agreed to put responsibility for the

⁽⁴⁸²⁾ For a discussion see: ifo-Schnelldienst 24/2017: 'Tarifrunde 2018: Höhere Löhne und Einstieg in die 28-Stunden-Woche' (21/12/2017).

health and safety of teleworkers on the employer. The agreement – in line with Directive 89/391 EEC – obliges employers to inform their employees about policies and risk prevention related to health and safety. Consequently, the employer can check whether health and safety requirements are met at the place of telework with the employee's consent.⁽⁴⁸³⁾

At the **company level**, social partners negotiate on these topics as already indicated by the company level agreement in AXA (Spain). Social partners within the Thales Group (France) agreed in 2015 on rules for telework. These rules extend the opportunity to telework from one day a week to two. They also provide that in order to be entitled to telework, the employee must work full-time (or minimum 80%) and have been in the same Thales Group for one year and in the same position for six months. The agreement also establishes workers' right to disconnect outside office hours (with a minimum 11 hours between working days, as envisaged by Directive 2003/99/EC). Similar company level agreements were reached in other large enterprises such as Peugeot Citroën (2011) and Orange (2016).⁽⁴⁸⁴⁾ They led to increased satisfaction at work-life balance, stress reduction through reduced commuting, and increased motivation and efficiency.

Research by Eurofound and the ILO indicates that jointly agreed rules for telework lead to higher satisfaction and better motivation of employees and subsequently also to an increase in productivity and competitiveness for the company.⁽⁴⁸⁵⁾

5. SOCIAL DIALOGUE ADDRESSES NON-STANDARD EMPLOYMENT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

Previous chapters have shown that digitalisation, alongside globalisation and broader technological change may accelerate further the proliferation of non-standard employment, including new forms of work. These forms of work bring opportunities for both employers and workers, but also challenges, which can be mitigated through constructive social dialogue.

Non-standard employment increases flexibility but this comes at a cost. Fixed-term contracts, part-time and self-employment have existed for many decades but their relevance has increased. New forms of work such as voucher-based work, zero-hour contracts, employee sharing and platform work feature prominently in the policy debate, including that between social partners. Non-standard employment was originally introduced to allow enterprises to respond to short-term or irregular increases in activity.

⁽⁴⁸³⁾ Eurofound and ILO (2017).

⁽⁴⁸⁴⁾ For information on the agreement in Orange: <https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/articles/france-first-company-level-agreement-on-digital-transformation-signed-at-orange>

⁽⁴⁸⁵⁾ Eurofound and ILO (2017).

On the one hand, its use gave enterprises access to specialist knowledge and the opportunity to screen new employees before offering them a permanent contract, or to cover long-term leave of permanent employees. Non-standard employment also provides access to the labour market for people who would otherwise be excluded, because of caring responsibilities for example, and who are sometimes subject to lower taxes and contributions. On the other hand, these forms of employment are associated with risks such as lower job security, weaker career progression, lower income, limited access to on-the-job training, limited access to social protection – especially unemployment benefits – and poor access to mortgage and other forms of credit. (see Chapters 2 and 5). As Chapter 2 has shown, employed workers are twice as likely to be satisfied with their working conditions as the self-employed (see Box 2.4).

Non-standard employment is often a controversial issue between employer and worker organisations. Trade unions fear that as non-standard employment, including new forms of work, becomes more widespread and competes with more traditional forms of work, it will result in poorer working conditions overall. Employers mainly see the advantages associated with these forms of work, such as flexibility and lower costs.

The social partners have jointly called for labour law to be modernised to respond to new forms of work in certain sectors. In 2016, the social partners in the temporary work agencies sector published a white paper on the future of work, identifying a number of new emerging forms of work in Europe. The white paper calls for changes to employment regulations to reflect the changing nature of work, particularly in relation to platform workers. ⁽⁴⁸⁶⁾

Social partners in the commerce sector jointly analysed their sector's labour market of throughout Europe, covering non-standard employment and its implications. They found that self-employment and casual work have emerged in the sector and that one of the main challenges for the social partners is to protect these workers. ⁽⁴⁸⁷⁾ The social partners in the hospitality sector (tourism, accommodation and restaurants) adopted a number of individual and joint positions, ⁽⁴⁸⁸⁾ highlighting the impact of the platform economy on employment and working conditions, and calling for the establishment at EU level of guiding policy principles on short-term accommodation rental services in the collaborative economy, which – according to the social partners – seem to "contribute to the increase of precarious if not undeclared work in tourism." ⁽⁴⁸⁹⁾ However, studies

show that the impact of collaborative short-term accommodation rental services on employment is not easy to establish and uncertain at this stage.

The trade unions in the media, arts and entertainment sector prepared a handbook on meeting the challenge of non-standard employment. The handbook gathers experiences on organising strategies of unions in the sector, addresses social protection rights, working conditions, lifelong learning and service provision for atypical workers, and discusses dependent self-employment. The recommendations stress the need to address the legal status of dependent self-employment as well as to explore and ensure freedom of association and collective bargaining. ⁽⁴⁹⁰⁾

EU level trade unions have started calling for regulation of platform work. ETUC has recently adopted a "Resolution on tackling new digital challenges to the world of labour, in particularly crowdwork." ⁽⁴⁹¹⁾ The Resolution concerns the impact of digitalisation and particularly of the platform economy on business and on trade union strategies. The resolution recognises that trade unions or self-organised groups of platform workers currently apply a number of strategies, from legal action to providing information and creating work councils. A process of stocktaking and exchange of ideas has been announced, so as to find the most appropriate way of regulating platforms. There has been a call to examine the extension of the Temporary Agency Work Directive to platform workers.

At national level, fixed-term employment, self-employment and temporary agency work have seen many regulatory changes. For example, in Finland the Employment Contracts Act was amended in 2011 and 2012, following extensive tripartite discussions, so as to restrict the misuse of fixed term contracts. The amendments also introduced an obligation for employers to inform employees of the reasons for concluding a fixed-term contract. ⁽⁴⁹²⁾

Dependent self-employment has been addressed by social partners in Italy, Austria and Belgium under the holistic approach to dealing with non-standard employment. In Belgium, the social partners agreed in 2009 to set up a joint committee dealing with wages and working conditions for a number of liberal professions. In Austria an inclusive approach was adopted by the social partners: a number of collective agreements have been signed that not only regulate pay and working conditions, but also limit the use of atypical employment contracts, e.g. setting the conditions under which dependent self-

⁽⁴⁸⁶⁾ World Employment Confederation Europe (2016).

⁽⁴⁸⁷⁾ EuroCommerce and UNI Europa Commerce (2017).

⁽⁴⁸⁸⁾ EFFAT, HOTREC (2015), HOTREC (2015) and EFFAT (2015).

⁽⁴⁸⁹⁾ [http://www.hotrec.eu/newsroom/press-releases-1714/hotrec-and-effat-urge-the-european-commission-to-make-publicly-available-the-proposal-for-guiding-policy-principles-for-short-](http://www.hotrec.eu/newsroom/press-releases-1714/hotrec-and-effat-urge-the-european-commission-to-make-publicly-available-the-proposal-for-guiding-policy-principles-for-short-term-accommodation-rental-services-in-the-so-called-collaborative-economy.aspx)

[term-accommodation-rental-services-in-the-so-called-collaborative-economy.aspx](http://www.hotrec.eu/newsroom/press-releases-1714/hotrec-and-effat-urge-the-european-commission-to-make-publicly-available-the-proposal-for-guiding-policy-principles-for-short-term-accommodation-rental-services-in-the-so-called-collaborative-economy.aspx)

⁽⁴⁹⁰⁾ www.fim-musicians.org/wp-content/uploads/atypical-work-handbook-en.pdf

⁽⁴⁹¹⁾ ETUC (2017).

⁽⁴⁹²⁾ Eurofound (2016a).

employed have to be offered regular employment contracts. In Italy the discussion on the status of dependent self-employed usually takes place through collective agreements (e.g. in the call-centre sector). Social partners also established a bipartite institution providing maternity, training and sickness benefits to the dependent self-employed.⁽⁴⁹³⁾ In this context the Commission proposed in December 2017 to replace Directive 91/533/EEC (Written Statement Directive) by a new Directive on Transparent and Predictable Working Conditions.

In Member States which joined the EU in the 2000s, social partners have adopted different approaches to dealing with fixed-term contracts and self-employment. The use of functional flexibility through the expansion of non-standard work has in general been recognised by the trade unions as preferable to job losses, particularly in the period post-2008. In most of these Member States trade unions tried to reduce the gap between the working conditions of standard and non-standard workers.⁽⁴⁹⁴⁾ For example, in Slovenia the 2013 Labour Code, prepared with the involvement of social partners, strives to eliminate the use of fixed-term contracts and introduces the status of dependent self-employed. Employer organisations mainly protected the status quo in terms of non-standard work regulations, or demanded greater flexibility.

The 2008 EU Directive on temporary agency work gave an impetus to social partner agreements in this field. At the beginning of this century in Sweden, Finland and Austria the social partners signed agreements to ensure that agency workers would benefit from protection similar to that of the rest of the workforce in terms of wages, collective agreement coverage and access to training. Germany and several other Member States adjusted their legislation.⁽⁴⁹⁵⁾ In Germany a minimum wage floor was introduced by cross-sectoral social partners in order to protect and enhance agency workers' rights. Additional sectoral agreements can complement the wage floor with equal pay rules and sector premiums. In 2008, Italian social partners agreed on a standby allowance for dismissed agency workers. A new version of the agreement in 2014 set a minimum pay rate equal to 25% of the full-time wage of a standard employee in the firm. A couple of agreements to protect temporary agency workers were introduced by social partners in Belgium in 2012. They include provisions for reducing the use of daily contracts and establishing a legal framework targeting the problem of temporary workers being used by the employer as a method for selecting potential future employees.

New forms of work have been addressed to a lesser extent across Member States. Employee sharing has for example been regulated in Belgium,

France, Hungary, Czech Republic and Luxembourg. In the Czech Republic the legislation was driven by a joint proposal from social partners to promote employment during the crisis. Equal treatment of shared workers and core staff is required either by law (e.g. France), voluntary standards (e.g. Austria, Germany) or collective agreements (e.g. Austria). Voucher-based household services have been set up in Austria, Belgium, France, Greece and Italy. These kind of services were also introduced in agriculture in Greece, Italy and Lithuania. In Belgium an official organisation providing voucher-based services can have the training costs of their workers partially reimbursed by a tripartite, publicly-financed Service Voucher Training Fund. In policy discussions on casual work, trade unions usually strive to limit the flexibility of this form of work, while employer organisations see it as enabling enterprises to adjust to market fluctuations. Other new forms of work are usually not a priority for social partners or governments, due to their novelty and limited spread.⁽⁴⁹⁶⁾

6. MOBILISING AND ORGANISING

The changing structure of the economy provides significant challenges to social partner organisations. Social partners, especially trade unions, face the challenge of how to recruit members and to organise social dialogue of workers in non-standard employment situations. This challenge is particularly pressing in those Member States where social partners' capacity is limited. Given the pronounced decline in union density, this dilemma is in general more relevant for trade unions than for employer organisations, whose density has been relatively stable. The next sections of this chapter look into activities undertaken by social partners to address them.

6.1. Trade unions

Trade union membership rates differ significantly across the EU. The Member States with the highest membership rates are Denmark (70%), Sweden (65%), Finland (60%) and Belgium (45%). All other Member States are at around 20% or below.⁽⁴⁹⁷⁾

Employees working in the private services sectors are less represented than those in public services or in industry and construction. In most Member States, workers in the public sector are the most likely to join a union, followed by industry and construction; workers in private services are the least likely. This broad pattern can be observed in almost all Member States, although to varying degrees (see Annex). However in Sweden, Finland and Denmark, even in the private service sector, more than 60% of employees are affiliated to a trade union. This is far

⁽⁴⁹³⁾ Eurofound (2009).

⁽⁴⁹⁴⁾ Trif et al (2016).

⁽⁴⁹⁵⁾ Eurofound (2016b).

⁽⁴⁹⁶⁾ Eurofound (2015), pp. 129.

⁽⁴⁹⁷⁾ ETUI/ETUC (2018), p.61.

above any sectoral affiliation in e.g. the Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Hungary and Lithuania.


Workers with permanent contracts are affiliated to a trade union to a significantly higher degree than workers on fixed-term contracts (Chart 6.3).

This trend can be observed in almost all Member States. In half of the Member States, the difference in trade union affiliation between workers on permanent contracts and those on fixed-term contracts is more than 10 pps. France, Portugal, Poland, Estonia and Slovenia have relatively high percentages of fixed-term contracts in total employment coupled with low union density of these workers, which results in a large part of the workforce lacking representation. Fixed-term contracts are more wide-spread among younger workers, who may be less inclined to join a trade union. The typical trade union member is aged 35 or older. ⁽⁴⁹⁸⁾ The obstacles to unionising younger workers include lack of awareness, negative views of trade unions as patriarchal and hierarchical organisations and fear of possible negative attitudes of employers. ⁽⁴⁹⁹⁾

Chart 6.3

Union membership is lower among workers on non-standard contracts

Union membership among employees by type of contract, 2016 or latest year



Note: Definition: Current members of trade unions or similar organisations among employees who have performed paid work over the last 7 days, by type of contract. For more information, see annex 1. Data years: 2016, except 2012 for BG, CY, SK, IT 2010 for HR, EL, 2004 for LU, 2008 for RO and LV. Data for MT not available.

Source: Calculations based on European Social Survey

[Click here to download chart.](#)

⁽⁴⁹⁸⁾ ETUI/ETUC (2018), p.61.

⁽⁴⁹⁹⁾ EFBWW (2016) and Keune (2015).

Reflecting the cross-cutting nature of temporary agency work, the landscape of collective organisation of temporary workers is very diverse.

Temporary agency workers have been estimated to represent 2-3% of the total European workforce. In 2013-2014 the highest proportions of temporary agency workers were found in the north-western Member States (between 1.5% and 3.3%), and some Member States who joined the EU in the 2000s (e.g. the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Estonia, Slovenia and Poland). Data on density of unionisation of temporary agency work is scarce, but estimates range from above 30% in Member States such as Sweden, Finland and Italy, to a very few in Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Greece, Lithuania and Romania, where trade unions organising temporary workers could not be identified. This may be because temporary agency work has only recently become an issue in these countries. ⁽⁵⁰⁰⁾

A triangular contractual relationship exists in temporary agency work (TAW), challenging the traditional structure of collective organisation.

Temporary work agencies act as intermediaries between a worker and a user company. The employment status of agency workers can range from direct employment (on a permanent or fixed-term basis) by the temporary work agency, to provision of services with some characteristics of an employment relationship or of self-employment. Specific trade union organisations for temporary workers exist only in France, while in other Member States, where temporary workers are organised, they are affiliated to sectoral unions. ⁽⁵⁰¹⁾ However, they are not likely to establish a professional identity as temporary agency workers. If they unionise it is most likely to be in the union prevailing in the company where they actually work.

Most of the newer forms of employment, suffer from a lack of representation, which comes at great social cost.

While data on the organisation of this segment of the labour market is poor, it has been argued that shared workers, casual workers, voucher-based work, portfolio workers and online platform workers are in general less well integrated in the organisational structure of companies. The considerable lack of representation of these forms of workers can be attributed on the one hand to the cost of their being represented and on the other to flexibility in terms of time and place of work, making it difficult for worker representatives to organise this rather fragmented workforce. This may be less of a fundamental problem today while the incidence of workers making a living on, for example, collaborative platforms is still low: an estimated 2.3%, as shown in Chapter 2. If they become more prominent in the future, low coverage of this type of work by trade unions may come at a great social cost. This is because it is unlikely that today's social security

⁽⁵⁰⁰⁾ Eurofound (2016b), pp 9-15.

⁽⁵⁰¹⁾ Ibid.

schemes are flexible enough to cover these workers' social risks effectively (Chapter 5) as many of them will not be required to make social contributions. Chapter 4 has shown that non-standard workers are likely to be disadvantaged in terms of wealth and income, compared with standard workers. They would therefore need a strong voice speaking on their behalf when it comes to negotiating their conditions of employment. From the trade union perspective, the decreased shares of workers affiliated could have a negative impact on trade union legitimacy vis-à-vis not only employer organisations but also governments.

ETUC recognises the need to reinforce recruitment activities. In its discussion paper "Organising and trade union recruitment – The future of trade unions in danger", adopted in December 2017, ETUC recognises the challenge of declining trade union density in most Member States and the urgency of recruiting more young people for the survival of the trade union movement. To support local unions organised in and around the workplace to recruit young workers, the discussion paper announces a new strategic training offer for organising workers to be provided by ETUI in order to: "initiate and lead such strategic discussions among local and sectoral union leadership team[s]; understand different tools and methods for organising workers; plan organising activities with a project management approach." ⁽⁵⁰²⁾

This may prove to be a challenging task. Young people, who represent the future workforce, seem to be less inclined to join a trade union, partly because they have not experienced the benefits of unionism first-hand or through their peers. ⁽⁵⁰³⁾ They also represent the first generation fully immersed in the digital world and therefore may be less likely to address their problems within the framework of traditional hierarchical organisations. In addition, the growing number of workers in non-standard employment may be less attached to the workplace, less interested and more difficult to recruit into union membership. The dichotomy of employer-worker is also often blurred, which further challenges the traditional context of collective bargaining and social dialogue.

Trade unions have employed various strategies for collective representation of non-standard workers. These fall into two main groups: the servicing model, providing existing or developing tailored services for specific groups of workers, and the lobbying model, ensuring advocacy, lobbying, decision-makers and undertaking awareness-raising campaigns. Some trade unions have integrated the two models, both providing services and engaging in lobbying. ⁽⁵⁰⁴⁾ In addition, several established trade unions have reorganised their internal structures so as

better to reflect their diversified membership and give a stronger voice to different groups of workers. ⁽⁵⁰⁵⁾

Trade unions provide a range of services to non-standard workers, from training and administrative support, to legal advice and accounting. For example, Platform Union (F3C-CFDT) in France provides insurance and a free bank account to their members. Similarly, CTAC (Condederació de treballadors autònoms de Catalunya) provides management and consulting services. It also functions as an intermediary with public funding entities to support its members financially as well as with training ⁽⁵⁰⁶⁾.

Opening services to non-members has sometimes proved to be a successful strategy for recruiting new members. In Germany, the biggest service-sector trade union, ver.di (United Services Union) has opened an online information platform for freelance workers which can be used by non-members as well. Approximately 15% of non-members who used the platform have later been recruited. ⁽⁵⁰⁷⁾

Several trade unions have started to adapt their internal structures so as better to reflect a more fragmented workforce. They establish committees or subsections within their organisations which give a voice to non-standard workers and have a representative role within the organisation for this specific group of workers. For example, in Italy the most prominent trade union federations have established specific organisational structures for temporary agency workers and other atypical workers, while such sub-structures within unions exist for the self-employed in Spain. ⁽⁵⁰⁸⁾

Awareness-raising campaigns are often targeted at under-represented workers. Campaigns aimed at mobilising young workers who are fully immersed in the digital world, or non-standard workers make use of social media and other online channels to reach their target audience. For example the "Movement for decent work and welfare", established in 2011 in Slovenia by unions and student organisations, regularly organises public debates to raise awareness in relation to non-standard forms of work and their implications. ⁽⁵⁰⁹⁾

Trade unions in certain sectors or Member States organise the self-employed. In general the self-employed are not members of trade unions, as such workers are viewed as small enterprises and therefore subject to competition law. However, trade unions are open to certain categories of self-employed people in more than half of the Member States, while

⁽⁵⁰²⁾ ETUC (2017a).

⁽⁵⁰³⁾ European Commission (2017).

⁽⁵⁰⁴⁾ I-Wire (2018).

⁽⁵⁰⁵⁾ E.g. IG Metall Germany has changed its statutes so as to allow self-employed people to become members of the union. Similar examples exist in Sweden.

⁽⁵⁰⁶⁾ For more examples see: I-Wire (2018).

⁽⁵⁰⁷⁾ Charhon and Murphy (2016), p. 70.

⁽⁵⁰⁸⁾ Eurofound (2009).

⁽⁵⁰⁹⁾ socialna-druzba.si/

organisations for the independent self-employed have been established in Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Spain, France, the Netherlands, Portugal and the UK. ⁽⁵¹⁰⁾ In certain Member States (e.g. France, Germany) the self-employed in sectors such as the performing arts and journalism, where (dependent) self-employment is widespread, are organised in sectoral trade unions. As more and more people work as solo self-employed in different services sectors, attempts have been made to achieve a broader representation of the self-employed as well. For example, the ver.di in Germany represents standard as well as self-employed workers in much of the services sector. ⁽⁵¹¹⁾

Bottom-up initiatives have developed into broader community practices crossing Member State borders. In particular SmartBE is an initiative with a long tradition that started in Belgium but is now present also in Italy, France, Spain, the Netherlands, Germany, Hungary, Austria and Sweden. ⁽⁵¹²⁾ SmartBE provides administrative services, and supports the social protection of members through mutual guarantee funds and customised insurance packages. In certain cases SmartBE has also become a legal employer of freelancers, while at the same time being owned by its members.

Some trade unions have built coalitions with parallel structures. Coalitions can facilitate access for non-unionised workers, and contribute to the legitimacy of lobbying/ advocacy activities. In Belgium the Association of Professional Journalists built a united front against bogus self-employment with the trade unions organising journalists. ⁽⁵¹³⁾

The online platform economy blurs the distinction between employer and employee. Online platforms act as intermediaries between service users and providers, sharing certain characteristics with the temporary work agency model. The providers of services on online platforms are considered self-employed by the platform, even though the relationship between service providers and platforms often has features of an employment relationship, based on subordination. Platform work itself challenges the traditional collective organisation: many service providers do not develop a professional identity as platform workers and seem unaware that solidarity with colleagues would be an option.

Trade unions have not yet engaged in recruiting online platform workers on a great scale, but some examples of existing trade unions opening their membership to online platform workers have been recorded. IG Metall in Germany has so far taken the most systematic action in this regard by opening

membership to platform workers in 2016. IG Metall has also engaged in a joint project with the Austrian Chamber of Labour, the Austrian Trade Union Confederation and the Swedish white-collar union "Unionen" to run FairCrowdWork, ⁽⁵¹⁴⁾ an online tool that collects information about online platform work from the perspective of workers and unions. In France, UNSA SCP-VTC ⁽⁵¹⁵⁾ is a trade union for private drivers, particularly Uber drivers. However, their activities as reported on their website have so far been rather limited.

Trade unions have recognised the need to expand their reach to online platform workers in a more systematic manner. At the EU level, ETUC together with the French 'Sharers and Workers' network took the first step towards launching an EU-level dialogue on the platform economy by bringing together platform entrepreneurs, workers, trade unionists and experts. ⁽⁵¹⁶⁾ The need to develop their capacity to enter into negotiations with platforms to ensure decent working conditions for online platform workers has been recognised not only as a goal in itself but also as a means of preventing the downward convergence of social norms across the economy. ⁽⁵¹⁷⁾ These preliminary initiatives indicate that trade unions are striving to overcome the dilemma of protecting their existing members as against bridging the gap between standard and non-standard workers. Through this approach they aim for more inclusive membership and improved working conditions for all workers, regardless of the type of contract or sector they are working in.

Initiatives enabling semi-structured actions by platform workers are emerging in parallel with traditional trade unions. Such initiatives offer support for campaigns in specific workplaces or industries (Coworker.org in the US). In parallel, grassroots movements have emerged, often organised as Facebook groups in which online platform workers can exchange information about potential clients (Online Filipino, Mturk). These initiatives can be seen as a first step towards the development of collective action ⁽⁵¹⁸⁾ suited to the needs and preferences of online platform workers.

⁽⁵¹⁴⁾ FairCrowd Work is a joint project of IG Metall (the German Metalworkers' Union), the Austrian Chamber of Labour, the Austrian Trade Union Confederation, and the Swedish white collar union Unionen, in association with research and development partners Encountering Tech and M&L Communication Marketing. It provides information on online platform work including the basics of crowd work, information on unions for crowdworkers, and crowdworkers rights. Reviews of platforms based on surveys with workers are also available on the website. Finally a hotline is accessible through the website where crowdworkers can get additional information about work and payment. More on: faircrowd.work.

⁽⁵¹⁵⁾ syndicat-vtc.com/

⁽⁵¹⁶⁾ www.socialeurope.eu/time-european-dialogue-platform-economy

⁽⁵¹⁷⁾ ETUI, 2017.

⁽⁵¹⁸⁾ Ibid.

⁽⁵¹⁰⁾ Eurofound (2017b).

⁽⁵¹¹⁾ For more information on collective representation of the self-employed see European Commission (2017).

⁽⁵¹²⁾ I-Wire (2018).

⁽⁵¹³⁾ I-Wire (2018).

Box 6.2: Mobilisations of courier platform workers supported by trade unions

The Foodora couriers strike in October 2016 has been widely reported in the media as the first strike of workers employed through a platform in Italy. This grassroots movement – couriers' self-organisation using online tools – started as a result of changed contractual forms where compensation was changed from an hourly rate to a fixed rate by delivery. Further demands expressed by the workers included a change in status from self-employed to employee with access to standard employment protection. The couriers were subsequently supported and their action facilitated by established trade unions (SI-COBAS) which gave additional legitimacy to the action. Even though this action has been broadly covered by the media which was in general sympathetic to workers' demands, the workers have so far had only limited success in gaining the rights they have demanded. Foodora did not agree to the demands of workers, although it did increase the delivery fee. The workers have filed a legal action with the goal of being recognised as employees with the accompanying rights.

The UberEats drivers' mobilisation in London in 2016 was also instigated by a change from hourly pay to payment by delivery, but had a broader focus on the drivers' remits such as the employment status. The drivers had organised through an encrypted messaging app and by contacting other Uber Eats drivers on the streets. Their struggle was later supported by United Voices of the World and the Independent Workers Union of Great Britain (IWGB). In addition, they are coordinating their efforts with Deliveroo drivers who have made similar demands in the past. The IWGB took the issue of the couriers' employment status to the labour court (industrial tribunal) which found that couriers were self-employed and not workers. However, in a subsequent case brought by Uber drivers in 2017 the industrial tribunal found that these drivers were not self-employed but "workers" who are entitled to the minimum wage and holiday pay.

Recently a series of strikes has been organised by the Deliveroo and UberEats couriers in Europe (e.g. Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands) but also worldwide (e.g. Hong Kong). As a result the Labour Minister in Belgium launched an investigation into employment practices of both platforms.

Source: theguardian.com, jacobinmag.com, libcom.org, www.ft.com and rtbf.be

Online platform workers, mostly couriers delivering a service offline, have started mobilising in a number of Member States (e.g. the UK, Italy). In these cases, mobilised workers usually first organised themselves with demands for better pay, working conditions and the recognition of their status as employees, and were later supported by established unions (see *Box 6.2* for examples). Such industrial action has so far had limited success and has been limited to platform workers providing services offline, in the local environment. Physical proximity not only facilitated the initial mobilisation but also enabled the engagement of a relevant trade union.

In Austria, a more permanent structure has been set up by platform workers with the aid of traditional trade unions. Foodora couriers in Vienna founded what is probably the first works council of online platform workers. The establishment of the works council was facilitated by the Austrian transport and services trade union "vida". The main aim of the council is to negotiate better working conditions between couriers and management as well as increasing the number of employment contracts. ⁽⁵¹⁹⁾

As a response to digitalisation and the increase of trans-border platform work, an international

trade union network has been established. Trade unions face an additional challenge in organising platform workers who provide online services. As the physical location of service providers is not limited to national borders, platform workers who are subject to different national legal systems compete for the same tasks made available through a platform. In this global context, even the discussion of minimum standards or minimum wages becomes challenging. A network of European and North American unions which is engaged in providing information and representing the interests of platform workers has therefore called for a "transnational cooperation between workers, worker organizations, platform clients, platform operators, and regulators to ensure fair working conditions and worker participation in governance in the growing world of digital labour platforms." ⁽⁵²⁰⁾ Some of these unions have been instrumental in setting up the FairCrowd Work website. In addition, the UNI global union General Secretary brought the issue of the misclassification of workers to global business leaders at Davos in early 2018, mirroring the concerns of Deliveroo couriers on strike in several European countries.

6.2. Employer organisations

Digitalisation lowers market entry barriers for new service providers and, by bringing down transaction costs, it can be expected to reduce the cost

⁽⁵¹⁹⁾ faircrowd.work/2017/04/28/deutsch-oesterreich-foodora-fahrer-gruenden-betriebsrat/

⁽⁵²⁰⁾ faircrowd.work/unions-for-crowdworkers/frankfurt-declaration


advantages of large enterprises. ⁽⁵²¹⁾ As companies often affiliate with an employer organisation only after they have operated for some time and as SMEs are traditionally less likely to join employer organisations, digitalisation will put further pressure on established employer organisations to demonstrate that they can protect their interests and attract new companies into membership.

Enterprises in the expanding service sector are less likely to be members of employer organisations than those in industry (Chart 6.4). This is observed in the majority of Member States, although not Spain, Finland, Hungary, Portugal, Croatia or Slovakia. The difference between the sectors is particularly large in Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, all Member States characterised by a service sector which is above average in terms of employment and the proportion of enterprises engaged in the sector. The overall employer density is rather low in Member States which joined the EU in the 2000s, with the exception of Malta and Cyprus.

Chart 6.4

Enterprises in the expanding service sector are somewhat less likely to be members of an employer organisation

Membership rate of employer organisations by sector (%), 2013



Source: Eurofound calculations based on European Company Survey 2013

[Click here to download chart.](#)

Employer organisation density in the temporary agency work sector is high in countries where such work has been regulated for decades. Quantitative data on employer density in this sector is more complete than for trade unions, but there are some gaps. Density is high in countries where such work has been regulated for a longer period of time

⁽⁵²¹⁾ CEPS (2017), p. 26.

(such as Belgium, France and the Netherlands) but much lower in southern and eastern Europe. ⁽⁵²²⁾

Digitalisation is blurring the distinction between sectors as well as between the online and offline economy, posing challenges to employer representation. Digitalisation enables enterprises to diversify their activities and therefore operate in sectors where they were not present previously. Such trends have for example been recorded in the postal services and logistics as a result of e-commerce and the flourishing market of parcel delivery (see Box 6.1). And recently, temporary work agencies such as Randstad and Adecco have developed or acquired their own online platforms, possibly representing an additional incentive for employer organisations to move into the online world.

Employer organisation mergers can address this challenge and increase their effectiveness and negotiating power. Mergers can have a positive effect by enlarging the scope of topics covered in collective agreements and by increasing the capacity of employer organisations to offer specialised services. The trend in the number of employer organisations varies across Member States: since the 1990s there has been an increase in the number of employer organisations in a number of Member States who joined the EU in the 2000s, while in others the number of organisations has decreased in an attempt to make the existing ones more efficient and increase their collective power. ⁽⁵²³⁾ For example, in order to overcome overlaps between different associations and consolidate their membership base, mergers of national employer associations took place in the Netherlands to create VNO-NCW and MKB-Nederland as well as the Confederation of Hungarian Employers and Industrialists (Munkaadók és Gyáriparosok Országos Szövetsége, MGYOSZ) in the 1990s. ⁽⁵²⁴⁾

Employer organisations have shown that they can offer targeted services which provide added value to their members. In particular, small and medium sized enterprises benefit from services such as legal advice and representation, training, industrial information, marketing and wage surveys and guidance on health and safety. ⁽⁵²⁵⁾ Globalisation and extensions of collective agreements ⁽⁵²⁶⁾ have also been identified as driving factors for stable employer density, at least in Western European countries. However, the successive decentralisation of collective bargaining puts pressure on employer organisations. ⁽⁵²⁷⁾ In Germany, for example, the

⁽⁵²²⁾ Eurofound (2016b) pp 17-36.

⁽⁵²³⁾ Eurofound (2015).

⁽⁵²⁴⁾ Eurofound (2004).

⁽⁵²⁵⁾ Brandl (2016).

⁽⁵²⁶⁾ Extensions of collective agreements to enterprises that have not signed the agreement or are not affiliated to an employer organisation which signed a collective agreement.

⁽⁵²⁷⁾ Eurofound database on Collective wage bargaining shows a trend towards decentralisation and less coordination, thus a declining importance of employer organisations

number of companies, which affiliate with employer organisations without being bound to collective agreements is high and increasing to the extent of calling extension mechanisms into question. ⁽⁵²⁸⁾

Rather than trying to organise platforms, employer or business associations are engaging in disputes with them. Traditional employer or business organisations have so far considered platforms mostly as competitors with the comparative advantage of operating in a less regulated market. For example, hotel industry associations have entered into disputes with Airbnb. ⁽⁵²⁹⁾ Platforms still represent a limited share of the overall economy. However, if online platforms proliferate, an important segment of the economy will be left outside the scope of employer organisations, undermining their representativeness and subsequently their negotiating power. Mobilising platforms might make it easier for employer or business associations to create a level playing field for traditional and platform companies.

Platforms have so far not felt the need to organise themselves in dedicated associations. The reasons identified for this include: 1) platforms have not yet needed to organise themselves as platform workers have only started their collective activities, so countering their influence is not a priority; 2) platforms are different in nature and therefore might not have the same interests; and 3) platforms merge frequently, therefore associations between platforms less important. ⁽⁵³⁰⁾ Nevertheless, in the Czech Republic in May 2017 a number of enterprises in the shared economy (BlaBlaCar, Bringr, Flatio) established the Association of the Shared Economy (ČASE) to negotiate fair business conditions in this segment of the economy with the authorities and to promote the principles of such an economy. ⁽⁵³¹⁾

This could change radically if the platform economy proliferates and platform workers' movements become stronger. With traditional companies entering the online platform economy and the number of platforms growing, employer organisations may be inclined to find ways to organise platforms or search for alliances with parallel structures, as has happened on the trade union side.

<https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/collective-wage-bargaining/context>

⁽⁵²⁸⁾ Behrens, M. and Helfen, M. (2016).

⁽⁵²⁹⁾ CEPS (2017).

⁽⁵³⁰⁾ Ibid.

⁽⁵³¹⁾ sharingeconomy.cz.

Table 6.3

Employees are organising faster in the platform economy than platforms

Social dialogue in the platform economy

	Employees organising	Employers organising	Bipartite dialogue	Tripartite dialogue
Evidence found	Numerous examples	No	Numerous examples	One example
Example	Syndicat des chauffeurs privés VTC, Couriers; Logistics Branch of the Independent Workers of Great Britain		Discussions between i) Airbnb and unions; and ii) Uber and unions in several countries	Discussions between Syndicat des chauffeurs privés VTC and Uber, moderated by French government official

Source: CEPS 2017

6.3. Collective bargaining and stronger social partnership

Collective bargaining constitutes an opportunity for social partners to manage the structural changes resulting from digitalisation and the increase in non-standard forms of work. When successful, it results in collective agreements on wages and other working conditions concluded by worker and employer representatives. Collective bargaining takes place either at company, sectoral, industry or cross-industry level. A collective agreement applies to the employers who sign the agreement, either directly or through the employer organisations that negotiate and sign the agreement on their behalf. Employees tend to be covered by an agreement via their employers, whether or not they are members of the union/worker organisation that concluded the agreement.

Over the last 16 years the proportion of workers covered by collective agreements has become smaller. Collective bargaining coverage was lower in 2016 than in 2000 in 19 Member States. For example, the coverage rate dropped from 82% to 40% in Greece; from 100% to 65% in Slovenia, due to changes in the legal system; and from 51% to 24% in Slovakia. In Germany the coverage rate declined from 68% to 56%. In general (except for Slovenia) countries with a high coverage rate saw smaller declines than those which started from a lower level. The reasons for higher stability in the coverage of collective agreement than in trade union membership are the prevalence of multi-employer bargaining and the existence of mechanisms ensuring broad application of collective agreements. ⁽⁵³²⁾

Collective bargaining coverage is usually higher in industry than in private services. Collective bargaining coverage across sectors varies considerably across Member States. However, in the majority of Member States for which data is available, the collective bargaining coverage of the private services sector is lower than for industry, with the exception of Slovakia, Croatia, Cyprus, the United Kingdom Bulgaria and Estonia. In most Member States the coverage of


⁽⁵³²⁾ ETUI/ETUC (2018), p. 60.

workers on fixed-term contracts is lower than that of workers on permanent contracts. A lower coverage of workers on fixed-term contracts could imply that they are concentrated in sectors or companies where no collective agreements apply. As service sector and flexible contracts are expected to play an increasing role in the future, collective bargaining coverage may decrease further.

Chart 6.5

Workers in the private services sector are less likely to be covered by collective wage agreements at company, regional or industry level

Collective bargaining coverage (% employees) by type of sector, 2014



Note: Does not include MSs with collective agreements at national or inter-confederal level or MS with confidential/unknown data. Private services do not include public administration, defence, compulsory social security, activities of households as employers and extra-territorial organisations and bodies.

Source: Eurostat, based on Structure of Earnings Survey 2014

[Click here to download chart.](#)

Collective bargaining on behalf of the self-employed occurs only in exceptional cases: in the UK for entertainers⁽⁵³³⁾, in Germany under strict conditions related to the economic dependence of the self-employed, in Italy for the dependent self-employed and in Denmark for art, culture and IT professionals.⁽⁵³⁴⁾ Since 2016, certain dependent self-employed workers have a right to collective bargaining in Ireland.⁽⁵³⁵⁾

The pattern of collective bargaining coverage in the temporary agency work sector is strongly polarised. In some Member States in western and northern Europe, very high rates (above 90%) have been reported. Collective bargaining usually takes place at a multi-employer level. In Member States who joined the EU in 2000 collective bargaining hardly takes place at all. The polarised pattern is mainly driven by employer organisations. Collective bargaining

⁽⁵³³⁾ I-Wire (2018).

⁽⁵³⁴⁾ Eurofound (2009).

⁽⁵³⁵⁾ europeanjournalists.org/blog/2017/06/13/ireland-unions-celebrate-victory-over-competition-authority/

is a precondition for social partner involvement in active regulation of working conditions in the sector. This takes place in the eight Member States,⁽⁵³⁶⁾ mostly at the bipartite level. It covers provision of social benefits, training and health and safety issues.⁽⁵³⁷⁾

As relatively few platform workers and platforms are organised in social partner organisations, collective bargaining is exceptional in this part of the economy. Collective agreements apply only rarely to the self-employed and to workers in new forms of employment. Cases have been reported of employee sharing and job sharing.

However, for platform work there is often no clearly established employer-employee relationship. Platforms generally do not assume the role of an employer, or do so only partly, and it is not clear whether workers perform their tasks as employees, as self-employed or as part of a service contract.⁽⁵³⁸⁾ If workers in new forms of employment are less likely to be covered by collective agreements, they are also less likely to benefit from the measures implemented jointly by social partners (see previous sections).

Successful collective bargaining is the best means to increase the attractiveness of social partner organisations. It helps to ensure a fairer distribution of incomes and better working conditions,

while maintaining the competitiveness of the economy. Taking into account that in some areas it is difficult for social partners to reach the necessary level of autonomy, the Commission supports social dialogue in a number of ways. These include discussions, consultations, negotiations and joint actions at the EU level, financial and logistical support to the EU-level social partners and involving of social partners at national and EU levels in discussions around the European Semester.

7. CONCLUSIONS

Social dialogue is under pressure in the changing world of work. Trade unions' attractiveness has decreased over recent decades (similarly to the decline in membership of established political parties). Organising workers is particularly difficult in non-standard employment situations and in Central and Eastern European Member States. For enterprises, social partnership at European and national level is losing ground to lobbying. Collective bargaining

⁽⁵³⁶⁾ Austria, Belgium, Spain, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the UK.

⁽⁵³⁷⁾ Eurofound (2016), temporary agency, p.32.

⁽⁵³⁸⁾ CEPS (2017) p. 44. Nevertheless, in Denmark, Hilfr.dk, a platform for cleaning in private homes, recently signed a collective agreement with 3F, a Danish trade union. The agreement, which enters into force in August 2018, provides sick pay, holiday allowance and a pension contribution for those who provide services through the platform. ()

coverage is declining or low in most Member States. ⁽⁵³⁹⁾

Social partners are working hard to counter these trends. The Commission supports social partners by prioritising social partner organisations over other NGOs and involving social partners in national consultation processes. Some positive signs can be observed:

In several Central and Eastern European Member States a continuous increase of trust in trade unions can be observed. This is the case, for example, in the Czech Republic, Latvia, Slovakia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland and Estonia. ⁽⁵⁴⁰⁾ While the organisation and coordination of interests is challenging, several groups recently succeeded in organising interest representations. This may be for local platform workers, who have achieved recognition as workers; mobile workers in transport professions, who insist on their need for a collective agreement; artists or athletes who set up unions to defend their interests or self-employed workers organised in cooperatives.

Structural changes can also be observed in employer organisations due to digitalisation and globalisation. At European level there are signs of improved cooperation between cross-industry and sectoral organisations. Big companies, which operate in several Member States, play an increasingly important role. In these cases European level social dialogue complements the European character of their business activities.

Social partners have produced results. They have formed agreements on telework, or have looked into ways of making the best use of more flexible forms of work without risking the long-term fitness of the workers. Joint skill forecasts and upskilling strategies are further examples of successful social dialogue. This autonomous, bi-partite social dialogue should continue to find pragmatic and adapted solutions for concrete problems and allow the economic stakeholders to experience their joint responsibility for socio-economic development.

Several Commission initiatives have motivated economic actors to ensure increased presence at the European level. This interest stems in particular from the initiatives in the area of social policy (European Pillar of Social Rights with its proposals for transparency and predictability of working conditions, the planned European Labour Authority, the revision of the Posting of Workers Directive agreed in 2018, etc.), the digital economy, and mobility packages. Similar efforts can also be observed at national and regional level.

All this leads to the conclusion that industrial relations and in particular social dialogue are undergoing deep changes. These changes will require social partner organisations as well as public authorities to move out of the comfort zone of established routines. However, it is also clear that constructive and well organised cooperation between representatives of the different groups will play an important role in delivering social peace as well as improved economic performance and competitiveness.

Social dialogue remains highly relevant in the changing world of work. New players need to be involved as they become more important – workers engaged in new forms of work as well as new employers. The insight that a fair balance between social and economic objectives is beneficial for the whole of society may need to be further cultivated. As in other areas, non-cooperative, individualistic behaviour is likely to produce significantly worse results than a functioning social dialogue. It is very important to recognise that good economic performance, trustful labour relations and high social cohesion are often interlinked.

⁽⁵³⁹⁾ OECD (2017).

⁽⁵⁴⁰⁾ OECD (2017), p. 158.

Annex 1: Union Density

Table A1.1

Union density is lower for those on fixed term contracts, smaller establishments and the private services sector

Share of total union density, % of employees, contract type, establishment size and broad economic sector, 2016 or latest available year

	total	contract type		establishment type					broad economic sector		
		open ended	fixed-term	less than 10	10 to 24	25 to 99	100 to 499	500+	industry and constr.	private services	public services
AT	31	31	20	17	24	34	49	55	37	22	38
BE	51	51	47	62	45	52	47	48	61	43	50
CZ	7	8	4	2	6	6	8	20	7	5	11
DE	19	20	12	7	14	19	23	26	21	12	24
DK	80	83	68	69	77	84	82	85	82	73	86
EE	8	8	10	5	7	7	13	20	7	5	12
ES	19	25	6	7	24	24	27	34	21	16	27
FI	76	77	71	73	74	77	78	81	78	64	84
FR	11	13	2	5	6	8	21	17	13	10	12
UK	28	30	24	11	17	29	30	44	22	17	42
HU	6	7	1	2	6	5	11	19	3	4	12
IE	33	39	34	18	25	37	60	48	35	22	46
LT	8	8	4	2	2	13	14	10	3	2	17
NL	23	25	15	19	26	25	21	28	22	17	29
PL	12	16	4	2	6	13	13	27	10	7	21
PT	12	14	6	8	7	17	21	12	3	6	30
SE	73	77	49	66	72	76	75	74	77	65	77
SI	30	36	3	7	11	37	38	45	28	20	43
BG	13	15	5	6	14	17	17	25	13	8	18
CY	44	43	68	31	40	59	69	38	59	37	51
SK	12	12	14	7	13	11	11	33	9	8	21
HR	27	31	11	16	21	32	31	49	31	15	17
IT	24	26	21	9	16	34	34	37	18	16	39
LV	15	16	14	9	13	18	28	35	n/a	n/a	n/a
EL	10	13	5	5	12	16	17	16	11	10	6
LU	46	49	17	29	39	56	52	51	n/a	n/a	n/a
RO	29	31	21	8	29	37	36	45	n/a	n/a	n/a

Note: Data years: 2016, except 2012 for BG, CY, SK, IT 2010 for HR, EL, 2004 for LU, 2008 for RO and LV. Data for MT not available.

Current members of trade unions or similar organisations among employees having performed paid work over the last 7 days.

Cells light shade: Chi test with p lower than 5%; dark shade p lower than 1%

Point estimates based on a limited number of observations (due to size of sample or of subcategories in certain MS) may be imprecise. Data based on fewer than 100 observations are therefore presented in bold. The main aim of the table is to illustrate common patterns across the Member States

Source: Calculations based on European Social Survey

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Statistical annex

1. COUNTRY PROFILES

European Union 28

European Union 28		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017		
Macro Economic Indicators (Annual % growth)	Real GDP	3.3	3.1	0.5	-4.3	2.1	1.7	-0.4	0.3	1.8	2.3	2.0	2.5		
	Total employment	1.7	1.9	1.0	-1.7	-0.7	0.1	-0.4	-0.3	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.6		
	Labour productivity	1.6	1.2	-0.6	-2.6	2.8	1.6	0.0	0.5	0.7	1.2	0.7	0.9		
	Annual average hours worked per person employed	-0.1	0.1	-0.2	-1.3	-0.2	0.1	-1.0	-0.4	0.1	-0.2	0.1	-0.3		
	Real productivity per hour worked	1.6	1.0	-0.4	-1.4	3.0	1.5	0.9	1.0	0.6	1.4	0.6	1.2		
	Harmonized CPI	2.3	2.4	3.7	1.0	2.1	3.1	2.6	1.5	0.5	0.0	0.3	1.7		
	Price deflator GDP	2.4	2.8	0.1	-1.5	2.0	1.2	2.4	0.6	1.7	3.0	-1.2	0.3		
	Nominal compensation per employee	3.1	3.3	0.5	-1.0	3.8	1.9	2.8	0.9	1.8	3.2	-0.5	1.0		
	Real compensation per employee (GDP deflator)	0.7	0.5	0.3	0.5	1.7	0.7	0.4	0.4	0.1	0.2	0.7	0.6		
	Real compensation per employee (private consumption deflator)	0.7	0.9	-3.1	-2.0	1.7	-1.2	0.2	-0.6	1.3	3.2	-0.7	-0.7		
	Nominal unit labour costs	1.5	2.1	1.0	1.7	1.0	0.3	2.9	0.4	1.1	2.0	-1.2	0.1		
	Real unit labour costs	-1.0	-0.7	0.9	3.2	-1.0	-0.9	0.5	-0.2	-0.6	-1.0	0.0	-0.2		
	Labour Market Indicators - Total	Total population (000)	496437	498301	500297	502090	503171	b502965	b504048	b505162	507011	e508540	be510277	ep511523	bp
		Population aged 15-64 (000)	333371	334546	335847	336478	336350	335459	b334945	334153	333852	e333226	be333077	ep332389	bp
		Total employment (000)	216156	220441	222946	219006	216165	216258	215854	215478	218388	220923	224286	227631	
Employment aged 15-64 (000)		212568	216643	218996	215034	212131	212070	211392	210840	213476	215804	218957	221970		
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)		68.9	69.8	70.3	69.0	68.6	68.6	68.4	68.4	69.2	70.1	71.1	72.2		
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)		64.3	65.3	65.7	64.5	64.1	64.2	64.1	64.1	64.9	65.7	66.7	67.7		
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)		36.5	37.3	37.4	34.9	33.9	33.3	32.6	32.2	32.6	33.2	33.9	34.7		
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)		78.1	79.0	79.4	78.0	77.7	77.7	77.3	76.9	77.5	78.1	78.8	79.7		
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)		43.3	44.5	45.5	45.9	46.2	47.2	48.7	50.1	51.8	53.3	55.3	57.1		
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)			64.5	65.0	63.6	63.0	62.9	62.7	62.5	63.3	64.1	65.1	66.2		
Self-employed (% total employment)		15.2	15.1	14.9	15.0	15.3	15.1	15.2	15.2	15.1	14.9	14.8	14.5		
Part-time employment (% total employment)		17.4	17.5	17.5	18.0	18.5	18.8	19.2	19.6	19.6	19.6	19.5	19.4		
Temporary employment (% total employment)		11.2	11.2	10.8	10.3	10.7	10.9	10.6	10.6	10.9	11.2	11.3	11.3		
Employment in Services (% total employment)				67.8	b69.2	69.9	70.2	70.6	71.1	71.3	71.6	71.9	71.9		
Employment in Industry (% total employment)				27.5	b26.1	25.4	25.2	24.8	24.4	24.3	24.2	24.1	24.2		
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)				4.7	b4.7	4.8	4.6	4.6	4.5	4.4	4.2	4.0	3.9		
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)		70.1	70.4	70.7	70.8	71.0	71.1	71.7	72.0	72.3	72.6	73.0	73.4		
Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)		44.2	44.2	44.3	43.6	42.9	42.6	42.4	42.1	41.8	41.6	41.7	41.7		
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)		84.1	84.3	84.6	84.7	85.0	85.0	85.4	85.4	85.5	85.5	85.5	85.7		
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)		46.1	47.0	47.9	48.9	49.6	50.6	52.5	54.3	55.9	57.3	59.1	60.6		
Total unemployment (000)		19321	16998	16768	21386	23011	23154	25294	26335	24832	22898	20942	18776		
Unemployment rate (% labour force)		8.2	7.2	7.0	9.0	9.6	9.7	10.5	10.9	10.2	9.4	8.6	7.6		
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)		17.7	15.8	15.9	20.3	21.4	21.8	23.3	23.8	22.2	20.3	18.7	16.8		
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)		3.7	3.0	2.6	2.9	3.8	4.1	4.6	5.1	5.0	4.5	4.0	3.4		
Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)		45.0	42.6	36.9	33.1	39.8	42.8	44.3	47.1	49.3	48.1	46.4	44.7		
Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)		7.7	6.9	6.9	8.7	9.0	9.2	9.8	10.0	9.3	8.5	7.8	7.0		
Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)		56.4	57.1	56.5	54.6	53.8	53.4	52.7	52.0	52.5	b53.2	54.3	55.6		
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)		73.5	74.4	74.7	73.4	73.0	73.1	72.9	72.7	73.4	b73.9	74.8	75.7		
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)		84.7	85.2	85.1	84.3	83.9	83.7	83.5	83.4	83.7	b84.2	84.8	85.3		
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)		64.5	65.5	66.0	64.8	64.5	64.5	64.5	64.5	65.2	66.0	67.1	68.1		
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)		68.6	69.7	69.7	67.8	67.6	68.0	67.9	68.2	69.2	70.5	71.8	72.9		
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)		57.3	58.1	59.0	55.3	55.0	54.7	53.4	52.6	53.2	53.6	53.7	54.6		
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)		64.6	65.5	65.9	64.8	64.4	64.5	64.4	64.4	65.2	66.0	67.0	68.1		
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)		67.9	69.2	68.8	67.0	66.7	66.6	66.1	66.5	67.5	68.8	69.9	72.8		
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)		62.1	62.9	63.3	59.5	58.9	58.0	57.0	56.1	57.0	57.6	58.7	60.6		
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)				3.2	3.5	3.7	3.7	3.9	4.3	4.2	4.1	3.9	3.7		
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)		1.2	1.1	1.1	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9		
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)		3.3	3.2	3.1	3.4	3.5	3.6	3.7	4.0	3.9	3.8	3.6	3.3		

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European Union 28		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017		
Labour Market Indicators - Male	Total population (000)	241952	242934	243991	244912	245500	b245185	b245753	b246381	247402	e 248233	be 249356	ep 250072	bp	
	Population aged 15-64(000)	166743	167334	168007	168307	168234	167556	b 167295	166917	166829	e 166568	be 166701	ep 166441	bp	
	Total employment (000)	120061	122169	123077	119774	117986	117773	117212	116699	118126	119469	121309	123041		
	Employment aged 15-64 (000)	117822	119801	120614	117334	115517	115195	114446	113818	115067	116277	117978	119532		
	Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	76.8	77.7	77.9	75.7	75.1	75.0	74.6	74.3	75.0	75.9	76.9	78.0		
	Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)	71.5	72.4	72.7	70.6	70.1	70.0	69.6	69.4	70.1	70.9	71.9	73.0		
	Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)	39.5	40.3	40.2	36.9	36.0	35.4	34.5	34.0	34.4	35.0	35.6	36.4		
	Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)	85.9	86.7	86.8	84.6	84.0	83.9	83.3	82.6	83.2	83.8	84.6	85.6		
	Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)	52.5	53.7	54.8	54.6	54.5	54.9	56.2	57.4	58.8	60.2	62.0	63.7		
	FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)		76.1	76.2	74.0	73.2	72.9	72.4	72.0	72.7	73.4	74.4	75.6		
	Self-employed (% total employment)	19.2	19.0	18.8	19.0	19.4	19.2	19.3	19.2	19.1	18.8	18.5	18.2		
	Part-time employment (% total employment)	6.9	6.9	7.0	7.4	7.8	8.0	8.4	8.7	8.8	8.9	8.9	8.8		
	Temporary employment (% total employment)	11.2	11.2	10.8	10.3	10.7	10.9	10.6	10.6	10.9	11.2	11.3	11.3		
	Employment in Services (% total employment)				56.3	b 57.7	58.4	58.9	59.4	59.9	60.2	60.4	60.6	60.8	
	Employment in Industry (% total employment)				38.4	b 37.0	36.1	35.8	35.3	34.8	34.6	34.5	34.5	34.4	
	Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)				5.2	b 5.4	5.5	5.3	5.4	5.3	5.2	5.1	5.0	4.8	
	Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)	77.5	77.6	77.8	77.6	77.6	77.5	77.8	77.9	78.2	78.3	78.6	78.9		
	Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)	47.6	47.6	47.7	46.7	46.1	45.5	45.3	44.9	44.5	44.2	44.1	44.1		
	Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)	91.9	91.9	91.9	91.7	91.8	91.6	91.8	91.5	91.5	91.5	91.4	91.6		
	Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)	55.9	56.8	57.7	58.4	58.7	59.3	61.0	62.5	63.9	65.0	66.6	67.8		
	Total unemployment (000)	9859	8632	8683	11756	12588	12473	13641	14183	13281	12249	11066	9846		
	Unemployment rate (% labour force)	7.6	6.6	6.6	9.0	9.7	9.6	10.4	10.8	10.1	9.3	8.4	7.4		
	Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)	17.4	15.6	16.0	21.4	22.2	22.4	24.0	24.4	22.8	21.1	19.4	17.4		
	Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)	3.4	2.8	2.4	2.8	3.9	4.1	4.6	5.1	5.0	4.5	3.9	3.3		
	Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)	45.2	42.8	36.6	31.8	40.3	43.4	44.6	47.4	49.7	48.6	46.6	45.1		
	Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)	8.1	7.2	7.5	9.8	10.1	10.2	10.8	10.9	10.1	9.3	8.5	7.7		
	Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)	69.8	70.2	69.7	66.6	65.2	64.3	63.0	61.9	62.5	b 63.5	64.8	66.3		
	Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)	80.1	81.0	81.4	79.6	79.1	79.2	79.0	78.7	79.3	b 79.8	80.7	81.6		
	Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)	88.0	88.7	88.9	87.9	87.4	87.3	87.1	87.4	b 87.9	87.9	88.6	89.2		
	Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)	71.5	72.4	72.6	70.8	70.2	70.1	69.8	69.6	70.2	71.0	72.0	73.1		
	Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)	77.1	78.1	78.3	75.0	74.7	74.8	74.6	74.9	76.2	77.3	78.6	80.1		
	Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)	69.0	69.9	69.9	63.9	64.5	64.5	62.8	61.9	62.6	63.4	63.6	64.5		
	Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)	71.5	72.3	72.5	70.7	70.1	69.9	69.6	69.4	70.1	70.9	71.8	72.9		
	Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)	77.1	78.5	77.8	74.3	73.6	73.4	72.7	73.0	73.9	75.2	76.6	79.7		
	Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)	73.1	73.9	73.2	67.7	67.2	66.5	65.4	64.3	65.3	66.2	68.1	69.6		
	Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)				1.7	1.9	2.1	2.2	2.4	2.6	2.6	2.5	2.3		
	Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)	0.9	0.9	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.8		
	Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)	2.3	2.2	2.1	2.5	2.7	2.9	2.9	3.1	3.1	3.0	2.9	2.7		
	Labour Market Indicators - Female	Total population (000)	254485	255366	256306	257178	257671	b 257780	b 258295	b 258781	259609	e 260307	be 260922	ep 261451	bp
		Population aged 15-64(000)	166629	167211	167841	168171	168116	167903	b 167649	167236	167023	e 166657	be 166376	ep 165948	bp
		Total employment (000)	96094	98273	99869	99232	98179	98485	98642	98780	100262	101455	102978	104590	
		Employment aged 15-64 (000)	94746	96842	98382	97700	96614	96875	96946	97023	98409	99528	100978	102438	
		Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	61.1	62.1	62.8	62.3	62.1	62.2	62.4	62.6	63.5	64.3	65.3	66.5	
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)		57.2	58.2	58.9	58.4	58.2	58.4	58.6	58.8	59.6	60.4	61.4	62.5		
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)		33.5	34.2	34.4	32.9	31.7	31.2	30.6	30.3	30.7	31.3	32.1	33.0		
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)		70.2	71.3	72.1	71.5	71.4	71.4	71.3	71.1	71.7	72.3	73.0	73.8		
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)		34.7	35.8	36.7	37.7	38.5	40.0	41.7	43.3	45.2	46.9	48.9	50.9		
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)			53.7	54.4	53.9	53.5	53.5	53.6	53.7	54.5	55.4	56.3	57.5		
Self-employed (% total employment)		10.2	10.2	10.1	10.1	10.3	10.2	10.4	10.3	10.4	10.4	10.3	10.2		
Part-time employment (% total employment)		30.5	30.5	30.4	30.8	31.3	31.5	31.9	32.4	32.2	32.1	31.9	31.7		
Temporary employment (% total employment)		13.2	13.4	13.3	12.8	12.8	12.8	12.5	12.5	12.6	12.8	13.0	13.2		
Employment in Services (% total employment)					81.8	b 83.0	83.6	83.7	83.9	84.3	84.4	84.8	85.0	84.9	
Employment in Industry (% total employment)					14.2	b 13.1	12.6	12.6	12.5	12.3	12.3	12.1	12.1	12.3	
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)					4.0	b 4.0	3.9	3.7	3.6	3.4	3.3	3.1	2.9	2.8	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)		62.8	63.2	63.7	64.1	64.4	64.8	65.5	66.0	66.6	66.8	67.4	67.9		
Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)		40.7	40.7	40.8	40.4	39.7	39.5	39.4	39.3	39.0	38.9	39.1	39.2		
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)		76.3	76.7	77.3	77.7	78.2	78.4	79.0	79.2	79.5	79.5	79.6	79.8		
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)		36.9	37.9	38.6	40.0	41.0	42.6	44.6	46.5	48.4	50.0	52.0	53.8		
Total unemployment (000)		9462	8366	8085	9630	10423	10681	11653	12151	11551	10649	9877	8930		
Unemployment rate (% labour force)		9.0	7.9	7.5	8.9	9.6	9.8	10.6	10.9	10.3	9.5	8.8	7.9		
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)		18.1	16.2	15.8	19.0	20.4	21.0	22.4	23.0	21.4	19.5	17.9	16.1		
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)		4.0	3.3	2.8	3.1	3.7	4.1	4.6	5.1	5.0	4.5	4.0	3.5		
Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)		44.8	42.4	37.1	34.8	39.1	42.0	44.0	46.8	48.7	47.6	46.2	44.3		
Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)		7.2	6.5	6.3	7.5	8.0	8.3	8.8	9.0	8.3	7.6	7.0	6.3		
Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)		44.6	45.3	44.7	43.8	43.3	43.2	43.1	42.6	43.0	b 43.2	43.8	44.9		
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)		66.5	67.4	67.6	66.9	66.6	66.6	66.5	66.4	67.1	b 67.7	68.5	69.3		
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)		81.3	81.8	81.6	81.1	80.6	80.3	80.1	80.1	80.4	b 80.8	81.5	82.0		
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)		57.6	58.6	59.3	58.9	58.7	58.9	59.2	59.4	60.2	61.1	62.1	63.2		
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)		60.2	61.3	61.4	60.9	60.9	61.8	61.6	61.9	62.7	64.0	65.1	66.0		
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)		45.5	46.4	48.1	46.7	46.0	45.3	44.5	43.9	44.5	44.5	44.0	45.0		
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)		57.7	58.6	59.3	58.9	58.7	58.9	59.2	59.4	60.2	61.1	62.2	63.3		
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)		59.9	61.1	60.9	60.6	60.6	60.8	60.5	61.0	62.1	63.2	64.1	66.5		
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)		51.4	52.4	53.7	51.8	51.0	50.1	49.2	48.6	49.5	49.8	50.1	52.2		
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)					5.1	5.3	5.5	5.4	5.7	6.2	6.1	5.9	5.5	5.2	
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)		1.5	1.5	1.4	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1		
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)		4.6	4.5	4.3	4.5	4.5	4.6	4.7	4.9	4.9	4.7	4.4	4.1		

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European Union 28		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	
All	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of total population)					23.8	24.3	24.8	24.6	24.4	23.8	23.5		
	At-risk-of-poverty (% of total population)					16.5	16.9	16.8	16.7	17.2	17.3	17.3		
	At-risk-of-poverty threshold (PPS single person)													
	Poverty gap (%)					22.9	23.0	23.4	23.8	24.6	24.8	25.0		
	Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of total population)					10.0 e	9.8 e	10.3 e	10.0	10.3	10.9	11.0 e		
	At-risk-of-poverty before social transfers excl. pensions (% of total population)					26.1	26.4	25.8	26.0	26.1	26.1	25.9		
	Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (%)					36.8	36.0	34.9	35.8	34.1	33.7	33.2		
	Severe Material Deprivation (% of total population)					8.4	8.8	9.9	9.6	8.9	8.1	7.5	6.7 e	
	Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of people aged 0-59)					10.3	10.5	10.6	11.0	11.3	10.7	10.5		
	Real Gross Household Disposable income (growth %)	2.0	2.1	0.7	0.7	-0.2	-0.6	-1.0	0.0	1.2	2.0	2.0		
	Income quintile share ratio S80/S20					4.9	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.2	5.2	5.2		
	GINI coefficient					30.5	30.8	30.5	30.5	31.0	31.0	30.8		
	Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18-24)	15.3 b	14.9	14.7	14.2	13.9	13.4	12.7	11.9	11.2 b	11.0	10.7	10.6	
	NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of total population aged 15-24)	11.7 b	11.0	10.9	12.4	12.8	12.9	13.2	13.0	12.5	12.0	11.6	10.9	
Male	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of male population)					22.7	23.2	23.8	23.7	23.6	23.1	22.5		
	At-risk-of-poverty (% of male population)					15.8	16.1	16.2	16.2	16.7	16.9	16.6		
	Poverty gap (%)					23.6	24.0	24.2	24.6	25.6	25.8	26.1		
	Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of male population)					9.3 e	9.3 e	9.7 e	9.6	9.9	10.4	10.4 e		
	Severe Material Deprivation (% of male population)					8.2	8.6	9.7	9.4	8.8	8.0	7.3	6.4 e	
	Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of males aged 0-59)					9.6	9.9	10.0	10.5	10.9	10.2	10.0		
	Life expectancy at birth (years)					76.9 e	77.4	77.4	77.8 e	78.1	77.9 b	78.2		
	Healthy life years at birth (years) - men					61.8 e	61.7	61.5	61.4 e	61.4	62.6 b	63.5		
	Early leavers from education and training (% of males aged 18-24)	17.4 b	16.9	16.7	16.1	15.8	15.3	14.5	13.6	12.8 b	12.4	12.2	12.1	
	NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of males aged 15-24)	10.6 b	9.8	9.7	12.0	12.4	12.6	13.0	12.8	12.3	11.8	11.3	10.7	
	Female	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of female population)					24.8	25.4	25.8	25.5	25.2	24.5	24.4	
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of female population)					17.2	17.6	17.4	17.2	17.7	17.7	17.9	
		Poverty gap (%)					22.1	22.1	22.5	23.2	23.8	23.9	24.1	
		Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of female population)					10.7 e	10.3 e	11.0 e	10.5	10.7	11.3	11.5 e	
Severe Material Deprivation (% of female population)						8.6	9.1	10.2	9.8	9.0	8.2	7.7	6.9 e	
Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of females aged 0-59)						11.0	11.2	11.2	11.5	11.7	11.2	11.0		
Life expectancy at birth (years)						82.8 e	83.2	83.1	83.3 e	83.6	83.3 b	83.6		
Healthy life years at birth (years) - women						62.6 e	62.1	62.1	61.5 e	61.8	63.3 b	64.2		
Early leavers from education and training (% of females aged 18-24)		13.2 b	12.8	12.7	12.3	11.9	11.5	10.9	10.2	9.6 b	9.5	9.2	8.9	
NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of females aged 15-24)		12.9 b	12.2	12.0	12.9	13.2	13.3	13.4	13.2	12.7	12.3	11.9	11.2	
Children (0-17)		At-Risk-of-poverty or exclusion of children (% of people aged 0-17)					27.6	27.3	28.1	27.9	27.8	27.1	26.4	
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of Children population)					21.0	20.7	20.6	20.5	21.1	21.2	21.0	
		Severe Material Deprivation (% of Children population)					9.9	10.1	11.8	11.1	10.4	9.6	8.5	7.3 e
		Share of children living in low work intensity households (% of Children population)					9.4	9.3	9.2	9.6	9.9	9.4	9.3	
	Risk of poverty of children in households at work (Working Intensity > 0.2)					15.8	15.6	15.7	15.7	16.0	16.1	15.9		
	Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (0-17) (%)					40.5	41.0	39.8	41.1	39.4	38.9	38.8		
	Working age (18-64)	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of Working age population)					23.6	24.5	25.4	25.5	25.4	24.7	24.2	
At-risk-of-poverty (% of Working age population)						15.3	16.0	16.4	16.5	17.1	17.1	17.0		
Severe Material Deprivation (% of Working age population)						8.4	8.9	10.0	10.0	9.2	8.4	7.8	6.9 e	
Very low work intensity (18-59)						10.6	10.9	11.0	11.4	11.7	11.1	10.9		
In-work at-risk-of poverty rate (% of persons employed 18-64)						8.3	8.8	8.9	9.0	9.5	9.5	9.6		
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (18-64) (%)						38.8	37.7	35.7	36.3	34.7	34.5	34.1		
Elderly (65+)		At-Risk-of-poverty or exclusion of elderly (% of people aged 65+)					20.1	20.4	19.2	18.2	17.8	17.4	18.2	
	At-risk-of-poverty (% of Elderly population)					16.0	15.9	14.5	13.7	13.7	14.1	14.6		
	Severe Material Deprivation (% of Elderly population)					6.7	7.3	7.4	7.0	6.3	5.6	5.8	5.2 e	
	Relative median income of elderly (ratio with median income of people younger than 65)					0.88	0.90	0.92	0.93	0.94	0.93	0.93		
	Aggregate replacement ratio (ratio)					0.52	0.53	0.54	0.56	0.56	0.57	0.58		
Expenditure in social protection indicators (% of GDP)	Sickness/Health care			7.2 p	8.0 p	8.0 p	7.9 p	8.0 p	8.0 p	8.0 p				
	Disability			1.9 p	2.0 p	2.0 p	2.0 p	2.0 p	2.0 p	2.0 p				
	Old age and survivors			11.3 p	12.3 p	12.3 p	12.3 p	12.6 p	12.7 p	12.7 p				
	Family/Children			2.1 p	2.4 p	2.4 p	2.3 p	2.3 p	2.3 p	2.4 p				
	Unemployment			1.2 p	1.7 p	1.7 p	1.6 p	1.5 p	1.5 p	1.4 p				
	Housing and Social exclusion n.e.c.			1.0 p	1.1 p	1.1 p	1.1 p	1.1 p	1.1 p	1.1 p				
	Total (including Admin and Other expenditures)			25.9 p	28.7 p	28.6 p	28.3 p	28.7 p	28.8 p	28.8 p				
	of which: Means tested benefits			2.7 p	3.0 p	3.1 p	3.0 p	3.0 p	3.0 p	3.0 p				

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Euro Area 19

Euro Area 19		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	
Macro Economic Indicators (Annual % growth)	Real GDP	3.2	3.1	0.4	-4.5	2.1	1.6	-0.9	-0.2	1.3	2.1	1.8	2.4	
	Total employment	1.8	1.9	0.8	-1.9	-0.6	0.1	-0.4	-0.6	0.6	1.0	1.3	1.6	
	Labour productivity	1.5	1.2	-0.4	-2.7	2.7	1.5	-0.4	0.4	0.7	1.1	0.5	0.8	
	Annual average hours worked per person employed	-0.1	0.2	-0.1	-1.7	0.1	-0.1	-1.2	-0.7	0.0	0.1	-0.1	-0.2	
	Real productivity per hour worked	1.5	1.0	-0.3	-1.0	2.5	1.6	0.7	1.1	0.8	1.0	0.6	1.0	
	Harmonized CPI	2.2	2.2	3.3	0.3	1.6	2.7	2.5	1.3	0.4	0.0	0.2	1.5	
	Price deflator GDP	2.0	2.5	2.0	1.0	0.7	1.0	1.3	1.2	0.9	1.4	0.8	1.1	
	Nominal compensation per employee	2.4	2.6	3.4	1.6	2.0	2.1	1.5	1.5	1.4	1.5	1.2	1.6	
	Real compensation per employee (GDP deflator)	0.4	0.2	1.3	0.7	1.3	1.0	0.2	0.3	0.5	0.0	0.5	0.5	
	Real compensation per employee (private consumption deflator)	0.1	0.5	0.0	1.3	0.3	-0.7	-1.0	0.2	0.9	1.4	1.0	0.0	
	Nominal unit labour costs	0.9	1.5	3.8	4.4	-0.7	0.6	1.9	1.2	0.6	0.4	0.7	0.8	
	Real unit labour costs	-1.1	-1.0	1.7	3.5	-1.3	-0.4	0.6	-0.1	-0.3	-0.9	-0.1	-0.2	
	Labour Market Indicators - Total	Total population (000)	329685	331205	333097	334470	335266	334573 b	335289 b	336044	337541	338560 b	339880 p	340720 bp
		Population aged 15-64 (000)	219986	220686	221860	222290	222222	221221 b	220959	220572	220676	220387 b	220615 p	220355 bp
		Total employment (000)	142543	145432	146829	143874	142241	142335	141499	140726	142133	143653	146167	148318
		Employment aged 15-64 (000)	140590	143339	144645	141678	140048	140041	139023	138166	139412	140761	143136	145033
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)		69.0	69.9	70.2	68.8	68.4	68.4	68.0	67.7	68.2	69.0	70.0	71.0	
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)		64.6	65.5	65.9	64.5	64.1	64.1	63.7	63.5	63.9	64.6	65.5	66.5	
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)		36.8	37.7	37.5	34.8	33.4	33.0	31.7	31.0	30.8	31.0	31.5	32.4	
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)		78.3	79.1	79.4	77.7	77.3	77.3	76.5	75.9	76.1	76.7	77.5	78.2	
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)		41.7	43.3	44.4	45.1	45.7	47.0	48.6	50.0	51.7	53.3	55.3	57.2	
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)		63.2	64.1	64.4	62.9	62.4	62.2	61.6	61.2	61.6	62.3	63.3	64.3	
Self-employed (% total employment)		15.2	15.0	14.8	14.9	15.1	15.0	15.0	15.0	14.9	14.8	14.6	14.3	
Part-time employment (% total employment)		18.5	18.6	18.7	19.3	19.7	20.1	20.7	21.5	21.6	21.6	21.6	21.6	
Temporary employment (% total employment)		12.7	12.7	12.3	11.5	11.8	12.1	11.7	11.6	11.9	12.3	12.5	12.9	
Employment in Services (% total employment)				69.5 b	70.7	71.4	71.8	72.2	72.8	73.1	73.2	73.4	73.5	
Employment in Industry (% total employment)				27.2 b	26.0	25.3	25.0	24.6	24.1	23.8	23.8	23.6	23.7	
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)				3.3 b	3.3	3.4	3.3	3.2	3.2	3.1	3.0	3.0	2.9	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)		70.5	70.8	71.2	71.3	71.3	71.5	72.0	72.2	72.4	72.5	72.9	73.1	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)		44.1	44.4	44.4	43.5	42.3	41.9	41.4	41.0	40.3	39.8	39.7	39.9	
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)		84.5	84.7	85.1	85.1	85.2	85.2	85.6	85.5	85.5	85.4	85.5	85.5	
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)		44.9	46.2	47.1	48.4	49.4	50.7	52.8	54.6	56.4	58.0	59.8	61.3	
Total unemployment (000)		12990	11731	11967	15258	16178	16216	18220	19271	18661	17470	16258	14747	
Unemployment rate (% labour force)		8.4	7.5	7.6	9.6	10.2	10.2	11.4	12.0	11.6	10.9	10.0	9.1	
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)		17.1	15.6	16.1	20.7	21.5	21.4	23.6	24.4	23.7	22.3	20.9	18.8	
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)		3.8	3.2	2.9	3.3	4.3	4.6	5.2	5.9	6.0	5.5	5.0	4.4	
Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)		45.6	43.6	38.6	35.1	42.2	45.0	46.2	49.4	52.2	51.1	49.7	48.5	
Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)		7.3	6.6	6.9	8.7	8.9	8.9	9.7	9.9	9.5	8.9	8.3	7.5	
Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)		57.0	57.5	57.2	55.1	54.3	54.0	53.0	52.1	52.2 b	53.0	53.9	55.1	
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)		74.2	75.1	75.5	74.4	74.1	74.0	73.7	73.3	73.7 b	74.1	74.9	75.5	
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)		83.9	84.5	84.8	83.9	83.5	83.5	83.1	82.7	82.7 b	83.2	84.0	84.6	
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)		64.9	65.9	66.2	65.0	64.6	64.7	64.4	64.1	64.4	65.1	66.1	67.1	
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)		67.4	68.2	68.0	65.9	65.7	65.9	65.7	65.9	66.5	67.7	69.3	70.4	
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)		56.5	57.8	58.6	54.5	54.3	54.0	52.5	51.5	52.1	52.5	52.4	53.5	
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)		64.9	65.9	66.2	65.0	64.5	64.6	64.2	64.0	64.3	65.1	66.1	67.0	
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)		66.4	67.5	66.6	64.5	64.1	63.6	62.9	63.0	63.4	64.3	65.3	70.5	
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)		62.6	63.5	63.5	58.9	58.1	56.9	55.4	53.8	54.5	55.1	55.9	58.9	
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)				3.5	3.7	3.8	3.8	4.0	4.6	4.6	4.5	4.3	4.1	
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)		1.4	1.3	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)		3.2	3.2	3.3	3.5	3.6	3.7	3.9	4.2	4.4	4.3	4.1	3.8	

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Euro Area 19		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	
Labour Market Indicators - Male	Total population (000)	160760	161550	162517	163200	163564	162976 b	163337 b	163743	164542	165085 b	165961 p	166421 bp	
	Population aged 15-64(000)	110271	110616	111180	111344	111235	110489 b	110342	110127	110196	110065 b	110348 p	110239 bp	
	Total employment (000)	80064	81341	81635	79114	77853	77654	76872	76170	76782	77568	78956	80115	
	Employment aged 15-64 (000)	78776	79975	80211	77699	76454	76172	75263	74503	75002	75709	77013	78028	
	Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	77.4	78.2	78.1	75.7	75.0	74.9	74.1	73.4	73.8	74.6	75.6	76.6	
	Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)	72.4	73.2	73.1	70.8	70.2	70.1	69.3	68.7	69.0	69.7	70.6	71.6	
	Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)	40.3	41.0	40.5	36.9	35.5	35.0	33.6	32.8	32.5	32.6	33.1	34.0	
	Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)	87.0	87.6	87.4	84.7	84.0	83.8	82.7	81.7	81.9	82.5	83.3	84.1	
	Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)	50.8	52.3	53.3	53.4	53.7	54.3	55.6	56.7	58.1	59.6	61.6	63.3	
	FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	75.7	76.5	76.3	73.8	73.0	72.6	71.7	70.9	71.2	71.9	72.8	73.9	
	Self-employed (% total employment)	19.0	18.8	18.5	18.8	19.1	19.0	19.1	19.0	18.8	18.6	18.2	17.8	
	Part-time employment (% total employment)	6.7	6.8	6.8	7.3	7.6	8.0	8.4	8.9	9.1	9.3	9.3	9.4	
	Temporary employment (% total employment)	12.7	12.7	12.3	11.5	11.8	12.1	11.7	11.6	11.9	12.3	12.5	12.9	
	Employment in Services (% total employment)			57.7 b	58.8	59.6	60.2	60.7	61.4	61.7	61.8	62.0	62.2	
	Employment in Industry (% total employment)			38.4 b	37.1	36.2	35.8	35.3	34.6	34.4	34.3	34.1	34.1	
	Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)			4.0 b	4.1	4.1	4.0	4.1	4.1	4.0	3.9	3.9	3.8	
	Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)	78.3	78.4	78.6	78.3	78.1	77.9	78.2	78.1	78.1	78.1	78.3	78.5	
	Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)	47.8	47.8	47.8	46.6	45.2	44.6	44.1	43.5	42.8	42.2	42.0	42.1	
	Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)	92.9	92.9	92.9	92.5	92.4	92.2	92.2	91.8	91.6	91.4	91.4	91.4	
	Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)	54.5	55.5	56.4	57.4	58.1	58.8	60.7	62.4	63.8	65.3	66.9	68.1	
	Total unemployment (000)	6454	5784	6052	8256	8728	8637	9753	10317	9930	9275	8484	7640	
	Unemployment rate (% labour force)	7.5	6.7	6.9	9.5	10.1	10.0	11.2	11.9	11.5	10.7	9.7	8.7	
	Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)	16.3	14.8	15.9	21.6	22.1	21.7	24.0	24.8	24.2	23.0	21.4	19.4	
	Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)	3.4	2.9	2.6	3.1	4.2	4.5	5.2	5.9	6.0	5.5	4.8	4.2	
	Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)	45.7	43.6	37.9	33.3	42.3	45.3	46.2	49.5	52.3	51.3	49.6	48.6	
	Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)	7.5	6.8	7.3	9.8	9.7	9.6	10.5	10.7	10.3	9.7	9.0	8.1	
	Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)	71.7	71.8	70.9	67.4	66.0	65.2	63.3	61.9	62.0 b	63.1	64.3	65.8	
	Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)	81.0	82.0	82.1	80.2	79.8	79.8	79.4	78.8	79.0 b	79.4	80.3	80.9	
	Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)	87.7	88.5	88.7	87.5	87.1	87.1	86.8	86.3	86.3 b	86.9	87.8	88.4	
	Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)	72.5	73.3	73.2	71.2	70.5	70.3	69.7	69.1	69.2	69.9	70.8	71.8	
	Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)	76.3	76.9	76.6	72.9	72.9	72.8	72.2	72.4	73.4	74.8	76.1	77.5	
	Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)	68.5	69.7	69.5	63.1	63.7	63.7	61.6	60.7	61.1	62.2	62.4	63.4	
	Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)	72.5	73.2	73.1	71.1	70.3	70.2	69.4	68.9	69.1	69.7	70.7	71.6	
	Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)	76.6	77.3	76.0	71.9	71.5	70.8	69.2	69.2	69.5	70.9	71.8	77.5	
	Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)	73.8	74.5	73.3	66.7	66.1	65.0	63.1	61.6	62.0	63.3	65.3	67.7	
	Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)			1.6	1.8	1.9	2.1	2.2	2.6	2.7	2.7	2.6	2.5	
	Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)	1.1	1.0	1.0	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.9	0.8	
	Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)	2.0	2.1	2.1	2.4	2.6	2.8	2.8	3.2	3.3	3.3	3.2	3.0	
	Labour Market Indicators - Female	Total population (000)	168925	169655	170580	171270	171702	171597 b	171952 b	172301	172999	173476 b	173919 p	174300 bp
		Population aged 15-64(000)	109715	110070	110681	110946	110987	110732 b	110617	110445	110481	110321 b	110268 p	110116 bp
		Total employment (000)	62478	64091	65194	64760	64388	64681	64627	64556	65352	66085	67211	68203
		Employment aged 15-64 (000)	61814	63363	64434	63979	63594	63868	63760	63663	64410	65053	66122	67005
		Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	60.5	61.7	62.4	61.9	61.8	62.0	62.0	62.0	62.7	63.4	64.4	65.4
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)		56.7	57.9	58.6	58.1	58.0	58.3	58.2	58.2	58.8	59.5	60.4	61.3	
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)		33.3	34.3	34.4	32.7	31.3	30.9	29.7	29.2	29.0	29.3	29.8	30.7	
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)		69.5	70.6	71.4	70.7	70.6	70.7	70.4	70.1	70.4	70.9	71.6	72.3	
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)		33.1	34.8	35.9	37.3	38.2	40.0	41.9	43.6	45.7	47.4	49.4	51.4	
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)		51.5	52.4	53.2	52.7	52.4	52.5	52.3	52.2	52.8	53.5	54.5	55.5	
Self-employed (% total employment)		10.4	10.3	10.2	10.1	10.2	10.1	10.3	10.3	10.3	10.3	10.3	10.1	
Part-time employment (% total employment)		33.5	33.6	33.5	33.9	34.3	34.6	35.3	36.1	36.0	36.0	35.9	35.7	
Temporary employment (% total employment)		15.4	15.3	15.2	14.6	14.5	14.5	14.0	13.8	13.8	14.1	14.3	14.8	
Employment in Services (% total employment)				84.2 b	85.0	85.5	85.6	85.8	86.1	86.3	86.5	86.7	86.6	
Employment in Industry (% total employment)				13.3 b	12.5	12.1	12.1	11.9	11.7	11.6	11.5	11.4	11.6	
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)				2.5 b	2.5	2.4	2.3	2.2	2.1	2.1	2.0	1.9	1.9	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)		62.6	63.2	63.9	64.4	64.6	65.1	65.9	66.3	66.7	66.9	67.4	67.7	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)		40.4	40.8	40.9	40.4	39.2	39.1	38.6	38.3	37.7	37.3	37.4	37.5	
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)		76.0	76.4	77.2	77.6	78.1	78.3	79.0	79.3	79.4	79.3	79.6	79.6	
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)		35.8	37.2	38.3	40.0	41.1	43.0	45.3	47.3	49.5	51.2	53.1	54.9	
Total unemployment (000)		6536	5947	5915	7002	7450	7579	8466	8954	8732	8195	7774	7107	
Unemployment rate (% labour force)		9.5	8.5	8.4	9.8	10.4	10.5	11.6	12.2	11.8	11.0	10.4	9.5	
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)		18.1	16.4	16.3	19.6	20.7	21.0	23.1	23.9	23.2	21.6	20.3	18.1	
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)		4.2	3.7	3.2	3.6	4.3	4.7	5.3	6.0	6.1	5.6	5.1	4.5	
Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)		45.4	43.7	39.4	37.1	42.0	44.8	46.3	49.4	52.2	51.0	49.8	48.4	
Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)		7.1	6.5	6.4	7.7	7.9	8.2	8.9	9.1	8.7	8.1	7.6	6.8	
Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)		43.4	44.1	44.2	43.3	43.1	43.2	42.9	42.4	42.4 b	42.9	43.3	44.1	
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)		67.2	68.1	68.8	68.4	68.2	68.0	67.9	67.7	68.3 b	68.6	69.5	70.0	
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)		79.9	80.5	80.9	80.4	80.0	80.1	79.7	79.3	79.4 b	79.8	80.7	81.2	
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)		57.3	58.5	59.2	58.8	58.7	59.0	59.1	59.2	59.6	60.4	61.4	62.3	
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)		58.7	59.8	59.6	59.1	58.9	59.5	59.7	59.7	60.0	60.9	62.8	63.4	
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)		44.4	45.9	47.6	45.9	45.4	44.8	44.0	42.8	43.7	43.4	42.7	43.7	
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)		57.3	58.5	59.2	58.8	58.7	59.0	59.0	59.1	59.6	60.4	61.5	62.4	
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)		57.7	59.2	58.6	58.0	57.8	57.6	57.8	57.8	58.3	58.8	60.0	64.2	
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)		51.7	52.9	54.0	51.5	50.5	49.4	48.3	46.8	47.7	47.6	47.5	50.6	
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)				5.9	5.9	6.1	5.8	6.1	6.9	6.8	6.7	6.3	6.0	
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)		1.8	1.7	1.6	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.2	
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)		4.8	4.7	4.7	4.7	4.7	4.9	5.1	5.5	5.6	5.5	5.1	4.8	

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Euro Area 19		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017			
Social Indicators	All	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of total population)	22.1	21.9	21.7	21.6	22.0	22.9	23.3	23.1	23.5	23.1	23.1			
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of total population)	15.6	16.1	16.1	16.2	16.3	16.8	16.9	16.7	17.1	17.2	17.4			
		At-risk-of-poverty threshold (PPS single person)														
		Poverty gap (%)	22.1	22.2	21.4	21.9	22.5	22.8	23.2	24.0	24.8	24.9	24.8			
		Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of total population)			9.0	9.7	10.3	10.0	10.4	10.4	10.6	11.5	11.2 e			
		At-risk-of-poverty before social transfers excl. pensions (% of total population)	24.8	24.6	24.2	24.4	25.2	25.7	25.2	25.5	25.8	25.7	25.7			
		Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (%)	37.1	34.6	33.5	33.6	35.3	34.6	32.9	34.5	33.7	33.1	32.3			
		Severe Material Deprivation (% of total population)	6.0	5.6	5.9	6.0	6.1	6.9	7.8	7.5	7.4	7.0	6.6	5.8 e		
		Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of people aged 0-59)	10.3	9.7	9.3	9.1	10.4	11.0	10.7	11.2	11.9	11.2	11.1			
		Real Gross Household Disposable income (growth %)	1.8	1.6	0.6	0.2	-0.7	-0.4	-1.6	-0.5	1.0	1.6	1.9	1.4		
		Income quintile share ratio S80/S20	4.7	4.8	4.9	4.9	4.9	5.0	5.0	5.1	5.2	5.2	5.2			
		GINI coefficient	29.4	30.0	30.5	30.3	30.3	30.6	30.5	30.7	31.0	30.8	30.7			
		Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18-24)	17.2 b	16.7	16.3	15.7	15.4	14.6	13.8	12.8	11.9 b	11.6	11.1	11.0		
		NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of total population aged 15-24)	11.3 b	10.7	11.0	12.6	12.8	12.8	13.1	12.9	12.6	12.2	11.7	11.2		
		Social Indicators	Male	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of male population)	20.6	20.2	20.2	20.3	20.9	21.8	22.2	22.2	22.6	22.3	22.1	
				At-risk-of-poverty (% of male population)	14.6	15.1	15.0	15.2	15.5	16.0	16.1	16.1	16.5	16.8	16.7	
Poverty gap (%)	22.9			22.8	22.2	22.4	23.0	23.8	23.9	24.7	25.7	25.8	25.6			
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of male population)					8.2	8.8	9.5	9.4	9.7	10.0	10.2	11.1	10.5 e			
Severe Material Deprivation (% of male population)	5.7			5.2	5.7	5.8	5.9	6.6	7.5	7.3	7.2	7.0	6.4	5.6 e		
Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of males aged 0-59)	9.2			8.7	8.4	8.3	9.7	10.3	10.1	10.7	11.4	10.8	10.7			
Life expectancy at birth (years)																
Healthy life years at birth (years) - men																
Early leavers from education and training (% of males aged 18-24)	20.0 b			19.4	19.0	18.2	17.9	16.9	15.9	14.7	13.6 b	13.2	12.8	12.9		
NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of males aged 15-24)	10.2 b			9.7	10.2	12.6	12.7	12.6	13.2	13.0	12.7	12.3	11.7	11.3		
Social Indicators	Female			At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of female population)	23.6	23.5	23.2	22.9	23.1	24.0	24.4	24.0	24.3	23.8	24.0	
				At-risk-of-poverty (% of female population)	16.5	17.1	17.1	17.1	17.1	17.6	17.6	17.3	17.7	17.7	18.1	
				Poverty gap (%)	21.4	21.6	20.9	21.5	22.1	22.1	22.6	23.5	24.2	24.1	24.2	
				Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of female population)			9.7	10.6	11.0	10.6	11.2	10.9	11.0	11.9	11.9 e	
				Severe Material Deprivation (% of female population)	6.2	6.0	6.2	6.2	6.2	7.2	8.0	7.7	7.5	7.1	6.9	6.0 e
				Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of females aged 0-59)	11.4	10.7	10.2	9.9	11.1	11.6	11.4	11.6	12.3	11.6	11.6	
		Life expectancy at birth (years)														
		Healthy life years at birth (years) - women														
		Early leavers from education and training (% of females aged 18-24)	14.4 b	13.9	13.6	13.2	12.8	12.3	11.5	10.8	10.0 b	9.9	9.3	9.0		
		NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of females aged 15-24)	12.4 b	11.8	11.8	12.6	12.8	12.9	13.0	12.8	12.5	12.1	11.7	11.1		
		Social Indicators	Children (0-17)	At-Risk-of-poverty or exclusion of children (% of people aged 0-17)	23.2	23.0	23.7	24.3	25.4	25.5	25.6	25.2	25.7	25.4	25.3	
				At-risk-of-poverty (% of Children population)	17.8	18.4	19.0	19.6	20.7	20.5	20.4	19.9	20.4	20.7	20.8	
				Severe Material Deprivation (% of Children population)	6.8	6.2	7.1	7.2	7.2	7.8	9.0	8.4	8.4	8.1	7.2	6.2 e
				Share of children living in low work intensity households (% of Children population)	7.9	7.4	7.0	7.1	8.6	9.0	8.3	8.7	9.4	8.7	9.1	
				Risk of poverty of children in households at work (Working Intensity > 0.2)	13.7	14.3	15.1	15.6	15.7	15.2	15.3	14.9	15.0	15.4	15.6	
				Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (0-17) (%)	43.5	41.8	39.9	39.1	38.9	39.2	37.8	40.1	38.6	38.0	37.7	
Social Indicators	Working age (18-64)	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of Working age population)	22.0	21.7	21.5	21.5	22.3	23.5	24.3	24.5	25.1	24.6	24.3			
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of Working age population)	14.0	14.6	14.6	14.8	15.3	16.2	16.6	16.8	17.4	17.4	17.4			
		Severe Material Deprivation (% of Working age population)	6.0	5.7	6.0	6.1	6.2	7.1	8.0	7.9	7.8	7.5	6.9	6.1 e		
		Very low work intensity (18-59)	11.1	10.4	10.0	9.7	11.0	11.6	11.5	12.0	12.7	12.0	11.8			
		In-work at-risk-of poverty rate (% of persons employed 18-64)	7.3	7.9	8.1	8.2	8.0	8.5	8.6	8.7	9.4	9.4	9.5			
		Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (18-64) (%)	40.4	37.1	36.5	36.5	38.1	36.7	34.7	35.4	34.3	34.3	33.6			
Social Indicators	Elderly (65+)	At-Risk-of-poverty or exclusion of elderly (% of people aged 65+)	21.3	21.5	20.4	19.5	17.6	18.2	17.6	16.5	16.2	15.9	17.3			
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of Elderly population)	18.8	19.1	18.2	17.4	15.2	15.1	14.1	13.3	13.3	13.5	14.2			
		Severe Material Deprivation (% of Elderly population)	4.9	4.9	4.5	4.3	4.2	5.4	5.7	5.2	4.9	4.5	5.1	4.3 e		
		Relative median income of elderly (ratio with median income of people younger than 65)	0.86	0.85	0.86	0.88	0.90	0.91	0.93	0.95	0.95	0.95	0.94			
		Aggregate replacement ratio (ratio)	0.51	0.49	0.49	0.51	0.52	0.54	0.54	0.56	0.56	0.58	0.58			
		Expenditure in social protection indicators (% of GDP)	Sickness/Health care	7.3 p	7.2 p	7.5 p	8.3 p	8.2 p	8.1 p	8.2 p	8.3 p	8.3 p	8.3 p			
Disability	1.8 p		1.8 p	1.8 p	2.0 p	2.0 p	1.9 p	2.0 p	2.0 p	2.0 p	2.0 p					
Old age and survivors	11.6 p		11.4 p	11.6 p	12.6 p	12.6 p	12.7 p	12.9 p	13.1 p	13.1 p	13.1 p					
Family/Children	2.0 p		2.0 p	2.0 p	2.2 p	2.2 p	2.2 p	2.2 p	2.2 p	2.2 p	2.3 p					
Unemployment	1.5 p		1.5 p	1.5 p	2.0 p	1.9 p	1.8 p	1.8 p	1.8 p	1.8 p	1.7 p					
Housing and Social exclusion n.e.c.	0.8 p		0.8 p	0.8 p	0.9 p	0.9 p	0.9 p	0.9 p	0.9 p	0.9 p	0.9 p					
Total (including Admin and Other expenditures)	26.2 p		25.8 p	26.5 p	29.3 p	29.2 p	28.9 p	29.3 p	29.7 p	29.7 p	29.6 p					
of which: Means tested benefits	2.6 p		2.5 p	2.6 p	2.9 p	2.9 p	2.9 p	2.9 p	3.0 p	3.0 p						

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Belgium

Belgium	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Macro Economic Indicators (Annual % growth)												
Real GDP	2.5	3.4	0.8	-2.3	2.7	1.8	0.2	0.2	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.7
Total employment	1.1	1.7	1.8	-0.2	0.6	1.4	0.4	-0.3	0.4	0.9	1.3	1.4
Labour productivity	1.4	1.8	-1.0	-2.1	2.1	0.4	-0.2	0.5	0.9	0.5	0.2	0.3
Annual average hours worked per person employed	0.4	0.3	-0.4	-1.4	-0.2	0.9	0.0	-0.1	-0.2	-0.7	0.1	
Real productivity per hour worked	0.9	1.5	-0.6	-0.7	2.2	-0.5	-0.2	0.7	1.0	1.2	0.1	
Harmonized CPI	2.3	1.8	4.5	0.0	2.3	3.4	2.6	1.2	0.5	0.6	1.8	2.2
Price deflator GDP	2.3	2.0	1.9	0.8	1.9	2.0	2.0	1.0	0.7	1.1	1.6	1.7
Nominal compensation per employee	3.6	3.6	3.7	1.1	1.4	3.1	3.2	2.6	0.9	0.0	0.1	1.9
Real compensation per employee (GDP deflator)	1.2	1.5	1.7	0.3	-0.5	1.1	1.2	1.5	0.2	-1.1	-1.5	0.2
Real compensation per employee (private consumption deflator)	1.2	1.7	-0.8	1.1	-0.9	-0.2	0.5	1.3	0.4	-0.6	-1.6	-0.3
Nominal unit labour costs	2.2	1.7	4.7	3.2	-0.7	2.7	3.4	2.0	0.1	-0.5	-0.1	1.6
Real unit labour costs	-0.1	-0.3	2.8	2.4	-2.5	0.7	1.3	1.0	-0.7	-1.6	-1.7	0.0
Labour Market Indicators - Total												
Total population (000)	10511	10585	10667	10753	10840	11001 b	11076 b	11138	11181	11237	11311	11352
Population aged 15-64 (000)	6906	6977	7047	7101	7148	7250	7270	7287	7286	7296	7327	7329
Total employment (000)	4264	4380	4446	4421	4489	4509 b	4524	4530	4544	4552	4587	4638 b
Employment aged 15-64 (000)	4233	4348	4414	4389	4451	4471 b	4479	4485	4497	4499	4541	4587 b
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	66.5	67.7	68.0	67.1	67.6	67.3	67.2	67.2	67.3	67.2	67.7	68.5 b
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)	61.0	62.0	62.4	61.6	62.0	61.9	61.8	61.8	61.9	61.8	62.3	63.1 b
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)	27.6	27.5	27.4	25.3	25.2	26.0	25.3	23.6	23.2	23.4	22.7	22.7 b
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)	78.4	79.7	80.5	79.8	80.0	79.3	79.3	79.0	79.1	78.5	79.1	79.5 b
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)	32.0	34.4	34.5	35.3	37.3	38.7	39.5	41.7	42.7	44.0	45.4	48.3 b
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	60.5	61.8	62.0	61.0	61.4	60.6 b	60.7	61.2	60.8	60.8	61.3	63.4 b
Self-employed (% total employment)	13.5	13.5	13.0	13.5	13.4	13.2 b	13.5	14.2	13.7	14.3	14.0	13.6 b
Part-time employment (% total employment)	22.0	21.9	22.4	23.2	23.7	24.7	24.3	23.7	24.3	24.3	24.7	24.5 b
Temporary employment (% total employment)	5.7	5.7	5.5	5.4	5.6	6.4	5.9	5.9	6.3	6.8	6.9	8.0 b
Employment in Services (% total employment)			73.8 b	75.0	75.2 u	75.5 bu	77.1	76.9 u	77.4	77.4 u	77.5 u	78.1 bu
Employment in Industry (% total employment)			24.7 b	23.6	23.5 u	23.3 bu	21.8	21.8 u	21.5	21.5 u	21.4 u	20.9 bu
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)			1.5 b	1.4	1.3	1.2 b	1.1	1.3	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.1 b
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)	66.5	67.1	67.1	66.9	67.7	66.7	66.9	67.5	67.7	67.6	67.6	68.0 b
Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)	34.7	33.9	33.4	32.4	32.5	32.0	31.5	31.0	30.2	30.0	28.5	28.1 b
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)	84.5	85.3	85.7	85.6	86.3	84.7	85.0	85.3	85.6	85.1	85.1	84.8 b
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)	33.6	35.9	36.1	37.2	39.2	40.3	41.4	44.1	45.1	46.6	48.1	51.3 b
Total unemployment (000)	383	353	333	380	406	347	369	417	423	422	390	354 b
Unemployment rate (% labour force)	8.3	7.5	7.0	7.9	8.3	7.2	7.6	8.4	8.5	8.5	7.8	7.1 b
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)	20.5	18.8	18.0	21.9	22.4	18.7	19.8	23.7	23.2	22.1	20.1	19.3 b
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)	4.2	3.8	3.3	3.5	4.0	3.5	3.4	3.9	4.3	4.4	4.0	3.5 b
Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)	51.1	50.2	47.4	44.2	48.7	48.3	44.6	46.0	49.9	51.7	51.6	49.7 b
Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)	7.1	6.4	6.0	7.1	7.3	6.0 b	6.2	7.3	7.0	6.6	5.7	5.4 b
Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)	49.0	49.8	49.4 b	48.0	48.9	47.7 b	47.6	47.8	47.5 b	46.6	46.4	46.5 b
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)	73.2	74.2	74.7 b	74.0	74.5	74.0 b	73.5	73.6	72.8 b	72.2	73.0	73.3 b
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)	83.6	84.9	84.7 b	84.2	84.0	84.2 b	84.6	84.1	84.7 b	84.6	85.2	85.2 b
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)	62.0	62.9	63.1	62.5	62.8	63.0 b	63.0	62.9	62.9	62.8	63.3	64.1 b
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)	58.6	61.2	62.3	59.6	62.4	62.2 b	62.0	60.6	62.5	63.1	64.4	65.0 b
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)	33.6	38.1	39.9	38.8	38.0	37.4 b	36.2	37.6	38.0	39.9	39.3	39.5 b
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)	62.7	63.5	63.8	63.2	63.6	63.7 b	63.8	63.6	63.8	63.6	64.1	64.7 b
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)	56.2	57.8	60.8	58.7	61.2	62.1 b	61.5	62.1	62.6	63.2	65.2	65.8 b
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)	44.9	45.2	48.1	47.1	46.5	45.8 b	45.4	46.0	45.7	46.2	46.8	50.0 b
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)			0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	3.2 b	3.3	3.1	3.4	3.3	3.4 b
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)	1.9	1.8	1.5	1.6	1.7	1.4 b	1.2	1.2	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.3 b
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.7	2.2 b	2.0	2.1	2.0	1.7	1.6	2.1 b

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Belgium	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017		
Labour Market Indicators - Male	Total population (000)	5144	5181	5224	5269	5312	5402 b	5440 b	5473	5494	5524	5589		
	Population aged 15-64(000)	3473	3508	3543	3570	3592	3650	3659	3667	3665	3669	3689		
	Total employment (000)	2392	2444	2461	2429	2458	2462 b	2466	2451	2435	2434	2466	2496 b	
	Employment aged 15-64 (000)	2371	2421	2439	2406	2433	2435 b	2433	2420	2403	2397	2433	2461 b	
	Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	74.0	75.0	74.7	73.2	73.5	73.0	72.7	72.3	71.6	71.3	72.3	73.4 b	
	Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)	67.9	68.7	68.6	67.2	67.4	67.1	66.9	66.4	65.8	65.5	66.5	67.5 b	
	Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)	30.4	29.9	29.7	27.4	27.3	27.7	27.8	25.3	24.5	25.0	24.0	24.4 b	
	Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)	85.9	87.0	87.0	85.7	85.5	84.9	84.5	84.0	83.2	82.5	83.8	84.4 b	
	Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)	40.9	42.9	42.8	42.9	45.6	46.0	46.0	47.7	48.4	48.9	50.7	53.8 b	
	FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	72.6	73.6	73.2	71.5	71.8	70.9 b	70.9	70.2	70.0	69.2	70.1	72.3 b	
	Self-employed (% total employment)	17.2	17.1	16.6	17.2	17.0	17.0 b	17.2	18.4	17.5	18.3	18.0	17.0 b	
	Part-time employment (% total employment)	7.0	7.1	7.5	8.2	8.4	9.2	9.0	8.7	8.4	9.3	9.5	10.2 b	
	Temporary employment (% total employment)	5.7	5.7	5.5	5.4	5.6	6.4	5.9	5.9	6.3	6.8	6.9	8.0 b	
	Employment in Services (% total employment)			61.7 bu	63.3	63.8 u	63.8 bu	65.6	65.2 u	65.6 u	65.5 u	65.7 u	67.1 bu	
	Employment in Industry (% total employment)			36.4 bu	34.9	34.6 u	34.7 bu	32.9	33.1 u	33.0 u	33.0 u	32.8 u	31.5 bu	
	Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)			1.9 b	1.8	1.7	1.6 b	1.5	1.7	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.5 b	
	Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)	73.4	73.6	73.3	72.8	73.4	72.3	72.5	72.7	72.4	72.2	72.3	72.8 b	
	Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)	37.4	36.1	36.0	34.9	35.2	34.1	35.0	33.7	32.3	32.8	30.7	30.6 b	
	Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)	91.9	92.5	92.3	91.8	92.2	90.7	90.9	90.9	90.7	89.9	90.4	90.0 b	
	Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)	42.7	44.4	44.4	45.2	47.6	47.8	47.9	50.5	51.3	52.2	53.6	56.9 b	
	Total unemployment (000)	191	174	170	204	217	188	204	232	241	243	216	191 b	
	Unemployment rate (% labour force)	7.4	6.7	6.5	7.8	8.1	7.1	7.7	8.7	9.0	9.1	8.1	7.1 b	
	Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)	18.8	17.1	17.3	21.5	22.4	18.7	20.4	24.7	24.0	23.8	21.7	20.2 b	
	Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)	3.7	3.3	3.0	3.4	4.0	3.4	3.5	4.0	4.7	4.8	4.2	3.7 b	
	Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)	49.8	49.3	47.0	43.5	49.5	47.1	46.0	46.5	51.8	52.5	52.2	52.0 b	
	Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)	7.0	6.2	6.2	7.5	7.9	6.4 b	7.1	8.3	7.7	7.8	6.7	6.2 b	
	Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)	61.2	61.9	60.6 b	58.7	59.2	57.9 b	57.5	56.9	56.1 b	54.4	54.6	55.2 b	
	Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)	81.2	82.0	81.9 b	80.5	81.6	80.7 b	79.8	79.4	78.1 b	77.6	79.5	79.8 b	
	Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)	87.2	88.2	88.2 b	87.2	86.7	86.9 b	87.2	87.2	87.2 b	86.8	87.5	88.3 b	
	Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)	68.7	69.2	68.9	67.7	68.0	67.8 b	67.8	67.3	66.5	66.0	67.1	68.0 b	
	Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)	67.0	69.4	70.4	67.3	68.5	68.3 b	67.1	65.5	67.3	69.0	68.4	70.0 b	
	Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)	45.7	52.4	54.1	51.3	50.0	49.3 b	45.3	47.1	48.4	49.0	49.9	53.0 b	
	Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)	69.0	69.7	69.2	68.1	68.5	68.2 b	68.2	67.5	66.9	66.5	67.4	68.0 b	
	Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)	65.8	65.5	69.5	66.8	67.6	68.1 b	67.4	67.5	67.6	68.8	70.3	72.1 b	
	Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)	56.5	57.2	60.1	57.1	56.5	56.7 b	55.2	55.5	55.0	54.8	56.6	61.1 b	
	Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)			0.4	0.5	0.5	0.6	1.6 b	1.6	1.6	1.8	1.7	2.0 b	
	Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)	1.4	1.4	1.1	1.2	1.4	0.9 b	0.9	0.9	0.8	0.9	0.9	1.0 b	
	Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.7	0.6	2.0 b	1.9	2.0	1.8	1.6	1.6	2.0 b	
	Labour Market Indicators - Female	Total population (000)	5368	5403	5443	5484	5528	5599 b	5636 b	5665	5687	5713	5742	5762
		Population aged 15-64(000)	3433	3468	3503	3532	3556	3600	3611	3620	3622	3627	3637	3640
		Total employment (000)	1872	1937	1985	1991	2031	2047 b	2058	2080	2108	2118	2121	2142 b
		Employment aged 15-64 (000)	1862	1927	1975	1984	2018	2036 b	2046	2065	2095	2102	2108	2126 b
		Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	58.8	60.3	61.3	61.0	61.6	61.5	61.7	62.1	62.9	63.0	63.0	63.6 b
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)		54.0	55.3	56.2	56.0	56.5	56.7	56.8	57.2	57.9	58.0	58.1	58.7 b	
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)		24.7	25.0	25.0	23.2	23.1	24.2	22.6	21.9	21.8	21.7	21.4	20.9 b	
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)		70.7	72.3	73.8	73.8	74.4	73.8	73.9	74.0	74.9	74.5	74.3	74.6 b	
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)		23.2	26.0	26.3	27.7	29.2	31.6	33.1	35.8	37.0	39.3	40.2	42.8 b	
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)		49.2	50.6	51.5	51.1	51.7	51.2 b	51.5	52.1	53.3	53.4	53.3	55.4 b	
Self-employed (% total employment)		8.9	9.1	8.6	9.1	9.0	8.6 b	9.1	9.2	9.4	9.7	9.4	9.6 b	
Part-time employment (% total employment)		41.0	40.5	40.8	41.4	42.1	43.3	43.5	42.5	41.2	41.4	42.1	41.2 b	
Temporary employment (% total employment)		9.6	9.6	9.2	9.0	8.6	9.2	8.3	8.2	8.7	8.6	9.0	10.0 b	
Employment in Services (% total employment)														
Employment in Industry (% total employment)														
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)				1.0 b	1.0	0.9	0.8 b	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.7 b	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)		59.5	60.4	60.8	60.9	61.8	61.1	61.3	62.3	63.0	63.0	62.9	63.2 b	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)		31.9	31.6	30.8	29.9	29.8	29.8	27.9	28.2	28.1	27.1	26.2	25.4 b	
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)		77.0	78.0	79.0	79.2	80.4	78.7	79.1	79.7	80.6	80.2	79.8	79.6 b	
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)		24.6	27.5	27.9	29.3	30.9	33.0	34.9	37.8	39.0	41.2	42.8	45.8 b	
Total unemployment (000)		192	179	163	176	189	158	165	185	182	178	173	163 b	
Unemployment rate (% labour force)		9.3	8.5	7.6	8.1	8.5	7.2	7.4	8.2	7.9	7.8	7.6	7.1 b	
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)		22.6	20.9	18.7	22.5	22.4	18.7	18.9	22.5	22.3	20.0	18.2	18.0 b	
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)		4.9	4.3	3.6	3.6	4.1	3.6	3.2	3.7	3.8	3.9	3.8	3.3 b	
Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)		52.4	51.2	47.9	44.9	47.6	49.7	42.9	45.4	47.3	50.6	50.8	47.0 b	
Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)		7.2	6.6	5.8	6.7	6.7	5.6 b	5.3	6.3	6.3	5.4	4.7	4.6 b	
Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)		36.6	37.7	38.1 b	37.0	38.2	37.0 b	36.9	37.9	38.1 b	38.1	37.5	37.2 b	
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)		64.5	65.4	66.8 b	66.8	66.7	66.7 b	66.5	67.1	66.9 b	66.0	65.5	65.9 b	
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)		80.2	81.9	81.5 b	81.6	81.6	81.8 b	82.3	81.5	82.6 b	82.7	83.2	82.6 b	
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)		55.3	56.6	57.3	57.3	57.7	58.1 b	58.1	58.6	59.4	59.5	59.4	60.1 b	
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)		49.5	52.0	53.5	51.2	55.8	55.9 b	56.8	55.3	57.5	57.1	60.0	59.9 b	
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)		22.0	24.8	26.0	26.4	26.7	25.6 b	27.1	27.8	28.1	31.4	29.5	27.0 b	
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)		56.2	57.2	58.2	58.2	58.7	59.1 b	59.4	59.7	60.5	60.7	60.7	61.4 b	
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)		47.3	50.7	52.8	50.9	55.2	56.8 b	56.5	56.9	57.9	58.2	60.4	60.0 b	
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)		33.7	34.2	36.6	37.4	36.9	35.2 b	35.9	37.0	36.8	38.0	37.5	39.1 b	
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)				1.2	1.1	1.1	1.0	5.2 b	5.3	4.8	5.2	5.1	5.1 b	
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)		2.6	2.4	2.0	2.2	2.1	2.0 b	1.6	1.4	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.7 b	
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)		1.1	1.0	1.0	0.9	0.9	2.5 b	2.2	2.3	2.3	1.9	1.6	2.3 b	

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Belgium		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017			
Social Indicators	All	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of total population)	21.5	21.6	20.8	20.2	20.8	21.0	21.6	20.8	21.2	21.1	20.7			
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of total population)	14.7	15.2	14.7	14.6	14.6	15.3	15.3	15.1	15.5	14.9	15.5			
		At-risk-of-poverty threshold (PPS single person)	9707	9787	10046	10501	10399	10895	11038	11738	11755	11953	12492			
		Poverty gap (%)	19.4	17.8	17.2	18.1	18.0	18.6	18.7	19.2	18.8	17.4	19.4			
		Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of total population)		7.8	9.0	9.2	9.3	8.0	9.9	8.7	9.5	9.8	10.0			
		At-risk-of-poverty before social transfers excl. pensions (% of total population)	26.8	27.5	27.0	26.7	26.7	27.8	27.7	26.3	27.5	26.7	26.3			
		Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (%)	45.2	44.7	45.6	45.3	45.3	45.0	44.8	42.6	43.6	44.2	41.1			
		Severe Material Deprivation (% of total population)	6.4	5.7	5.6	5.2	5.9	5.7	6.3	5.1	5.9	5.8	5.5	5.2 p		
		Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of people aged 0-59)	14.3	13.8	11.7	12.3	12.7	13.8	13.9	14.0	14.6	14.9	14.6			
		Real Gross Household Disposable income (growth %)	2.3	2.1	2.4	2.1	-1.0	-1.0	-0.1	0.3	0.5	0.3	0.9			
		Income quintile share ratio S80/S20	4.2	3.9	4.1	3.9	3.9	3.9	4.0	3.8	3.8	3.8	3.8			
		GINI coefficient	27.8	26.3	27.5	26.4	26.6	26.3	26.5	25.9	25.9	26.2	26.3			
		Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18-24)	12.6 b	12.1	12.0 b	11.1	11.9	12.3	12.0	11.0	9.8 b	10.1	8.8	8.9 b		
NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of total population aged 15-24)	11.2 b	11.2	10.1	11.1	10.9	11.8 b	12.3	12.7	12.0	12.2	9.9	9.3 b				
Social Indicators	Male	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of male population)	20.0	19.9	19.1	18.5	20.0	20.4	20.9	20.4	20.9	20.0	19.4			
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of male population)	13.7	14.4	13.6	13.4	13.9	14.6	14.7	14.6	15.0	14.1	14.4			
		Poverty gap (%)	20.7	19.2	18.2	18.9	18.0	19.9	18.9	20.1	19.6	17.8	19.5			
		Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of male population)		7.3	8.3	7.8	8.5	8.2	9.5	9.1	9.6	9.9	9.0			
		Severe Material Deprivation (% of male population)	6.2	5.2	5.2	4.9	5.7	5.9	6.3	5.5	6.2	5.5	5.3	4.9 p		
		Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of males aged 0-59)	12.8	12.6	10.3	11.1	11.9	13.2	13.4	14.0	14.2	14.1	13.1			
		Life expectancy at birth (years)	76.6	77.1	76.9	77.3	77.5	78.0	77.8	78.1	78.8	78.7	79.0			
		Healthy life years at birth (years) - men	63.0	63.5	63.4	63.9	64.0	63.4	64.2	64.0	64.5	64.4	63.7			
		Early leavers from education and training (% of males aged 18-24)	15.1 b	13.9	13.4 b	12.8	13.8	14.9	14.4	13.2	11.8 b	11.6	10.2	10.4 b		
		NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of males aged 15-24)	10.2 b	10.2	9.2	10.5	10.8	11.6 b	12.5	13.2	12.6	12.5	10.1	10.0 b		
		Social Indicators	Female	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of female population)	23.1	23.1	22.4	21.8	21.7	21.5	22.3	21.2	21.5	22.2	22.0	
				At-risk-of-poverty (% of female population)	15.6	15.9	15.9	15.7	15.2	16.0	15.9	15.5	15.9	15.6	16.5	
				Poverty gap (%)	18.5	16.9	16.6	17.7	18.0	17.4	18.5	18.5	18.1	17.2	19.4	
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of female population)				8.3	9.7	10.4	10.0	7.8	10.3	8.4	9.4	9.7	11.0			
Severe Material Deprivation (% of female population)	6.7			6.2	6.0	5.5	6.0	5.4	6.3	4.7	5.6	6.1	5.7	5.4 p		
Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of females aged 0-59)	15.9			15.0	13.2	13.6	13.5	14.4	14.3	14.0	14.9	15.8	16.2			
Life expectancy at birth (years)	82.3			82.6	82.6	82.8	83.0	83.3	83.1	83.2	83.9	83.4	84.0			
Healthy life years at birth (years) - women	63.2			63.9	64.1	63.7	62.6	63.6	63.0	63.7	63.7	64.0	63.8			
Early leavers from education and training (% of females aged 18-24)	10.0 b			10.3	10.6 b	9.3	10.0	9.7	9.5	8.7	7.7 b	8.6	7.4	7.3 b		
NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of females aged 15-24)	12.3 b			12.2	11.1	11.7	10.9	12.0 b	12.2	12.1	11.5	11.8	9.7	8.7 b		
Social Indicators	Children (0-17)			At-Risk-of-poverty or exclusion of children (% of people aged 0-17)	21.4	21.6	21.3	20.5	23.2	23.3	22.8	21.9	23.2	23.3	21.6	
				At-risk-of-poverty (% of Children population)	15.3	16.9	17.2	16.6	18.3	18.7	17.3	17.2	18.8	18.0	17.8	
				Severe Material Deprivation (% of Children population)	9.4	7.0	7.3	6.5	7.7	8.2	8.3	5.5	6.8	7.9	6.9	6.6 p
		Share of children living in low work intensity households (% of Children population)	13.1	12.2	8.9	11.0	12.0	14.0	13.0	12.2	13.0	13.8	13.0			
		Risk of poverty of children in households at work (Working Intensity > 0.2)	6.7	9.2	11.1	8.8	10.3	8.5	8.6	9.2	10.1	9.1	8.2			
		Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (0-17) (%)	47.2	46.2	45.6	48.6	42.5	44.7	46.6	46.6	43.9	45.1	44.2			
Social Indicators	Working age (18-64)	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of Working age population)	20.7	20.7	20.1	19.3	20.0	20.0	21.3	20.8	21.6	21.7	21.7			
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of Working age population)	12.2	12.6	12.2	12.1	12.1	12.9	13.5	13.4	14.2	13.7	14.7			
		Severe Material Deprivation (% of Working age population)	6.2	5.9	5.7	5.3	6.0	5.6	6.6	5.8	6.5	6.1	6.1	5.6 p		
		Very low work intensity (18-59)	14.8	14.4	12.8	12.8	12.9	13.7	14.2	14.7	15.1	15.3	15.2			
		In-work at-risk-of poverty rate (% of persons employed 18-64)	4.0	4.3	4.7	4.5	4.4	4.1	4.5	4.4	4.8	4.5	4.7			
		Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (18-64) (%)	53.1	52.3	53.1	51.8	52.9	51.1	50.6	47.7	48.0	49.1	45.2			
Social Indicators	Elderly (65+)	At-Risk-of-poverty or exclusion of elderly (% of people aged 65+)	25.2	25.0	22.9	23.1	21.0	21.6	21.2	19.5	17.3	16.2	16.4			
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of Elderly population)	23.2	23.0	21.2	21.6	19.4	20.2	19.4	18.4	16.1	15.2	15.4			
		Severe Material Deprivation (% of Elderly population)	3.3	3.6	3.2	3.1	2.8	2.6	2.8	2.0	2.4	2.1	2.1	2.2 p		
		Relative median income of elderly (ratio with median income of people younger than 65)	0.71	0.74	0.74	0.74	0.75	0.74	0.74	0.76	0.77	0.79	0.76			
		Aggregate replacement ratio (ratio)	0.42	0.44	0.45	0.45	0.46	0.44	0.46	0.47	0.47	0.47	0.48			
Expenditure in social protection indicators (% of GDP)		Sickness/Health care	7.0	7.1	7.5	8.1	8.0	8.1	8.2	8.3	8.4	8.5				
		Disability	1.7	1.7	1.8	1.9	2.0	2.0	2.1	2.2	2.3	2.4				
		Old age and survivors	10.4	10.1	10.7	11.5	11.1	11.4	11.5	11.8	11.8	12.1				
		Family/Children	2.0	2.1	2.1	2.3	2.2	2.2	2.1	2.2	2.2	2.1				
		Unemployment	3.3	3.1	3.2	3.7	3.7	3.6	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.1				
		Housing and Social exclusion n.e.c.	0.9	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.9	0.9				
		Total (including Admin and Other expenditures)	26.6	26.2	27.7	30.0	29.4	29.7	29.6	30.1	30.2	30.3				
		of which: Means tested benefits	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.4	1.4				

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Bulgaria		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	
Macro Economic Indicators (Annual % growth)	Real GDP	6.9	7.3	6.0	-3.6	1.3	1.9	0.0	0.9	1.3	3.6	3.9	3.6 p	
	Total employment	3.3	3.2	2.4	-1.7	-3.9	-2.2	-2.5 p	-0.4 p	0.4 p	0.4 p	0.5 p	1.8 p	
	Labour productivity	3.4	4.0	3.6	-1.9	5.4	4.2	2.6 p	1.3 p	1.0 p	3.3 p	3.4 p	1.7 p	
	Annual average hours worked per person employed	-0.3	0.0	2.4	-2.8	-0.1	-0.1	0.1 p	0.0 p	-0.1 p	0.0 p	-0.1 p	0.0 p	
	Real productivity per hour worked	3.7	4.0	1.2	0.9	5.5	4.3	2.5 p	1.3 p	1.0 p	3.2 p	3.5 p	1.8 p	
	Harmonized CPI	7.4	7.6	12.0	2.5	3.0	3.4	2.4	0.4	-1.6	-1.1	-1.3	1.2	
	Price deflator GDP	6.7	11.1	8.1	4.0	1.1	6.0	1.6	-0.7	0.5	2.2	2.2	1.2 p	
	Nominal compensation per employee	6.3	12.7	16.8	8.1	9.9	6.8	7.7 p	8.8 p	5.6 p	5.6 p	5.8 p	7.5 p	
	Real compensation per employee (GDP deflator)	-0.4	1.5	8.0	3.9	8.7	0.8	6.1 p	9.6 p	5.1 p	3.4 p	3.5 p	6.3 p	
	Real compensation per employee (private consumption deflator)	-1.0	4.8	4.3	5.5	6.7	3.3	5.2 p	8.4 p	7.3 p	6.8 p	7.2 p	6.3 p	
	Nominal unit labour costs	2.8	8.3	12.8	10.2	4.3	2.5	5.0 p	7.4 p	4.6 p	2.3 p	2.3 p	5.7 p	
	Real unit labour costs	-3.6	-2.5	4.2	5.9	3.1	-3.3	3.4 p	8.2 p	4.1 p	0.1 p	0.0 p	4.5 p	
	Labour Market Indicators - Total	Total population (000)	7629	7573	7518	7467	7422	7369	7327	7285	7246	7202	7154	7102
		Population aged 15-64 (000)	5270	5235	5194	5147	5097	5034	4966	4899	4832	4764	4694	4629
		Total employment (000)	3110	3253	3361 b	3254	3075 b	2965 b	2934	2935	2981	3032	3017	3150
		Employment aged 15-64 (000)	3072	3209	3306 b	3205	3037 b	2928 b	2895	2889	2927	2974	2954	3073
		Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	65.1	68.4	70.7	68.8	64.7 b	62.9 b	63.0	63.5	65.1	67.1	67.7	71.3
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)		58.6	61.7	64.0	62.6	59.8 b	58.4 b	58.8	59.5	61.0	62.9	63.4	66.9	
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)		23.2	24.5	26.3	24.8	24.3 b	22.1 b	21.9	21.2	20.7	20.3	19.8	22.9	
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)		75.7	79.4	81.3	79.2	75.1 b	73.3 b	73.1	73.3	74.5	76.1	76.2	79.4	
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)		39.6	42.6	46.0	46.1	44.9 b	44.6 b	45.7	47.4	50.0	53.0	54.5	58.2	
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)		64.7	68.1	70.3 b	68.4	64.1 b	62.4 b	62.4	62.9	64.4	66.5	67.1	70.7	
Self-employed (% total employment)		11.9	11.3	11.4 b	11.5	11.5 b	11.1 b	10.8	11.5	11.8	11.4	11.1	11.1	
Part-time employment (% total employment)		1.7	1.4	2.0	2.1	2.2 b	2.2 b	2.2	2.5	2.5	2.2	2.0	2.2	
Temporary employment (% total employment)		4.9	4.0	4.7	4.4	4.2 b	3.8 b	4.2	5.2	4.8	4.0	3.9	4.2	
Employment in Services (% total employment)				56.2 b	57.6	60.2 b	61.8 b	62.2	63.1	62.8	63.2	63.3	63.0	
Employment in Industry (% total employment)				36.8 b	35.5	33.1 b	31.6 b	31.5	30.4	30.3	30.1	30.0	30.1	
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)				7.0 b	6.9	6.7 b	6.6 b	6.3	6.5	6.9	6.7	6.7	6.8	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)		64.5	66.3	67.8	67.2	66.7 b	65.9 b	67.1	68.4	69.0	69.3	68.7	71.3	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)		28.9	28.9	30.1	29.5	31.2 b	29.5 b	30.4	29.6	27.2	26.0	23.9	26.3	
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)		82.3	84.5	85.5	84.3	82.9 b	81.9 b	82.3	83.1	83.3	83.2	82.0	84.3	
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)		43.0	45.7	48.7	49.2	49.3 b	48.9 b	51.1	54.1	56.6	58.0	58.8	61.8	
Total unemployment (000)		309	242	202	240	352 d	376	410	436	385	305	247	207	
Unemployment rate (% labour force)		9.0	6.9	5.6	6.8	10.3 d	11.3	12.3	13.0	11.4	9.2	7.6	6.2	
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)		18.3	14.1	11.9	15.1	21.9 d	25.0	28.1	28.4	23.8	21.6	17.2	12.9	
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)		5.0	4.1	2.9	3.0	4.7 b	6.3 b	6.8	7.4	6.9	5.6	4.5	3.4	
Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)		55.7	58.8	51.7	43.3	46.1 b	55.7 b	55.2	57.3	60.4	61.2	59.1	55.0	
Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)		5.6	4.4	3.8 b	4.8	6.8 b	7.4 b	8.5	8.4	6.5	5.6	4.1	3.4	
Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)		41.4 b	44.5	47.6 b	46.4	41.0 b	38.0 b	37.4	38.1	40.0 b	40.3	40.3	45.4	
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)		73.0 b	75.7	77.8 b	75.4	70.7 b	69.3 b	69.1	69.3	71.1 b	73.0	73.5	77.0	
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)		82.7 b	85.1	86.4 b	85.8	83.2 b	81.8 b	81.8	81.4	82.7 b	84.9	85.1	86.2	
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)		58.7	61.7	64.0 b	62.6	59.8 b	58.5 b	58.8	59.5	61.1	62.9	63.4	66.9	
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)														
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)		54.2 u	60.6 u		42.7 u	42.5 bu			47.5 u	55.4 u		50.8 u	50.9 u	
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)		58.6	61.7	64.0 b	62.6	59.8 b	58.5 b	58.8	59.5	61.1	62.9	63.4	66.9	
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)														
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)		61.4	61.0 u	55.2 bu	51.7 u	46.6 bu	49.7 bu	54.7 u	57.9	60.3	56.7 u	61.9	61.8	
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)				0.6 b	0.6	0.8 b	0.8 b	0.8	1.0	1.0	0.8	0.7	0.8	
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)		0.6	0.5	0.7 b	0.6	0.7 b	0.8 b	0.8	0.9	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.6	
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)		10.4	8.0	5.8 b	6.8	8.2 b	8.5 b	8.1	7.5	6.9	6.4	6.3	4.6	

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Bulgaria		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	
Labour Market Indicators - Male	Total population (000)	3715	3687	3660	3636	3614	3589	3567	3545	3525	3502	3477	3450	
	Population aged 15-64(000)	2636	2622	2604	2584	2562	2534	2501	2470	2439	2406	2373	2342	
	Total employment (000)	1653	1732	1793 b	1732	1640 b	1567 b	1542	1547	1577	1608	1608	1683	
	Employment aged 15-64 (000)	1626	1701	1756 b	1699	1614 b	1541 b	1517	1518	1543	1572	1569	1639	
	Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	69.9	73.4	76.1	73.8	68.6 b	66.0 b	65.8	66.4	68.1	70.4	71.3	75.3	
	Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)	62.8	66.0	68.5	66.9	63.3 b	61.2 b	61.3	62.1	63.9	65.9	66.7	70.6	
	Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)	25.4	27.1	29.3	28.0	27.3 b	25.1 b	24.9	24.0	24.0	24.0	23.1	26.5	
	Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)	78.6	82.5	84.7	82.7	77.6 b	74.7 b	74.3	75.0	76.4	78.5	79.2	82.8	
	Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)	49.5	51.8	55.8	54.1	51.3 b	50.5 b	50.8	51.9	54.5	56.8	58.3	62.5	
	FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	69.7	73.2	75.9 b	73.4	68.1 b	65.5 b	65.2	65.9	67.5	69.9	70.7	74.7	
	Self-employed (% total employment)	15.1	14.3	14.1 b	14.2	14.1 b	13.7 b	13.5	14.5	14.9	14.5	13.8	13.9	
	Part-time employment (% total employment)	1.2	1.1	1.6	1.8	2.0 b	2.0 b	2.0	2.0	2.2	1.9	1.8	2.0	
	Temporary employment (% total employment)	4.9	4.0	4.7	4.4	4.2 b	3.8 b	4.2	5.2	4.8	4.0	3.9	4.2	
	Employment in Services (% total employment)			47.8 b	48.7	50.9 b	53.2 b	54.6	55.3	54.5	54.6	54.6	54.5	
	Employment in Industry (% total employment)			43.7 b	43.0	41.0 b	38.4 b	37.2	36.2	36.5	36.5	36.6	36.6	
	Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)			8.4 b	8.3	8.1 b	8.4 b	8.2	8.5	9.0	9.0	8.8	9.0	
	Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)	68.8	70.6	72.5	72.0	71.1 b	69.9 b	71.0	72.2	72.9	73.2	72.7	75.4	
	Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)	31.3	31.7	34.0	34.0	35.5 b	33.9 b	35.3	34.3	31.5	30.5	28.0	30.5	
	Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)	85.1	87.5	88.8	88.0	86.1 b	84.5 b	84.8	85.7	86.2	86.4	85.7	88.0	
	Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)	53.6	55.3	58.7	57.4	56.6 b	55.8 b	57.3	59.9	62.5	62.7	63.4	66.8	
	Total unemployment (000)	159	123	105	132	200 d	219	241	250	221	174	142	114	
	Unemployment rate (% labour force)	8.6	6.5	5.5	6.9	10.9 d	12.3	13.5	13.9	12.3	9.8	8.1	6.4	
	Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)	17.7	13.5	12.8	16.7	23.2 d	26.0	29.5	30.2	23.8	21.2	17.4	13.3	
	Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)	4.8	3.7	2.7	2.8	5.0 b	7.0 b	7.7	8.1	7.7	6.1	4.8	3.6	
	Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)	55.0	56.6	50.0	40.7	46.0 b	56.9 b	56.7	58.3	62.4	62.4	59.2	56.5	
	Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)	5.9	4.6	4.7 b	6.0	8.2 b	8.8 b	10.4	10.4	7.5	6.5	4.9	4.0	
	Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)	49.2 b	52.2	56.9 b	54.9	47.5 b	43.7 b	42.7	43.4	45.4 b	46.6	47.7	53.8	
	Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)	77.8 b	80.9	82.7 b	80.1	75.3 b	72.7 b	72.1	72.5	74.7 b	76.8	77.6	81.2	
	Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)	86.5 b	88.6	90.2 b	89.9	85.7 b	83.7 b	83.6	84.1	85.6 b	87.6	87.5	88.6	
	Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)	62.8	66.0	68.5 b	66.9	63.4 b	61.2 b	61.3	62.1	63.9	65.9	66.7	70.6	
	Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)													
	Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)													
	Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)	62.8	66.0	68.5 b	66.9	63.4 b	61.2 b	61.3	62.1	63.8	65.9	66.7	70.6	
	Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)													
	Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)	67.7 u	58.8 u						62.4 u	71.0 u		74.3 u	72.4 u	
	Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)			0.5 b	0.6	0.8 b	0.7 b	0.7	0.7	0.9	0.7	0.7	0.9	
	Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)	0.6	0.5	0.6 b	0.6	0.7 b	0.8 b	0.7	0.8	0.6	0.7	0.5	0.6	
	Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)	10.0	7.6	5.4 b	6.5	8.3 b	8.8 b	8.1	7.8	7.2	6.6	6.4	4.5	
	Labour Market Indicators - Female	Total population (000)	3915	3886	3858	3831	3808	3781	3760	3739	3721	3700	3677	3652
		Population aged 15-64(000)	2634	2614	2589	2563	2535	2500	2465	2429	2393	2358	2321	2287
		Total employment (000)	1457	1521	1568 b	1521	1435 b	1398 b	1392	1388	1404	1424	1409	1468
		Employment aged 15-64 (000)	1446	1508	1551 b	1506	1423 b	1386 b	1378	1372	1384	1402	1385	1435
		Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	60.4	63.5	65.4	64.0	60.8 b	59.8 b	60.2	60.7	62.0	63.8	64.0	67.3
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)		54.6	57.6	59.5	58.3	56.2 b	55.6 b	56.3	56.8	58.2	59.8	60.0	63.1	
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)		21.0	21.8	23.1	21.4	21.2 b	19.0 b	18.7	18.4	17.3	16.5	16.3	19.1	
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)		72.8	76.2	77.9	75.8	72.5 b	71.9 b	71.8	71.5	72.5	73.6	73.0	75.8	
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)		31.1	34.5	37.7	39.2	39.2 b	39.4 b	41.3	43.4	46.0	49.5	51.0	54.3	
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)		59.9	63.1	64.9 b	63.5	60.2 b	59.2 b	59.5	59.9	61.3	63.1	63.4	66.6	
Self-employed (% total employment)		8.2	7.8	8.3 b	8.3	8.6 b	8.1 b	7.7	8.1	8.3	7.9	8.1	8.0	
Part-time employment (% total employment)		2.2	1.9	2.4	2.5	2.5 b	2.4 b	2.5	3.0	2.8	2.5	2.2	2.4	
Temporary employment (% total employment)		5.2	4.8	3.9	3.7	3.5 b	3.3 b	3.6	4.6	4.4	3.7	3.3	3.6	
Employment in Services (% total employment)				65.6 bu	67.8 u	70.7 bu	71.3 bu	70.6 u	71.7 u	72.1 u	72.9 u	73.3 u	72.8 u	
Employment in Industry (% total employment)				28.9 bu	27.0 u	24.2 bu	24.0 bu	25.3 u	24.0 u	23.4 u	22.9 u	22.6 u	22.8 u	
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)				5.5 b	5.2	5.1 b	4.7 b	4.2	4.3	4.5	4.2	4.2	4.4	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)		60.2	62.1	63.1	62.5	62.2 b	61.9 b	63.2	64.5	65.0	65.4	64.6	67.1	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)		26.4	26.0	26.1	24.8	26.6 b	24.8 b	25.3	24.7	22.7	21.2	19.6	21.8	
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)		79.4	81.4	82.1	80.6	79.6 b	79.3 b	79.8	80.3	80.2	79.8	78.2	80.5	
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)		33.9	37.2	40.2	42.1	42.9 b	42.8 b	45.5	49.0	51.4	53.8	54.6	57.3	
Total unemployment (000)		150	120	96	108	153 d	157	169	187	165	131	106	93	
Unemployment rate (% labour force)		9.4	7.4	5.8	6.7	9.6 d	10.1	10.8	11.8	10.4	8.4	7.0	6.0	
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)		18.9	14.8	10.5	12.8	20.1 d	23.6	26.0	25.7	23.7	22.3	16.9	12.4	
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)		5.3	4.5	3.1	3.1	4.4 b	5.5 b	5.8	6.6	6.0	5.0	4.1	3.2	
Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)		56.4	61.0	53.5	46.4	46.2 b	54.1 b	53.0	55.9	57.6	59.6	58.9	53.1	
Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)		5.3	4.1	3.0 b	3.4	5.3 b	5.9 b	6.6	6.3	5.4	4.7	3.3	2.7	
Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)		33.8 b	37.0	38.6 b	38.0	34.5 b	32.2 b	32.0	32.6	34.1 b	33.5	32.2	36.4	
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)		67.5 b	69.9	72.2 b	70.0	65.3 b	65.1 b	65.5	65.4	66.8 b	68.4	68.4	71.7	
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)		80.3 b	82.9	84.0 b	83.2	81.6 b	80.7 b	80.6	79.7	80.8 b	83.2	83.5	84.6	
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)		54.6	57.5	59.5 b	58.4	56.3 b	55.6 b	56.3	56.8	58.2	59.9	60.1	63.1	
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)														
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)														
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)		54.6	57.5	59.5 b	58.4	56.3 b	55.6 b	56.3	56.8	58.2	59.9	60.1	63.1	
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)														
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)		56.9 u	63.0 u	55.7 bu	53.3 u	46.7 bu	47.9 bu	51.1 u	54.9 u	53.8 u	52.7 u	52.4 u	55.6 u	
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)				0.7 b	0.7	0.8 b	0.9 b	0.9	1.2	1.1	0.9	0.8	0.7	
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)		0.7	0.5 u	0.8 b	0.6	0.7 b	0.9 b	0.8	1.0	0.9	0.7	0.7	0.6	
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)		10.9	8.4	6.3 b	7.1	8.1 b	8.2 b	8.0	7.2	6.6	6.3	6.1	4.8	

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Bulgaria		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	
All	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of total population)	61.3	60.7	44.8 b	46.2	49.2	49.1	49.3	48.0	40.1 b	41.3	40.4 b	38.9	
	At-risk-of-poverty (% of total population)	18.4	22.0	21.4	21.8	20.7	22.2	21.2	21.0	21.8	22.0	22.9 b	23.4	
	At-risk-of-poverty threshold (PPS single person)	1920 b	1979	2859	3436	3531	3499	3418	3540	4052	4129	4029 b	4500	
	Poverty gap (%)	28.1	33.5	27.0	27.4	29.6	29.4	31.4	30.9	33.2	30.3	30.4 b	30.5	
	Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of total population)				10.7	16.4	16.9	12.9	13.4	16.5	16.2	15.3 b	15.9	
	At-risk-of-poverty before social transfers excl. pensions (% of total population)	24.7	25.5	27.1	26.4	27.1	27.4	25.9	26.7	27.3	28.4	27.9 b	29.2	
	Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (%)	25.5	13.7	21.0	17.4	23.6	19.0	18.2	21.4	20.2	22.5	17.9 b	19.9	
	Severe Material Deprivation (% of total population)	57.7	57.6	41.2	41.9	45.7	43.6	44.1	43.0	33.1	34.2	31.9 b	30.0	
	Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of people aged 0-59)	14.7	16.0	8.1 b	6.9	8.0	11.0	12.5	13.0	12.1	11.6	11.9 b	11.1	
	Real Gross Household Disposable income (growth %)	11.4	4.3	14.7	1.5	-0.7	2.9	-3.0	4.8	-0.6	8.1	10.4		
	Income quintile share ratio S80/S20	5.1	7.0	6.5	5.9	5.9	6.5	6.1	6.6	6.8	7.1	7.7 b	8.2	
	GINI coefficient	31.2 b	35.3	35.9	33.4	33.2	35.0	33.6	35.4	35.4	37.0	37.7 b	40.2	
	Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18-24)	17.3 b	14.9	14.8	14.7	12.6 b	11.8	12.5	12.5	12.9 b	13.4	13.8	12.7	
	NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of total population aged 15-24)	22.2 b	19.1	17.4 b	19.5	21.0 b	21.8	21.5	21.6	20.2	19.3	18.2	15.3	
Male	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of male population)	60.5	59.4	43.0 b	44.1	47.3	47.7	47.6	46.5	38.8 b	39.5	38.5 b	37.2	
	At-risk-of-poverty (% of male population)	17.3	20.9	19.8	19.8	19.0	20.8	19.5	19.7	20.9	20.0	21.7 b	21.8	
	Poverty gap (%)	30.8	37.1	26.8	27.3	29.0	31.0	32.6	31.8	34.8	32.9	33.6 b	32.4	
	Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of male population)				9.8	13.7	15.9	11.0	11.8	15.7	13.7	13.3 b	14.5	
	Severe Material Deprivation (% of male population)	57.1	56.6	39.6	40.1	44.2	42.5	42.9	41.6	31.7	33.0	30.4 b	28.8	
	Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of males aged 0-59)	14.5	15.6	7.8 b	7.0	7.8	11.1	12.5	12.9	12.1	11.7	11.7 b	11.4	
	Life expectancy at birth (years)	69.2	69.5	69.8 b	70.1	70.3	70.7	70.9	71.3	71.1	71.2	71.3 b		
	Healthy life years at birth (years) - men	66.2 d	67.1	62.1 b	62.1	63.0	62.1	62.1	62.4	62.0	61.5	64.0 b		
	Early leavers from education and training (% of males aged 18-24)	17.7 b	15.2	14.1	13.7	12.4 b	11.2	12.1	12.3	12.8 b	13.3	13.7	12.0	
	NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of males aged 15-24)	19.9 b	17.7	15.6 b	18.1	20.3 b	21.8	21.6	22.1	19.2	18.6	17.1	13.6	
	Female	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of female population)	62.1	61.9	46.4 b	48.1	50.9	50.5	50.9	49.4	41.3 b	43.0	42.1 b	40.4
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of female population)	19.3	23.0	22.9	23.7	22.3	23.6	22.8	22.2	22.6	23.8	24.1 b	24.9
		Poverty gap (%)	26.6	31.6	27.0	27.5	30.2	29.0	30.5	30.4	31.9	28.5	28.0 b	28.9
		Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of female population)				11.5	18.9	17.8	14.6	15.0	17.3	18.4	17.1 b	17.1
Severe Material Deprivation (% of female population)		58.2	58.6	42.8	43.5	47.2	44.6	45.3	44.4	34.3	35.3	33.4 b	31.1	
Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of females aged 0-59)		15.0	16.4	8.3 b	6.8	8.2	11.0	12.4	13.2	12.1	11.4	12.2 b	10.8	
Life expectancy at birth (years)		76.3	76.6	77.0 b	77.4	77.4	77.8	77.9	78.6	78.0	78.2	78.5 b		
Healthy life years at birth (years) - women		71.9 d	73.9	65.7 b	65.9	67.1	65.9	65.7	66.6	66.1	65.0	67.5 b		
Early leavers from education and training (% of females aged 18-24)		17.0 b	14.7	15.5	15.8	12.9 b	12.6	13.0	12.7	12.9 b	13.4	13.9	13.5	
NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of females aged 15-24)		24.7 b	20.6	19.3 b	20.9	21.8 b	21.9	21.5	21.1	21.4	20.0	19.4	17.2	
Children (0-17)		At-Risk-of-poverty or exclusion of children (% of people aged 0-17)	61.0	60.8	44.2 b	47.3	49.8	51.8	52.3	51.5	45.2 b	43.7	45.6 b	41.6
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of Children population)	25.0	29.9	25.5	24.9	26.7	28.4	28.2	28.4	31.7	25.4	31.9 b	29.2
		Severe Material Deprivation (% of Children population)	57.6	58.3	40.8	43.6	46.5	45.6	46.6	46.3	38.4	37.3	36.1 b	33.1
		Share of children living in low work intensity households (% of Children population)	16.8	18.9	9.5 b	7.6	10.4	14.1	16.8	18.2	15.2	13.9	15.1 b	13.3
	Risk of poverty of children in households at work (Working Intensity > 0.2)	13.4	16.6	18.2	19.3	19.3	19.0	17.0	16.6	22.5	15.3	22.1 b	19.9	
	Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (0-17) (%)	23.1	11.8	18.0	17.3	21.7	19.3	21.5	25.5	18.5	32.1	17.8 b	23.0	
Working age (18-64)	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of Working age population)	58.1	57.9	39.5 b	40.6	45.0	45.2	45.6	44.3	36.4 b	37.4	37.2 b	34.8	
	At-risk-of-poverty (% of Working age population)	16.2	19.4	17.0	16.4	16.0	18.2	17.4	17.1	18.9	18.0	20.0 b	18.9	
	Severe Material Deprivation (% of Working age population)	54.2	54.9	36.2	37.1	42.2	40.3	40.8	39.9	29.5	31.3	29.0 b	27.0	
	Very low work intensity (18-59)	14.1	15.1	7.7 b	6.7	7.3	10.2	11.2	11.6	11.2	10.9	11.0 b	10.5	
	In-work at-risk-of poverty rate (% of persons employed 18-64)	5.5	5.9	7.6	7.5	7.7	8.2	7.4	7.2	9.3	7.8	11.6	10.0	
	Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (18-64) (%)	24.3	14.5	24.1	21.2	28.9	21.9	21.3	24.7	22.2	26.2	21.6 b	24.4	
Elderly (65+)	At-Risk-of-poverty or exclusion of elderly (% of people aged 65+)	73.7	71.1	65.5 b	66.0	63.9	61.1	59.1	57.6	47.8 b	51.8	45.9 b	48.9	
	At-risk-of-poverty (% of Elderly population)	19.9	23.9	33.8	39.3	32.2	31.2	28.2	27.9	22.6	31.7	24.3 b	32.0	
	Severe Material Deprivation (% of Elderly population)	70.7	67.2	61.0	58.4	58.1	53.7	53.2	50.7	40.3	40.9	37.5 b	36.3	
	Relative median income of elderly (ratio with median income of people younger than 65)	0.79 b	0.78	0.66	0.63	0.74	0.72	0.74	0.76	0.82	0.71	0.80 b	0.71	
	Aggregate replacement ratio (ratio)	0.37	0.37	0.34	0.34	0.43	0.41	0.42	0.39	0.44	0.41	0.45 b	0.37	
Expenditure in social protection indicators (% of GDP)	Sickness/Health care	3.5	3.5	4.2	3.6	4.0	4.2	4.2	4.4	5.0	4.6			
	Disability	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.3	1.3	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.3			
	Old age and survivors	7.1	6.7	7.1	8.1	8.5	8.0	8.0	8.6	8.9	8.7			
	Family/Children	1.0	1.1	1.3	1.9	1.9	1.8	1.7	1.8	1.9	1.9			
	Unemployment	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.5			
	Housing and Social exclusion n.e.c.	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3			
	Total (including Admin and Other expenditures)	13.8	13.4	14.7	16.1	17.0	16.5	16.6	17.6	18.5	17.9			
	of which: Means tested benefits	0.8	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.7			

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Czech Republic

Czech Republic		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	
Macro Economic Indicators (Annual % growth)	Real GDP	6.9	5.6	2.7	-4.8	2.3	1.8	-0.8	-0.5	2.7	5.3	2.6	4.4	
	Total employment	1.3	2.1	2.2	-1.8	-1.0	-0.3	0.4	0.3	0.6	1.4	1.3	1.6	
	Labour productivity	5.4	3.4	0.5	-3.1	3.3	2.1	-1.2	-0.8	2.2	3.8	1.3	2.8	
	Annual average hours worked per person employed	-1.0	-0.8	0.3	-0.6	1.2	0.3	-1.6	-0.7	0.8	-1.2	1.3	-0.1	
	Real productivity per hour worked	6.5	4.3	0.2	-2.5	2.2	1.7	0.4	-0.1	1.4	5.0	0.0	2.9	
	Harmonized CPI	2.1	2.9	6.3	0.6	1.2	2.2	3.5	1.4	0.4	0.3	0.6	2.4	
	Price deflator GDP	0.7	3.5	2.1	2.6	-1.4	0.0	1.5	1.4	2.5	1.2	1.2	1.4	
	Nominal compensation per employee	5.9	6.1	4.1	-0.6	3.5	2.7	1.8	-0.3	2.6	3.0	4.6	6.7	
	Real compensation per employee (GDP deflator)	5.2	2.5	2.0	-3.1	5.0	2.7	0.3	-1.7	0.1	1.8	3.3	5.2	
	Real compensation per employee (private consumption deflator)	3.8	3.2	-2.1	-1.1	2.2	0.6	-1.8	-1.6	2.1	2.8	3.9	4.3	
	Nominal unit labour costs	0.5	2.6	3.6	2.6	0.1	0.7	3.0	0.5	0.4	-0.8	3.3	3.8	
	Real unit labour costs	-0.3	-0.9	1.5	0.0	1.6	0.7	1.5	-0.9	-2.0	-2.0	2.0	2.4	
	Labour Market Indicators - Total	Total population (000)	10224	10254	10343	10426	10462	10487	10505	10516	10512	10538	10554	10579
		Population aged 15-64 (000)	7271	7297	7358	7392	7369	7328	7263	7188	7109	7057	6998	6943
Total employment (000)		4828	4922	5003	4934	4885	4873 b	4890	4937	4974	5042	5139	5222	
Employment aged 15-64 (000)		4769	4856	4934	4857	4810	4796 b	4810	4846	4884	4934	5016	5094	
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)		71.2	72.0	72.4	70.9	70.4	70.9 b	71.5	72.5	73.5	74.8	76.7	78.5	
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)		65.3	66.1	66.6	65.4	65.0	65.7 b	66.5	67.7	69.0	70.2	72.0	73.6	
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)		27.7	28.5	28.1	26.5	25.2	24.5 b	25.2	25.6	27.1	28.4	28.6	29.1	
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)		82.5	83.5	83.8	82.5	82.2	82.8 b	82.9	83.5	83.8	84.5	85.7	86.7	
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)		45.2	46.0	47.6	46.8	46.5	47.7 b	49.3	51.6	54.0	55.5	58.5	62.1	
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)		70.2	70.9	71.3	69.8	69.1	69.8 b	70.3	71.0	72.2	73.5	75.3	76.9	
Self-employed (% total employment)		15.5	15.6	15.5	16.2	17.1	17.5 b	17.8	16.9	17.4	16.7	16.6	16.7	
Part-time employment (% total employment)		4.4	4.4	4.3	4.8	5.1	4.7 b	5.0	5.8	5.5	5.3	5.7	6.2	
Temporary employment (% total employment)		5.4	5.2	4.5	4.8	5.3	5.2 b	5.4	6.0	6.6	6.7	6.5	6.2	
Employment in Services (% total employment)				56.1 b	58.1	58.7	58.3 b	58.6	59.2	58.9	58.7	58.6	58.7	
Employment in Industry (% total employment)				40.8 b	38.8	38.3	38.7 b	38.4	37.8	38.3	38.4	38.5	38.5	
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)				3.2 b	3.1	3.1	3.0 b	3.0	3.0	2.8	2.9	2.9	2.8	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)		70.3	69.9	69.7	70.1	70.2	70.5 b	71.6	72.9	73.5	74.0	75.0	75.9	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)		33.5	31.9	31.1	31.8	30.9	29.9 b	31.3	31.5	32.2	32.5	32.0	31.7	
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)		88.2	87.8	87.3	87.7	87.8	88.0 b	88.4	89.1	88.8	88.6	88.9	89.1	
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)		47.7	48.2	49.5	49.6	49.7	50.6 b	52.4	54.8	56.8	58.0	60.8	63.6	
Total unemployment (000)		371	276	230	352	384	351	367	370	324	268	212	155	
Unemployment rate (% labour force)		7.1	5.3	4.4	6.7	7.3	6.7	7.0	7.0	6.1	5.1	4.0	2.9	
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)		17.5	10.7	9.9	16.6	18.3	18.1	19.5	18.9	15.9	12.6	10.5	7.9	
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)		3.9	2.8	2.2	2.0	3.0	2.7 b	3.0	3.0	2.7	2.4	1.7	1.0	
Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)		54.2	52.2	49.2	30.0	40.9	40.6 b	43.4	43.4	43.5	47.3	42.1	35.0	
Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)		5.9	3.4	3.1	5.3	5.7	5.4 b	6.1	6.0	5.1	4.1	3.4	2.5	
Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)		43.9	45.7	46.5	43.9	43.2	42.2 b	40.4	41.8	43.0 b	41.9	45.1	50.5	
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)		75.6	76.1	76.6	75.1	74.5	75.2 b	75.9	76.6	77.6 b	78.9	80.7	82.2	
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)		85.1	85.2	85.1	84.3	83.3	83.1 b	83.6	84.9	84.5 b	84.8	85.6	86.0	
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)		65.2	66.0	66.5	65.3	64.9	65.6 b	66.4	67.6	68.9	70.1	71.8	73.5	
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)		74.9	81.7	76.1	77.3	78.4	75.6 b	74.0	74.4	72.7	75.9	82.8	84.9	
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)		70.7	71.6	72.1	68.2	70.9	70.0 b	72.9	76.0	75.4	73.3	75.6	74.3	
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)		65.4	66.1	66.6	65.4	64.9	65.7 b	66.5	67.7	68.9	70.2	71.9	73.5	
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)		57.5	65.5	64.3	64.2	67.3	65.4 b	63.0	66.0	69.2	68.5	72.6	78.4	
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)		67.9	71.3	71.3	69.4	69.3	71.9 b	73.8	75.2	75.9	74.7	75.9	76.2	
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)				0.3	0.4	0.6	0.5 b	0.5	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.5	0.4	
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)		0.6	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.3 b	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2	
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)		1.2	0.8	0.7	1.0	1.1	1.1 b	1.2	1.3	1.1	0.9	0.8	0.7	

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Czech Republic		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	
Labour Market Indicators - Male	Total population (000)	4990	5011	5065	5117	5136	5147	5158	5164	5162	5177	5186	5201	
	Population aged 15-64(000)	3651	3670	3710	3737	3727	3706	3676	3640	3601	3577	3550	3526	
	Total employment (000)	2742	2806	2863	2824	2798	2778 b	2779	2794	2817	2837	2877	2916	
	Employment aged 15-64 (000)	2704	2764	2820	2777	2753	2733 b	2732	2742	2764	2775	2806	2843	
	Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	80.4	81.5	82.0	80.2	79.6	79.9 b	80.2	81.0	82.2	83.0	84.6	86.3	
	Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)	73.7	74.8	75.4	73.8	73.5	74.0 b	74.6	75.7	77.0	77.9	79.3	80.9	
	Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)	31.5	32.8	32.4	31.1	29.6	29.0 b	29.2	29.9	32.3	33.1	33.8	33.8	
	Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)	90.4	91.7	92.1	90.5	90.5	90.9 b	90.9	91.2	91.5	91.9	92.7	93.7	
	Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)	59.5	59.6	61.9	59.6	58.4	58.9 b	60.3	62.5	64.8	65.5	68.2	71.7	
	FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	80.4	81.4	81.9	79.9	79.4	79.7 b	79.9	80.6	81.7	82.7	84.3	86.0	
	Self-employed (% total employment)	19.9	20.2	19.9	20.5	21.6	21.8 b	21.9	20.7	21.7	20.6	20.0	20.3	
	Part-time employment (% total employment)	1.7	1.7	1.6	2.0	2.2	1.8 b	2.2	2.5	2.5	2.2	2.3	2.4	
	Temporary employment (% total employment)	5.4	5.2	4.5	4.8	5.3	5.2 b	5.4	6.0	6.6	6.7	6.5	6.2	
	Employment in Services (% total employment)			45.0 b	46.4	46.7	46.5 b	46.5	47.2	46.9	46.6	46.7	46.9	
	Employment in Industry (% total employment)			51.2 b	49.8	49.4	49.7 b	49.7	49.1	49.5	49.5	49.5	49.6	
	Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)			3.8 b	3.8	4.0	3.8 b	3.9	3.7	3.6	3.9	3.8	3.6	
	Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)	78.3	78.1	78.1	78.5	78.6	78.7 b	79.5	80.5	81.2	81.4	82.2	82.9	
	Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)	37.7	36.7	35.9	37.3	36.2	35.5 b	36.4	36.8	38.1	37.4	37.5	36.5	
	Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)	94.8	95.0	94.8	95.1	95.5	95.3 b	95.5	95.8	95.6	95.4	95.4	95.7	
	Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)	62.7	62.5	64.2	63.2	62.5	62.6 b	64.0	66.1	67.9	68.3	70.9	73.2	
	Total unemployment (000)	169	124	103	175	191	171	178	176	151	125	101	70	
	Unemployment rate (% labour force)	5.8	4.2	3.5	5.9	6.4	5.8	6.0	5.9	5.1	4.2	3.4	2.3	
	Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)	16.6	10.6	9.8	16.6	18.2	18.2	19.9	18.7	15.0	11.3	10.0	7.4	
	Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)	3.1	2.1	1.7	1.6	2.6	2.4 b	2.6	2.5	2.2	2.0	1.4	0.8	
	Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)	53.1	50.6	49.5	27.8	40.0	40.6 b	43.3	41.8	43.8	47.8	41.5	35.0	
	Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)	6.3	3.9	3.5	6.2	6.6	6.4 b	7.2	6.9	5.7	4.2	3.7	2.7	
	Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)	52.6	56.3	57.4	53.6	53.1	50.7 b	48.6	52.5	53.5 b	52.6	56.6	61.7	
	Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)	84.5	85.2	85.9	84.0	83.3	83.5 b	84.3	84.5	85.6 b	86.3	87.6	89.2	
	Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)	91.1	91.4	92.2	91.0	91.0	91.5 b	91.2	92.7	92.3 b	92.7	93.4	93.9	
	Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)	73.6	74.7	75.3	73.7	73.3	73.9 b	74.4	75.5	76.8	77.7	79.1	80.7	
	Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)	81.7	90.6	85.5	85.9	90.8	88.7 b	89.0	85.7	84.2	86.4	92.3	93.4	
	Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)	82.1	80.6	82.7	77.7	83.5	80.8 b	86.6	86.6	88.4	86.9	85.9	85.5	
	Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)	73.7	74.8	75.4	73.8	73.4	73.9 b	74.5	75.5	76.8	77.7	79.1	80.7	
	Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)	66.3	73.8	75.5	73.7	78.2	78.9 b	75.2	76.3	80.4	79.7	84.2	86.6	
	Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)	80.6	83.0	82.5	76.7	80.9	82.6 b	86.7	86.5	89.4	87.2	85.9	87.5	
	Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)			0.1 u	0.2	0.2	0.2 b	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.2	
	Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2 b	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1	
	Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)	0.9	0.6	0.5	0.8	0.8	0.9 b	0.9	0.9	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.6	
	Labour Market Indicators - Female	Total population (000)	5234	5244	5278	5309	5326	5340	5347	5352	5350	5361	5368	5378
		Population aged 15-64(000)	3620	3628	3648	3655	3641	3622	3587	3548	3508	3479	3447	3416
		Total employment (000)	2086	2116	2139	2111	2087	2095 b	2112	2143	2157	2205	2262	2306
		Employment aged 15-64 (000)	2065	2092	2114	2081	2057	2064 b	2079	2104	2120	2159	2210	2251
		Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	61.8	62.4	62.5	61.4	60.9	61.7 b	62.5	63.8	64.7	66.4	68.6	70.5
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)		56.8	57.3	57.6	56.7	56.3	57.2 b	58.2	59.6	60.7	62.4	64.4	66.2	
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)		23.7	23.9	23.5	21.7	20.6	19.8 b	21.0	21.0	21.6	23.4	23.2	24.3	
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)		74.5	74.9	75.2	74.1	73.4	74.3 b	74.6	75.5	75.7	76.7	78.4	79.3	
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)		32.1	33.5	34.4	35.0	35.5	37.2 b	39.0	41.4	43.8	45.9	49.3	53.0	
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)		60.2	60.5	60.7	59.6	58.8	59.8 b	60.5	61.3	62.5	64.2	66.1	67.8	
Self-employed (% total employment)		9.6	9.5	9.6	10.4	11.1	11.9 b	12.4	11.9	11.8	11.7	12.3	12.1	
Part-time employment (% total employment)		8.0	7.9	7.8	8.5	9.1	8.5 b	8.6	10.0	9.5	9.3	10.0	10.9	
Temporary employment (% total employment)		8.4	8.4	8.1	8.3	8.6	8.3 b	8.6	9.5	9.8	10.4	10.1	10.2	
Employment in Services (% total employment)				70.8 b	73.6	74.7	74.0 b	74.5	74.9	74.6	74.3	73.8	73.7	
Employment in Industry (% total employment)				26.9 b	24.2	23.4	24.1 b	23.6	23.1	23.8	24.1	24.5	24.5	
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)				2.3 b	2.2	1.9	1.9 b	1.9	2.0	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.8	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)		62.3	61.5	61.0	61.5	61.5	62.2 b	63.5	65.1	65.6	66.5	67.6	68.7	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)		29.2	26.9	26.1	26.1	25.3	24.1 b	25.9	26.1	26.1	27.4	26.2	26.6	
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)		81.3	80.3	79.6	79.9	79.8	80.4 b	80.9	81.9	81.6	81.4	82.1	82.1	
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)		34.0	35.2	36.1	37.2	38.0	39.4 b	41.5	44.2	46.3	48.3	51.2	54.5	
Total unemployment (000)		202	153	127	177	193	180	189	194	172	145	111	86	
Unemployment rate (% labour force)		8.8	6.7	5.6	7.7	8.5	7.9	8.2	8.3	7.4	6.1	4.7	3.6	
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)		18.7	11.0	9.9	16.7	18.5	18.0	19.0	19.3	17.1	14.4	11.4	8.7	
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)		4.9	3.6	2.8	2.5	3.5	3.2 b	3.6	3.7	3.2	2.9	2.0	1.3	
Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)		55.2	53.6	49.1	32.2	41.9	40.5 b	43.4	44.8	43.2	46.8	42.6	35.0	
Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)		5.4	2.9	2.6	4.4	4.7	4.3 b	4.9	5.1	4.5	3.9	3.0	2.3	
Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)		39.8	40.6	41.3	39.1	38.3	38.0 b	36.1	35.7	37.1 b	35.6	37.9	43.2	
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)		66.1	66.4	66.6	65.5	65.0	66.2 b	66.8	67.9	68.7 b	70.7	73.1	74.4	
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)		77.9	77.9	77.2	76.9	75.0	74.4 b	76.0	77.3	77.2 b	77.6	78.3	78.9	
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)		56.7	57.2	57.5	56.6	56.2	57.2 b	58.3	59.6	60.7	62.4	64.4	66.1	
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)		66.0	71.2	63.2	66.6	62.9	58.7 b	53.0	61.7	61.2	64.6	70.4	74.4	
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)		59.2	61.5	62.3	58.9	58.7	59.1 b	60.3	63.1	60.5	59.0	64.9	63.3	
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)		56.9	57.3	57.6	56.7	56.3	57.3 b	58.3	59.6	60.7	62.5	64.5	66.1	
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)		49.1	56.7	52.7	54.2	55.1	49.5 b	49.6	55.4	58.3	57.5	61.4	69.9	
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)		55.5	59.7	61.1	62.4	58.0	61.5 b	61.7	62.8	61.4	61.9	65.9	65.1	
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)				0.6	0.8	1.0	0.9 b	0.9	1.2	1.1	0.9	0.9	0.7	
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)		0.9	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.5 b	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.4	
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)		1.6	1.1	1.0	1.3	1.4	1.3 b	1.5	1.7	1.4	1.2	1.0	0.9	

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Czech Republic		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017			
Social Indicators	All	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of total population)	18.0	15.8	15.3	14.0	14.4	15.3	15.4	14.6	14.8	14.0	13.3			
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of total population)	9.9	9.6	9.0	8.6	9.0	9.8	9.6	8.6	9.7	9.7	9.7			
		At-risk-of-poverty threshold (PPS single person)	4956	5305	5835	5666	5796	5993	6188	6481	6654	6991	7508			
		Poverty gap (%)	16.8	18.1	18.5	18.8	21.1	17.2	19.1	16.6	18.0	19.2	19.5			
		Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of total population)			3.9	3.7	5.5	4.2	4.3	4.1	3.4	4.5	4.3			
		At-risk-of-poverty before social transfers excl. pensions (% of total population)	21.6	20.1	20.0	17.9	18.1	18.0	17.6	16.6	17.2	16.8	16.3			
		Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (%)	54.2	52.2	55.0	52.0	50.3	45.6	45.5	48.2	43.6	42.3	40.5			
		Severe Material Deprivation (% of total population)	9.6	7.4	6.8	6.1	6.2	6.1	6.6	6.6	6.7	5.6	4.8	3.7 p		
		Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of people aged 0-59)	8.9	8.6	7.2	6.0	6.4	6.6	6.8	6.9	7.6	6.8	6.7			
		Real Gross Household Disposable income (growth %)	5.5	3.4	2.4	2.0	0.4	-1.5	-1.2	-0.7	2.9	4.1	2.8			
		Income quintile share ratio S80/S20	3.5	3.5	3.4	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.4	3.5	3.5	3.5			
		GINI coefficient	25.3	25.3	24.7	25.1	24.9	25.2	24.9	24.6	25.1	25.0	25.1			
		Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18-24)	5.1 b	5.2	5.6	5.4	4.9	4.9 b	5.5	5.4 b	5.5 b	6.2	6.6	6.7		
		NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of total population aged 15-24)	9.2 b	6.9	6.7	8.5	8.8	8.3 b	8.9	9.1 b	8.1	7.5	7.0	6.3		
		Social Indicators	Male	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of male population)	16.6	14.2	13.3	12.3	12.7	13.7	13.7	13.1	13.3	12.3	12.0	
At-risk-of-poverty (% of male population)	8.9			8.7	8.0	7.5	8.0	8.9	8.7	7.7	8.9	8.5	8.5			
Poverty gap (%)	18.6			19.0	21.4	22.0	23.6	19.1	20.2	17.8	18.7	20.9	22.6			
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of male population)					3.5	3.1	5.1	3.8	3.4	3.3	3.4	3.9	3.4			
Severe Material Deprivation (% of male population)	9.4			7.0	6.3	5.8	5.8	5.6	6.0	5.9	6.2	5.0	4.6	3.5 p		
Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of males aged 0-59)	8.2			7.4	6.2	4.8	5.2	5.8	6.1	6.2	6.8	6.0	6.2			
Life expectancy at birth (years)	73.5			73.8 b	74.1	74.2	74.5	74.8	75.1	75.2	75.8	75.7	76.1			
Healthy life years at birth (years) - men	57.9			61.4 b	61.3	61.1	62.2	62.2	62.3	62.5	63.4	62.4	62.7			
Early leavers from education and training (% of males aged 18-24)	5.4 b			5.7	5.8	5.5	4.9	5.4 b	6.1	5.4 b	5.8 b	6.4	6.6	6.8		
NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of males aged 15-24)	7.3 b			4.9	4.8	7.2	7.5	7.1 b	8.1	7.5 b	6.5	5.5	5.5	4.4		
Social Indicators	Female			At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of female population)	19.4	17.4	17.2	15.7	16.0	16.9	16.9	16.1	16.3	15.6	14.6	
				At-risk-of-poverty (% of female population)	10.8	10.5	10.1	9.5	10.0	10.6	10.5	9.4	10.5	11.0	10.8	
				Poverty gap (%)	15.6	17.2	15.1	16.3	18.9	16.5	17.7	16.1	17.4	16.7	16.6	
				Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of female population)			4.3	4.2	5.9	4.5	5.2	4.9	3.4	5.1	5.2	
				Severe Material Deprivation (% of female population)	9.9	7.7	7.3	6.5	6.5	6.7	7.2	7.2	7.2	6.2	5.0	4.0 p
		Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of females aged 0-59)	9.6	9.9	8.2	7.1	7.6	7.4	7.5	7.7	8.4	7.8	7.2			
		Life expectancy at birth (years)	79.9	80.2 b	80.5	80.5	80.9	81.1	81.2	81.3	82.0	81.6	82.1			
		Healthy life years at birth (years) - women	59.9	63.3 b	63.4	62.7	64.5	63.6	64.1	64.2	65.0	63.7	64.0			
		Early leavers from education and training (% of females aged 18-24)	4.9 b	4.7	5.4	5.2	4.8	4.4 b	4.9	5.5 b	5.2 b	6.0	6.6	6.7		
		NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of females aged 15-24)	11.1 b	9.1	8.7	9.9	10.3	9.5 b	9.8	10.8 b	9.9	9.5	8.6	8.3		
		Social Indicators	Children (0-17)	At-Risk-of-poverty or exclusion of children (% of people aged 0-17)	22.7	21.5	18.6	17.2	18.9	20.0	18.8	16.4	19.5	18.5	17.4	
				At-risk-of-poverty (% of Children population)	16.5	16.6	13.2	13.3	14.3	15.2	13.9	11.3	14.7	14.7	14.1	
				Severe Material Deprivation (% of Children population)	12.2	10.0	8.3	7.4	8.6	8.0	8.5	7.3	9.7	7.2	6.3	4.5 p
				Share of children living in low work intensity households (% of Children population)	8.6	10.0	7.6	6.2	7.0	6.9	6.7	6.2	9.4	8.2	8.3	
				Risk of poverty of children in households at work (Working Intensity > 0.2)	10.3	9.0	8.1	8.6	9.2	10.5	9.6	7.3	7.7	9.0	7.5	
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (0-17) (%)	48.4			46.1	55.6	47.4	45.0	43.7	46.5	49.6	42.8	38.5	39.5			
Social Indicators	Working age (18-64)	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of Working age population)	17.8	15.3	15.0	13.7	14.1	15.1	15.5	15.2	14.6	13.6	13.0			
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of Working age population)	8.8	8.6	8.3	7.6	8.1	9.1	9.3	8.6	9.1	9.0	8.8			
		Severe Material Deprivation (% of Working age population)	9.3	6.8	6.5	5.9	6.0	5.8	6.3	6.7	6.3	5.4	4.9	3.7 p		
		Very low work intensity (18-59)	8.9	8.2	7.1	5.9	6.2	6.5	6.9	7.1	7.0	6.4	6.2			
		In-work at-risk-of poverty rate (% of persons employed 18-64)	3.5	3.3	3.6	3.2	3.7	4.1	4.6	4.1	3.6	4.0	3.8			
		Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (18-64) (%)	56.9	54.3	55.4	54.5	52.6	47.7	47.2	49.7	45.8	45.5	44.3			
Social Indicators	Elderly (65+)	At-Risk-of-poverty or exclusion of elderly (% of people aged 65+)	12.7	10.9	12.5	11.7	10.1	10.7	10.8	10.4	10.7	10.9	10.1			
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of Elderly population)	5.9	5.5	7.4	7.2	6.8	6.6	6.0	5.8	7.0	7.4	8.1			
		Severe Material Deprivation (% of Elderly population)	8.0	6.5	6.4	5.7	4.3	5.4	6.0	5.3	5.1	4.5	3.0	2.9 p		
		Relative median income of elderly (ratio with median income of people younger than 65)	0.82	0.81	0.79	0.78	0.82	0.82	0.84	0.85	0.84	0.81	0.79			
		Aggregate replacement ratio (ratio)	0.52	0.51	0.51	0.51	0.54	0.53	0.55	0.56	0.55	0.51	0.50			
Social Indicators	Expenditure in social protection indicators (% of GDP)	Sickness/Health care	5.7	5.6	5.5	6.1	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	5.8				
		Disability	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.3	1.3	1.2				
		Old age and survivors	7.2	7.3	7.7	8.6	8.8	9.2	9.5	9.3	9.0	8.7				
		Family/Children	1.7	1.9	2.0	2.0	2.0	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.7	1.6				
		Unemployment	0.5	0.6	0.6	1.0	0.8	0.7	0.6	0.7	0.6	0.5				
		Housing and Social exclusion n.e.c.	0.5	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.5				
		Total (including Admin and Other expenditures) of which: Means tested benefits	17.6	17.6	17.9	20.1	20.0	20.1	20.4	20.2	19.7	19.0				

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Denmark

Denmark	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017		
Macro Economic Indicators (Annual % growth)	Real GDP	3.9	0.9	-0.5	-4.9	1.9	1.3	0.2	0.9	1.6	1.6	2.0	2.2	
	Total employment	2.3	2.3	1.2	-3.2	-2.3	0.0	-0.7	0.0	0.9	1.4	1.6	1.6	
	Labour productivity	1.6	-1.4	-1.7	-1.8	4.3	1.4	1.0	1.0	0.7	0.2	0.4	0.6	
	Annual average hours worked per person employed	0.3	-1.6	-0.2	-0.9	0.4	1.0	-0.9	0.2	-0.9	-0.4	0.4	-0.4	
	Real productivity per hour worked	1.3	0.2	-1.5	-0.9	3.9	0.3	1.9	0.8	1.6	0.6	0.0	1.0	
	Harmonized CPI	1.8	1.7	3.6	1.0	2.2	2.7	2.4	0.5	0.4	0.2	0.0	1.1	
	Price deflator GDP	2.1	2.4	4.1	0.5	3.2	0.6	2.4	0.9	1.0	0.7	0.0	1.6	
	Nominal compensation per employee	3.5	3.7	3.9	2.8	3.3	1.4	1.9	1.6	1.5	1.8	1.3	1.3	
	Real compensation per employee (GDP deflator)	1.4	1.3	-0.2	2.2	0.0	0.7	-0.5	0.7	0.4	1.1	1.4	-0.2	
	Real compensation per employee (private consumption deflator)	1.7	2.0	0.2	1.8	1.1	-1.2	-0.5	1.1	1.1	1.6	1.3	0.2	
	Nominal unit labour costs	1.9	5.2	5.7	4.7	-1.0	0.0	0.9	0.6	0.8	1.6	0.9	0.7	
	Real unit labour costs	-0.2	2.7	1.5	4.1	-4.1	-0.6	-1.4	-0.3	-0.2	0.9	0.9	-0.8	
	Labour Market Indicators - Total	Total population (000)	5427	5447	5476	5511	5535	5561	5581	5603	5627	5660	5707	5749
		Population aged 15-64 (000)	3589	3598	3613	3628	3631	3632	3626	3625	3632	3646	3673	3692
		Total employment (000)	2805	2804	2853	2771	2706	2703	2689	2688	2714	2752	2840 b	2816
Employment aged 15-64 (000)		2762	2759	2807	2724	2654	2643	2621	2622	2640	2678	2748 b	2734	
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)		79.4	79.0	79.7	77.5	75.8	75.7	75.4	75.6	75.9	76.5	77.4 b	76.9	
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)		77.4	77.0	77.9	75.3	73.3	73.1	72.6	72.5	72.8	73.5	74.9 b	74.2	
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)		64.6	65.3	66.4	62.5	58.1	57.5	55.0	53.7	53.7	55.4	58.2 b	56.3	
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)		86.1	86.1	87.5	84.7	82.8	82.3	81.9	82.0	82.0	82.1	82.5 b	81.7	
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)		60.7	58.9	58.4	58.2	58.4	59.5	60.8	61.7	63.2	64.7	67.8 b	68.9	
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)		73.9	73.7 b	74.3	71.8	69.7	69.4	69.3	69.4	69.2	69.5	70.4 b	70.3	
Self-employed (% total employment)		8.4	8.4	8.4	9.0	8.8	8.9	8.9	8.8	8.7	8.4	8.3 b	7.8	
Part-time employment (% total employment)		22.9	23.0	23.8	25.2	25.6	25.1	24.8	24.7	24.6	24.7	26.4 b	25.3	
Temporary employment (% total employment)		7.0	6.8	6.7	6.9	7.2	7.4	7.0	7.2	7.3	7.1	10.7 b	10.7	
Employment in Services (% total employment)				74.5 bu	77.2 u	78.0 u	77.7 u	77.8	78.1	78.3	78.3	79.2 b	79.3	
Employment in Industry (% total employment)				23.2 bu	20.3 u	19.7 u	20.0 u	19.8	19.6	19.4	19.3	18.6 b	18.7	
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)				2.4 b	2.5	2.3	2.2	2.4	2.3	2.3	2.4	2.3 b	2.1	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)		80.6	80.1	80.7	80.2	79.4	79.3	78.6	78.1	78.1	78.5	80.0 b	78.8	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)		69.9	70.6	72.2	70.9	67.5	67.1	64.1	61.7	61.5	62.1	66.2 b	63.3	
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)		88.9	88.9	89.9	89.4	88.7	88.2	87.8	87.5	87.1	87.1	87.4 b	86.2	
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)		63.2	61.0	59.9	60.8	61.8	63.2	64.4	65.0	66.4	67.6	70.6 b	71.6	
Total unemployment (000)		114 d	111	101	177	218	221	219	202	191	181	187	172	
Unemployment rate (% labour force)		3.9 d	3.8	3.4	6.0	7.5	7.6	7.5	7.0	6.6	6.2	6.2	5.7	
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)		7.7 d	7.5	8.0	11.8	13.9	14.2	14.1	13.0	12.6	10.8	12.0	11.0	
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)		0.8	0.6	0.5	0.6	1.5	1.8	2.1	1.8	1.7	1.7	1.4 b	1.3	
Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)		20.8	16.1	13.5	9.5	20.2	24.4	28.0	25.5	25.2	26.9	22.3 b	22.6	
Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)		5.4	5.3	5.8	8.4	9.4	9.6	9.1	8.1	7.8	6.7	7.9 b	7.0	
Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)		62.8	67.5 b	68.4	65.2	62.8	62.6	61.4	60.9	61.4 b	60.5	63.5 b	62.1	
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)		81.3	82.3 b	82.7	80.0	79.1	79.0	78.7	79.3	79.1 b	80.3	81.1 b	81.0	
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)		87.4	87.2 b	88.5	86.8	85.7	85.8	86.4	86.5	86.0 b	85.9	86.0 b	85.9	
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)		77.9	78.1	78.7	76.0	74.1	74.1	73.7	73.5	73.8	74.7	75.8 b	75.2	
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)		76.6	75.0	80.8	80.2	75.4	72.4	71.7	72.3	75.7	75.9	76.4 b	75.6	
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)		59.2	54.0	57.4	58.5	54.2	53.7	52.5	56.0	54.6	54.9	59.8 b	58.8	
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)		78.4	78.5	79.0	76.2	74.6	74.7	74.2	73.9	74.2	75.1	76.3 b	75.8	
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)		70.9	75.7	78.8	77.6	73.5	71.0	71.8	73.3	76.1	75.4	76.0 b	75.6	
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)		61.2	60.5	64.1	64.3	59.6	57.9	56.5	58.3	58.3	58.2	62.1 b	59.8	
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)				2.3	3.2	3.0	3.1	3.0	2.7	2.5	2.3	4.6 b	3.6	
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)		0.8	0.9	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.9	0.8	0.9	0.8	0.7	1.7 b	1.7	
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)		1.2	1.8	1.6	1.9	2.0	2.6	2.4	2.3	1.9	1.5	3.2 b	2.1	

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Denmark	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017		
Labour Market Indicators - Male	Total population (000)	2686	2697	2713	2732	2743	2757	2767	2779	2792	2811	2838	2860	
	Population aged 15-64(000)	1812	1816	1823	1831	1830	1830	1826	1826	1830	1839	1855	1865	
	Total employment (000)	1496	1492	1517	1454	1415	1421	1413	1410	1433	1461	1503 b	1487	
	Employment aged 15-64 (000)	1464	1460	1484	1421	1378	1381	1368	1365	1384	1408	1440 b	1431	
	Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	83.8	83.2	83.9	80.5	78.6	79.0	78.6	78.7	79.5	80.2	80.7 b	80.2	
	Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)	81.2	80.8	81.6	78.0	75.6	75.9	75.2	75.0	75.8	76.6	77.7 b	76.9	
	Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)	65.0	66.5	67.4	62.2	56.7	56.6	54.6	52.3	52.7	54.6	56.5 b	55.3	
	Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)	90.1	89.8	90.9	86.9	85.3	85.7	84.6	85.0	85.5	85.9	86.4 b	85.2	
	Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)	67.1	64.9	65.2	64.9	63.3	63.8	65.9	66.5	68.9	69.8	71.9 b	72.8	
	FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	81.5	80.9 b	81.2	77.6	75.7	75.8	75.0	75.1	75.6	75.9	76.4 b	76.0	
	Self-employed (% total employment)	11.7	11.9	11.9	12.6	12.2	12.3	12.2	12.0	11.7	11.3	11.1 b	10.5	
	Part-time employment (% total employment)	12.3	12.4	13.3	14.3	14.0	14.2	14.8	14.8	15.2	15.6	16.8 b	16.2	
	Temporary employment (% total employment)	7.0	6.8	6.7	6.9	7.2	7.4	7.0	7.2	7.3	7.1	10.7 b	10.7	
	Employment in Services (% total employment)			63.6 bu	66.6 u	67.0 u	66.7 u	67.2	67.4	67.9	68.4	69.5 b	69.3 u	
	Employment in Industry (% total employment)			32.9 bu	29.7 u	29.3 u	29.7 u	29.2	29.1	28.5	28.0	27.0 b	27.6 u	
	Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)			3.6 b	3.7	3.7	3.5	3.7	3.6	3.6	3.5	3.5 b	3.1	
	Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)	84.1	83.7	84.3	83.6	82.6	82.3	81.4	80.6	81.1	81.6	82.6 b	81.5	
	Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)	70.5	72.0	72.8	71.7	67.6	67.1	64.1	61.1	61.0	61.7	65.0 b	62.5	
	Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)	92.3	92.3	93.3	92.2	92.0	91.5	90.6	90.2	90.3	90.8	90.8 b	89.6	
	Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)	69.6	66.9	66.9	68.1	67.8	68.3	69.9	70.2	72.6	72.7	74.9 b	75.6	
	Total unemployment (000)	52 d	53	50	103	129	118	115	102	98	92	92	88	
	Unemployment rate (% labour force)	3.3 d	3.4	3.2	6.6	8.4	7.7	7.5	6.7	6.4	5.9	5.8	5.6	
	Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)	7.9 d	7.6	7.3	13.2	16.0	15.6	14.7	14.2	13.7	11.6	13.1	11.4	
	Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)	0.7	0.5	0.5	0.6	1.8	2.0	2.1	1.6	1.7	1.6	1.3 b	1.3	
	Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)	20.7	15.6	14.2	9.3	21.9	26.2	28.5	23.5	25.9	27.5	23.0 b	23.7	
	Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)	5.6	5.5	5.4	9.5	10.9	10.5	9.5	8.7	8.4	7.2	8.5 b	7.1	
	Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)	70.9	75.8 b	76.2	71.7	69.6	70.0	67.1	67.6	69.2 b	68.9	71.7 b	70.9	
	Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)	85.6	85.1 b	85.7	82.4	80.8	81.5	81.5	82.6	83.0 b	83.9	84.8 b	84.1	
	Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)	90.0	89.6 b	90.6	88.7	87.5	88.2	89.2	88.4	89.2 b	89.4	88.7 b	88.5	
	Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)	81.5	81.6	82.1	78.3	76.0	76.5	75.9	75.6	76.3	77.2	78.2 b	77.6	
	Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)	77.8	81.5	87.6	84.8	77.5	76.9	77.0	77.8	81.5	82.4	82.1 b	79.7	
	Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)	71.4	61.6	64.7	63.0	61.4	59.7	57.6	61.0	61.2	62.4	64.8 b	64.0	
	Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)	81.9	81.9	82.2	78.5	76.5	77.1	76.3	76.0	76.5	77.5	78.5 b	77.9	
	Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)	75.8	83.4	84.5	82.2	72.9	73.5	77.5	78.3	82.2	82.5	80.4 b	79.6	
	Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)	68.8	66.7	72.6	69.6	64.6	63.2	61.2	62.3	65.2	64.4	68.3 b	65.8	
	Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)			1.6	2.4	2.2	2.3	2.1	2.0	1.8	1.5	3.6 b	2.8	
	Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.8	0.7	0.8	0.7	0.6	1.4 b	1.4	
	Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)	1.1	1.7	1.6	2.0	1.9	2.5	2.4	2.4	1.9	1.6	3.3 b	2.2	
	Labour Market Indicators - Female	Total population (000)	2742	2750	2763	2779	2791	2804	2814	2824	2835	2849	2869	2889
		Population aged 15-64(000)	1777	1782	1790	1797	1800	1802	1800	1799	1802	1807	1818	1827
		Total employment (000)	1309	1312	1336	1316	1292	1282	1276	1278	1282	1291	1337 b	1329
		Employment aged 15-64 (000)	1297	1299	1323	1303	1276	1262	1254	1257	1256	1270	1307 b	1304
		Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	74.8	74.7	75.5	74.5	73.0	72.4	72.2	72.4	72.2	72.6	74.0 b	73.7
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)		73.4	73.2	74.1	72.7	71.1	70.4	70.0	70.0	69.8	70.4	72.0 b	71.5	
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)		64.1	64.0	65.3	62.8	59.5	58.5	55.4	55.0	54.9	56.2	60.0 b	57.3	
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)		82.0	82.3	84.0	82.5	80.3	78.9	79.1	79.0	78.4	78.3	78.5 b	78.1	
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)		54.3	52.9	51.5	51.7	53.6	55.3	55.8	56.8	57.6	59.6	63.6 b	65.2	
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)		67.3	67.5 b	68.4	67.0	64.8	64.0	64.3	64.5	63.5	63.6	65.1 b	65.3	
Self-employed (% total employment)		4.6	4.5	4.5	4.9	5.1	5.1	5.2	5.3	5.3	5.0	5.1 b	4.8	
Part-time employment (% total employment)		34.9	35.1	35.6	37.2	38.1	37.0	35.8	35.3	35.0	34.7	36.9 b	35.3	
Temporary employment (% total employment)		9.3	9.7	8.9	9.1	8.3	8.9	8.8	9.0	8.5	8.9	14.3 b	13.2	
Employment in Services (% total employment)														
Employment in Industry (% total employment)														
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)				1.1 b	1.1	0.8	0.8	1.0	0.9	0.9	1.0	0.9 b	0.9	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)		77.0	76.4	77.0	76.8	76.0	76.1	75.8	75.6	75.0	75.3	77.2 b	76.1	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)		69.3	69.1	71.5	70.0	67.4	67.1	64.0	62.4	62.0	62.5	67.3 b	64.1	
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)		85.4	85.3	86.4	86.5	85.3	84.7	84.9	84.8	83.8	83.4	83.8 b	82.7	
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)		56.7	55.1	53.0	53.5	55.9	58.0	58.9	59.9	60.3	62.6	66.4 b	67.6	
Total unemployment (000)		62 d	57	52	74	89	103	104	100	94	89	95	84	
Unemployment rate (% labour force)		4.5 d	4.2	3.7	5.3	6.5	7.5	7.5	7.3	6.8	6.4	6.6	5.9	
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)		7.5 d	7.4	8.7	10.3	11.8	12.7	13.5	11.8	11.5	10.0	10.9	10.7	
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)		0.9	0.7	0.5	0.5	1.1	1.7	2.1	2.0	1.7	1.7	1.4 b	1.3	
Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)		20.8	16.6	12.7	9.8	17.8	22.3	27.5	27.5	24.4	26.2	21.6 b	21.5	
Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)		5.2	5.1	6.2	7.2	7.9	8.5	8.6	7.4	7.1	6.3	7.3 b	6.8	
Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)		55.9	59.8 b	61.2	59.3	56.3	55.3	55.5	53.9	52.4 b	50.9	53.8 b	51.2	
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)		76.0	78.9 b	79.1	76.9	76.9	75.9	75.0	75.1	74.5 b	75.8	76.8 b	77.4	
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)		85.2	85.1 b	86.6	85.3	84.3	83.9	84.3	85.0	83.4 b	83.3	83.8 b	83.9	
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)		74.1	74.5	75.2	73.5	72.2	71.7	71.4	71.4	71.2	72.1	73.2 b	72.8	
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)		75.4	69.9	75.1	75.2	73.4	68.3	66.7	67.2	69.1	68.3	70.4 b	70.8	
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)		49.8	47.5	51.6	55.3	49.4	49.3	48.6	52.2	49.3	49.2	55.7 b	54.0	
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)		74.8	75.0	75.7	73.9	72.6	72.3	72.0	71.7	71.8	72.6	73.9 b	73.7	
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)		66.0	69.8	73.7	73.1	74.2	68.7	66.8	69.0	69.6	68.0	71.5 b	71.2	
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)		55.2	54.7	56.6	59.8	55.6	53.7	52.3	54.8	52.2	53.0	56.8 b	54.3	
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)				3.1	4.0	3.8	4.1	4.1	3.5	3.4	3.1	5.7 b	4.5	
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)		0.9	1.1	0.8	0.9	0.8	1.0	1.0	0.9	0.9	0.8	2.0 b	1.9	
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)		1.3	1.9	1.6	1.8	2.0	2.6	2.4	2.3	2.0	1.4	3.2 b	2.1	

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Denmark		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017			
Social Indicators	All	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of total population)	16.7	16.8	16.3	17.6	18.3	17.6 b	17.5	18.3	17.9	17.7	16.7	17.2		
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of total population)	11.7	11.7	11.8	13.1	13.3	12.1	12.0	11.9	12.1	12.2	11.9	12.4		
		At-risk-of-poverty threshold (PPS single person)	9688	10121	10561	10751	10770	11510 b	11537	11846	11992	12231	12672	12714		
		Poverty gap (%)	16.5	17.0	18.0	18.4	21.6	20.5 b	19.5	23.5	18.5	22.0	20.8	21.7		
		Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of total population)		4.7	4.9	2.7	6.3	6.4	5.7	5.1	5.3	4.3	7.2			
		At-risk-of-poverty before social transfers excl. pensions (% of total population)	28.0	27.1	27.8	31.2	29.1	27.9 b	27.4	27.8	26.9	25.8	24.9	25.3		
		Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (%)	58.2	56.8	57.6	58.0	54.3	56.6 b	56.2	57.2	55.0	52.7	52.2	51.0		
		Severe Material Deprivation (% of total population)	3.1	3.3	2.0	2.3	2.7	2.3	2.7	3.6	3.2	3.7	2.6	3.1		
		Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of people aged 0-59)	9.6	10.1	8.5	8.8	10.6	10.5	10.2	11.9	12.2	11.6	10.6	10.0		
		Real Gross Household Disposable income (growth %)	2.5	-0.3	-0.5	0.9	3.3	1.1	-0.2	1.1	0.7	3.9	4.1	2.0		
		Income quintile share ratio S80/S20	3.4	3.7	3.6	4.6	4.4 b	4.0 b	3.9	4.0	4.1	4.1	4.1	4.1		
		GINI coefficient	23.7	25.2	25.1	26.9	26.9 b	26.6 b	26.5	26.8	27.7	27.4	27.7	27.6		
		Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18-24)	9.1	12.9 b	12.5	11.3	11.0	9.6	9.1	8.0	7.8 b	7.8	7.2 b	8.8		
		NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of total population aged 15-24)	3.6	4.3 b	4.3	5.4	6.0	6.3	6.6	6.0	5.8	6.2	5.8 b	7.0		
		Social Indicators	Male	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of male population)	15.5	15.9	15.7	17.0	17.7	17.2 b	17.4	18.1	17.6	17.5	16.3	17.8
At-risk-of-poverty (% of male population)	11.4			11.3	11.7	12.8	13.1	12.1	12.0	12.0	12.4	12.5	12.0	13.1		
Poverty gap (%)	18.8			18.8	19.3	21.9	23.3	24.1 b	21.8	25.5	24.2	23.6	22.3	24.5		
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of male population)				4.5	5.2	4.0	5.5	6.7	6.0	4.0	5.4	3.8	8.0			
Severe Material Deprivation (% of male population)	2.8			2.9	1.5	2.2	2.8	1.7	2.7	3.5	3.2	3.5	3.1	3.6		
Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of males aged 0-59)	8.3			9.1	8.4	8.2	9.7	10.3	10.5	12.2	11.8	11.1	10.4	10.6		
Life expectancy at birth (years)	76.1			76.2	76.5 b	76.9	77.2	77.8	78.1	78.3	78.7	78.8	79.0			
Healthy life years at birth (years) - men	67.7			67.4	62.4 b	61.8	62.3	63.6	60.6	60.4	60.3	60.4	60.3			
Early leavers from education and training (% of males aged 18-24)	10.5			16.2 b	15.0	14.3	14.1	12.1	10.8	9.9	9.5 b	9.7	8.5 b	11.3		
NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of males aged 15-24)	3.4			4.7 b	4.4	5.9	6.7	6.4	6.6	6.3	6.2	6.3	6.5 b	7.0		
Social Indicators	Female			At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of female population)	17.9	17.7	17.0	18.2	19.0	18.0 b	17.5	18.6	18.2	18.0	17.1	16.6
				At-risk-of-poverty (% of female population)	12.0	12.0	12.0	13.4	13.4	12.0	11.9	11.8	11.8	11.9	11.9	11.7
				Poverty gap (%)	15.2	16.4	17.2	17.1	20.9	16.1 b	16.4	17.9	17.2	19.8	19.8	18.8
				Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of female population)		4.9	4.6	1.5	7.0	6.1	5.3	6.2	5.2	4.8	6.5	
				Severe Material Deprivation (% of female population)	3.5	3.6	2.4	2.4	2.5	2.9	2.7	3.7	3.2	3.8	2.1	2.6
		Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of females aged 0-59)	11.0	11.1	8.6	9.4	11.4	10.8	9.9	11.5	12.6	12.0	10.8	9.4		
		Life expectancy at birth (years)	80.7	80.6	81.0 b	81.1	81.4	81.9	82.1	82.4	82.8	82.7	82.8			
		Healthy life years at birth (years) - women	67.2	67.4	60.8 b	60.4	61.4	59.4	61.4	59.1	61.4	57.6	60.3			
		Early leavers from education and training (% of females aged 18-24)	7.7	9.5 b	10.0	8.1	7.7	7.0	7.4	6.2	6.1 b	5.7	5.9 b	6.2		
		NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of females aged 15-24)	3.8	3.8 b	4.2	4.9	5.4	6.1	6.7	5.8	5.4	6.1	5.1 b	6.9		
		Social Indicators	Children (0-17)	At-Risk-of-poverty or exclusion of children (% of people aged 0-17)	14.5	14.2	12.7	14.0	15.1	15.7 b	14.9	15.4	14.5	15.7	13.8	14.5
				At-risk-of-poverty (% of Children population)	9.9	9.6	9.1	10.6	10.9	10.3	10.4	9.1	9.2	10.4	9.4	10.0
				Severe Material Deprivation (% of Children population)	4.3	4.8	2.5	2.1	3.1	2.9	4.0	3.8	3.1	4.3	3.0	3.1
				Share of children living in low work intensity households (% of Children population)	7.1	6.9	4.3	5.5	7.4	7.9	5.3	7.8	7.5	7.3	6.4	6.7
				Risk of poverty of children in households at work (Working Intensity > 0.2)	6.7	6.2	7.6	7.9	6.8	7.7 b	7.4	6.6	6.6	8.0	6.9	6.8
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (0-17) (%)	59.3			59.8	58.8	56.4	54.6	61.1 b	57.7	64.0	61.3	55.0	56.5	54.8		
Social Indicators	Working age (18-64)	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of Working age population)	17.1	17.4	17.1	18.1	19.5	19.0 b	19.6	21.6	21.3	20.9	20.2	20.6		
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of Working age population)	11.0	10.9	11.3	12.2	12.9	12.2	12.3	13.4	13.8	13.8	13.9	14.3		
		Severe Material Deprivation (% of Working age population)	3.2	3.3	2.0	2.7	2.9	2.5	2.9	4.3	4.0	4.3	3.1	3.8		
		Very low work intensity (18-59)	10.7	11.5	10.2	10.1	11.9	11.6	12.2	13.5	14.0	13.3	12.3	11.4		
		In-work at-risk-of poverty rate (% of persons employed 18-64)	4.5	4.2	5.0	5.9	6.3	6.3 b	5.3	5.4	4.8	5.1	5.3	5.4		
		Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (18-64) (%)	60.2	58.9	59.4	58.9	56.1	58.5 b	58.6	57.3	55.5	53.5	52.6	51.9		
Social Indicators	Elderly (65+)	At-Risk-of-poverty or exclusion of elderly (% of people aged 65+)	18.3	18.3	18.6	20.6	18.4	14.6 b	13.2	10.8	10.8	9.9	9.2	9.5		
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of Elderly population)	17.4	17.7	18.1	20.1	17.7	13.9	12.8	10.1	9.8	9.1	8.5	8.7		
		Severe Material Deprivation (% of Elderly population)	1.1	0.8	0.9	0.9	0.9	1.1	0.6	1.1	0.9	0.9	0.7	0.9		
		Relative median income of elderly (ratio with median income of people younger than 65)	0.71	0.70	0.70	0.71	0.71	0.74 b	0.75	0.76	0.78	0.77	0.75	0.77		
		Aggregate replacement ratio (ratio)	0.37	0.39	0.41	0.42	0.44	0.43 b	0.42	0.44	0.45	0.45	0.47	0.48		
Expenditure in social protection indicators (% of GDP)		Sickness/Health care	6.0	6.0 b	6.2	6.9	6.7	6.6	6.5	6.4	6.3	6.3				
		Disability	4.1	3.8 b	3.8	4.2	4.2	4.1	4.1	4.1	4.1	4.1				
		Old age and survivors	10.5	11.9 b	11.8	13.2	12.6	12.7	12.7	13.3	14.0	13.6				
		Family/Children	3.6	3.7 b	3.8	4.2	4.0	3.8	3.7	3.6	3.5	3.5				
		Unemployment	2.0	1.2 b	1.0	1.6	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.8	1.6	1.5				
		Housing and Social exclusion n.e.c.	1.5	1.3 b	1.3	1.5	1.8	1.9	1.9	2.0	2.0	2.2				
		Total (including Admin and Other expenditures)	28.4	29.1 b	28.9	32.7	32.4	32.1	32.0	32.5	32.8	32.3				
		of which: Means tested benefits	0.8	0.4 b	0.5	10.3	10.7	10.9	11.0	11.2	11.3	11.3				

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Germany

Germany	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017		
Macro Economic Indicators (Annual % growth)	Real GDP	3.7	3.3	1.1	-5.6	4.1	3.7	0.5	0.5	1.9	1.7	1.9	2.2	
	Total employment	0.8	1.7	1.3	0.1	0.3	1.4	1.2	0.6	0.8	0.9	1.3	1.5	
	Labour productivity	2.9	1.5	-0.2	-5.7	3.8	2.3	-0.7	-0.1	1.1	0.8	0.6	0.8	
	Annual average hours worked per person employed	1.0	0.0	-0.4	-3.2	1.3	0.2	-1.3	-0.9	0.3	0.1	-0.7	-0.2	
	Real productivity per hour worked	1.9	1.5	0.2	-2.6	2.5	2.1	0.6	0.8	0.8	0.7	1.3	0.9	
	Harmonized CPI	1.8	2.3	2.8	0.2	1.1	2.5	2.1	1.6	0.8	0.1	0.4	1.7	
	Price deflator GDP	0.3	1.7	0.8	1.8	0.8	1.1	1.5	2.0	1.8	2.0	1.3	1.5	
	Nominal compensation per employee	1.0	0.9	2.1	0.2	2.6	3.0	2.5	1.8	2.8	2.7	2.2	2.6	
	Real compensation per employee (GDP deflator)	0.7	-0.8	1.3	-1.5	1.8	1.9	1.0	-0.1	1.0	0.6	0.9	1.0	
	Real compensation per employee (private consumption deflator)	-0.8	-1.4	-0.6	0.0	1.4	0.5	0.4	0.2	2.0	2.6	1.8	0.8	
	Nominal unit labour costs	-1.8	-0.6	2.3	6.3	-1.2	0.7	3.2	1.9	1.7	1.8	1.6	1.8	
	Real unit labour costs	-2.1	-2.3	1.5	4.5	-1.9	-0.4	1.6	0.0	-0.1	-0.2	0.2	0.3	
	Labour Market Indicators - Total	Total population (000)	82438	82315	82218	82002	81802	80222 b	80328	80524	80767	81198	82176	82522
		Population aged 15-64 (000)	54918	54574	54417	54134	53878	52762 b	52951	53126	53272	53422	53994	53963
Total employment (000)		37172	37989	38542	38471	37993 b	38787 b	39127	39531	39871	40211	41267	41664	
Employment aged 15-64 (000)		36633	37397	37902	37808	37337 b	38045 b	38321	38640	38908	39176	40165	40482	
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)		71.1	72.9	74.0	74.2	75.0 b	76.5 b	76.9	77.3	77.7	78.0	78.6	79.2	
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)		67.2	69.0	70.1	70.3	71.3 b	72.7 b	73.0	73.5	73.8	74.0	74.7	75.2	
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)		43.5	45.4	46.6	46.0	46.2 b	47.9 b	46.6	46.9	46.1	45.3	45.7	46.5	
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)		78.8	80.3	80.9	80.8	81.6 b	83.0 b	83.3	83.4	83.5	83.7	83.9	84.2	
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)		48.1	51.3	53.7	56.1	57.8 b	60.0 b	61.6	63.6	65.6	66.2	68.6	70.1	
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)		61.4	62.9	64.1	64.4	65.0 b	66.0 b	66.5	66.8	67.3	67.5	68.3	68.8	
Self-employed (% total employment)		11.1	11.0	10.8	11.0	11.0 b	11.1 b	11.0	10.7	10.5	10.4	10.0	9.8	
Part-time employment (% total employment)		25.2	25.4	25.1	25.3	25.6 b	25.9 b	25.8	26.6	26.5	26.8	26.7	26.9	
Temporary employment (% total employment)		12.7	12.7	12.8	12.5	12.4 b	12.5 b	11.9	11.6	11.4	11.5	11.7	11.5	
Employment in Services (% total employment)				68.8 b	69.5	70.0 b	70.1 b	70.2	70.7	70.4	70.8	71.1	71.1	
Employment in Industry (% total employment)				29.5 b	29.0	28.5 b	28.4 b	28.4	28.0	28.3	27.9	27.6	27.7	
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)				1.7 b	1.6	1.5 b	1.5 b	1.5	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.2	1.2	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)		74.9	75.6	75.9	76.3	76.7 b	77.3 b	77.2	77.6	77.7	77.6	77.9	78.2	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)		50.4	51.5	52.2	51.8	51.3 b	52.4 b	50.7	50.8	49.9	48.8	49.2	49.9	
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)		87.1	87.2	87.0	87.1	87.3 b	87.7 b	87.7	87.7	87.6	87.6	87.5	87.3	
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)		54.9	57.2	58.7	61.0	62.6 b	64.1 b	65.4	67.5	69.1	69.4	71.3	72.6	
Total unemployment (000)		4104	3473	3018	3098	2821	2399	2224	2182	2090	1950	1774	1621	
Unemployment rate (% labour force)		10.1	8.5	7.4	7.6	7.0	5.8	5.4	5.2	5.0	4.6	4.1	3.8	
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)		13.6	11.8	10.4	11.1	9.8	8.5	8.0	7.8	7.7	7.2	7.1	6.8	
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)		5.7	4.9	3.9	3.5	3.3 b	2.8 b	2.4	2.3	2.2	2.0	1.7	1.6	
Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)		55.7	56.0	51.8	44.9	46.8 b	47.6 b	45.1	44.4	44.0	43.6	40.8	41.7	
Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)		6.9	6.1	5.5	5.8	5.0 b	4.5 b	4.1	4.0	3.9	3.5	3.5	3.4	
Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)		53.8	54.6	55.3	54.9	55.4 b	56.7 b	57.6	58.1	58.0 b	58.7	59.4	60.1	
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)		72.5	74.4	75.3	75.5	76.3 b	77.6 b	78.2	78.9	79.7 b	79.9	81.0	81.6	
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)		84.3	85.5	85.8	86.4	87.0 b	88.0 b	88.0	87.9	88.1 b	88.1	88.3	88.6	
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)		68.7	70.5	71.7	71.9	72.7 b	74.0 b	74.2	74.8	75.1	75.4	76.5	77.3	
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)		65.5	67.2	68.1	67.8	68.4 b	71.0 b	71.9	72.4	73.4	73.9	75.7	76.4	
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)		46.3	48.4	50.0	50.6	51.6 b	53.8 b	55.0	54.9	54.7	54.2	51.4	52.3	
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)		69.0	70.7	71.7	71.9	72.5 b	73.8 b	74.0	74.5	74.9	75.2	76.2	77.0	
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)													77.6	
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)													62.6	
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)				5.9	5.4	5.4 b	4.6 b	4.3	4.2	3.9	3.7	3.4	3.2	
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)		2.3	2.2	2.0	1.4	1.3 b	1.2 b	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.1	
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)		1.4	1.4	1.4	1.6	1.3 b	1.4 b	1.3	1.3	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.2	

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Germany	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017		
Labour Market Indicators - Male	Total population (000)	40340	40301	40274	40184	40104	39125 b	39230	39381	39557	39835	40514	40697	
	Population aged 15-64(000)	27808	27629	27541	27386	27249	26509 b	26631	26745	26847	26968	27415	27400	
	Total employment (000)	20336	20745	21033	20816	20423 b	20802 b	21019	21143	21301	21454	22065	22289	
	Employment aged 15-64 (000)	20000	20378	20631	20401	20019 b	20338 b	20512	20584	20698	20808	21375	21552	
	Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	77.2	79.1	80.1	79.6	80.4 b	81.7 b	82.1	82.1	82.2	82.3	82.7	83.1	
	Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)	72.8	74.7	75.8	75.4	76.3 b	77.6 b	77.9	78.0	78.1	78.0	78.4	78.9	
	Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)	45.3	47.2	48.7	47.5	47.9 b	49.7 b	48.6	48.4	47.7	46.5	46.9	47.4	
	Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)	84.8	86.4	87.1	86.1	86.8 b	88.0 b	88.4	88.2	88.0	88.1	88.1	88.4	
	Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)	56.1	59.4	61.7	63.8	65.2 b	67.1 b	68.6	69.9	71.4	71.3	73.7	75.0	
	FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	74.1	75.9	77.1	76.5	77.3 b	78.3 b	78.6	78.6	78.7	78.7	79.1	79.4	
	Self-employed (% total employment)	14.1	13.9	13.6	14.0	14.0 b	14.1 b	14.0	13.6	13.3	13.1	12.6	12.3	
	Part-time employment (% total employment)	8.5	8.5	8.3	8.6	8.5 b	8.9 b	8.9	9.1	9.2	9.3	9.4	9.7	
	Temporary employment (% total employment)	12.7	12.7	12.8	12.5	12.4 b	12.5 b	11.9	11.6	11.4	11.5	11.7	11.5	
	Employment in Services (% total employment)			56.4 b	56.9	57.4 b	57.4 b	57.5	58.1	57.7	58.0	58.7	58.7	
	Employment in Industry (% total employment)			41.6 b	41.2	40.7 b	40.7 b	40.7	40.2	40.7	40.3	39.8	39.8	
	Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)			2.1 b	1.9	1.9 b	1.9 b	1.8	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.6	1.5	
	Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)	81.3	81.7	82.0	82.2	82.4 b	82.7 b	82.6	82.6	82.5	82.1	82.2	82.4	
	Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)	53.1	54.0	54.7	54.3	53.7 b	54.8 b	53.2	52.9	52.0	50.5	50.9	51.3	
	Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)	93.8	93.8	93.5	93.2	93.2 b	93.2 b	93.1	92.9	92.6	92.5	91.9	91.9	
	Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)	63.7	65.8	67.2	69.3	70.8 b	71.8 b	73.1	74.5	75.5	75.3	76.9	77.9	
	Total unemployment (000)	2245	1855	1609	1747	1611	1336	1236	1231	1188	1123	1028	957	
	Unemployment rate (% labour force)	10.2	8.4	7.3	8.0	7.4	6.1	5.6	5.5	5.3	5.0	4.5	4.1	
	Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)	14.6	12.4	10.8	12.2	10.6	9.2	8.7	8.5	8.3	7.9	7.8	7.6	
	Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)	5.7	4.8	3.9	3.6	3.5 b	3.0 b	2.6	2.5	2.4	2.3	1.9	1.8	
	Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)	55.6	56.1	52.5	43.9	47.5 b	49.0 b	46.5	45.0	45.8	45.3	42.6	43.5	
	Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)	7.9	6.8	6.0	6.8	5.8 b	5.0 b	4.6	4.5	4.3	4.0	4.0	3.9	
	Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)	64.6	65.5	66.3	64.9	65.7 b	67.0 b	67.8	67.8	67.4 b	68.0	68.4	68.5	
	Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)	77.8	80.0	81.0	80.3	81.0 b	82.3 b	82.9	83.1	83.5 b	83.5	84.4	85.0	
	Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)	87.6	89.1	89.4	89.7	90.3 b	91.1 b	91.4	91.3	91.3 b	91.3	91.3	91.7	
	Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)	73.9	75.8	76.8	76.5	77.1 b	78.3 b	78.5	78.6	78.7	78.7	79.7	80.3	
	Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)	73.2	74.6	76.0	74.2	75.8 b	78.5 b	79.6	80.4	81.5	81.5	83.0	84.1	
	Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)	57.1	59.2	61.6	61.1	63.1 b	66.0 b	66.3	66.5	65.4	64.8	59.2	59.8	
	Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)	74.0	75.7	76.7	76.3	76.8 b	77.9 b	78.1	78.1	78.3	78.2	79.2	79.9	
	Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)												84.8	
	Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)												69.2	
	Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)			2.8	2.7	2.7 b	2.4 b	2.2	2.1	2.0	1.9	1.7	1.8	
	Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)	1.8	1.9	1.7	1.2	1.2 b	1.1 b	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	
	Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.2	1.0 b	1.1 b	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.1	
	Labour Market Indicators - Female	Total population (000)	42098	42014	41944	41818	41699	41097 b	41098	41143	41211	41362	41662	41825
		Population aged 15-64(000)	27110	26945	26877	26748	26629	26253 b	26321	26381	26425	26454	26579	26564
		Total employment (000)	16837	17244	17509	17655	17571 b	17986 b	18108	18389	18570	18757	19203	19375
		Employment aged 15-64 (000)	16633	17019	17271	17407	17318 b	17708 b	17809	18056	18210	18368	18790	18929
		Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	65.0	66.7	67.8	68.7	69.7 b	71.3 b	71.6	72.5	73.1	73.6	74.5	75.2
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)		61.5	63.2	64.3	65.2	66.2 b	67.8 b	68.1	69.0	69.5	69.9	70.8	71.5	
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)		41.6	43.5	44.5	44.4	44.5 b	46.1 b	44.5	45.2	44.3	44.0	44.5	45.5	
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)		72.7	74.0	74.7	75.4	76.4 b	77.9 b	78.2	78.6	78.8	79.2	79.7	80.0	
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)		40.3	43.4	46.0	48.6	50.7 b	53.2 b	54.9	57.6	60.0	61.2	63.5	65.4	
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)		49.4	50.6	51.8	52.8	53.5 b	54.7 b	55.2	55.8	56.7	57.1	58.1	58.7	
Self-employed (% total employment)		7.5	7.5	7.3	7.4	7.6 b	7.6 b	7.6	7.4	7.3	7.2	7.1	7.0	
Part-time employment (% total employment)		45.4	45.6	45.2	44.9	45.3 b	45.4 b	45.3	46.7	46.3	46.6	46.5	46.4	
Temporary employment (% total employment)		13.1	13.4	13.5	13.6	13.6 b	13.6 b	12.7	12.4	12.2	12.2	12.3	12.0	
Employment in Services (% total employment)				83.7 b	84.2	84.5 b	84.6 b	84.7	85.0	84.8	85.2	85.3	85.3	
Employment in Industry (% total employment)				15.1 b	14.6	14.4 b	14.3 b	14.2	14.1	14.3	13.9	13.8	13.9	
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)				1.2 b	1.2	1.1 b	1.1 b	1.0	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.8	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)		68.5	69.4	69.7	70.4	70.9 b	71.9 b	71.9	72.6	72.9	73.1	73.6	74.0	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)		47.6	49.0	49.5	49.2	48.8 b	50.0 b	48.0	48.7	47.7	47.1	47.4	48.3	
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)		80.3	80.6	80.5	81.0	81.3 b	82.1 b	82.3	82.4	82.5	82.5	82.6	82.5	
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)		46.3	48.9	50.5	52.9	54.6 b	56.8 b	58.2	60.8	62.9	63.8	65.9	67.5	
Total unemployment (000)		1859	1618	1409	1350	1210	1063	989	951	902	827	746	664	
Unemployment rate (% labour force)		10.1	8.7	7.6	7.2	6.5	5.6	5.2	4.9	4.6	4.2	3.8	3.3	
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)		12.5	11.0	9.9	9.7	8.8	7.8	7.3	7.1	7.1	6.5	6.1	5.8	
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)		5.7	4.9	3.9	3.4	3.0 b	2.6 b	2.2	2.1	1.9	1.7	1.4	1.3	
Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)		55.9	55.8	51.1	46.3	46.0 b	45.8 b	43.4	43.5	41.6	41.3	38.2	39.0	
Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)		6.0	5.4	4.9	4.8	4.3 b	3.9 b	3.5	3.5	3.4	3.0	2.9	2.8	
Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)		46.4	47.3	47.7	48.0	48.3 b	49.5 b	50.4	51.1	50.9 b	51.5	52.0	52.9	
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)		67.3	68.9	69.8	70.7	71.8 b	73.0 b	73.6	74.6	76.0 b	76.5	77.7	78.3	
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)		79.8	80.6	81.1	82.2	82.9 b	84.2 b	83.9	84.0	84.0 b	84.1	84.6	84.7	
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)		63.5	65.2	66.4	67.2	68.2 b	69.7 b	69.9	70.9	71.5	72.1	73.3	74.1	
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)		57.5	59.4	59.8	60.7	61.0 b	63.5 b	63.9	63.9	64.4	65.3	67.2	67.5	
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)		35.1	37.4	38.4	40.2	40.7 b	42.5 b	44.2	44.0	44.5	43.7	42.9	43.8	
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)		63.9	65.6	66.7	67.4	68.2 b	69.7 b	69.8	70.8	71.4	72.1	73.2	74.1	
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)													70.3	
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)													55.7	
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)				9.6	8.5	8.5 b	7.3 b	6.7	6.6	6.1	5.7	5.2	4.8	
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)		2.8	2.6	2.4	1.5	1.5 b	1.4 b	1.3	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)		2.0	1.9	2.0	2.2	1.6 b	1.8 b	1.7	1.6	1.5	1.5	1.4	1.4	

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Germany		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	
All	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of total population)	20.2	20.6	20.1	20.0	19.7	19.9	19.6	20.3	20.6	20.0	19.7		
	At-risk-of-poverty (% of total population)	12.5	15.2	15.2	15.5	15.6	15.8	16.1	16.1	16.7	16.7	16.5		
	At-risk-of-poverty threshold (PPS single person)	9100	10395	10804	10770	10544	11037	11525	11687	11530	12219	12726		
	Poverty gap (%)	20.4	23.2	22.2	21.5	20.7	21.4	21.1	20.4	23.2	22.0	20.7		
	Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of total population)			7.2	8.1	9.1	10.4	10.4	10.6	9.5	11.3	10.5		
	At-risk-of-poverty before social transfers excl. pensions (% of total population)	25.7	24.8	24.2	24.1	24.2	25.1	24.3	24.4	25.0	25.1	25.3		
	Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (%)	51.4	38.7	37.2	35.7	35.5	37.1	33.7	34.0	33.2	33.5	34.8		
	Severe Material Deprivation (% of total population)	5.1	4.8	5.5	5.4	4.5	5.3	4.9	5.4	5.0	4.4	3.7	3.6 p	
	Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of people aged 0-59)	13.6	11.5	11.7	10.9	11.2	11.2	9.9	9.9	10.0	9.8	9.6		
	Real Gross Household Disposable income (growth %)	1.1	0.4	0.8	-0.4	0.4	1.0	1.1	0.5	1.6	2.0	2.3		
	Income quintile share ratio S80/S20	4.1	4.9	4.8	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.3	4.6	5.1	4.8	4.6		
	GINI coefficient	26.8	30.4	30.2	29.1	29.3	29.0	28.3	29.7	30.7	30.1	29.5		
	Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18-24)	13.7	12.5	11.8 b	11.1	11.8 b	11.6	10.5	9.8	9.5 b	10.1	10.3	10.1	
	NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of total population aged 15-24)	9.6	8.9	8.4 b	8.8	8.3 b	7.5 b	7.1	6.3	6.4	6.2	6.7	6.3	
Male	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of male population)	18.9	18.8	18.5	18.8	18.6	18.5	18.1	18.8	19.5	18.8	18.1		
	At-risk-of-poverty (% of male population)	12.1	14.1	14.2	14.7	14.9	14.9	14.9	15.0	15.9	15.9	15.2		
	Poverty gap (%)	21.4	24.4	23.7	22.3	21.5	22.6	21.8	20.9	24.0	22.8	22.0		
	Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of male population)			6.6	7.0	9.0	10.0	9.9	10.0	9.5	11.3	9.6		
	Severe Material Deprivation (% of male population)	5.0	4.3	5.3	5.3	4.4	5.0	4.5	5.2	4.8	4.2	3.4	3.1 p	
	Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of males aged 0-59)	12.3	10.5	10.9	10.5	10.7	10.5	9.2	9.4	9.8	9.5	9.1		
	Life expectancy at birth (years)	77.2	77.4	77.6 b	77.8	78.0	78.4	78.6	78.6	78.7	78.3 b	78.6		
	Healthy life years at birth (years) - men	58.7 bd	59.0	56.4 b	57.1	57.9	57.9	57.4	57.8	56.4	65.3 b	65.3		
	Early leavers from education and training (% of males aged 18-24)	14.0	13.1	12.4 b	11.5	12.5 b	12.5	11.1	10.2	10.0 b	10.4	11.0	11.1	
	NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of males aged 15-24)	8.9	8.0	7.5 b	8.2	7.6 b	6.7 b	6.3	5.6	5.5	5.4	6.1	5.8	
	Female	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of female population)	21.3	22.3	21.6	21.2	20.9	21.3	21.1	21.9	21.8	21.1	21.2	
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of female population)	13.0	16.3	16.2	16.3	16.4	16.8	17.2	17.2	17.4	17.4	17.8	
		Poverty gap (%)	19.2	22.4	21.1	20.8	19.6	20.6	20.6	20.1	22.6	21.5	19.5	
		Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of female population)			7.7	9.0	9.2	10.8	10.9	11.1	9.5	11.3	11.4	
Severe Material Deprivation (% of female population)		5.1	5.3	5.6	5.4	4.7	5.7	5.2	5.6	5.1	4.6	4.0	4.1 p	
Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of females aged 0-59)		14.8	12.6	12.4	11.3	11.7	11.9	10.7	10.5	10.2	10.1	10.2		
Life expectancy at birth (years)		82.4	82.7	82.7 b	82.8	83.0	83.2	83.3	83.2	83.6	83.1 b	83.5		
Healthy life years at birth (years) - women		58.3 bd	58.6	57.7 b	58.1	58.7	58.7	57.9	57.0	56.5	67.5 b	67.3		
Early leavers from education and training (% of females aged 18-24)		13.4	11.9	11.2 b	10.7	11.0 b	10.7	9.9	9.3	8.9 b	9.8	9.5	9.0	
NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of females aged 15-24)		10.4	9.8	9.5 b	9.4	9.0 b	8.3 b	7.9	7.0	7.2	7.0	7.4	6.7	
Children (0-17)		At-Risk-of-poverty or exclusion of children (% of people aged 0-17)	20.9	19.7	20.1	20.4	21.7	19.9	18.4	19.4	19.6	18.5	19.3	
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of Children population)	12.4	14.1	15.2	15.0	17.5	15.6	15.2	14.7	15.1	14.6	15.4	
		Severe Material Deprivation (% of Children population)	5.9	5.4	6.9	7.1	5.2	5.4	4.8	5.6	5.0	4.7	3.6	3.4 p
		Share of children living in low work intensity households (% of Children population)	11.0	9.2	9.1	9.0	8.9	8.6	6.8	6.9	7.0	7.1	8.3	
	Risk of poverty of children in households at work (Working Intensity > 0.2)	8.2	9.2	9.6	9.7	11.7	10.5	10.8	11.3	11.8	10.6	11.1		
	Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (0-17) (%)	63.3	53.6	50.3	50.8	46.7	52.7	50.7	51.7	50.0	53.4	52.8		
Working age (18-64)	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of Working age population)	21.9	21.9	21.5	21.1	20.8	21.3	21.2	22.0	22.0	21.3	20.2		
	At-risk-of-poverty (% of Working age population)	12.6	15.2	15.4	15.8	15.6	16.4	16.6	16.9	17.2	17.3	16.4		
	Severe Material Deprivation (% of Working age population)	5.7	5.5	6.1	5.8	5.2	6.0	5.5	6.0	5.6	5.0	4.0	4.0 p	
	Very low work intensity (18-59)	14.4	12.3	12.4	11.4	11.9	12.0	10.8	10.8	10.9	10.6	10.0		
	In-work at-risk-of poverty rate (% of persons employed 18-64)	5.5	7.4	7.1	6.8	7.1	7.7	7.7	8.6	9.9	9.6	9.5		
	Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (18-64) (%)	53.0	40.4	38.2	36.3	37.4	37.2	34.1	33.7	33.9	33.5	35.4		
Elderly (65+)	At-Risk-of-poverty or exclusion of elderly (% of people aged 65+)	13.5	16.8	15.5	16.0	14.8	15.3	15.8	16.0	17.4	17.2	18.3		
	At-risk-of-poverty (% of Elderly population)	12.5	16.2	14.9	15.0	14.1	14.2	15.0	14.9	16.3	16.5	17.6		
	Severe Material Deprivation (% of Elderly population)	2.1	2.2	2.1	2.5	2.1	3.2	2.8	3.2	3.2	2.4	2.7	2.3 p	
	Relative median income of elderly (ratio with median income of people younger than 65)	0.93	0.87	0.87	0.88	0.89	0.90	0.88	0.89	0.90	0.87	0.84		
	Aggregate replacement ratio (ratio)	0.46	0.46	0.44	0.47	0.49	0.51	0.47	0.47	0.45	0.46	0.46		
Expenditure in social protection indicators (% of GDP)	Sickness/Health care	7.7	7.7	8.0	9.4	9.2	9.1	9.3	9.5	9.6	9.7 p			
	Disability	2.1	2.0	2.1	2.2	2.2	2.1	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.3 p			
	Old age and survivors	11.5	11.1	11.1	11.8	11.4	11.0	11.0	10.9	10.9	10.9 p			
	Family/Children	2.8	2.7	2.8	3.1	3.1	3.1	3.1	3.1	3.1	3.2 p			
	Unemployment	1.8	1.5	1.4	1.8	1.6	1.3	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.0 p			
	Housing and Social exclusion n.e.c.	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.8 p			
	Total (including Admin and Other expenditures)	27.8	26.8	27.1	30.5	29.8	28.6	28.7	29.0	29.0	29.1 p			
	of which: Means tested benefits	3.4	3.2	3.1	3.5	3.4	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.4	3.5 p			

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Estonia

Estonia		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	
Macro Economic Indicators (Annual % growth)	Real GDP	10.3	7.7	-5.4	-14.7	2.3	7.6	4.3	1.9	2.9	1.7	2.1	4.9	
	Total employment	4.9	0.2	-0.2	-10.2	-4.9	6.5	1.6	1.2	0.8	2.9	0.3	2.7	
	Labour productivity	5.1	7.5	-5.2	-5.0	7.6	1.0	2.6	0.7	2.1	-1.2	1.8	2.1	
	Annual average hours worked per person employed	-0.4	-0.1	-1.5	-6.9	2.3	2.4	-1.7	-1.1	-0.3	-0.4	0.2	0.1	
	Real productivity per hour worked	5.5	7.7	-3.7	2.0	5.1	-1.3	4.4	1.8	2.5	-0.7	1.6	2.0	
	Harmonized CPI	4.4	6.7	10.6	0.2	2.7	5.1	4.2	3.2	0.5	0.1	0.8	3.7	
	Price deflator GDP	8.9	11.5	7.5	0.4	1.7	5.3	3.2	3.6	1.5	1.2	1.6	4.0	
	Nominal compensation per employee	14.8	25.6	10.6	-3.0	2.7	0.8	7.8	4.8	6.5	3.3	5.9	5.7	
	Real compensation per employee (GDP deflator)	5.5	12.6	2.9	-3.4	0.9	-4.3	4.5	1.2	4.9	2.1	4.2	1.6	
	Real compensation per employee (private consumption deflator)	9.9	17.6	0.0	-3.1	-0.1	-4.1	3.4	1.5	6.0	3.3	5.1	2.0	
	Nominal unit labour costs	9.2	16.8	16.7	2.2	-4.6	-0.2	5.0	4.1	4.3	4.5	4.0	3.5	
	Real unit labour costs	0.4	4.7	8.5	1.8	-6.2	-5.2	1.8	0.5	2.8	3.2	2.4	-0.4	
	Labour Market Indicators - Total	Total population (000)	1351	1343	1338	1336	1333	1330	1325	1320	1316	1315 b	1316	1316
		Population aged 15-64 (000)	920	911	906	903	899	894	885	875	866	859 b	854	848
Total employment (000)		652	658	656	594	568	603	615	621	625	641	645	659	
Employment aged 15-64 (000)		626	632	632	574	548	582	591	597	600	613	612	626	
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)		75.9	76.9	77.1	70.0	66.8	70.6	72.2	73.3	74.3	76.5	76.6	78.7	
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)		68.4	69.8	70.1	63.8	61.2	65.3	67.1	68.5	69.6	71.9	72.1	74.1	
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)		31.4	34.1	35.9	28.3	25.3	31.1	32.3	32.4	33.3	36.3	37.5	40.5	
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)		84.1	84.8	83.9	76.5	74.9	78.2	79.5	80.4	80.9	83.0	82.6	83.9	
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)		58.4	59.9	62.3	60.3	53.8	57.5	60.5	62.6	64.0	64.5	65.2	68.1	
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)		74.4	75.1	75.5	68.0	64.8	68.6	70.1	71.4	72.5	74.3	74.5	76.4	
Self-employed (% total employment)		8.0	8.9	7.7	8.2	8.3	8.5	8.6	8.9	8.9	9.2	9.4	10.0	
Part-time employment (% total employment)		6.8	7.1	6.4	9.4	9.8	9.3	9.2	8.9	8.3	9.5	9.9	9.5	
Temporary employment (% total employment)		2.8	2.4	3.1	2.7	4.4	5.0	4.1	3.6	2.9	3.4	3.4	2.9	
Employment in Services (% total employment)				60.4 bu	64.3 u	65.1 u	62.7	63.9	64.9	65.6	65.0	65.9	66.2	
Employment in Industry (% total employment)				35.8 bu	31.6 u	30.9 u	33.1	31.7	30.8	30.5	31.1	30.3	30.4	
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)				3.9 b	4.0	4.1	4.2	4.4	4.3	3.9	3.9	3.9	3.4	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)		72.8	73.2	74.2	74.0	73.9	74.7	74.8	75.1	75.2	76.7	77.5	78.8	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)		35.7	37.9	40.8	39.0	37.8	40.0	40.8	39.8	39.2	41.8	43.3	46.1	
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)		89.0	88.5	88.2	87.8	88.3	88.4	87.8	87.6	87.1	87.9	87.8	88.6	
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)		61.0	62.2	65.0	66.5	64.3	65.1	65.1	66.6	67.7	68.7	71.0	72.2	
Total unemployment (000)		41	32	38 d	93	114	85	68	59	50	42	47	40	
Unemployment rate (% labour force)		5.9	4.6	5.5 d	13.5	16.7	12.3	10.0	8.6	7.4	6.2	6.8	5.8	
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)		12.1	10.1	12.0 d	27.4	32.9	22.4	20.9	18.7	15.0	13.1	13.4	12.1	
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)		2.9	2.3	1.7	3.7	7.6	7.1	5.5	3.8	3.3	2.4	2.1	1.9	
Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)		48.6	49.8	31.1	27.3	45.3	57.3	54.7	44.5	45.3	38.3	31.6	33.5	
Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)		4.3	3.8	4.9	10.7	12.4	9.0	8.5	7.4	5.9	5.5	5.8	5.6	
Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)		56.1	56.8	58.1	47.5	45.2	48.5	50.3	58.2	60.6 b	58.6	62.7	66.1	
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)		77.9	79.4	79.6	71.6	68.8	74.0	74.4	74.5	75.3 b	77.7	76.9	78.8	
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)		87.6	87.3	85.8	82.7	79.7	79.9	82.3	83.0	84.0 b	85.7	84.9	85.7	
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)		68.6	69.7	69.8	64.3	62.2	65.8	67.9	69.0	70.3	72.5	72.9	74.7	
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)		65.9 u	64.0 u	80.4 u	69.2 u	62.6 u	58.8 u	59.3 u	63.2 u	77.5	57.8	70.4	78.6	
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)		67.6	70.3	71.1	61.3	56.1	62.6	63.4	65.4	64.8	68.4	67.2	70.6	
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)		67.8	69.0	69.3	63.2	61.5	65.5	67.1	68.5	69.8	72.1	72.3	74.4	
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)		65.5	76.2	77.2	74.0	61.4	61.9	59.2	62.6	71.7	66.8	71.8	76.4	
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)		72.6	74.3	74.9	67.6	59.3	64.3	67.6	68.8	67.6	70.5	70.3	71.1	
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)				0.7	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.5	1.2	1.0	1.2	1.2	0.7	
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)						0.3 u	0.2 u	0.4 u	0.3 u	0.4 u	0.4	0.6	0.7	
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)		4.6	4.2	3.4	5.4	6.0	6.4	6.0	5.1	4.8	4.1	4.7	4.2	

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Estonia		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	
Labour Market Indicators - Male	Total population (000)	628	624	622	621	621	620	618	616	615	615 b	617	618	
	Population aged 15-64(000)	448	444	442	441	440	438	434	430	427	424 b	423	421	
	Total employment (000)	330	335	334	291	278	303	309	315	320	328	329	338	
	Employment aged 15-64 (000)	317	324	323	282	269	295	300	305	309	317	317	324	
	Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	79.5	81.4	81.5	71.0	67.8	73.5	75.1	76.7	78.3	80.5	80.8	82.4	
	Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)	71.4	73.5	73.7	64.3	61.7	67.8	69.7	71.4	73.0	75.3	75.7	77.4	
	Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)	36.8	38.2	38.9	30.0	26.5	33.1	34.2	34.0	33.4	39.4	38.8	42.8	
	Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)	87.3	89.6	88.2	77.4	75.8	81.6	83.1	84.7	85.6	87.7	87.9	88.5	
	Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)	57.3	59.0	64.7	59.3	51.9	57.2	59.2	61.4	65.1	63.1	63.7	66.6	
	FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	79.0	80.6	80.9	69.8	66.6	72.9	74.3	75.7	77.1	79.4	79.7	81.2	
	Self-employed (% total employment)	11.3	12.5	10.6	11.4	11.5	11.9	12.3	12.1	12.2	11.9	12.1	13.6	
	Part-time employment (% total employment)	3.8	3.9	3.6	6.2	6.1	5.0	5.1	5.5	5.7	6.0	6.8	6.0	
	Temporary employment (% total employment)	2.8	2.4	3.1	2.7	4.4	5.0	4.1	3.6	2.9	3.4	3.4	2.9	
	Employment in Services (% total employment)			46.5 bu		50.8 u	47.7 u	48.8 u	50.5 u	52.4 u	51.5 u	52.7 u	52.9 u	
	Employment in Industry (% total employment)			48.2 bu		43.7 u	46.2 u	44.9 u	43.3 u	42.3 u	43.5 u	41.7 u	42.1 u	
	Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)			5.4 b	5.6	5.6	6.1	6.3	6.2	5.3	5.1	5.6	5.0	
	Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)	76.2	77.8	78.4	77.7	76.8	78.2	78.4	78.6	79.3	80.4	81.9	82.7	
	Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)	40.9	43.5	44.5	43.8	41.2	43.4	44.3	41.4	41.4	45.7	46.1	49.7	
	Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)	92.6	93.5	92.8	91.9	91.8	92.1	92.3	92.2	92.6	92.6	93.7	93.3	
	Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)	61.5	63.4	68.3	67.3	64.3	67.0	65.3	66.9	69.1	67.7	70.4	72.0	
	Total unemployment (000)	22	19	20 d	58	66	45	38	31	27	22	26	22	
	Unemployment rate (% labour force)	6.2	5.4	5.8 d	16.7	19.3	13.1	10.9	9.1	7.9	6.2	7.4	6.2	
	Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)	10.0	12.2	12.6 d	31.6	35.6	23.8	22.8	17.7	19.3	13.8	15.8	13.9	
	Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)	3.2	2.9	2.0	4.4	9.3	7.9	6.1	4.2	3.9	2.5	2.4	2.2	
	Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)	51.2	53.3	35.5	26.6	48.3	60.5	55.5	46.6	50.2	40.8	32.8	36.0	
	Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)	4.1	5.3	5.6	13.8	14.7	10.3	10.1	7.3	8.0	6.3	7.3	6.9	
	Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)	62.0	63.9	65.6	51.7	46.5	53.2	54.1	62.5	66.1 b	63.4	68.1	71.2	
	Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)	82.1	84.7	83.8	72.8	71.9	78.1	79.1	79.4	81.3 b	82.9	81.8	83.0	
	Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)	90.8	91.5	92.4	87.3	81.1	84.3	86.2	87.6	89.5 b	91.0	91.3	91.1	
	Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)	70.8	72.6	73.2	65.1	62.5	67.9	69.6	71.5	72.9	75.4	75.8	77.3	
	Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)	91.4 u		93.1 u	66.1 u	59.8 u	54.9 u	68.6 u		83.2 u	76.5 u	89.0	83.1	
	Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)	73.6	77.3	75.8	61.2	58.1	67.7	69.8	70.6	72.7	74.9	74.5	77.5	
	Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)	70.8	72.9	72.8	63.8	61.9	67.5	69.5	71.3	72.8	75.3	75.5	77.4	
	Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)	70.6 u	88.2 u	94.2 u	75.5 u	58.8 u	51.6 u	58.2 u	52.9 u	73.6	73.9	79.3	77.6	
	Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)	75.5	77.1	79.6	68.1	60.7	71.0	71.8	73.1	74.7	75.8	76.5	77.5	
	Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)			0.6 u	1.7	1.3	1.0	1.1	1.0	0.9	0.8	1.0	0.5 u	
	Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)										0.4 u	0.6 u	0.6 u	
	Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)	4.3	4.3	3.5	5.5	5.7	6.1	6.0	4.7	4.3	3.5	4.5	3.9	
	Labour Market Indicators - Female	Total population (000)	723	719	716	714	712	710	707	704	701	700 b	699	698
		Population aged 15-64(000)	472	467	464	462	459	456	451	445	439	435 b	431	426
		Total employment (000)	322	323	322	303	290	301	306	307	305	313	315	321
		Employment aged 15-64 (000)	309	309	309	292	279	287	291	292	291	296	295	302
		Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	72.5	72.6	72.9	69.0	65.9	67.8	69.4	70.1	70.6	72.6	72.6	75.1
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)		65.6	66.2	66.6	63.2	60.8	63.0	64.7	65.7	66.3	68.5	68.6	70.9	
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)		25.8	29.8	32.9	26.7	24.1	29.0	30.3	30.7	33.3	33.1	36.1	38.2	
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)		80.9	80.1	79.7	75.7	74.0	75.0	75.8	76.1	76.1	78.2	77.2	79.2	
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)		59.3	60.7	60.5	61.1	55.3	57.8	61.5	63.6	63.1	65.7	66.5	69.3	
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)		70.1	70.1	70.6	66.3	63.3	64.7	66.3	67.3	68.1	69.5	69.6	71.9	
Self-employed (% total employment)		4.6	5.2	4.7	5.1	5.2	5.0	4.8	5.6	5.5	6.4	6.6	6.3	
Part-time employment (% total employment)		9.8	10.6	9.4	12.6	13.4	13.8	13.3	12.4	11.2	13.4	13.3	13.3	
Temporary employment (% total employment)		2.0	1.5	1.4	1.8	2.5	3.3	2.3	2.7	2.8	2.8	3.3	2.7	
Employment in Services (% total employment)														
Employment in Industry (% total employment)														
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)				2.3 b	2.6	2.6	2.3	2.5	2.3	2.3	2.6	2.0	1.8	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)		69.6	68.9	70.3	70.6	71.1	71.5	71.4	71.8	71.3	73.0	73.2	75.1	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)		30.4	32.1	37.1	34.1	34.3	36.5	37.2	38.2	37.0	37.7	40.4	42.4	
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)		85.5	83.6	83.7	83.8	84.8	84.7	83.5	82.9	82.0	83.0	81.8	83.7	
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)		60.6	61.2	62.4	66.0	64.3	63.5	65.0	66.5	66.5	69.4	71.4	72.4	
Total unemployment (000)		19	13	17 d	35	48	39	31	27	22	20	20	18	
Unemployment rate (% labour force)		5.6	3.8	5.1 d	10.3	14.1	11.6	9.1	8.2	6.8	6.1	6.1	5.3	
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)		15.1	7.2	11.3 d	21.8	29.5	20.7	18.5	19.8	10.0	12.2	10.6	10.0	
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)		2.6	1.7	1.3	2.9	5.8	6.2	4.9	3.4	2.7	2.2	1.8	1.6	
Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)		45.7	44.4	26.1	28.6	41.1	53.7	53.6	42.1	39.4	35.7	30.1	30.3	
Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)		4.6	2.3	4.2	7.4	10.1	7.5	6.9	7.5	3.7	4.6	4.3	4.2	
Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)		47.7	47.3	48.9	41.4	43.3	41.3	44.3	50.7	50.0 b	50.7	52.6	56.3	
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)		73.6	73.5	74.8	70.2	65.1	69.3	68.8	68.7	68.4 b	71.3	70.8	73.5	
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)		85.6	84.7	82.0	80.2	78.9	77.3	80.0	80.3	80.8 b	82.7	81.1	82.5	
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)		66.6	67.0	66.9	63.5	62.0	63.9	66.2	66.8	67.9	69.8	70.2	72.2	
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)									59.3 u	70.6 u			71.0 u	
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)		60.7	62.5	65.5	61.4	53.9	56.7	55.8	59.2	55.7	60.3	58.7	61.4	
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)		64.9	65.2	66.1	62.6	61.2	63.5	64.8	65.7	66.8	68.9	69.1	71.5	
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)		61.6 u	67.9 u			65.6 u	75.5 u	60.3 u	69.7 u	69.8	60.4 u	61.1 u	74.9	
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)		70.1	72.1	70.8	67.1	58.2	58.9	64.6	65.7	61.9	65.8	65.4	65.4	
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)				0.8 u	1.9	2.3	2.6	1.9	1.4	1.1	1.7	1.5	0.8	
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)						0.5 u	0.3 u	0.6 u	0.4 u	0.5 u	0.5 u	0.7 u	0.9	
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)		4.9	4.0	3.2	5.3	6.2	6.7	6.0	5.5	5.2	4.6	5.1	4.6	

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Estonia		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	
All	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of total population)	22.0	22.0	21.8	23.4	21.7	23.1	23.4	23.5	26.0 b	24.2	24.4		
	At-risk-of-poverty (% of total population)	18.3	19.4	19.5	19.7	15.8	17.5	17.5	18.6	21.8	21.6	21.7		
	At-risk-of-poverty threshold (PPS single person)	3376	3895	4538	4861	4448	4491	4734	5164	5545 b	6259	7116		
	Poverty gap (%)	22.0	20.2	20.3	17.0	23.2	26.0	23.8	21.5	22.0 b	21.0	20.5		
	Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of total population)		11.1	13.6	12.9	9.9	10.5	12.0	9.3	11.2 b	13.1	13.5		
	At-risk-of-poverty before social transfers excl. pensions (% of total population)	24.6	25.2	24.7	25.9	24.9	24.9	24.8	25.4	28.4 b	27.8	28.9		
	Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (%)	25.6	23.0	21.1	23.9	36.6	29.7	29.4	26.8	23.2 b	22.3	24.9		
	Severe Material Deprivation (% of total population)	7.0	5.6	4.9	6.2	9.0	8.7	9.4	7.6	6.2	4.5	4.7	4.1 p	
	Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of people aged 0-59)	7.1	6.2	5.3	5.6	9.0	10.0	9.1	8.4	7.6 b	6.6	5.8		
	Real Gross Household Disposable income (growth %)	10.2	11.1	4.6	-8.9	-4.0	3.0	3.1	2.5	4.6	5.5	3.9		
	Income quintile share ratio S80/S20	5.5	5.5	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.3	5.4	5.5	6.5 b	6.2	5.6		
	GINI coefficient	33.1	33.4	30.9	31.4	31.3	31.9	32.5	32.9	35.6 b	34.8	32.7		
	Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18-24)	13.4	14.4	14.0	13.5 b	11.0	10.6	10.3	9.7	12.0 b	12.2	10.9	10.8	
	NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of total population aged 15-24)	8.8	8.9	8.7	14.5 b	14.0	11.6	12.2	11.3	11.7	10.8	9.1	9.4	
Male	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of male population)	20.0	19.4	18.9	21.1	21.5	23.2	22.3	22.5	24.5 b	22.2	21.9		
	At-risk-of-poverty (% of male population)	16.3	16.7	16.5	17.5	15.4	17.6	16.8	17.2	20.1	19.6	19.2		
	Poverty gap (%)	26.5	24.2	23.8	20.7	25.9	27.9	27.6	27.4	29.4 b	28.3	26.3		
	Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of male population)		9.5	10.1	11.5	7.8	9.9	11.6	8.6	11.0 b	11.5	11.4		
	Severe Material Deprivation (% of male population)	6.8	5.4	4.8	6.2	9.3	8.8	9.5	8.1	6.2	4.3	4.6	3.6 p	
	Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of males aged 0-59)	7.7	6.6	6.0	6.5	9.7	10.9	9.6	9.5	8.6 b	7.3	6.6		
	Life expectancy at birth (years)	67.4	67.5	68.9 b	69.8	70.9	71.4	71.4	72.8	72.4	73.2	73.3		
	Healthy life years at birth (years) - men	49.6	49.8	53.1 b	55.0	54.2	54.3	53.1	53.9	53.2	53.8	54.4		
	Early leavers from education and training (% of males aged 18-24)	19.5	21.4	19.8	17.9 b	14.4	12.8	13.3	13.6	16.0 b	14.2	14.3	14.2	
	NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of males aged 15-24)	6.6	8.5	8.0	14.4 b	14.6	11.8	11.2	10.8	11.8	9.0	6.8	8.4	
	Female	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of female population)	23.7	24.2	24.3	25.5	22.0	22.9	24.4	24.4	27.3 b	26.0	26.7	
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of female population)	19.9	21.7	22.0	21.6	16.2	17.4	18.1	19.9	23.3	23.3	24.0	
		Poverty gap (%)	19.9	18.4	19.3	15.5	20.0	24.0	21.8	16.9	17.5 b	16.9	18.0	
		Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of female population)		12.5	16.5	13.9	11.7	11.0	12.3	9.9	11.4 b	14.4	15.5	
Severe Material Deprivation (% of female population)		7.2	5.8	4.9	6.3	8.7	8.6	9.3	7.1	6.2	4.7	4.8	4.5 p	
Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of females aged 0-59)		6.5	5.8	4.7	4.8	8.3	9.2	8.6	7.3	6.5 b	5.9	5.0		
Life expectancy at birth (years)		78.6	78.9	79.5 b	80.2	80.8	81.3	81.5	81.7	81.9	82.2	82.2		
Healthy life years at birth (years) - women		53.9	54.9	57.5 b	59.2	58.2	57.9	57.2	57.1	57.1	56.2	59.0		
Early leavers from education and training (% of females aged 18-24)		6.9	7.2	8.3	9.1 b	7.6	8.4	7.3	5.8	7.9 b	10.0	7.4	7.3	
NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of females aged 15-24)		11.0	9.2	9.4	14.5 b	13.5	11.4	13.2	11.8	11.6	12.8	11.6	10.5	
Children (0-17)		At-Risk-of-poverty or exclusion of children (% of people aged 0-17)	24.1	20.1	19.4	24.5	24.0	24.8	22.4	22.3	23.8 b	22.5	21.2	
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of Children population)	20.1	18.2	17.1	20.6	17.3	19.5	17.0	18.1	19.7	20.0	18.6	
		Severe Material Deprivation (% of Children population)	7.6	4.1	5.3	7.0	10.7	9.1	9.2	7.0	5.7	3.9	4.0	3.4 p
		Share of children living in low work intensity households (% of Children population)	6.5	4.6	3.8	4.5	8.4	9.2	6.9	6.6	6.5 b	5.2	3.8	
	Risk of poverty of children in households at work (Working Intensity > 0.2)	15.3	14.4	14.3	17.8	12.1	13.7	12.8	13.4	16.1 b	16.6	16.2		
	Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (0-17) (%)	34.3	35.5	35.0	30.6	44.4	35.9	40.6	34.2	30.9 b	31.0	38.6		
Working age (18-64)	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of Working age population)	19.8	19.1	17.5	19.9	21.8	24.2	24.2	22.7	24.0 b	21.0	20.3		
	At-risk-of-poverty (% of Working age population)	15.9	16.1	15.0	15.8	15.6	18.0	17.7	17.3	19.4	17.9	17.1		
	Severe Material Deprivation (% of Working age population)	6.8	5.5	4.5	6.1	9.1	9.3	10.0	8.0	6.3	4.4	4.7	3.7 p	
	Very low work intensity (18-59)	7.3	6.8	5.8	5.9	9.1	10.3	9.8	9.0	7.9 b	7.0	6.5		
	In-work at-risk-of poverty rate (% of persons employed 18-64)	7.8	7.9	7.4	8.3	6.7	8.2	8.5	7.7	11.8 b	10.3	9.9		
	Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (18-64) (%)	27.4	25.1	24.6	28.2	37.6	30.2	28.9	28.8	25.7 b	26.3	29.6		
Elderly (65+)	At-Risk-of-poverty or exclusion of elderly (% of people aged 65+)	27.8	35.4	40.9	35.6	19.0	17.0	21.8	28.0	35.0 b	37.0	41.4		
	At-risk-of-poverty (% of Elderly population)	25.1	33.2	39.0	33.9	15.1	13.1	17.2	24.4	32.6	35.8	40.2		
	Severe Material Deprivation (% of Elderly population)	7.4	7.9	5.8	5.6	6.6	5.8	7.1	6.3	6.4	5.2	5.4	6.0 p	
	Relative median income of elderly (ratio with median income of people younger than 65)	0.69	0.65	0.62	0.66	0.73	0.75	0.72	0.69	0.63 b	0.62	0.60		
	Aggregate replacement ratio (ratio)	0.49	0.47	0.45	0.52	0.55	0.54	0.50	0.50	0.47 b	0.43	0.45		
Expenditure in social protection indicators (% of GDP)	Sickness/Health care	3.7	4.0	4.7	5.3	4.7	4.3	4.2	4.1	4.4	4.6			
	Disability	1.1	1.1	1.4	1.8	1.9	1.8	1.7	1.8	1.8	1.8			
	Old age and survivors	5.4	5.2	6.2	7.9	7.7	6.8	6.6	6.6	6.6	7.1			
	Family/Children	1.4	1.4	1.7	2.2	2.2	1.9	1.7	1.6	1.6	2.1			
	Unemployment	0.1	0.1	0.3	1.2	0.7	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.4			
	Housing and Social exclusion n.e.c.	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1			
	Total (including Admin and Other expenditures)	12.0	12.0	14.7	18.8	17.6	15.6	15.0	14.8	15.1	16.4			
	of which: Means tested benefits	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1			

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Ireland

Ireland		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	
Macro Economic Indicators (Annual % growth)	Real GDP	5.5	5.2	-3.9	-4.6	1.8	3.0	0.0	1.6	8.3	25.6	5.1	7.8	
	Total employment	4.6	4.4	-0.6	-7.8	-4.1	-0.5 b	-0.6	2.5	1.7	2.5	2.8	1.9 b	
	Labour productivity	0.9	0.8	-3.3	3.5	6.1	3.6 b	0.6	-0.9	6.5	22.5	2.3	5.8 b	
	Annual average hours worked per person employed	-0.2	-0.7	-1.1	-1.7	-0.6	-5.5 b	0.3 b	0.7	0.7	0.6	-0.1	0.0 b	
	Real productivity per hour worked	1.1	1.6	-2.2	5.3	6.7	9.6 b	0.3	-1.5	5.8	21.8	2.4	5.8 b	
	Harmonized CPI	2.7	2.9	3.1	-1.7	-1.6	1.2	1.9	0.5	0.3	0.0	-0.2	0.3	
	Price deflator GDP	3.0	1.3	-0.9	-5.0	-3.2	-0.4	2.1	1.0	-0.4	7.3	0.0	-0.3	
	Nominal compensation per employee	4.4	5.8	3.9	-1.1	-3.6	0.9 b	0.3 b	0.2	1.8	2.1	2.0	2.9 b	
	Real compensation per employee (GDP deflator)	1.4	4.4	4.9	4.1	-0.4	1.3 b	-1.7 b	-0.8	2.2	-4.8	2.0	3.3 b	
	Real compensation per employee (private consumption deflator)	1.7	2.8	0.7	0.6	-2.0	-0.4 b	-1.5 b	-0.3	1.5	2.1	2.3	2.6 b	
	Nominal unit labour costs	3.5	4.9	7.5	-4.5	-9.1	-2.6 b	-0.3	1.1	-4.4	-16.6	-0.2	-2.7 b	
	Real unit labour costs	0.5	3.5	8.5	0.5	-6.1	-2.2 b	-2.3 b	0.0	-4.0	-22.3	-0.3	-2.4 b	
	Labour Market Indicators - Total	Total population (000)	4208	4340	4458	4521	4549	4571	4589	4610	4638	4678	4726	4784
		Population aged 15-64 (000)	2884	2992	3070	3094	3086	3072	3058	3053	3057	3071	3097	3129
Total employment (000)		2044	2221 b	2199	2015	1926	1888	1880	1938	1989	2058	2133	2194 b	
Employment aged 15-64 (000)		2005	2177 b	2152	1970	1879	1841	1831	1885	1932	1994	2067	2125 b	
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)		74.7	75.1 b	73.5	68.0	65.5	64.6	64.4	66.5	68.1	69.9	71.4	73.0	
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)		71.2	71.8 b	69.7	63.6	61.0	60.0	59.9	61.7	63.1	64.7	66.5	67.7	
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)		62.2	63.0 b	57.1	45.3	38.7	36.2	34.8	36.6	36.8	37.8	42.1	40.0	
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)		78.3	78.6 b	77.3	72.2	70.1	69.1	69.4	71.2	73.0	74.6	75.7	77.9	
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)		53.2	53.9 b	53.8	51.3	50.3	50.1	49.4	51.3	53.0	55.6	57.2	58.6	
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)		68.0	69.4 b	67.6	61.4	58.6	57.4	57.2	59.2	60.9	62.8	64.4	66.4 b	
Self-employed (% total employment)		15.7	15.4 b	15.9	16.5	16.2	16.0	15.8	16.0	15.8	15.5	15.3	14.7 b	
Part-time employment (% total employment)		17.4	18.2 b	19.0	21.7	22.9	23.8	24.1	24.2	23.6	22.8	22.6	20.4	
Temporary employment (% total employment)		6.3	6.2 b	6.3	6.4	7.4	8.1	8.1	8.4	7.7	7.4	6.8	7.0 b	
Employment in Services (% total employment)				72.0 b	75.2	76.8	77.5	77.9	77.7	77.9	77.3	76.8	76.8 b	
Employment in Industry (% total employment)				23.5 b	20.0	18.2	17.7	17.2	17.5	17.6	18.3	18.8	19.0 b	
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)				4.5 b	4.8	5.0	4.9	4.9	4.9	4.5	4.4	4.4	4.2 b	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)		74.9	75.6 b	74.8	73.0	71.6	71.2	71.1	71.8	71.8	72.0	72.7	72.6	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)		68.1	69.4 b	66.0	60.1	53.9	51.4	50.3	49.9	48.0	47.4	50.6	46.7	
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)		81.6	82.1 b	82.0	81.2	80.7	80.4	80.7	81.3	81.7	81.9	81.9	82.8	
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)		54.6	55.2 b	55.7	54.8	55.1	55.5	55.2	57.5	58.6	60.3	61.1	62.2	
Total unemployment (000)		107	117	160	291	328	343	344	309	268	226	195	158	
Unemployment rate (% labour force)		4.8	5.0	6.8	12.7	14.6	15.4	15.5	13.8	11.9	10.0	8.4	6.7	
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)		8.9	9.3	13.6	24.8	28.4	29.9	31.1	27.0	23.7	20.5	17.0	14.5	
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)		1.4	1.4 b	1.7	3.6	6.9	8.8	9.2	8.0	6.7	5.4	4.3	3.0	
Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)		30.0	28.3 b	25.1	28.2	47.5	57.0	59.4	57.9	56.2	54.3	51.1	45.3	
Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)		4.7	6.4 b	8.9	14.7	15.2	15.2	15.5	13.3	11.2	9.6	8.5	6.7 b	
Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)		58.8	58.4 b	56.7	50.6	47.7	45.9	44.1	46.9	46.5 b	48.6	49.2	50.9 b	
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)		77.2	76.8 b	75.2	69.3	66.1	64.5	65.1	65.8	67.9 b	68.9	71.0	71.9 b	
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)		86.1	86.6 b	85.3	82.1	80.8	80.4	80.1	80.5	81.7 b	82.8	83.4	84.9 b	
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)		68.1	71.1 b	69.1	63.4	61.0	59.9	59.7	61.5	62.9	64.6	66.0	67.1 b	
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)		76.7	79.0 b	75.2	67.0	63.7	63.2	64.0	66.4	67.6	68.9	71.8	73.7 b	
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)		62.3	67.2 b	66.5	59.1	54.8	55.6	53.0	53.6	54.6	55.6	60.0	61.0 b	
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)		68.1	71.1 b	69.1	63.6	61.1	60.0	59.9	61.6	62.9	64.6	66.1	67.2 b	
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)		74.5	77.1 b	73.6	65.4	62.4	61.6	62.1	64.8	66.0	67.9	70.7	72.2 b	
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)		63.0	67.6 b	67.4	59.6	55.9	56.0	55.3	56.7	58.1	59.4	61.6	62.5 b	
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)					5.0	5.2	6.4	6.9	6.9	6.0	5.3	4.8	4.6	
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)		0.3	0.3 b	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.5	
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)		0.6	0.5 b	0.6	1.4	1.7	1.9	1.9	1.7	1.3	1.0	0.9	2.6 b	

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Ireland	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017		
Labour Market Indicators - Male	Total population (000)	2103	2173	2227	2253	2261	2269	2274	2283	2296	2313	2339	2368	
	Population aged 15-64(000)	1457	1514	1548	1553	1542	1532	1521	1517	1517	1521	1535	1550	
	Total employment (000)	1179	1265 b	1232	1091	1032	1009	1003	1044	1077	1116	1154	1187 b	
	Employment aged 15-64 (000)	1149	1232 b	1197	1058	998	975	967	1007	1037	1072	1108	1137 b	
	Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	84.6	84.2 b	81.4	73.1	69.9	68.9	68.8	71.8	74.0	76.1	77.5	79.1	
	Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)	80.7	80.4 b	77.0	68.2	64.9	63.8	63.7	66.4	68.3	70.2	71.8	73.0	
	Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)	67.3	66.8 b	58.5	42.9	36.5	34.2	32.5	36.0	36.8	38.4	42.3	40.2	
	Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)	88.3	87.8 b	85.6	78.0	75.2	74.1	74.6	77.0	79.3	81.1	82.2	84.5	
	Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)	66.8	67.5 b	66.0	60.6	57.7	56.7	55.4	58.8	60.8	64.5	65.4	66.8	
	FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	82.4	83.0 b	79.9	70.4	66.8	65.3	64.9	67.9	70.2	72.4	73.9	76.0 b	
	Self-employed (% total employment)	22.8	22.4 b	23.2	24.8	24.2	23.9	23.7	23.5	23.1	22.6	22.1	21.2 b	
	Part-time employment (% total employment)	7.1	7.6 b	8.3	11.1	12.2	13.2	14.0	14.2	13.9	13.1	13.1	11.1	
	Temporary employment (% total employment)	6.3	6.2 b	6.3	6.4	7.4	8.1	8.1	8.4	7.7	7.4	6.8	7.0 b	
	Employment in Services (% total employment)			58.7 b	63.1	65.5	66.5	67.4	67.2	67.5	66.3	65.7	65.5 b	
	Employment in Industry (% total employment)			34.4 b	29.3	26.6	25.6	24.7	25.0	25.4	26.8	27.2	27.9 b	
	Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)			6.9 b	7.6	7.9	8.0	7.9	7.8	7.1	7.0	7.1	6.6 b	
	Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)	84.8	84.8 b	83.6	80.7	78.7	78.0	77.8	78.4	78.6	79.0	79.2	78.8	
	Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)	74.2	74.5 b	70.0	62.7	56.0	53.6	51.9	51.6	50.2	50.2	52.7	47.9	
	Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)	91.9	91.6 b	91.4	89.8	88.9	88.4	88.6	88.8	89.4	89.5	89.2	90.1	
	Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)	68.5	69.2 b	68.5	65.6	64.2	63.9	63.5	66.7	68.0	70.7	70.4	70.9	
	Total unemployment (000)	60	67	102	194	213	217	216	182	157	134	115	90	
	Unemployment rate (% labour force)	4.7	5.1	7.7	15.2	17.2	17.8	17.8	14.9	12.8	10.8	9.1	7.1	
	Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)	9.3	10.3	16.6	31.8	35.0	36.3	37.7	30.5	26.8	23.7	19.8	16.1	
	Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)	1.7	1.7 b	2.2	4.7	9.0	11.2	11.8	9.6	7.9	6.5	5.1	3.5	
	Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)	36.8	33.4 b	28.6	31.3	52.6	63.1	66.2	64.6	62.0	59.8	56.7	49.0	
	Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)	5.3	7.6 b	11.5	19.8	19.5	19.4	19.4	15.7	13.3	11.8	10.4	7.7 b	
	Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)	74.4	72.7 b	69.2	60.4	56.6	53.9	52.3	56.6	57.5 b	60.5	60.5	62.3 b	
	Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)	89.4	88.9 b	86.5	77.0	73.0	71.5	72.1	73.5	76.5 b	77.8	80.1	81.6 b	
	Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)	91.6	91.8 b	90.8	86.6	84.7	84.7	84.6	85.4	86.5 b	87.7	88.2	89.5 b	
	Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)	77.2	79.7 b	76.3	67.7	64.6	63.3	63.2	65.8	67.6	69.6	70.8	72.0 b	
	Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)	86.1	86.9 b	82.5	72.4	68.9	68.4	69.0	72.9	74.9	77.4	80.2	81.1 b	
	Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)	72.7	77.2 b	76.4	67.0	62.0	63.5	60.5	62.0	63.6	63.8	70.0	71.2 b	
	Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)	77.1	79.7 b	76.3	67.8	64.6	63.5	63.2	65.7	67.6	69.6	70.8	72.0 b	
	Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)	84.6	85.6 b	81.5	70.8	67.3	65.9	66.6	71.4	72.8	75.2	78.2	78.7 b	
	Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)	73.2	77.3 b	76.6	67.3	63.1	63.4	63.1	64.3	67.1	66.6	70.9	71.8 b	
	Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)				3.9	4.1	5.1	5.6	5.6	5.1	4.5	4.1	3.6	
	Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)	0.3	0.3 b	0.3	0.4	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.5	0.5	0.4	
	Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)	0.5	0.5 b	0.7	1.7	2.2	2.3	2.1	1.9	1.5	1.1	1.0	2.3 b	
	Labour Market Indicators - Female	Total population (000)	2105	2167	2231	2269	2288	2301	2315	2326	2342	2364	2387	2416
		Population aged 15-64(000)	1427	1478	1522	1541	1544	1540	1537	1536	1540	1550	1562	1579
		Total employment (000)	865	956 b	967	925	894	880	878	893	912	941	980	1008 b
		Employment aged 15-64 (000)	855	945 b	955	912	881	866	864	878	895	922	959	988 b
		Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	64.7	65.8 b	65.4	62.8	61.1	60.2	60.2	61.2	62.3	63.8	65.4	67.0
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)		61.5	62.9 b	62.2	59.0	57.1	56.3	56.2	57.1	58.0	59.3	61.2	62.4	
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)		56.9	59.1 b	55.6	47.8	40.9	38.2	37.2	37.2	36.8	37.3	41.8	39.8	
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)		67.9	69.2 b	68.9	66.5	65.1	64.2	64.4	65.7	66.8	68.4	69.5	71.6	
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)		39.3	40.0 b	41.4	41.8	42.8	43.6	43.3	43.9	45.2	46.9	49.1	50.6	
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)		54.4	56.5 b	56.1	53.3	51.4	50.5	50.6	51.5	52.7	54.4	56.0	57.9 b	
Self-employed (% total employment)		5.9	6.2 b	6.6	6.8	7.1	7.0	6.8	7.3	7.2	7.2	7.3	7.1 b	
Part-time employment (% total employment)		31.2	32.2 b	32.4	34.1	34.9	35.7	35.4	35.6	34.8	34.2	33.5	31.2	
Temporary employment (% total employment)		9.6	9.9 b	9.9	9.7	10.0	10.3	10.2	9.8	9.4	8.8	8.4	8.6 b	
Employment in Services (% total employment)														
Employment in Industry (% total employment)														
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)				1.5 b	1.5	1.7	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.4	1.3	1.4 b	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)		64.7	66.2 b	66.0	65.3	64.5	64.4	64.5	65.4	65.2	65.2	66.3	66.6	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)		61.9	64.2 b	61.9	57.4	51.7	49.1	48.6	48.1	45.8	44.6	48.4	45.5	
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)		71.0	72.4 b	72.5	72.6	72.5	72.7	72.9	74.0	74.2	74.5	74.8	75.8	
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)		40.5	41.0 b	42.7	43.9	45.9	46.9	46.8	48.4	49.2	50.1	51.9	53.7	
Total unemployment (000)		46	50	59	97	115	126	128	127	111	92	80	68	
Unemployment rate (% labour force)		4.9	4.9	5.7	9.5	11.4	12.5	12.8	12.4	10.9	8.9	7.6	6.3	
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)		8.3	8.0	10.2	17.1	21.2	22.7	23.9	23.1	20.1	16.6	13.8	12.7	
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)		1.0	1.1 b	1.1	2.1	4.3	5.8	6.1	6.0	5.2	4.1	3.3	2.5	
Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)		21.3	21.5 b	18.9	21.9	37.9	46.4	48.1	48.3	48.0	46.4	43.1	40.2	
Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)		4.1	5.1 b	6.2	9.6	10.8	11.0	11.4	10.9	9.1	7.3	6.6	5.7 b	
Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)		39.6	41.1 b	41.3	38.4	36.7	35.9	34.2	34.8	32.3 b	33.6	34.3	35.2 b	
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)		65.4	65.1 b	64.2	61.8	59.3	57.6	58.0	58.0	59.4 b	59.8	61.8	62.5 b	
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)		81.3	82.1 b	80.5	78.1	77.6	76.8	76.3	76.4	77.7 b	78.8	79.4	81.0 b	
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)		59.1	62.4 b	61.8	59.1	57.4	56.5	56.3	57.3	58.2	59.6	61.3	62.4 b	
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)		64.7	69.8 b	67.3	61.3	58.5	58.1	59.1	60.0	60.4	60.6	63.5	66.3 b	
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)		51.7	57.1 b	56.4	51.1	47.6	47.8	45.7	45.3	45.7	47.5	49.8	50.6 b	
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)		59.1	62.4 b	61.9	59.3	57.5	56.6	56.5	57.5	58.4	59.6	61.5	62.5 b	
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)		63.1	67.9 b	65.6	59.9	57.6	57.5	57.8	58.5	59.4	60.9	63.5	65.9 b	
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)		52.8	57.7 b	57.7	51.9	48.7	48.4	48.0	49.2	49.5	52.5	52.6	53.8 b	
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)					6.4	6.5	8.0	8.4	8.5	7.2	6.2	5.7	5.7	
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)		0.3	0.4 b	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.5	
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)		0.6	0.5 b	0.5	1.0	1.2	1.4	1.6	1.5	1.2	0.9	0.8	3.0 b	

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Ireland		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017			
Social Indicators	All	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of total population)	23.3	23.1	23.7	25.7	27.3	29.4	30.3	29.9	27.7	26.0	24.2			
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of total population)	18.5	17.2	15.5	15.0	15.2	15.2	16.6	15.7	16.4	16.3	16.6			
		At-risk-of-poverty threshold (PPS single person)	9563	10633	10901	10386	10102	9999	9962	10039	9939	10622	10895			
		Poverty gap (%)	16.6	17.6	17.7	16.2	15.5	17.5	20.0	17.5	18.9	18.5	18.1			
		Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of total population)		11.6				8.8	13.2	9.1	10.7	9.4				
		At-risk-of-poverty before social transfers excl. pensions (% of total population)	32.8	33.1	34.0	37.5	39.9	39.6	39.5	38.3	37.1	36.2	34.7			
		Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (%)	43.6	48.0	54.4	60.0	61.9	61.6	58.0	59.0	55.8	55.0	52.2			
		Severe Material Deprivation (% of total population)	4.8	4.5	5.5	6.1	5.7	7.8	9.8	9.9	8.4	7.5	6.5			
		Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of people aged 0-59)	12.9	14.3	13.7	20.0	22.9	24.2	23.4	23.9	21.0	19.2	18.2			
		Real Gross Household Disposable income (growth %)	5.4	5.5	4.6	-0.6	-1.6	-4.0	2.2	-1.9	-0.3	3.3	3.0			
		Income quintile share ratio S80/S20	4.9	4.8	4.4	4.2	4.7	4.6	4.8	4.7	4.9	4.5	4.4			
		GINI coefficient	31.9	31.3	29.9	28.8	30.7	29.8	30.5	30.7	31.1	29.8	29.5			
		Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18-24)	12.2 b	12.0 b	11.7	11.8	11.9	11.0	9.9	8.6	6.9 b	7.0	6.2	5.1 b		
		NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of total population aged 15-24)	10.1 b	9.5 b	13.9	18.3	19.4	19.2	19.2	16.4	15.3	14.3	12.6	10.9 b		
		Social Indicators	Male	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of male population)	22.0	21.6	22.7	25.0	26.5	29.0	30.0	29.4	27.4	25.4	23.2	
At-risk-of-poverty (% of male population)	17.5			16.0	14.5	14.9	14.6	15.4	16.4	15.7	16.2	16.1	16.0			
Poverty gap (%)	17.6			17.7	18.9	17.1	15.5	18.7	21.7	17.9	18.4	19.0	17.8			
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of male population)				11.6				10.1	11.7	8.8	9.9	9.9				
Severe Material Deprivation (% of male population)	4.6			4.0	5.3	5.5	5.5	7.4	9.7	9.2	8.1	7.2	6.1			
Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of males aged 0-59)	12.2			13.7	13.1	18.8	21.4	23.4	23.2	23.6	21.4	18.6	17.5			
Life expectancy at birth (years)	77.3			77.3	77.9	77.7	78.5	78.6	78.7	79.0	79.3	79.6	79.9			
Healthy life years at birth (years) - men	63.2			62.9	63.5	63.9	65.9	66.1	65.9	65.8	66.3	66.6	67.3			
Early leavers from education and training (% of males aged 18-24)	15.2 b			15.9 b	15.7	15.7	14.5	13.7	12.0	10.6	8.4 b	8.7	7.9	6.2 b		
NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of males aged 15-24)	9.0 b			9.7 b	15.6	21.6	22.2	21.8	21.9	17.7	15.8	15.6	13.5	11.4 b		
Social Indicators	Female			At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of female population)	24.6	24.6	24.7	26.4	28.1	29.8	30.7	30.5	28.1	26.6	25.3	
				At-risk-of-poverty (% of female population)	19.5	18.5	16.4	15.1	15.8	14.9	16.9	15.7	16.7	16.4	17.3	
				Poverty gap (%)	15.0	17.1	17.4	14.9	15.5	16.6	18.7	16.8	19.1	18.2	18.4	
				Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of female population)		11.7				7.4	14.5	9.3	11.6	8.9		
				Severe Material Deprivation (% of female population)	5.0	4.9	5.8	6.8	5.9	8.3	10.0	10.6	8.6	7.8	6.9	
		Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of females aged 0-59)	13.7	15.0	14.3	21.2	24.5	25.1	23.5	24.1	20.6	19.7	18.9			
		Life expectancy at birth (years)	82.1	82.1	82.4	82.7	83.1	83.0	83.2	83.1	83.5	83.4	83.6			
		Healthy life years at birth (years) - women	64.9	65.6	65.1	65.2	66.9	68.3	68.5	68.0	67.5	67.9	69.8			
		Early leavers from education and training (% of females aged 18-24)	9.1 b	7.9 b	7.5	8.0	9.3	8.4	7.8	6.5	5.4 b	5.1	4.4	3.9 b		
		NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of females aged 15-24)	11.3 b	9.4 b	12.2	15.1	16.7	16.6	16.5	15.1	14.8	13.0	11.6	10.5 b		
		Social Indicators	Children (0-17)	At-Risk-of-poverty or exclusion of children (% of people aged 0-17)	28.0	26.2	26.6	31.4	34.1	34.1	33.5	34.4	30.4	28.8	27.3	
				At-risk-of-poverty (% of Children population)	22.5	19.2	18.0	18.8	18.9	17.1	19.3	18.2	18.3	17.9	18.9	
				Severe Material Deprivation (% of Children population)	7.4	7.6	6.8	8.4	8.2	10.0	12.4	13.4	10.1	8.9	9.2	
				Share of children living in low work intensity households (% of Children population)	15.4	15.8	15.1	23.4	25.6	26.0	22.8	24.2	21.4	19.8	19.9	
				Risk of poverty of children in households at work (Working Intensity > 0.2)	13.4	10.1	11.0	7.5	9.3	6.3	7.3	7.3	7.1	7.7	6.3	
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (0-17) (%)	44.9			50.6	55.2	59.7	62.9	65.2	58.0	59.5	58.1	57.7	53.2			
Social Indicators	Working age (18-64)	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of Working age population)	20.5	20.7	22.6	24.8	27.2	30.5	32.0	31.3	29.5	26.8	24.4			
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of Working age population)	15.3	14.4	13.4	13.2	14.6	15.1	16.2	15.7	16.7	16.0	15.8			
		Severe Material Deprivation (% of Working age population)	4.3	3.7	5.6	5.8	5.4	7.9	10.1	9.6	8.7	7.8	6.2			
		Very low work intensity (18-59)	11.8	13.7	13.1	18.4	21.7	23.4	23.6	23.7	20.8	18.9	17.4			
		In-work at-risk-of poverty rate (% of persons employed 18-64)	6.2	5.5	6.3	4.9	5.5	5.3	5.6	5.0	5.4	4.8	4.8			
		Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (18-64) (%)	45.9	50.3	56.6	61.4	61.8	61.4	59.2	59.6	55.6	54.4	52.7			
Social Indicators	Elderly (65+)	At-Risk-of-poverty or exclusion of elderly (% of people aged 65+)	27.7	28.7	22.5	17.9	11.3	13.8	15.2	13.7	13.9	16.5	17.4			
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of Elderly population)	26.9	28.3	21.1	16.2	9.9	11.0	12.8	10.6	11.4	14.2	16.0			
		Severe Material Deprivation (% of Elderly population)	1.7	1.2	2.2	2.6	1.5	3.0	2.8	3.6	2.9	3.1	2.4			
		Relative median income of elderly (ratio with median income of people younger than 65)	0.70	0.69	0.74	0.78	0.85	0.86	0.86	0.91	0.89	0.87	0.86			
		Aggregate replacement ratio (ratio)	0.38	0.49	0.49	0.48	0.47	0.43	0.42	0.37	0.38	0.38	0.35			
Expenditure in social protection indicators (% of GDP)		Sickness/Health care	6.1	6.3	7.1	7.9	7.6	7.6 p	7.4 p	7.1 p	6.6 p	5.0 p				
		Disability	0.9	0.9	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	0.9				
		Old age and survivors	5.0	5.1	5.8	6.9	7.2	7.0	7.3	7.1	6.6	5.0				
		Family/Children	2.4	2.5	2.9	3.4	3.2	3.1	3.0	2.8	2.5	1.9				
		Unemployment	1.3	1.4	1.8	3.0	3.7	3.5	3.3	3.1	2.6	1.9				
		Housing and Social exclusion n.e.c.	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.9	0.8	0.6				
		Total (including Admin and Other expenditures)	17.5	18.1	20.7	24.6	25.2	24.7	24.4	23.5	21.6	16.3				
		of which: Means tested benefits	4.0	4.2	5.0	6.2	7.0	7.2	7.1	6.8	6.2	4.6				

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Greece

Greece		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	
Macro Economic Indicators (Annual % growth)	Real GDP	5.7	3.3	-0.3	-4.3	-5.5	-9.1 p	-7.3 p	-3.2 p	0.7 p	-0.3 p	-0.2 p	1.4 p	
	Total employment	1.8	1.3	1.3	-0.6	-2.6	-6.9 p	-6.3 p	-2.6 p	0.9 p	0.7 p	0.5 p	2.1 p	
	Labour productivity	3.8	1.9	-1.6	-3.8	-3.0	-2.4 p	-1.1 p	-0.6 p	-0.2 p	-1.0 p	-0.7 p	-0.8 p	
	Annual average hours worked per person employed	-0.5	-0.7	-0.2	-1.2	-3.0	0.9 p	0.9 p	0.2 p	-1.9 p	0.5 p	-0.1 p	-0.6 p	
	Real productivity per hour worked	4.3	2.6	-1.4	-2.6	0.0	-3.3 p	-1.9 p	-0.8 p	1.7 p	-1.5 p	-0.7 p	-0.2 p	
	Harmonized CPI	3.3	3.0	4.2	1.3	4.7	3.1	1.0	-0.9	-1.4	-1.1	0.0	1.1	
	Price deflator GDP	3.5	3.4	4.3	2.6	0.7	0.8 p	-0.4 p	-2.4 p	-1.8 p	-1.0 p	-1.0 p	0.7 p	
	Nominal compensation per employee	3.1	4.6	3.7	3.1	-2.0	-3.8 p	-3.0 p	-7.5 p	-2.0 p	-2.3 p	-0.9 p	0.1 p	
	Real compensation per employee (GDP deflator)	-0.4	1.1	-0.7	0.5	-2.6	-4.5 p	-2.7 p	-5.3 p	-0.2 p	-1.3 p	0.1 p	-0.6 p	
	Real compensation per employee (private consumption deflator)	-0.2	1.5	-0.6	1.7	-6.4	-6.7 p	-4.0 p	-6.7 p	-0.6 p	-1.2 p	-0.9 p	-1.0 p	
	Nominal unit labour costs	-0.7	2.6	5.3	7.1	1.0	-1.4 p	-2.0 p	-6.9 p	-1.8 p	-1.3 p	-0.2 p	0.9 p	
	Real unit labour costs	-3.9	-0.8	1.0	4.5	0.3	-2.2 p	-1.6 p	-4.7 p	0.1 p	-0.3 p	0.9 p	0.1 p	
	Labour Market Indicators - Total	Total population (000)	11005	11036	11061	11095	11119	11123	11086	11004	10927	10858	10784	10768
		Population aged 15-64 (000)	7334	7357	7378	7388	7382	7349	7280	7180	7088	7011	6934	6894
		Total employment (000)	4528	4564	4611	4556 b	4390	4054	3695	3513	3536	3611	3674	3753
Employment aged 15-64 (000)		4440	4476	4523	4469 b	4306	3979	3636	3459	3480	3548	3610	3683	
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)		65.6	65.8	66.3	65.6 b	63.8	59.6	55.0	52.9	53.3	54.9	56.2	57.8	
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)		60.6	60.9	61.4	60.8 b	59.1	55.1	50.8	48.8	49.4	50.8	52.0	53.5	
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)		24.2	24.0	23.5	22.8 b	20.1	16.1	13.0	11.8	13.3	13.0	13.0	14.1	
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)		75.2	75.4	76.0	75.3 b	73.2	68.8	63.9	61.3	62.4	64.5	66.0	67.4	
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)		42.5	42.7	43.0	42.4 b	42.4	39.5	36.5	35.6	34.0	34.3	36.3	38.3	
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)		64.4	64.7	65.3	64.5 b	62.4	58.0	53.1	50.8	51.1	52.6	53.7	55.3	
Self-employed (% total employment)		29.5	29.0	29.1	29.4 b	29.9	30.7	31.6	32.1	31.3	30.6	30.2	30.1	
Part-time employment (% total employment)		5.5	5.4	5.4	5.9 b	6.3	6.7	7.7	8.4	9.3	9.4	9.8	9.7	
Temporary employment (% total employment)		5.7	5.8	6.3	6.7 b	6.9	6.6	5.4	5.6	6.7	7.0	6.5	6.3	
Employment in Services (% total employment)				67.1 b	67.6 b	68.5	70.5	70.8	71.0	71.9	72.6	72.8	73.0	
Employment in Industry (% total employment)				22.5 b	21.4 b	19.8	17.9	16.7	15.7	15.1	15.1	15.4	15.6	
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)				10.5 b	11.1 b	11.7	11.7	12.5	13.3	13.0	12.3	11.7	11.5	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)		66.7	66.5	66.7	67.4 b	67.8	67.3	67.5	67.5	67.4	67.8	68.2	68.3	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)		32.2	31.0	30.1	30.7 b	30.0	29.1	29.1	28.4	28.0	26.0	24.6	25.0	
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)		82.0	81.8	81.9	82.8 b	83.2	83.1	83.7	83.9	84.3	85.4	85.5	85.0	
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)		44.2	44.2	44.4	44.4 b	45.2	43.1	42.1	42.4	41.1	41.6	44.9	46.7	
Total unemployment (000)		448	418	388	485	639	882	1195	1330	1274	1197	1131	1027	
Unemployment rate (% labour force)		9.0	8.4	7.8	9.6	12.7	17.9	24.5	27.5	26.5	24.9	23.6	21.5	
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)		25.0	22.7	21.9	25.7	33.0	44.7	55.3	58.3	52.4	49.8	47.3	43.6	
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)		4.9	4.2	3.7	3.9 b	5.7	8.8	14.5	18.5	19.5	18.2	17.0	15.6	
Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)		54.1	49.7	47.1	40.4 b	44.6	49.3	59.1	67.1	73.5	73.1	72.0	72.8	
Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)		8.0	7.0	6.6	7.9 b	9.9	13.0	16.1	16.5	14.7	12.9	11.7	10.9	
Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)		59.5	59.9	60.2	59.8 b	58.1	53.9	48.4	46.3	46.9 b	48.5	48.4	49.5	
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)		69.8	69.5	69.9	68.5 b	66.5	62.0	57.2	54.1	54.5 b	56.4	58.1	59.3	
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)		83.4	83.0	83.0	82.5 b	80.0	75.1	71.4	69.1	68.5 b	68.7	70.4	71.8	
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)		60.1	60.4	60.8	60.3 b	58.6	54.7	51.0	49.0	49.3	50.8	52.0	53.6	
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)		64.0	62.2	61.6	63.0 b	64.3	61.7	53.7	49.7	51.9	54.0	50.9	53.6	
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)		68.8	68.4	69.9	67.2 b	63.9	58.0	47.9	45.4	50.0	50.4	52.3	51.5	
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)		60.1	60.4	60.8	60.3 b	58.5	54.8	50.9	48.9	49.3	50.6	51.9	53.6	
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)		63.7	62.7	62.4	62.6 b	64.3	60.6	53.3	50.6	53.3	56.2	54.6	54.4	
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)		67.4	67.0	68.4	66.2 b	63.4	57.5	48.7	46.6	49.5	51.5	53.5	52.4	
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)				2.0	2.4 b	2.7	3.2	3.9	4.4	5.0	5.1	5.6	5.4	
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)		0.5	0.5	0.4	0.4 b	0.3	0.5	0.7	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.8	0.8	
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)		0.9	0.8	0.9	1.1 b	1.1	1.3	1.9	2.0	1.9	2.1	2.3	2.4	

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Greece		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	
Labour Market Indicators - Male	Total population (000)	5433	5442	5448	5456	5461	5453	5424	5366	5313	5268	5224	5221	
	Population aged 15-64(000)	3698	3704	3709	3707	3697	3673	3629	3564	3504	3456	3410	3395	
	Total employment (000)	2762	2777	2787	2722 b	2601	2390	2168	2065	2056	2086	2129	2181	
	Employment aged 15-64 (000)	2697	2713	2722	2660 b	2542	2338	2126	2027	2017	2048	2092	2138	
	Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	79.9	80.1	80.1	78.5 b	76.0	70.8	65.0	62.7	62.6	64.0	65.8	67.7	
	Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)	73.9	74.2	74.4	73.0 b	70.3	65.4	60.1	57.9	58.0	59.3	61.0	62.7	
	Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)	29.5	29.1	28.3	27.3 b	24.2	19.4	16.1	14.6	15.8	15.2	14.7	15.9	
	Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)	90.0	90.1	90.1	88.3 b	85.3	79.9	73.9	71.4	71.8	73.7	76.0	77.5	
	Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)	59.2	59.1	59.2	57.8 b	56.5	52.3	47.7	46.0	44.0	44.9	46.2	49.6	
	FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	80.0	80.2	80.4	78.6 b	75.7	70.0	63.9	61.3	60.9	62.2	63.9	66.0	
	Self-employed (% total employment)	35.1	34.6	34.5	35.1 b	35.5	36.2	37.3	37.7	37.0	35.9	34.9	35.1	
	Part-time employment (% total employment)	2.7	2.5	2.6	2.9 b	3.5	4.3	4.7	5.4	6.5	6.7	6.9	6.6	
	Temporary employment (% total employment)	5.7	5.8	6.3	6.7 b	6.9	6.6	5.4	5.6	6.7	7.0	6.5	6.3	
	Employment in Services (% total employment)			58.9 b	59.2 b	60.5	63.5	64.3	65.2	66.0	67.0	67.1	67.2	
	Employment in Industry (% total employment)			31.1 b	30.0 b	28.0	25.1	23.2	21.5	20.5	20.2	20.6	20.8	
	Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)			10.1 b	10.9 b	11.5	11.4	12.5	13.3	13.5	12.8	12.3	12.0	
	Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)	78.5	78.4	78.4	78.5 b	78.3	77.2	76.9	76.9	76.0	75.9	76.2	76.4	
	Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)	35.8	34.4	34.0	33.9 b	33.0	31.7	31.2	31.6	30.0	27.7	26.4	26.2	
	Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)	94.7	94.6	94.4	94.4 b	94.2	93.5	93.6	93.6	93.1	93.1	93.2	93.0	
	Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)	61.1	60.9	61.0	60.2 b	60.2	57.3	55.2	55.0	53.4	54.9	57.3	59.8	
	Total unemployment (000)	167	154	151	204	290	426	595	669	635	579	528	473	
	Unemployment rate (% labour force)	5.7	5.3	5.1	7.0	10.1	15.2	21.6	24.5	23.7	21.8	19.9	17.8	
	Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)	17.6	15.5	16.9	19.5	26.8	38.8	48.5	53.8	47.4	45.2	44.3	39.3	
	Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)	2.6	2.2	2.1	2.4 b	3.9	6.8	12.2	16.2	17.2	15.8	14.1	12.6	
	Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)	46.2	41.6	40.0	33.9 b	38.3	44.7	56.4	66.0	72.8	72.7	71.1	70.8	
	Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)	6.3	5.3	5.7	6.6 b	8.9	12.3	15.1	17.0	14.2	12.5	11.7	10.3	
	Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)	79.7	79.9	80.0	78.1 b	74.7	68.5	61.5	58.2	58.6 b	60.2	60.7	62.7	
	Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)	85.7	85.6	85.5	83.0 b	80.6	75.6	69.5	66.8	67.0 b	68.9	70.7	72.1	
	Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)	88.3	87.9	87.7	87.3 b	84.8	80.1	76.4	74.5	72.5 b	73.1	76.4	78.1	
	Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)	73.2	73.4	73.3	72.1 b	69.7	64.9	60.3	58.1	57.8	59.2	60.8	62.6	
	Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)	79.4	77.2	77.5	74.8 b	77.6	71.2	61.1	57.3	59.5	64.0	63.9	66.0	
	Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)	86.4	86.8	88.3	82.7 b	76.7	70.3	56.8	55.1	59.3	59.6	64.1	64.1	
	Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)	73.2	73.3	73.3	72.1 b	69.6	64.9	60.3	58.0	57.9	59.1	60.6	62.6	
	Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)	80.2	78.8	77.1	74.5 b	78.0	71.2	61.6	56.7	61.8	68.8	69.9	67.9	
	Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)	83.9	85.2	86.4	81.2 b	76.0	69.5	57.4	55.9	58.2	59.7	63.9	64.5	
	Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)			1.2	1.4 b	1.9	2.6	2.8	3.3	4.0	4.2	4.6	4.3	
	Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3 b	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.6	0.5	
	Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.4 b	0.5	0.6	1.0	1.1	0.9	1.1	1.3	1.2	
	Labour Market Indicators - Female	Total population (000)	5571	5594	5613	5639	5658	5670	5663	5637	5614	5590	5560	5547
		Population aged 15-64(000)	3637	3653	3669	3682	3684	3676	3651	3617	3584	3555	3524	3499
		Total employment (000)	1765	1787	1824	1834 b	1789	1664	1527	1448	1480	1524	1544	1572
		Employment aged 15-64 (000)	1743	1763	1801	1809 b	1765	1641	1510	1432	1463	1500	1519	1545
		Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	51.3	51.7	52.6	52.9 b	51.8	48.7	45.2	43.3	44.3	46.0	46.8	48.0
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)		47.3	47.7	48.6	48.9 b	48.0	45.0	41.7	39.9	41.1	42.5	43.3	44.4	
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)		18.8	18.8	18.7	18.3 b	16.1	12.9	10.0	9.1	10.9	10.9	11.3	12.4	
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)		60.6	60.9	62.0	62.3 b	61.1	57.8	53.9	51.4	53.1	55.4	55.9	57.2	
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)		26.6	27.0	27.5	27.8 b	29.1	27.5	26.1	26.0	25.0	24.7	27.2	28.0	
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)		49.1	49.4	50.4	50.5 b	49.5	46.4	42.7	40.7	41.6	43.2	43.8	44.9	
Self-employed (% total employment)		20.8	20.2	21.0	21.0 b	21.9	22.9	23.6	24.2	23.4	23.3	23.7	23.3	
Part-time employment (% total employment)		10.0	9.9	9.8	10.2 b	10.3	10.1	11.8	12.6	13.0	13.1	13.7	14.1	
Temporary employment (% total employment)		9.1	9.3	9.7	10.1 b	10.2	9.1	8.1	7.7	8.7	9.0	8.8	9.6	
Employment in Services (% total employment)				79.4 bu				79.9 u						
Employment in Industry (% total employment)				9.5 bu				7.5 u						
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)				11.1 b	11.3 b	12.1	12.1	12.6	13.1	12.4	11.6	11.0	10.7	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)		55.0	54.8	55.0	56.5 b	57.5	57.5	58.3	58.3	59.0	59.9	60.4	60.3	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)		28.6	27.5	26.1	27.4 b	27.1	26.6	27.0	25.3	26.1	24.3	22.9	23.9	
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)		69.2	69.2	69.5	71.1 b	72.4	72.8	74.0	74.3	75.6	77.7	77.7	77.0	
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)		28.0	28.2	28.7	29.5 b	31.1	29.9	30.0	31.0	29.9	29.5	33.6	34.9	
Total unemployment (000)		282	265	237	281	349	456	600	661	639	618	603	554	
Unemployment rate (% labour force)		13.8	12.9	11.5	13.3	16.4	21.5	28.2	31.4	30.2	28.9	28.1	26.1	
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)		34.2	31.7	28.3	33.3 b	40.3	51.6	63.1	63.8	58.1	55.0	50.7	48.2	
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)		8.1	7.0	5.9	6.0 b	8.1	11.6	17.4	21.4	22.4	21.2	20.5	19.4	
Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)		58.8	54.4	51.6	45.1 b	49.8	53.7	61.7	68.2	74.2	73.5	72.7	74.4	
Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)		9.8	8.7	7.4	9.1 b	10.9	13.7	17.0	16.1	15.2	13.4	11.6	11.5	
Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)		38.7	39.2	39.5	40.3 b	40.1	38.0	34.4	33.6	34.4 b	35.6	35.0	35.4	
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)		55.4	55.1	55.7	55.2 b	53.7	49.8	46.0	42.5	42.9 b	44.6	45.7	46.5	
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)		78.2	77.9	78.2	77.9 b	75.4	70.3	66.7	63.9	64.8 b	64.7	65.2	66.4	
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)		47.1	47.6	48.6	48.8 b	47.8	44.8	41.8	40.1	41.0	42.5	43.5	44.7	
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)		54.8	52.7	51.4	55.5 b	56.8	56.1	48.9	44.3	46.8	48.1	42.9	46.1	
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)		48.8	46.8	47.3	48.7 b	48.6	44.0	38.1	35.2	40.0	40.9	39.5	39.0	
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)		47.0	47.6	48.5	48.7 b	47.7	44.8	41.8	40.0	40.9	42.3	43.3	44.6	
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)		54.8	52.8	53.0	55.0 b	56.4	54.3	48.3	46.9	48.1	48.2	45.8	47.0	
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)		49.5	47.3	47.4	49.1 b	49.2	44.4	39.5	37.0	40.8	43.6	43.1	41.2	
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)				3.2	3.7 b	3.8	4.1	5.3	5.8	6.2	6.2	6.8	6.8	
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)		0.7	0.7	0.6	0.6 b	0.5	0.6	1.0	1.3	1.2	1.1	1.0	1.1	
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)		1.6	1.5	1.7	2.0 b	2.0	2.3	2.9	3.3	3.2	3.3	3.5	3.8	

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Greece		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017			
Social Indicators	All	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of total population)	29.3	28.3	28.1	27.6	27.7	31.0	34.6	35.7	36.0	35.7	35.6			
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of total population)	20.5	20.3	20.1	19.7	20.1	21.4	23.1	23.1	22.1	21.4	21.2			
		At-risk-of-poverty threshold (PPS single person)	6697	6873	7219	7521	7559	6976	6038	5427	5166	5281	5297			
		Poverty gap (%)	25.8	26.0	24.7	24.1	23.4	26.1	29.9	32.7	31.3	30.6	31.9			
		Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of total population)		13.1	13.0	16.1	17.6	10.5	13.8	12.4	14.5	13.3	15.2			
		At-risk-of-poverty before social transfers excl. pensions (% of total population)	23.4	23.7	23.3	22.7	23.8	24.8	26.8	28.0	26.0	25.5	25.2			
		Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (%)	12.4	14.4	13.7	13.2	15.6	13.7	13.8	17.5	15.0	16.1	15.9			
		Severe Material Deprivation (% of total population)	11.5	11.5	11.2	11.0	11.6	15.2	19.5	20.3	21.5	22.2	22.4	21.1 p		
		Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of people aged 0-59)	8.1	8.1	7.5	6.6	7.6	12.0	14.2	18.2	17.2	16.8	17.2			
		Real Gross Household Disposable income (growth %)	5.7	2.9	1.1	0.9	-11.1	-10.6	-8.9	-6.8	1.7	-2.2	-1.3			
		Income quintile share ratio S80/S20	6.1	6.0	5.9	5.8	5.6	6.0	6.6	6.6	6.5	6.5	6.6			
		GINI coefficient	34.3	34.3	33.4	33.1	32.9	33.5	34.3	34.4	34.5	34.2	34.3			
		Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18-24)	15.1 b	14.3	14.4 b	14.2 b	13.5	12.9	11.3	10.1	9.0 b	7.9	6.2	6.0		
		NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of total population aged 15-24)	12.0 b	11.3	11.4 b	12.4 b	14.8	17.4	20.2	20.4	19.1	17.2	15.8	15.3		
		Social Indicators	Male	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of male population)	27.5	26.8	26.3	26.1	26.0	29.6	33.9	34.6	35.3	34.8	34.4	
				At-risk-of-poverty (% of male population)	19.5	19.6	19.6	19.1	19.3	20.9	22.5	22.4	22.2	21.5	21.2	
				Poverty gap (%)	25.8	25.6	24.4	24.4	23.4	27.2	29.9	32.9	32.1	32.9	33.6	
				Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of male population)		12.4	11.3	15.6	16.3	10.4	14.0	11.7	13.5	13.2	14.9	
				Severe Material Deprivation (% of male population)	11.0	10.6	10.1	10.2	10.9	14.9	19.9	20.3	21.2	22.1	22.2	21.0 p
Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of males aged 0-59)	6.6			6.5	6.0	5.3	6.5	11.0	12.9	17.5	16.0	15.5	15.8			
Life expectancy at birth (years)	77.2			76.9	77.5 b	77.8	78.0	78.0	78.7	78.7	78.9	78.5	78.9			
Healthy life years at birth (years) - men	66.5			66.0	65.6 b	66.1	66.1	66.2	64.8	64.7	64.1	63.9	63.8			
Early leavers from education and training (% of males aged 18-24)	19.6 b			18.2	18.0 b	17.9 b	16.4	15.9	13.7	12.7	11.5 b	9.4	7.1	7.1		
NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of males aged 15-24)	8.7 b			8.1	8.8 b	9.5 b	12.7	16.1	19.0	20.9	18.7	17.1	15.9	15.0		
Social Indicators	Female			At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of female population)	31.1	29.9	29.8	29.0	29.3	32.3	35.2	36.8	36.7	36.6	36.6	
				At-risk-of-poverty (% of female population)	21.4	20.9	20.7	20.2	20.9	21.9	23.6	23.8	22.0	21.2	21.2	
				Poverty gap (%)	25.7	26.3	25.0	24.1	23.4	25.6	29.1	32.6	30.8	28.3	30.8	
				Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of female population)		13.8	14.7	16.6	18.7	10.6	13.5	13.0	15.5	13.3	15.5	
				Severe Material Deprivation (% of female population)	11.9	12.3	12.2	11.7	12.2	15.4	19.1	20.3	21.8	22.2	22.6	21.2 p
				Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of females aged 0-59)	9.7	9.8	9.0	8.0	8.6	13.0	15.6	18.9	18.4	18.0	18.6	
				Life expectancy at birth (years)	81.9	82.5	83.0 b	82.7	83.3	83.6	83.4	84.0	84.1	83.7	84.0	
				Healthy life years at birth (years) - women	68.1	67.6	66.2 b	66.8	67.7	66.9	64.9	65.1	64.8	64.1	64.7	
				Early leavers from education and training (% of females aged 18-24)	10.6 b	10.3	10.6 b	10.5 b	10.6	10.0	8.9	7.5	6.6 b	6.4	5.3	4.9
		NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of females aged 15-24)	15.3 b	14.5	14.1 b	15.2 b	16.9	18.7	21.3	20.0	19.6	17.2	15.7	15.5		
		Social Indicators	Children (0-17)	At-Risk-of-poverty or exclusion of children (% of people aged 0-17)	27.9	28.2	28.7	30.0	28.7	30.4	35.4	38.1	36.7	37.8	37.5	
				At-risk-of-poverty (% of Children population)	22.6	23.3	23.0	23.7	23.0	23.7	26.9	28.8	25.5	26.6	26.3	
				Severe Material Deprivation (% of Children population)	9.5	9.7	10.4	12.2	12.2	16.4	20.9	23.3	23.8	25.7	26.7	23.8 p
				Share of children living in low work intensity households (% of Children population)	4.3	4.6	3.9	2.7	3.9	7.2	7.6	13.8	10.2	10.6	10.9	
				Risk of poverty of children in households at work (Working Intensity > 0.2)	20.5	21.3	21.4	22.8	21.6	19.2	22.1	20.4	20.6	21.2	20.1	
				Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (0-17) (%)	9.2	14.0	10.9	6.0	10.9	10.6	9.7	18.2	17.7	18.4	20.3	
		Social Indicators	Working age (18-64)	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of Working age population)	28.4	27.8	27.9	27.1	27.7	31.6	37.7	39.1	40.1	39.4	39.7	
				At-risk-of-poverty (% of Working age population)	18.4	18.7	18.7	18.1	19.0	20.0	23.8	24.1	23.5	22.5	22.7	
				Severe Material Deprivation (% of Working age population)	10.6	10.2	10.4	10.3	11.2	15.4	20.7	21.6	22.9	23.5	23.7	22.1 p
Very low work intensity (18-59)	9.3			9.2	8.6	7.8	8.7	13.5	16.3	19.6	19.4	18.7	19.2			
In-work at-risk-of poverty rate (% of persons employed 18-64)	13.7			14.1	14.2	13.7	13.9	11.9	15.1	13.0	13.2	13.4	14.0			
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (18-64) (%)	12.8			13.4	13.8	13.0	14.4	13.0	14.4	16.3	14.5	14.8	14.7			
Social Indicators	Elderly (65+)	At-Risk-of-poverty or exclusion of elderly (% of people aged 65+)	33.8	30.6	28.1	26.8	26.7	29.3	23.5	23.1	23.0	22.8	22.0			
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of Elderly population)	25.6	22.9	22.3	21.4	21.3	23.6	17.2	15.1	14.9	13.7	12.4			
		Severe Material Deprivation (% of Elderly population)	16.4	17.4	14.8	12.1	12.4	13.1	14.3	13.7	15.5	15.2	15.2	15.8 p		
		Relative median income of elderly (ratio with median income of people younger than 65)	0.82	0.83	0.86	0.86	0.84	0.81	1.01	1.04	1.0	1.04	1.07			
		Aggregate replacement ratio (ratio)	0.49	0.40	0.41	0.41	0.42	0.45	0.52	0.60	0.60	0.61	0.63			
		Expenditure in social protection indicators (% of GDP)		Sickness/Health care	5.6 p	5.8 p	6.3 p	6.6 p	6.8 p	6.2 p	5.9 p	5.3 p	4.6 p	5.1 p		
Disability	1.2 p			1.3 p	1.4 p	1.5 p	1.6 p	1.7 p	1.8 p	1.6 p	1.6 p	1.6 p	1.7 p			
Old age and survivors	11.4 p			11.7 p	12.6 p	13.7 p	14.3 p	16.0 p	17.3 p	16.2 p	16.7 p	17.0 p				
Family/Children	0.8 p			0.9 p	0.9 p	1.0 p	1.0 p	1.1 p	1.0 p	1.1 p	1.1 p	1.1 p				
Unemployment	1.1 p			1.0 p	1.2 p	1.4 p	1.6 p	1.7 p	1.4 p	1.3 p	1.1 p	1.0 p				
Housing and Social exclusion n.e.c.	0.1 p			0.1 p	0.1 p	0.1 p	0.1 p	0.1 p	0.1 p	0.1 p	0.3 p	0.2 p				
Total (including Admin and Other expenditures)	20.6 p			21.3 p	22.8 p	24.8 p	25.9 p	27.3 p	28.0 p	26.3 p	26.0 p	26.4 p				
of which: Means tested benefits	0.7 p			0.8 p	0.8 p	0.8 p	0.9 p	0.9 p	0.9 p	1.2 p	1.5 p	1.4 p				

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Spain

Spain		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	
Macro Economic Indicators (Annual % growth)	Real GDP	4.2	3.8	1.1	-3.6	0.0	-1.0	-2.9	-1.7	1.4	3.4 p	3.3 p	3.1 p	
	Total employment	4.2	3.3	0.2	-6.3	-1.7	-2.7	-4.0	-2.6	1.0	2.7 p	2.5 p	2.6 p	
	Labour productivity	0.0	0.5	0.9	2.9	1.8	1.7	1.1	0.9	0.4	0.7 p	0.7 p	0.5 p	
	Annual average hours worked per person employed	-0.6	-0.7	0.5	0.4	-0.5	0.3	-0.8	-0.5	0.1	0.3 p	0.1 p	-0.9 p	
	Real productivity per hour worked	0.6	1.2	0.4	2.5	2.3	1.4	2.0	1.4	0.3	0.4 p	0.6 p	1.3 p	
	Harmonized CPI	3.6	2.8	4.1	-0.2	2.0	3.0	2.4	1.5	-0.2	-0.6	-0.3	2.0	
	Price deflator GDP	4.0	3.3	2.1	0.3	0.2	0.0	0.1	0.4	-0.2	0.6 p	0.3 p	1.0 p	
	Nominal compensation per employee	3.3	4.6	6.7	4.5	0.2	0.7	-1.4	0.3	0.1	2.2 p	0.0 p	0.4 p	
	Real compensation per employee (GDP deflator)	-0.7	1.3	4.5	4.3	0.0	0.7	-1.5	0.0	0.3	1.5 p	-0.3 p	-0.6 p	
	Real compensation per employee (private consumption deflator)	-0.2	1.7	2.5	4.8	-1.9	-2.3	-3.8	-1.2	0.3	2.8 p	0.4 p	-1.6 p	
	Nominal unit labour costs	3.3	4.1	5.7	1.6	-1.6	-1.0	-2.6	-0.6	-0.3	1.4 p	-0.7 p	-0.1 p	
	Real unit labour costs	-0.7	0.7	3.5	1.3	-1.7	-1.0	-2.6	-1.0	-0.1	0.9 p	-1.0 p	-1.1 p	
	Labour Market Indicators - Total	Total population (000)	44010	44785	45669	46239	46487	46667	46818	46728	46512	46450	46440	46528
		Population aged 15-64 (000)	30306	30852	31480	31746	31742	31670	31613	31376	31005	30808	30721	30700
Total employment (000)		19939	20580	20470	19107	18725	18421	17633	17139	17344	17866	18342	18825	
Employment aged 15-64 (000)		19792	20437	20317	18958	18574	18271	17477	17002	17211	17718	18183	18649	
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)		69.0	69.7	68.5	64.0	62.8	62.0	59.6	58.6	59.9	62.0	63.9	65.5	
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)		65.0	65.8	64.5	60.0	58.8	58.0	55.8	54.8	56.0	57.8	59.5	61.1	
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)		39.6	39.2	36.0	28.0	25.0	22.0	18.4	16.8	16.7	17.9	18.4	20.5	
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)		76.1	77.1	75.6	71.0	70.0	69.1	66.7	65.8	67.4	69.4	71.5	73.2	
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)		44.1	44.5	45.5	44.0	43.5	44.5	43.9	43.2	44.3	46.9	49.1	50.5	
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)		65.6	66.5	65.2	60.5	59.2	58.2	55.6	54.2	55.4	57.5	59.5	61.2	
Self-employed (% total employment)		16.4	16.4	16.5	15.9 b	15.9	15.6	16.6	17.2	17.0	16.7	16.5	16.0	
Part-time employment (% total employment)		11.6	11.4	11.6	12.4	12.9	13.5	14.4	15.7	15.8	15.6	15.1	14.9	
Temporary employment (% total employment)		25.6	24.4	21.8	18.9	18.9	19.3	17.5	17.4	18.6	19.9	20.6	20.9	
Employment in Services (% total employment)				68.1 b	71.3	72.8	74.1	75.1	75.9	76.3	75.9	76.1	75.5	
Employment in Industry (% total employment)				27.9 b	24.7	23.1	21.9	20.7	19.8	19.5	20.0	19.7	20.1	
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)				4.0 b	4.1	4.2	4.1	4.2	4.3	4.2	4.1	4.2	4.3	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)		71.1	71.8	72.7	73.1	73.5	73.9	74.3	74.3	74.2	74.3	74.2	73.9	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)		48.2	47.9	47.7	45.0	42.7	40.9	39.0	37.8	35.7	34.7	33.0	33.3	
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)		82.3	83.1	84.0	84.8	85.7	86.2	86.9	87.2	87.3	87.4	87.4	87.0	
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)		46.8	47.4	49.1	50.0	50.7	52.4	53.5	54.1	55.4	57.6	59.2	59.6	
Total unemployment (000)		1841	1846	2596	4154	4640	5013	5811	6051	5610	5056	4481	3917	
Unemployment rate (% labour force)		8.5	8.2	11.3	17.9	19.9	21.4	24.8	26.1	24.5	22.1	19.6	17.2	
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)		17.9	18.1	24.5	37.7	41.5	46.2	52.9	55.5	53.2	48.3	44.4	38.6	
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)		1.8	1.7	2.0	4.3	7.3	8.9	11.0	13.0	12.9	11.4	9.5	7.7	
Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)		21.7	20.4	18.0	23.8	36.6	41.6	44.4	49.7	52.8	51.6	48.4	44.5	
Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)		8.6	8.7	11.7	17.0	17.7	18.9	20.6	21.0	19.0	16.8	14.7	12.9	
Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)		60.0	60.6	59.1	54.1	53.0	52.3	49.3	48.3	49.4 b	51.6	53.9	55.5	
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)		76.3	76.6	75.5	71.0	69.3	67.9	66.3	64.5	65.9 b	67.7	69.2	70.2	
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)		83.7	84.7	83.9	81.4	80.1	79.2	77.5	76.4	77.2 b	78.5	79.8	80.9	
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)		64.3	65.3	64.3	60.5	59.3	58.7	56.5	55.6	56.6	58.3	59.9	61.4	
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)		71.0	69.2	65.9	60.8	58.0	55.6	54.7	55.2	55.6	59.5	61.8	63.4	
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)		70.5	69.1	65.3	55.1	55.4	52.8	48.7	46.4	48.1	51.3	53.7	55.7	
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)		64.1	65.1	64.1	60.3	59.2	58.7	56.5	55.6	56.6	58.3	59.9	61.4	
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)		71.1	70.0	67.0	62.2	58.7	56.5	56.0	56.1	56.6	60.3	62.0	64.1	
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)		70.8	69.6	66.1	56.8	56.7	54.2	50.6	48.5	50.5	53.2	55.8	57.9	
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)				3.5	4.3	4.8	5.3	6.0	6.7	6.9	6.6	6.2	6.0	
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)		1.3	1.3	1.1	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.9	1.0	
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)		4.2	3.3	3.3	4.0	4.2	4.1	4.6	5.0	4.7	4.1	3.9	3.7	

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Spain		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	
Labour Market Indicators - Male	Total population (000)	21719	22119	22591	22881	22982	23049	23099	23018	22877	22827	22807	22835	
	Population aged 15-64(000)	15347	15632	15977	16112	16089	16033	15979	15824	15611	15495	15437	15412	
	Total employment (000)	11809	12067	11805	10733	10424	10153	9608	9316	9443	9760	10001	10266	
	Employment aged 15-64 (000)	11707	11968	11708	10643	10338	10068	9520	9237	9364	9676	9910	10162	
	Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	80.7	80.6	77.9	71.0	69.2	67.7	64.6	63.4	65.0	67.6	69.6	71.5	
	Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)	76.1	76.1	73.3	66.5	64.8	63.4	60.3	59.2	60.7	62.9	64.8	66.5	
	Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)	44.4	44.2	39.3	29.4	25.6	22.1	18.5	17.3	17.4	18.6	19.4	21.2	
	Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)	87.5	87.5	84.2	77.3	75.9	74.6	71.3	70.4	72.5	75.1	77.4	79.2	
	Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)	60.2	59.6	60.5	56.4	54.5	53.8	52.1	50.5	51.2	54.0	55.7	57.8	
	FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	80.0	80.1	77.2	70.0	68.0	66.3	62.9	61.4	63.0	65.5	67.6	69.6	
	Self-employed (% total employment)	19.6	19.7	20.1	19.4 b	19.5	19.3	20.6	21.3	21.0	20.6	20.1	19.7	
	Part-time employment (% total employment)	4.2	3.9	4.0	4.7	5.2	5.8	6.4	7.7	7.7	7.8	7.6	7.2	
	Temporary employment (% total employment)	25.6	24.4	21.8	18.9	18.9	19.3	17.5	17.4	18.6	19.9	20.6	20.9	
	Employment in Services (% total employment)			54.8 b	58.6	60.7	62.2	63.9	64.7	65.4	64.9	65.1	64.4	
	Employment in Industry (% total employment)			40.2 b	36.1	33.8	32.4	30.5	29.3	28.8	29.3	29.0	29.5	
	Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)			5.0 b	5.4	5.5	5.4	5.7	6.0	5.9	5.8	5.9	6.1	
	Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)	81.2	81.4	81.6	80.8	80.6	80.4	80.1	79.8	79.5	79.5	79.2	78.9	
	Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)	52.2	52.2	51.5	48.2	45.0	42.6	40.3	39.6	37.3	36.2	34.7	35.1	
	Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)	92.4	92.5	92.4	92.2	92.4	92.5	92.6	92.4	92.6	92.6	92.5	92.0	
	Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)	63.3	62.8	64.7	63.6	63.7	63.5	63.6	63.3	64.3	66.2	67.0	67.9	
	Total unemployment (000)	801	826	1320	2300	2536	2706	3131	3206	2916	2559	2213	1906	
	Unemployment rate (% labour force)	6.4	6.4	10.1	17.7	19.6	21.1	24.6	25.6	23.6	20.8	18.1	15.7	
	Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)	15.0	15.2	23.6	39.1	43.1	48.2	54.1	56.2	53.4	48.6	44.0	39.5	
	Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)	1.2	1.1	1.4	3.7	7.1	8.6	10.7	12.5	12.3	10.5	8.4	6.7	
	Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)	18.4	17.4	14.1	21.1	36.0	40.8	43.5	48.9	52.0	50.4	46.1	42.5	
	Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)	7.8	7.9	12.1	18.8	19.4	20.5	21.8	22.3	20.0	17.6	15.3	13.9	
	Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)	77.9	77.4	73.8	65.5	63.2	61.6	57.0	55.8	57.4 b	60.5	63.1	65.1	
	Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)	86.6	85.4	83.6	77.1	75.9	74.4	71.9	69.9	71.6 b	73.9	75.9	77.0	
	Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)	88.2	89.2	87.9	84.6	83.3	82.3	80.7	79.9	80.8 b	82.4	83.5	85.0	
	Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)	75.5	75.8	73.5	67.7	65.7	64.4	61.3	60.2	61.4	63.4	64.9	66.6	
	Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)	79.8	79.0	75.7	65.4	63.1	60.4	58.7	58.3	60.3	65.2	67.8	70.1	
	Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)	80.5	78.2	70.9	56.9	57.1	54.8	50.4	48.7	51.4	55.9	61.0	63.3	
	Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)	75.4	75.6	73.4	67.6	65.6	64.4	61.4	60.3	61.5	63.4	65.0	66.6	
	Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)	80.6	79.7	76.6	67.4	64.7	62.3	60.2	59.7	61.6	66.5	68.5	71.2	
	Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)	80.4	78.6	71.6	58.7	58.5	56.4	52.4	50.6	53.5	57.4	61.7	63.6	
	Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)			1.4	2.0	2.4	2.8	3.2	3.9	4.0	4.0	3.8	3.5	
	Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)	0.9	0.9	0.7	0.8	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.8	
	Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)	1.8	1.5	1.7	2.3	2.5	2.4	2.8	3.0	3.0	2.6	2.4	2.3	
	Labour Market Indicators - Female	Total population (000)	22291	22666	23077	23359	23504	23618	23719	23710	23635	23623	23633	23693
		Population aged 15-64(000)	14959	15220	15504	15634	15653	15638	15634	15552	15395	15314	15283	15288
		Total employment (000)	8131	8513	8665	8374	8301	8269	8025	7823	7902	8106	8341	8559
		Employment aged 15-64 (000)	8085	8469	8608	8314	8236	8203	7957	7765	7847	8042	8273	8487
		Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	57.1	58.6	58.9	56.8	56.3	56.1	54.6	53.8	54.8	56.4	58.1	59.6
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)		53.8	55.3	55.4	53.3	52.8	52.6	51.2	50.3	51.2	52.7	54.3	55.7	
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)		34.5	34.0	32.6	26.7	24.3	22.0	18.3	16.3	16.0	17.3	17.2	19.7	
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)		64.4	66.3	66.5	64.4	63.9	63.4	62.0	61.2	62.3	63.7	65.6	67.1	
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)		28.9	30.2	31.2	32.1	33.1	35.6	36.0	36.3	37.8	40.2	42.8	43.5	
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)		51.3	52.9	53.1	51.0	50.4	50.2	48.3	47.2	48.1	49.8	51.7	53.2	
Self-employed (% total employment)		11.7	11.8	11.8	11.5 b	11.3	11.2	11.8	12.3	12.2	12.1	12.1	11.6	
Part-time employment (% total employment)		22.4	22.1	21.9	22.3	22.6	22.8	23.9	25.2	25.5	25.1	24.1	24.1	
Temporary employment (% total employment)		31.7	28.6	27.2	23.8	23.0	23.3	21.8	21.1	21.4	22.1	23.2	24.3	
Employment in Services (% total employment)				86.2 bu	87.5 u	88.0 u	88.7 u	88.5 u	89.3 u	89.3 u	89.2 u	89.4 u	88.8 u	
Employment in Industry (% total employment)				11.3 bu	10.1 u	9.6 u	9.0 u	9.1 u	8.5 u	8.5 u	8.7 u	8.5 u	8.9 u	
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)				2.5 b	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.2	2.2	2.1	2.1	2.3	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)		60.7	61.9	63.6	65.1	66.3	67.3	68.4	68.7	68.8	69.0	69.2	68.8	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)		44.0	43.4	43.7	41.7	40.2	39.2	37.6	35.9	34.0	33.2	31.3	31.5	
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)		71.8	73.3	75.3	77.2	78.8	79.7	81.1	81.8	82.0	82.0	82.3	82.0	
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)		31.2	32.7	34.2	37.1	38.4	41.8	43.9	45.2	46.9	49.4	51.7	51.8	
Total unemployment (000)		1040	1020	1276	1854	2104	2307	2680	2846	2694	2497	2268	2011	
Unemployment rate (% labour force)		11.4	10.7	12.8	18.1	20.2	21.8	25.1	26.7	25.4	23.6	21.4	19.0	
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)		21.5	21.7	25.5	36.1	39.6	44.0	51.4	54.6	52.9	48.0	44.9	37.4	
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)		2.7	2.4	2.8	4.9	7.6	9.3	11.4	13.5	13.7	12.4	10.8	8.8	
Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)		24.2	22.8	22.0	27.1	37.3	42.6	45.3	50.5	53.8	52.8	50.6	46.4	
Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)		9.5	9.4	11.2	15.1	15.9	17.2	19.4	19.6	18.0	15.9	14.0	11.8	
Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)		41.4	43.2	43.8	41.9	42.1	42.3	40.8	40.1	40.7 b	41.7	43.5	44.7	
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)		65.7	67.2	67.1	64.7	62.5	61.4	60.8	59.2	60.1 b	61.3	62.5	63.4	
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)		79.4	80.4	79.9	78.4	77.1	76.4	74.5	73.2	74.0 b	75.2	76.7	77.5	
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)		52.9	54.6	54.9	53.1	52.7	52.8	51.6	50.8	51.8	53.1	54.8	56.2	
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)		62.1	59.4	56.1	56.1	52.9	51.2	51.1	52.3	51.2	54.3	56.2	57.1	
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)		60.4	60.2	59.5	53.4	53.7	50.8	47.2	44.3	45.1	47.0	47.0	49.0	
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)		52.6	54.3	54.5	52.8	52.5	52.7	51.4	50.7	51.7	53.0	54.7	55.9	
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)		62.1	60.4	57.6	57.0	52.9	51.4	52.3	52.8	51.8	54.6	56.0	57.4	
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)		61.0	60.8	60.6	55.0	54.9	52.1	49.0	46.7	47.9	49.5	50.7	53.1	
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)				6.4	7.4	7.8	8.3	9.3	10.0	10.3	9.7	8.9	8.9	
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)		1.8	1.8	1.5	1.4	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.3	
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)		7.4	5.7	5.6	6.2	6.3	6.1	6.7	7.2	6.8	5.9	5.6	5.2	

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Spain		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017			
Social Indicators	All	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of total population)	24.0	23.3	23.8 b	24.7	26.1	26.7	27.2	27.3	29.2	28.6	27.9			
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of total population)	20.3	19.7	19.8	20.4	20.7	20.6	20.8	20.4	22.2	22.1	22.3			
		At-risk-of-poverty threshold (PPS single person)	7335	7614	9026 b	9338	8967	8655	8582	8550	8517	8678	9105			
		Poverty gap (%)	26.4	25.9	25.6 b	25.7	26.8	27.4	30.6	30.9	31.6	33.8	31.4			
		Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of total population)		10.2	11.0	12.5	11.6	12.7 b	13.3	12.1	14.3	15.8	14.8			
		At-risk-of-poverty before social transfers excl. pensions (% of total population)	24.6	23.7	25.7 b	26.9	28.8	30.0	29.1	30.0	31.1	30.1	29.5			
		Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (%)	17.5	16.9	23.0 b	24.2	28.1	31.3	28.5	32.0	28.6	26.6	24.4			
		Severe Material Deprivation (% of total population)	4.1	3.5	3.6	4.5	4.9	4.5	5.8	6.2	7.1	6.4	5.8	5.1 p		
		Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of people aged 0-59)	6.4	6.8	6.6	7.6	10.8	13.4	14.3	15.7	17.1	15.4	14.9			
		Real Gross Household Disposable income (growth %)	2.1	0.7	1.8	2.8	-3.4	-1.5	-5.7	-1.9	1.0	2.3	2.0			
		Income quintile share ratio S80/S20	5.5	5.5	5.6 b	5.9	6.2	6.3	6.5	6.3	6.8	6.9	6.6			
		GINI coefficient	31.9	31.9	32.4 b	32.9	33.5	34.0	34.2	33.7	34.7	34.6	34.5			
		Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18-24)	30.3 b	30.8	31.7	30.9	28.2	26.3	24.7	23.6	21.9 b	20.0	19.0	18.3		
		NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of total population aged 15-24)	11.8 b	12.0	14.3	18.1	17.8	18.2	18.6	18.6	17.1 b	15.6	14.6	13.3		
Social Indicators	Male	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of male population)	22.6	21.9	22.4 b	23.8	25.5	26.1	27.3	27.9	29.4	29.0	28.0			
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of male population)	18.8	18.6	18.4	19.4	20.1	19.9	20.7	20.9	22.4	22.5	22.6			
		Poverty gap (%)	27.2	26.0	27.1 b	26.1	27.4	27.9	30.7	31.4	31.7	34.5	31.0			
		Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of male population)		9.6	10.1	11.7	11.1	11.4 b	12.9	12.6	14.2	16.3	15.3			
		Severe Material Deprivation (% of male population)	4.2	3.5	3.7	4.6	4.7	4.5	6.2	6.3	7.0	6.6	5.3	4.9 p		
		Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of males aged 0-59)	5.9	6.5	6.1	7.2	10.6	12.9	13.8	15.9	17.0	15.8	14.9			
		Life expectancy at birth (years)	77.7	77.9	78.3 b	78.7	79.2	79.5	79.5	80.2	80.4	80.1	80.5			
		Healthy life years at birth (years) - men	63.9	63.5	64.0 b	63.1	64.5	65.4	64.8	64.7	65.0	63.9	65.9			
		Early leavers from education and training (% of males aged 18-24)	36.7 b	36.6	38.0	37.4	33.6	31.0	28.9	27.2	25.6 b	24.0	22.7	21.8		
		NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of males aged 15-24)	10.3 b	10.4	13.9	19.4	18.8	19.2	19.6	19.4	18.0 b	16.4	15.1	13.8		
		Social Indicators	Female	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of female population)	25.5	24.6	25.1 b	25.6	26.7	27.4	27.2	26.7	28.9	28.3	27.9	
				At-risk-of-poverty (% of female population)	21.8	20.8	21.2	21.3	21.3	21.4	20.9	19.9	22.1	21.8	22.1	
				Poverty gap (%)	25.4	25.1	24.2 b	25.0	26.4	26.7	30.3	30.3	31.4	32.6	31.8	
				Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of female population)		10.9	11.9	13.3	12.2	14.0 b	13.7	11.6	14.4	15.2	14.3	
Severe Material Deprivation (% of female population)	4.0			3.6	3.5	4.4	5.1	4.6	5.5	6.1	7.1	6.3	6.2	5.3 p		
Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of females aged 0-59)	6.9			7.1	7.0	8.0	11.0	13.8	14.8	15.4	17.2	15.1	14.8			
Life expectancy at birth (years)	84.4			84.4	84.6 b	84.9	85.5	85.6	85.5	86.1	86.2	85.8	86.3			
Healthy life years at birth (years) - women	63.5			63.2	63.7 b	62.1	63.8	65.6	65.8	63.9	65.0	64.1	66.5			
Early leavers from education and training (% of females aged 18-24)	23.6 b			24.7	25.1	24.1	22.6	21.5	20.5	19.8	18.1 b	15.8	15.1	14.5		
NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of females aged 15-24)	13.5 b			13.7	14.6	16.7	16.8	17.3	17.6	17.8	16.2 b	14.9	14.1	12.8		
Social Indicators	Children (0-17)			At-Risk-of-poverty or exclusion of children (% of people aged 0-17)	29.5	28.6	30.1 b	32.0	33.3	32.2	32.4	32.6	35.8	34.4	32.9	
				At-risk-of-poverty (% of Children population)	27.1	26.2	27.3	29.0	29.3	27.5	27.9	27.5	30.5	29.6	29.7	
				Severe Material Deprivation (% of Children population)	5.6	4.4	5.5	6.7	7.4	5.2	7.6	8.3	9.5	9.1	7.1	6.5 p
				Share of children living in low work intensity households (% of Children population)	4.5	5.0	4.2	6.2	9.5	11.6	12.3	13.8	14.2	12.0	11.6	
		Risk of poverty of children in households at work (Working Intensity > 0.2)	24.5	23.7	25.4 b	25.8	24.1	21.3	20.4	19.3	22.6	22.9	22.8			
		Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (0-17) (%)	14.8	14.1	18.3 b	18.1	21.9	25.9	23.4	27.6	22.4	21.1	17.5			
Social Indicators	Working age (18-64)	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of Working age population)	20.8	20.8	21.5 b	22.7	24.9	26.7	28.6	29.2	31.8	31.2	30.4			
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of Working age population)	16.3	16.4	16.5	17.2	18.1	19.0	20.4	20.4	22.9	22.8	22.9			
		Severe Material Deprivation (% of Working age population)	3.8	3.3	3.5	4.5	4.9	4.8	6.1	6.5	7.6	6.9	6.4	5.5 p		
		Very low work intensity (18-59)	7.0	7.3	7.3	8.0	11.2	13.9	14.9	16.3	18.0	16.5	15.9			
		In-work at-risk-of poverty rate (% of persons employed 18-64)	10.1	10.2	11.3 b	11.7	10.8	10.9	10.8	10.6	12.6	13.2	13.1			
		Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (18-64) (%)	21.6	20.8	28.3 b	30.1	33.2	35.8	31.8	34.6	30.8	29.0	27.1			
Social Indicators	Elderly (65+)	At-Risk-of-poverty or exclusion of elderly (% of people aged 65+)	31.1	27.8	26.2 b	24.9	22.9	21.2	16.5	14.5	12.9	13.7	14.4			
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of Elderly population)	29.3	26.1	25.5	23.8	21.8	19.8	14.8	12.7	11.4	12.3	13.0			
		Severe Material Deprivation (% of Elderly population)	3.9	3.6	1.9	2.3	2.2	2.7	2.9	2.7	2.4	2.2	2.5	2.4 p		
		Relative median income of elderly (ratio with median income of people younger than 65)	0.75	0.79	0.83 b	0.87	0.88	0.91	0.96	1.0	1.03	1.01	1.01			
		Aggregate replacement ratio (ratio)	0.48	0.48	0.42 b	0.45	0.47	0.51	0.55	0.60	0.60	0.66	0.66			
Social Indicators	Expenditure in social protection indicators (% of GDP)	Sickness/Health care	6.2	6.2	6.6	7.1	7.0	6.9	6.6	6.5	6.5 p	6.6 p				
		Disability	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.7	1.7	1.8	1.8	1.9	1.8 p	1.7 p				
		Old age and survivors	8.2	8.5	8.8	9.8	10.3	10.8	11.4	12.0	12.3 p	12.0 p				
		Family/Children	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.5	1.5	1.4	1.3	1.4	1.3 p	1.3 p				
		Unemployment	2.1	2.0	2.3	3.5	3.2	3.6	3.4	3.3	2.7 p	2.2 p				
		Housing and Social exclusion n.e.c.	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.4 p	0.3 p				
		Total (including Admin and Other expenditures)	20.0	20.3	21.4	24.4	24.6	25.3	25.5	25.8	25.4 p	24.6 p				
		of which: Means tested benefits	2.7	2.7	2.8	3.3	3.6	4.0	3.7	3.7	3.5 p	3.2 p				

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France

France		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	
Macro Economic Indicators (Annual % growth)	Real GDP	2.4	2.4	0.3	-2.9	1.9	2.2	0.3	0.6	1.0	1.1	1.2 p	2.2 p	
	Total employment	1.1	1.4	0.5	-1.1	0.1	0.8	0.3	0.2	0.5	0.2	0.7 p	1.1 p	
	Labour productivity	1.3	1.0	-0.3	-1.8	1.8	1.4	0.0	0.4	0.4	0.9	0.5 p	1.1 p	
	Annual average hours worked per person employed	-1.1	1.4	0.4	-0.7	0.6	0.4	-0.4	-1.0	-0.5	0.1	0.4 p	-0.2 p	
	Real productivity per hour worked	2.5	-0.5	-0.6	-1.0	1.3	1.0	0.3	1.4	1.0	0.8	0.0 p	1.3 p	
	Harmonized CPI	1.9	1.6	3.2	0.1	1.7	2.3	2.2	1.0	0.6	0.1	0.3	1.2	
	Price deflator GDP	2.2	2.6	2.4	0.1	1.1	0.9	1.2	0.8	0.6	1.1	0.2 p	0.7 p	
	Nominal compensation per employee	3.2	2.5	2.6	1.6	2.9	2.3	2.2	1.8	1.2	1.1	0.8 p	1.9 p	
	Real compensation per employee (GDP deflator)	1.0	-0.1	0.2	1.5	1.8	1.4	1.0	1.0	0.6	-0.1	0.6 p	1.2 p	
	Real compensation per employee (private consumption deflator)	1.3	0.9	-0.5	1.5	1.1	0.0	0.0	0.8	0.6	1.0	0.5 p	0.7 p	
	Nominal unit labour costs	1.8	1.5	2.9	3.4	1.0	0.9	2.2	1.4	0.7	0.2	0.4 p	0.8 p	
	Real unit labour costs	-0.4	-1.0	0.4	3.4	-0.1	-0.1	1.0	0.7	0.1	-0.9	0.2 p	0.1 p	
	Labour Market Indicators - Total	Total population (000)	63230	63645	64007	64350	64659	64979	65277 b	65600	65942	66456 b	66730 p	66989 p
		Population aged 15-64 (000)	41164	41469	41683	41809	41912	42033	41959	41883	41835	41876 b	41854 p	41857 p
Total employment (000)		25150	25587	25926	25674	25731	25759	25805	25785	26377 b	26424	26584	26880	
Employment aged 15-64 (000)		25050	25459	25793	25545	25581	25564	25568	25546	26109 b	26119	26243	26512	
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)		69.4	69.9	70.5	69.5	69.3	69.2	69.4	69.5	69.8	70.0	70.4	71.0	
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)		63.7	64.3	64.9	64.1	64.0	63.9	64.0	64.0	64.2	64.3	64.6	65.2	
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)		30.0	31.2	31.4	30.5	30.1	29.6	28.6	28.4	28.4	28.4	28.2	29.1	
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)		81.3	82.1	83.2	82.1	82.0	81.5	80.9	80.6	80.4	79.9	80.3	80.6	
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)		38.1	38.2	38.2	38.9	39.7	41.4	44.5	45.6	47.0	48.8	49.9	51.4	
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)		64.9	65.4	66.0	65.0	64.6	64.5	64.7	64.9	64.6 b	64.8	65.2	65.8	
Self-employed (% total employment)		10.4	10.3	10.0	10.3	10.9	11.1	11.0	10.8	11.2 b	11.2	11.4	11.3	
Part-time employment (% total employment)		17.1	17.2	16.8	17.2	17.6	17.6	17.7	18.1	18.5	18.3	18.2	18.2	
Temporary employment (% total employment)		12.0	12.0	11.9	11.2	12.0	12.5	12.2	12.6	12.2	13.0	13.3	13.8	
Employment in Services (% total employment)				74.1 b	74.5	74.9	75.0	75.4	75.7	76.8 b	77.1	77.0	77.1	
Employment in Industry (% total employment)				23.2 b	22.6	22.2	22.2	21.8	21.3	20.4 b	20.3	20.2	20.4	
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)				2.7 b	2.9	2.9	2.8	2.8	3.0	2.8 b	2.7	2.8	2.5	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)		69.2 e	69.3 e	69.4 e	69.8 e	69.8 e	69.7 e	70.3 e	70.7 e	71.1	71.3	71.4	71.5	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)		38.1	38.4	38.5	39.6	38.9	37.9	37.4	37.4	37.1	37.3	37.2	37.2	
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)		87.6	87.9	88.5	88.6	88.7	88.2	88.2	88.3	88.2	87.8	87.8	87.7	
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)		40.1	40.0	39.8	41.2	42.2	43.9	47.4	49.0	50.7	52.6	53.7	54.9	
Total unemployment (000)		2482	2268	2121	2622	2679	2665	2855	3026	3026	3052	2972	2788	
Unemployment rate (% labour force)		8.8	8.0	7.4	9.1	9.3	9.2	9.8	10.3	10.3	10.4	10.1	9.4	
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)		22.0	19.5	19.0	23.6	23.3	22.6	24.4	24.9	24.2	24.7	24.6	22.3	
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)		3.8 e	3.3 e	2.9 e	3.3 e	3.9 e	4.0 e	4.1 e	4.4 e	4.5	4.6	4.6	4.2	
Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)		41.0	39.2	36.6	34.5	39.5	40.7	39.6	40.2	42.5	42.6	44.2	43.8	
Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)		8.1	7.2	7.1	9.1	8.8	8.3	8.8	9.0	8.8 b	9.1	9.1	8.2	
Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)		58.1	57.9	57.7	56.4	55.8	55.9	55.7	54.2 b	53.2 b	52.2	51.3	52.7	
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)		75.5	75.7	75.8	74.9	74.6	73.7	73.6	73.2 b	72.5 b	72.6	72.9	73.0	
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)		82.9	83.4	84.6	83.5	83.6	83.8	84.3	84.3 b	83.8 b	83.9	85.0	85.2	
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)		64.4	65.0	65.5	64.8	64.7	64.6	64.8	64.8	64.5 b	64.8	65.2	65.8	
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)		67.0	66.1	66.0	64.8	67.0	68.0	65.1	67.6	66.7 b	65.4	66.4	67.2	
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)		44.8	46.1	50.2	46.3	46.3	45.7	46.4	46.0	44.9 b	44.2	44.3	45.2	
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)		64.5	65.2	65.6	65.0	64.8	64.8	65.0	65.1	64.8 b	65.1	65.6	66.0	
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)		64.7	64.4	64.4	64.8	67.1	67.6	65.8	67.7	66.9 b	65.8	65.5	67.5	
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)		54.2	55.7	58.3	55.3	54.8	54.1	54.8	53.4	52.9 b	52.5	52.2	53.5	
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)				4.5 b	4.7	5.0	4.7	4.7	5.4 b	5.5	5.7	5.5	5.3	
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)		1.7	1.6	1.5	1.6	1.7	1.9	1.9	1.0 b	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.2	
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)		1.4	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.2		2.3	2.4	2.3	2.2	

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France	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017		
Labour Market Indicators - Male	Total population (000)	30591	30803	30980	31148	31302	31463	31605 b	31773	31937	32175 b	32309 p	32435 p	
	Population aged 15-64(000)	20371	20521	20616	20669	20715	20771	20725	20685	20654	20661 b	20646 p	20645 p	
	Total employment (000)	13397	13545	13692	13485	13520	13531	13508	13434	13661 b	13658	13761	13948	
	Employment aged 15-64 (000)	13336	13468	13612	13406	13427	13415	13369	13294	13501 b	13478	13562	13746	
	Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	75.1	75.1	75.6	74.3	74.0	74.0	73.9	73.6	73.6	73.6	74.2	75.0	
	Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)	69.0	69.2	69.7	68.4	68.3	68.2	68.1	67.8	67.7	67.5	68.0	68.9	
	Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)	33.5	34.2	34.4	32.6	33.2	32.5	31.0	31.1	30.6	30.3	30.2	31.5	
	Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)	88.0	88.4	89.3	87.7	87.4	86.8	86.0	85.2	84.9	84.1	84.7	85.5	
	Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)	40.5	40.5	40.6	41.5	42.3	44.1	47.5	48.4	48.9	50.8	51.6	52.8	
	FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	73.8	73.8	74.2	72.9	72.4	72.4	72.2	72.0	71.5 b	71.4	71.9	72.7	
	Self-employed (% total employment)	14.0	13.9	13.2	14.0	14.7	14.9	14.6	14.3	14.6	14.6	14.8	14.3	
	Part-time employment (% total employment)	5.6	5.5	5.6	5.8	6.4	6.5	6.4	6.7	7.3	7.3	7.4	7.6	
	Temporary employment (% total employment)	12.0	12.0	11.9	11.2	12.0	12.5	12.2	12.6	12.2	13.0	13.3	13.8	
	Employment in Services (% total employment)			62.4 b	62.4	63.0	63.6	63.9	64.4	65.7 b	65.9	65.7	66.4	
	Employment in Industry (% total employment)			34.2 b	33.8	33.2	32.7	32.3	31.5	30.5 b	30.4	30.4	30.2	
	Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)			3.5 b	3.8	3.9	3.7	3.8	4.1	3.8 b	3.7	3.9	3.5	
	Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)	74.9	74.7	74.7	75.0	74.9	74.6	75.3	75.5	75.4	75.5	75.6	75.9	
	Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)	42.0	41.9	42.2	42.9	42.6	41.3	40.8	40.8	40.5	40.5	40.0	40.6	
	Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)	94.1	94.1	94.4	94.3	94.2	93.7	93.6	93.3	93.1	92.7	92.7	92.9	
	Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)	42.7	42.5	42.4	44.0	45.0	46.8	50.8	52.3	53.1	55.1	56.1	56.8	
	Total unemployment (000)	1223	1132	1057	1360	1372	1344	1492	1590	1608	1653	1571	1456	
	Unemployment rate (% labour force)	8.2	7.6	7.0	9.0	9.0	8.9	9.8	10.4	10.5	10.8	10.3	9.5	
	Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)	21.1	19.0	19.2	24.7	22.9	22.0	24.8	24.6	25.1	25.8	25.1	23.1	
	Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)	3.3	2.9	2.6	3.0	3.6	3.5	3.8	4.1	4.5	4.6	4.6	4.2	
	Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)	41.6	39.3	38.0	34.8	41.1	41.5	40.4	40.6	43.9	43.6	46.1	45.5	
	Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)	8.6	7.7	7.8	10.3	9.4	8.8	9.8	9.7	10.0 b	10.4	10.0	9.3	
	Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)	65.8	65.3	65.9	64.1	62.9	63.0	63.3	61.8 b	60.4 b	58.9	58.6	60.7	
	Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)	80.7	80.5	80.3	79.1	78.8	78.1	77.6	76.7 b	76.1 b	76.2	76.3	76.8	
	Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)	86.8	86.9	88.1	86.9	87.0	87.2	87.6	87.3 b	86.4 b	86.7	88.1	88.3	
	Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)	69.2	69.5	69.9	68.8	68.5	68.4	68.4	68.4	67.5 b	67.6	68.0	68.9	
	Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)	75.1	73.0	72.5	71.7	74.8	74.2	70.7	73.3	71.5 b	70.0	69.6	70.2	
	Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)	57.4	59.5	62.8	56.8	60.6	58.9	60.3	60.0	56.5 b	55.2	57.7	58.5	
	Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)	69.2	69.4	69.8	68.8	68.5	68.6	68.4	68.1	67.6 b	67.8	68.2	68.9	
	Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)	72.6	71.1	70.4	70.6	73.1	72.9	70.9	73.3	70.8 b	69.6	68.3	69.7	
	Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)	64.9	66.2	68.3	63.8	64.5	63.4	64.6	64.0	61.5 b	61.0	62.2	64.3	
	Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)			1.8 b	1.9	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.5 b	2.7	3.0	3.0	2.8	
	Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.5	0.9 b	0.9	0.9	1.0	0.9	
	Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.0		2.0	2.2	2.2	2.0	
	Labour Market Indicators - Female	Total population (000)	32639	32842	33027	33202	33357	33516	33672 b	33828	34006	34281 b	34421 p	34554 p
		Population aged 15-64(000)	20793	20948	21067	21139	21197	21262	21234	21198	21181	21215 b	21207 p	21212 p
		Total employment (000)	11753	12042	12234	12189	12211	12228	12297	12351	12715 b	12766	12823	12932
		Employment aged 15-64 (000)	11713	11992	12181	12139	12154	12149	12199	12252	12607 b	12640	12682	12766
		Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	63.9	64.9	65.5	65.0	64.9	64.7	65.1	65.5	66.1	66.5	66.8	67.2
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)		58.6	59.6	60.3	59.9	59.8	59.7	60.1	60.4	60.9	61.1	61.4	61.7	
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)		26.4	28.1	28.5	28.3	27.1	26.7	26.1	25.7	26.2	26.4	26.3	26.8	
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)		74.8	76.0	77.3	76.7	76.8	76.2	76.0	76.2	76.1	75.9	75.9	75.8	
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)		35.8	36.0	35.9	36.5	37.3	38.9	41.6	43.0	45.3	47.0	48.3	50.1	
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)		57.3	58.2	58.9	58.2	57.9	57.7	58.2	58.9	58.7 b	59.1	59.4	59.8	
Self-employed (% total employment)		6.3	6.3	6.4	6.3	6.7	6.9	7.0	7.0	7.5 b	7.6	7.8	8.0	
Part-time employment (% total employment)		30.2	30.3	29.4	29.9	30.0	29.9	30.0	30.4	30.6	30.1	29.8	29.6	
Temporary employment (% total employment)		14.5	15.0	15.2	14.8	14.9	14.8	14.9	14.8	14.7	15.1	15.1	15.8	
Employment in Services (% total employment)									88.1 u	88.7 bu	89.0 u	89.2 u	88.6 u	
Employment in Industry (% total employment)									10.1 u	9.7 bu	9.4 u	9.3 u	9.9 u	
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)				1.8 b	1.9	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.6 b	1.6	1.6	1.5	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)		64.5	64.9	65.2	65.7	65.8	65.7	66.3	66.9	67.4	67.6	67.9	67.9	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)		34.1	34.9	34.7	36.2	35.2	34.5	34.0	33.9	33.7	34.2	34.3	33.7	
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)		81.3	82.0	82.8	83.1	83.4	83.0	83.0	83.5	83.4	83.0	83.1	82.8	
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)		37.6	37.6	37.3	38.5	39.5	41.2	44.2	46.0	48.6	50.4	51.5	53.1	
Total unemployment (000)		1259	1135	1064	1262	1308	1321	1363	1436	1417	1399	1402	1332	
Unemployment rate (% labour force)		9.5	8.5	7.9	9.2	9.5	9.6	9.8	10.2	10.0	9.9	9.9	9.3	
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)		23.2	20.1	18.8	22.3	23.7	23.3	23.8	25.2	23.1	23.3	24.1	21.3	
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)		3.7	3.2	2.6	3.0	3.4	3.6	3.6	3.9	4.0	3.9	4.0	3.8	
Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)		40.5	39.0	35.3	34.3	37.7	39.9	38.7	39.8	41.0	41.5	42.0	42.1	
Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)		7.7	6.8	6.3	7.8	8.1	7.8	7.9	8.3	7.7 b	7.9	8.2	7.1	
Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)		51.4	51.5	50.4	49.6	49.7	49.6	48.9	47.5 b	47.0 b	46.2	44.7	45.5	
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)		69.7	70.4	70.9	70.2	70.0	69.0	69.3	69.4 b	68.4 b	68.6	69.2	68.9	
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)		79.6	80.3	81.7	80.6	80.8	80.8	81.5	81.7 b	81.6 b	81.6	82.3	82.6	
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)		59.6	60.7	61.3	60.9	61.0	60.9	61.4	61.7	61.5 b	62.0	62.4	62.8	
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)		58.5	59.4	59.8	57.8	59.1	61.4	59.0	61.6	62.2 b	61.0	63.4	64.2	
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)		33.4	33.8	38.0	36.5	33.7	34.2	34.2	33.9	35.4 b	34.7	32.7	34.1	
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)		60.0	61.0	61.6	61.2	61.2	61.1	61.7	62.2	62.0 b	62.5	63.0	63.3	
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)		57.7	58.9	59.2	59.5	61.6	62.7	61.0	62.5	63.6 b	62.3	63.0	65.5	
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)		44.2	45.9	48.8	47.4	45.8	45.9	45.9	43.9	45.5 b	45.0	43.6	44.0	
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)				7.5 b	7.7	8.1	7.5	7.5	8.5 b	8.5	8.7	8.3	7.9	
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)		2.3	2.2	1.9	2.1	2.1	2.3	2.3	1.2 b	1.2	1.2	1.4	1.4	
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)		1.8	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.5		2.5	2.5	2.4	2.4	

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France		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	
All	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of total population)	18.8	19.0	18.5 b	18.5	19.2	19.3	19.1	18.1	18.5	17.7	18.2		
	At-risk-of-poverty (% of total population)	13.2	13.1	12.5	12.9	13.3	14.0	14.1	13.7	13.3	13.6	13.6		
	At-risk-of-poverty threshold (PPS single person)	8989	9089	10496 b	10644	10669	10897	11271	11516	11584	11931	12450		
	Poverty gap (%)	18.5	17.9	14.5 b	18.2	19.5	17.1	16.2	16.8	16.6	15.7	16.6		
	Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of total population)		6.4					7.0	8.3	7.9	8.5	8.0		
	At-risk-of-poverty before social transfers excl. pensions (% of total population)	24.9	26.4	23.5 b	24.0	24.9	24.7	23.8	24.4	24.0	23.9	23.6		
	Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (%)	47.0	50.4	46.8 b	46.3	46.6	43.3	40.8	43.9	44.6	43.1	42.4		
	Severe Material Deprivation (% of total population)	5.0	4.7	5.4	5.6	5.8	5.2	5.3	4.9	4.8	4.5	4.4	4.1 p	
	Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of people aged 0-59)	9.1	9.6	8.8	8.4	9.9	9.4	8.4	8.1	9.6	8.6	8.4		
	Real Gross Household Disposable income (growth %)	2.4	3.0	0.4	1.7	1.3	0.2	-0.8	-0.3	1.2	0.8	1.9		
	Income quintile share ratio S80/S20	4.0	3.9	4.4 b	4.4	4.4	4.6	4.5	4.5	4.3	4.3	4.3		
	GINI coefficient	27.3	26.6	29.8 b	29.9	29.8	30.8	30.5	30.1	29.2	29.2	29.3		
	Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18-24)	12.7	12.8	11.8	12.4	12.7	12.3	11.8	9.7 b	9.0 b	9.2	8.8	8.9	
	NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of total population aged 15-24)	11.3	10.7	10.5	12.7	12.7	12.3	12.5	11.2 b	11.4 b	12.0	11.9	11.5	
	Male	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of male population)	17.3	18.0	17.3 b	17.1	18.4	18.6	18.4	17.3	17.5	17.1	17.3	
At-risk-of-poverty (% of male population)		12.3	12.8	11.7	11.9	12.7	13.5	13.6	13.1	12.6	13.2	12.8		
Poverty gap (%)		19.1	18.0	14.7 b	18.8	19.5	17.8	16.3	16.7	17.1	15.7	16.8		
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of male population)			5.9					6.3	8.3	7.5	7.8	6.9		
Severe Material Deprivation (% of male population)		4.6	4.4	5.1	5.2	5.7	5.1	5.1	4.5	4.5	4.4	4.2	3.9 p	
Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of males aged 0-59)		8.2	8.6	8.1	7.6	9.2	9.0	8.4	7.5	8.9	8.3	8.0		
Life expectancy at birth (years)		77.3	77.6	77.8	78.0	78.2	78.7	78.7	79.0	79.5	79.2	79.5		
Healthy life years at birth (years) - men		62.8	62.8	62.8	62.8	61.8	62.7	62.6	63.0	63.4	62.6	62.6		
Early leavers from education and training (% of males aged 18-24)		14.6	15.2	13.8	14.5	15.3	14.1	13.7	10.7 b	10.2 b	10.1	10.1	10.5	
NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of males aged 15-24)		10.4	10.0	10.4	13.3	12.7	12.0	12.9	11.0 b	11.8 b	12.4	12.0	12.1	
Female		At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of female population)	20.3	20.0	19.7 b	19.7	19.9	19.9	19.6	18.9	19.5	18.2	19.1	
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of female population)	14.0	13.4	13.3	13.8	13.9	14.5	14.6	14.3	14.1	13.9	14.4	
		Poverty gap (%)	18.4	17.7	14.4 b	18.0	19.7	16.4	16.2	16.8	16.1	15.7	16.5	
		Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of female population)		6.9					7.7	8.4	8.3	9.1	9.0	
		Severe Material Deprivation (% of female population)	5.3	5.0	5.7	5.9	5.8	5.4	5.5	5.4	5.1	4.7	4.6	4.4 p
	Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of females aged 0-59)	10.0	10.6	9.6	9.1	10.5	9.7	8.5	8.6	10.4	8.8	8.8		
	Life expectancy at birth (years)	84.5	84.8	84.8	85.0	85.3	85.7	85.4	85.6	86.0	85.5	85.7		
	Healthy life years at birth (years) - women	64.4	64.4	64.5	63.5	63.4	63.6	63.8	64.4	64.2	64.6	64.1		
	Early leavers from education and training (% of females aged 18-24)	10.8	10.5	9.9	10.3	10.2	10.4	10.0	8.6 b	7.9 b	8.4	7.5	7.2	
	NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of females aged 15-24)	12.3	11.3	10.7	12.1	12.6	12.6	12.1	11.4 b	11.0 b	11.5	11.8	11.0	
	Children (0-17)	At-Risk-of-poverty or exclusion of children (% of people aged 0-17)	18.1	19.6	21.2 b	21.2	22.9	23.0	23.2	20.8	21.6	21.2	22.6	
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of Children population)	13.9	15.3	15.6	16.8	18.1	18.8	19.0	17.6	17.7	18.7	19.1	
		Severe Material Deprivation (% of Children population)	5.6	5.4	6.6	6.5	7.0	7.0	7.2	5.6	5.7	5.4	5.3	5.1 p
		Share of children living in low work intensity households (% of Children population)	6.9	7.7	7.4	6.6	8.8	8.2	7.2	6.3	8.1	7.4	7.6	
		Risk of poverty of children in households at work (Working Intensity > 0.2)	9.2	10.6	11.5	12.8	12.7	13.6	14.3	13.5	12.6	13.3	14.8	
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (0-17) (%)		54.9	58.5	55.3 b	51.5	50.0	47.5	44.3	48.1	48.4	45.2	44.5		
Working age (18-64)	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of Working age population)	19.4	19.7	18.8 b	18.9	19.9	20.1	19.8	19.3	19.9	19.0	19.2		
	At-risk-of-poverty (% of Working age population)	12.1	12.3	11.6	11.8	12.7	13.5	13.7	13.7	13.2	13.4	13.3		
	Severe Material Deprivation (% of Working age population)	5.3	4.8	5.5	5.9	6.0	5.2	5.4	5.4	5.2	5.0	4.6	4.3 p	
	Very low work intensity (18-59)	10.0	10.4	9.4	9.1	10.3	9.8	8.9	8.8	10.3	9.0	8.7		
	In-work at-risk-of poverty rate (% of persons employed 18-64)	6.0	6.4	6.5 b	6.6	6.5	7.6	8.0	7.8	8.0	7.5	8.0		
	Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (18-64) (%)	49.6	50.4	47.3 b	47.8	48.0	43.8	41.0	43.9	45.2	44.6	43.9		
Elderly (65+)	At-Risk-of-poverty or exclusion of elderly (% of people aged 65+)	17.5	15.2	14.1 b	13.4	11.8	11.5	11.1	10.8	10.1	9.3	10.0		
	At-risk-of-poverty (% of Elderly population)	16.1	13.1	11.9	11.9	9.4	9.7	9.4	9.1	8.6	8.0	8.2		
	Severe Material Deprivation (% of Elderly population)	2.9	3.4	3.3	3.2	3.4	2.9	2.4	2.6	2.4	1.9	2.9	2.5 p	
	Relative median income of elderly (ratio with median income of people younger than 65)	0.88	0.91	0.95 b	0.96	0.98	1.01	1.0	1.03	1.02	1.04	1.02		
	Aggregate replacement ratio (ratio)	0.58	0.60	0.65 b	0.66	0.65	0.64	0.65	0.66	0.69	0.69	0.68		
Expenditure in social protection indicators (% of GDP)	Sickness/Health care	8.5	8.4	8.4	9.0	8.9	8.8	9.0	9.0	9.1	9.1			
	Disability	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.9	1.9	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.1	2.0			
	Old age and survivors	12.5	12.6	12.9	13.8	13.9	14.0	14.3	14.6	14.6	14.6			
	Family/Children	2.5	2.4	2.4	2.6	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5			
	Unemployment	1.7	1.6	1.5	1.9	1.9	1.9	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0			
	Housing and Social exclusion n.e.c.	1.5	1.5	1.6	1.8	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.8	1.8			
	Total (including Admin and Other expenditures) of which: Means tested benefits	30.4	30.1	30.4	32.9	32.9	32.7	33.5	33.9	34.2	33.9			
	3.2	3.1	3.1	3.5	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.5	3.5	3.5				

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Croatia

Croatia		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Macro Economic Indicators (Annual % growth)	Real GDP	4.8	5.2	2.1	-7.4	-1.4	-0.3	-2.2	-0.6	-0.1	2.3	3.2	2.8
	Total employment	3.2 p	3.2 p	2.1 d	-0.7 d	-3.8 d	-3.9 d	-3.6 d	-2.6 d	2.7 d	1.2 d	0.3 d	2.2 d
	Labour productivity	1.6 p	1.9 p	-0.1 d	-6.7 d	2.4 d	3.7 d	1.4 d	2.0 d	-2.7 d	1.1 d	2.9 d	0.6 d
	Annual average hours worked per person employed	0.1 p	0.1 p	0.1 dp	-0.2 d	0.7 d	-0.1 d	-0.9 d	-0.7 d	-0.9 d	-3.4 d	0.4 d	-0.7 d
	Real productivity per hour worked	1.5 p	1.8 p	-0.2 d	-6.5 d	1.7 d	3.8 d	2.3 d	2.8 d	-1.8 d	4.6 d	2.5 d	1.3 d
	Harmonized CPI	3.3	2.7	5.8	2.2	1.1	2.2	3.4	2.3	0.2	-0.3	-0.6	1.3
	Price deflator GDP	4.0	4.1	5.7	2.8	0.8	1.7	1.6	0.8	0.1	0.0	-0.1	1.2
	Nominal compensation per employee	3.0 p	5.3 p	5.1 dp	-0.2 d	1.9 d	3.7 d	0.4 d	-0.9 d	-5.2 d	0.4 d	-0.2 d	-1.1 d
	Real compensation per employee (GDP deflator)	-1.0 p	1.1 p	-0.6 dp	-2.9 d	1.0 d	2.0 d	-1.2 d	-1.7 d	-5.3 d	0.4 d	-0.1 d	-2.3 d
	Real compensation per employee (private consumption deflator)	-0.3 p	2.5 p	-0.7 dp	-2.4 d	0.8 d	1.4 d	-2.9 d	-3.2 d	-5.4 d	0.6 d	0.5 d	-2.4 d
	Nominal unit labour costs	1.4 p	3.3 p	5.1 d	6.9 d	-0.6 d	0.0 d	-1.0 d	-2.9 d	-2.6 d	-0.7 d	-3.0 d	-1.7 d
	Real unit labour costs	-2.5 p	-0.7 p	-0.5 dp	4.0 d	-1.4 d	-1.6 d	-2.5 d	-3.7 d	-2.5 d	-0.7 d	-2.9 d	-2.8 d
	Total population (000)	4312	4314	4312	4310	4303	4290	4276	4262	4247	4225	4191	4154
	Population aged 15-64 (000)	2876	2879	2875	2875	2875	2874	2865	2852	2836	2809	2774	2737
	Total employment (000)	1586 b	1734	1771	1757	1690	1625	1566	1524	1566	1585	1590	1625
	Employment aged 15-64 (000)	1526 b	1694	1725	1708	1649	1584	1528	1494	1542	1559	1567	1603
	Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	60.6 e	63.9	64.9	64.2	62.1	59.8	58.1	57.2	59.2	60.6	61.4	63.6
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)	55.6 e	59.0	60.0	59.4	57.4	55.2	53.5	52.5	54.6	56.0	56.9	58.9	
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)	26.1 e	27.4	28.0	27.1	24.2	20.6	17.4	14.9	18.3	19.1	25.6	25.9	
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)	72.1 e	74.5	76.0	74.7	72.6	70.6	69.2	68.3	71.2	72.3	72.4	74.9	
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)	34.1 e	36.6	37.1	39.4	39.1	38.2	37.5	37.8	36.2	39.2	38.1	40.3	
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	59.2 b	62.6	63.6	62.8	60.5	58.2	56.9	56.0	58.1	59.3	60.0	62.3	
Self-employed (% total employment)	20.8 b	18.5	18.7	18.5	19.2	19.0	17.4	16.5	14.1 b	13.7	12.5	11.1	
Part-time employment (% total employment)	7.1 e	6.1	6.5	6.5	7.0	7.2	5.6	5.4	5.3	6.0	5.6	4.8	
Temporary employment (% total employment)	10.0 e	10.0	9.6	8.8	9.3	10.4	10.7	12.0	13.7	16.8	18.4	17.8	
Employment in Services (% total employment)			57.5 bu	58.9 u	59.4	58.6	61.0 u	62.4 u	64.1 u	64.7 u	66.0 u	66.9 u	
Employment in Industry (% total employment)			31.6 bu	29.8 u	28.0	28.6	28.5 u	28.1 u	27.2 u	27.0 u	27.2 u	26.7 u	
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)			10.9 b	11.4	12.5	12.9	10.6	9.6	8.7	8.3	6.8	6.4	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)	63.0 e	65.7	65.8	65.6	65.1	64.1	63.9	63.7	66.1	66.9	65.6	66.4	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)	36.5 e	36.6	36.6	36.3	35.9	32.5	30.1	29.9	33.6	33.2	37.2	35.7	
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)	80.1 e	81.6	81.9	81.2	80.8	80.6	80.9	80.8	84.1	84.5	82.0	83.3	
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)	36.3 e	39.0	39.3	41.8	41.8	41.4	41.8	41.9	41.0	44.3	42.2	43.6	
Total unemployment (000)	215 d	190	166	180	224	256	292	320	325	304	245	203	
Unemployment rate (% labour force)	11.6 d	9.9	8.6	9.3	11.8	13.7	15.8	17.4	17.2	16.1	13.4	11.1	
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)	28.9 d	25.4	23.6	25.4	32.3	36.6	42.2	49.9	44.9	42.3	31.8	27.0	
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)	6.7	6.0	5.3	5.1	6.6	8.4	10.2	11.0	10.1	10.2	6.6	4.6	
Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)	59.3	60.0	62.3	55.7	56.3	61.3	63.7	63.6	58.3	63.1	50.7	41.0	
Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)	10.4 b	9.2	8.7	9.2	11.6	11.9	12.7	14.9	15.3	14.0	11.6	9.8	
Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)	42.6 b	45.7	47.8	48.9	46.7 b	43.5	41.2	39.3	38.3 b	39.7	38.1	34.9	
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)	66.7 b	70.0	70.3	68.4	66.2 b	64.7	62.5	61.4	62.6 b	63.9	63.5	66.9	
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)	81.3 b	83.0	83.9	82.9	81.0 b	78.9	77.9	77.7	80.5 b	80.9	82.1	83.8	
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)	55.7 b	59.0	60.0	59.6	57.5	55.2	53.5	52.5	54.6	56.0	57.0	59.0	
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)						76.1 u	71.8 u	63.4 u			43.1 u	55.3 u	
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)		47.2 u	42.1 u	28.1 u	28.2 u	39.2 u	28.9 u	35.3 u	35.2 u	32.3 u	30.3 u	37.0 u	
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)	56.2 b	59.4	60.3	59.6	57.7	55.5	54.0	53.1	54.7	55.9	57.1	59.0	
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)	53.2 bu	61.4	64.8	70.8	63.9	59.5	56.2	52.9	57.1	61.0	64.5	70.6	
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)	50.8 b	55.4	56.8	56.7	53.6	51.4	47.8	46.6	52.5	55.8	54.3	56.9	
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)			1.7	1.9	2.4	2.4	1.9	1.8	1.8	2.3	1.9	1.7	
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)		0.7	0.6	0.6	0.8	0.9	0.7	0.6	0.9	0.6	0.9	0.7	
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)	6.5 e	5.8	5.2	5.7	5.9	6.9	8.2	10.8	8.7	8.4	10.0	7.7	

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Croatia		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	
Labour Market Indicators - Male	Total population (000)	2074	2076	2077	2077	2075	2069	2062	2056	2050	2039	2023	2005	
	Population aged 15-64(000)	1432	1435	1435	1436	1436	1436	1432	1426	1419	1405	1388	1369	
	Total employment (000)	868 b	970	988	962	920	894	856	821	849	855	860	881	
	Employment aged 15-64 (000)	839 b	951	966	937	899	872	835	803	836	841	845	868	
	Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	67.7 e	72.1	72.9	70.5	67.9	66.1	63.7	61.6	64.2	65.4	66.2	68.9	
	Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)	62.2 e	66.5	67.3	65.2	62.7	60.9	58.5	56.5	59.1	60.3	61.4	63.8	
	Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)	30.0 e	32.4	34.2	32.3	27.9	23.8	20.0	17.4	21.2	22.4	28.8	29.8	
	Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)	78.2 e	81.0	82.2	79.3	76.4	75.1	73.0	71.6	74.5	75.4	76.3	78.7	
	Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)	44.6 e	49.5	48.9	49.6	50.5	49.6	48.0	45.0	45.8	48.2	45.1	49.0	
	FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	66.7 b	71.3	72.3	69.8	66.9	65.0	62.9	60.7	63.5	64.4	65.2	67.9	
	Self-employed (% total employment)	23.3 b	21.0	21.2	21.2	21.2	21.3	20.0	19.4	17.6 b	17.4	15.9	13.3	
	Part-time employment (% total employment)	5.6 e	4.6	4.9	4.9	5.1	5.6	4.6	4.6	4.2	4.8	4.4	3.8	
	Temporary employment (% total employment)	10.0 e	10.0	9.6	8.8	9.3	10.4	10.7	12.0	13.7	16.8	18.4	17.8	
	Employment in Services (% total employment)				47.8 bu	48.7 u	49.5 u	49.5 u	51.4 u	50.8 u	53.0 u	53.5 u	54.4 u	
	Employment in Industry (% total employment)				41.9 bu	40.4 u	38.7 u	38.2 u	37.9 u	38.8 u	37.1 u	37.1 u	38.0 u	
	Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)				10.3 b	10.9	11.8	12.4	10.7	10.4	10.0	9.8	8.5	
	Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)	69.3 e	73.0	72.5	71.0	70.6	70.7	69.8	68.9	70.9	71.6	70.3	71.5	
	Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)	40.8 e	41.6	43.1	42.4	40.7	37.8	34.6	34.7	38.5	38.2	41.9	40.9	
	Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)	85.1 e	87.4	86.9	84.5	84.1	85.4	85.2	84.7	86.6	86.9	85.2	86.7	
	Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)	48.0 e	53.2	52.1	52.7	54.4	54.2	53.9	51.0	52.1	55.0	50.7	52.8	
	Total unemployment (000)	103 d	92	76	84	116	140	159	175	168	158	125	102	
	Unemployment rate (% labour force)	10.3 d	8.7	7.1	8.1	11.2	13.6	15.8	17.6	16.6	15.6	12.7	10.4	
	Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)	26.5 d	22.6	20.7	23.8	31.8	36.7	42.2	49.5	44.5	41.5	31.4	26.6	
	Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)	5.8	5.0	4.2	3.9	5.9	8.4	10.2	11.3	9.6	10.1	6.8	4.7	
	Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)	58.0	56.5	59.5	49.7	53.4	61.3	63.6	63.8	58.2	64.8	54.0	43.8	
	Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)	10.9 b	9.2	8.9	10.1	12.8	14.0	14.6	17.3	17.3	15.8	13.1	11.1	
	Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)	55.6 b	59.2	61.3	60.5	58.1 b	54.2	51.2	49.8	47.0 b	49.1	47.6	44.8	
	Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)	72.1 b	76.4	76.8	73.6	71.1 b	70.6	67.7	65.0	67.7 b	68.6	68.4	72.4	
	Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)	81.9 b	84.6	84.6	83.3	80.7 b	78.4	78.3	78.6	80.9 b	81.3	83.3	84.7	
	Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)	62.0 b	66.5	67.3	65.4	62.8	60.8	58.4	56.4	59.1	60.4	61.4	63.9	
	Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)						80.1 u	89.1 u	85.8 u				57.9 u	
	Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)								90.0 u	43.3 u			42.7 u	
	Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)	62.0 b	66.4	67.1	65.1	62.8	61.1	59.1	57.0	59.1	60.0	61.0	63.5	
	Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)	64.9 bu	74.0 u	71.9 u	71.3 u	70.6 u	59.7 u	59.4	50.3 u	63.8 u	65.8	71.8	73.5	
	Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)	61.4 b	66.8	68.7	65.6	60.9	58.7	52.3	52.4	59.0	62.7	63.0	65.3	
	Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)			1.7	2.0	2.3	2.2	1.8	1.9	1.4	2.1	1.8	1.6	
	Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)		0.5 u	0.3 u	0.4 u	0.6 u	0.4 u	0.4 u	0.3 u	0.7 u	0.5 u	0.7 u	0.6 u	
	Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)	4.3 e	3.7	3.6	4.5	4.5	4.6	6.0	8.2	7.4	7.0	7.7	5.2	
	Labour Market Indicators - Female	Total population (000)	2239	2237	2235	2233	2228	2221	2214	2206	2197	2186	2168	2149
		Population aged 15-64(000)	1444	1444	1440	1439	1438	1438	1434	1426	1418	1404	1386	1368
		Total employment (000)	718 b	764	783	795	770	731	710	703	717	731	730	744
		Employment aged 15-64 (000)	687 b	743	759	772	749	711	693	690	706	719	721	735
		Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	53.6 e	55.9	57.0	58.0	56.4	53.6	52.6	52.8	54.2	55.9	56.6	58.3
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)		49.3 e	51.6	52.7	53.7	52.1	49.5	48.5	48.5	50.0	51.6	52.4	54.0	
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)		21.9 e	22.3	21.4	21.7	20.4	17.2	14.7	12.4	15.3	15.8	22.2	21.8	
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)		66.1 e	67.9	69.7	70.1	68.8	66.1	65.2	64.9	67.9	69.3	68.5	71.1	
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)		25.1 e	25.0	26.4	30.0	28.5	27.7	27.7	31.0	27.3	30.7	31.6	32.3	
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)		51.9 b	54.0	55.0	56.0	54.1	51.5	50.9	51.4	52.7	54.2	54.9	56.7	
Self-employed (% total employment)		17.6 b	15.3	15.6	15.2	16.9	16.2	14.3	13.0	10.1 b	9.5	8.5	8.3	
Part-time employment (% total employment)		9.0 e	8.1	8.4	8.5	9.4	9.2	6.9	6.4	6.7	7.3	7.1	6.0	
Temporary employment (% total employment)		10.1 e	11.7	10.4	10.9	11.4	11.3	11.3	12.2	15.1	17.7	20.2	18.7	
Employment in Services (% total employment)						71.3 u	69.8 u			77.4 u	78.3 u			
Employment in Industry (% total employment)						15.3 u	16.8 u			15.5 u	15.3 u			
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)				11.6 b	12.0	13.4	13.5	10.5	8.6	7.1	6.5	4.8	4.6	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)		56.8 e	58.4	59.0	60.3	59.6	57.6	58.0	58.5	61.3	62.3	60.9	61.4	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)		32.0 e	31.5	29.9	30.0	30.7	26.9	25.3	24.8	28.5	28.0	32.3	30.2	
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)		75.1 e	75.7	76.9	77.8	77.4	75.8	76.6	76.8	81.5	82.1	78.8	79.9	
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)		26.3 e	26.1	27.6	31.8	30.2	29.6	30.6	33.4	30.6	34.4	34.2	35.0	
Total unemployment (000)		112 d	98	90	96	108	116	133	146	157	146	120	102	
Unemployment rate (% labour force)		13.3 d	11.4	10.4	10.8	12.4	13.8	15.8	17.2	18.0	16.7	14.2	12.0	
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)		32.1 d	29.2	28.0	27.8	33.1	36.3	42.3	50.4	45.4	43.5	32.2	27.4	
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)		7.8	7.2	6.7	6.5	7.3	8.5	10.2	10.6	10.7	10.4	6.5	4.5	
Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)		60.6	63.5	64.7	60.9	59.3	61.4	63.7	63.2	58.3	61.3	47.2	38.1	
Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)		9.8 b	9.2	8.5	8.2	10.3	9.7	10.6	12.4	13.2	12.2	10.1	8.4	
Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)		34.6 b	37.0	38.5	40.7	39.0 b	36.5	34.5	32.0	32.3 b	33.3	31.2	27.5	
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)		60.2 b	62.4	62.6	62.2	60.3 b	57.6	56.4	57.2	56.6 b	58.3	57.8	60.6	
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)		80.7 b	81.6	83.2	82.6	81.3 b	79.3	77.5	77.0	80.2 b	80.5	81.2	83.1	
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)		49.5 b	51.6	52.8	53.7	52.2	49.6	48.6	48.6	50.0	51.7	52.5	54.1	
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)														
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)					33.8 u	39.2 u					30.8 u	32.4 u	32.1 u	
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)		50.6 b	52.4	53.4	54.1	52.6	49.9	49.0	49.2	50.3	51.8	53.1	54.4	
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)		46.2 bu	51.0 u	59.8	70.5	60.5	59.3	52.7 u	55.7 u	51.8 u	56.1 u	56.5 u	67.3	
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)		40.9 b	43.8	45.7	48.6	46.9	44.4	43.4	41.0	46.7	49.2	45.4	48.8	
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)				1.8	1.9	2.4	2.6	1.9	1.7	2.3	2.4	2.1	1.8	
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)			1.0 u	1.0 u	0.8 u	1.0 u	1.4	1.0 u	0.8 u	1.2	0.8 u	1.1 u	0.7 u	
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)		9.1 e	8.3	7.2	7.1	7.6	9.6	10.9	13.8	10.2	10.1	12.6	10.6	

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Croatia		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	
All	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of total population)					31.1	32.6	32.6	29.9	29.3	29.1	27.9		
	At-risk-of-poverty (% of total population)					20.6	20.9	20.4	19.5	19.4	20.0	19.5		
	At-risk-of-poverty threshold (PPS single person)					4567 b	4454	4417	4448	4644	4952	5297		
	Poverty gap (%)					27.6	27.9	31.0	28.1	27.9	26.4	28.2		
	Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of total population)								13.2		14.7	14.5		
	At-risk-of-poverty before social transfers excl. pensions (% of total population)					30.0 b	30.7	30.6	29.7	29.9	31.0	27.3		
	Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (%)					31.3 b	31.9	33.3	34.3	35.1	35.5	28.6		
	Severe Material Deprivation (% of total population)					14.3	15.2	15.9	14.7	13.9	13.7	12.5	10.3 p	
	Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of people aged 0-59)					13.9	15.9	16.8	14.8	14.7	14.4	13.0		
	Real Gross Household Disposable income (growth %)	2.7	3.0	2.7	-2.0	-0.7	-0.1	-2.7						
	Income quintile share ratio S80/S20					5.5 b	5.6	5.4	5.3	5.1	5.2	5.0		
	GINI coefficient					31.6	31.2	30.9	30.9	30.2	30.4	29.8		
	Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18-24)	4.7 bu	4.5	4.4	5.2	5.2 b	5.0	5.1	4.5	2.8 bu	2.8 u	2.8 u	3.1	
	NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of total population aged 15-24)	14.2 b	12.9	11.6	13.4	15.7	16.2	16.6	19.6	19.3	18.1	16.9	15.4	
	Male	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of male population)					30.1	31.7	31.8	29.6	28.6	28.4	27.3	
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of male population)					19.7	19.7	19.4	18.8	18.7	19.3	18.6	
Poverty gap (%)						28.6	28.2	32.3	28.8	28.0	27.8	30.2		
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of male population)									13.1		14.9	14.8		
Severe Material Deprivation (% of male population)						14.5	15.4	15.7	14.9	13.6	13.9	12.8	10.2 p	
Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of males aged 0-59)						13.8	16.0	16.9	14.9	14.4	14.4	13.0		
Life expectancy at birth (years)		72.5	72.2	72.3	73.0	73.4	73.8	73.9 b	74.5 b	74.7	74.4	75.0		
Healthy life years at birth (years) - men						57.4	59.8	61.9 b	57.6 b	58.6	55.3	57.1		
Early leavers from education and training (% of males aged 18-24)		5.3 bu	6.1	5.1 u	5.5	6.5 b	5.9	5.7	5.5 u	3.1 bu	3.5 u	3.5 u	3.8 u	
NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of males aged 15-24)		13.9 b	12.4	11.2	13.4	17.1	17.8	17.9	20.6	21.9	20.5	19.0	15.4	
Female		At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of female population)					32.1	33.4	33.3	30.2	29.9	29.6	28.6	
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of female population)					21.4	22.1	21.3	20.3	20.1	20.6	20.4	
		Poverty gap (%)					26.9	26.2	30.0	27.3	27.6	26.3	26.6	
		Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of female population)								13.4		14.5	14.1	
		Severe Material Deprivation (% of female population)					14.2	15.0	16.1	14.5	14.3	13.6	12.2	10.4 p
		Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of females aged 0-59)					14.0	15.8	16.6	14.7	15.0	14.4	13.0	
	Life expectancy at birth (years)	79.3	79.2	79.7	79.7	79.9	80.4	80.6 b	81.0 b	81.0	80.5	81.3		
	Healthy life years at birth (years) - women					60.4	61.7	64.2 b	60.4 b	60.0	56.8	58.7		
	Early leavers from education and training (% of females aged 18-24)	4.1 bu	2.9 u	3.7 u	4.8 u	3.8 bu	4.0 u	4.4 u	3.4 u	2.5 bu	2.0 u	2.0 u	2.2 u	
	NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of females aged 15-24)	14.5 b	13.3	12.0	13.5	14.1	14.6	15.2	18.6	16.7	15.6	14.6	15.3	
	Children (0-17)	At-Risk-of-poverty or exclusion of children (% of people aged 0-17)					29.4	31.1	34.8	29.3	29.0	28.2	26.6	
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of Children population)					19.6	21.1	23.3	21.8	21.1	20.9	20.4	
		Severe Material Deprivation (% of Children population)					14.8	14.4	18.1	13.7	13.1	13.4	11.6	8.8 p
		Share of children living in low work intensity households (% of Children population)					11.5	13.8	15.7	11.4	12.9	12.7	10.8	
		Risk of poverty of children in households at work (Working Intensity > 0.2)					11.5	13.0	14.0	14.8	13.3	12.3	13.0	
		Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (0-17) (%)					37.0 b	37.2	34.4	37.2	40.1	41.9	38.0	
Working age (18-64)		At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of Working age population)					29.9	32.0	31.8	29.6	29.3	28.5	26.9	
	At-risk-of-poverty (% of Working age population)					18.2	18.6	18.1	17.8	17.9	17.9	17.2		
	Severe Material Deprivation (% of Working age population)					13.8	15.2	15.4	14.4	13.9	13.6	12.1	9.7 p	
	Very low work intensity (18-59)					14.7	16.6	17.1	15.9	15.3	15.0	13.7		
	In-work at-risk-of poverty rate (% of persons employed 18-64)					6.2	6.5	6.1	6.2	5.7	5.8	5.5		
	Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (18-64) (%)					32.6 b	33.8	35.8	34.8	34.9	35.8	31.2		
	Elderly (65+)	At-Risk-of-poverty or exclusion of elderly (% of people aged 65+)					37.5	36.4	33.1	31.9	29.7	31.8	32.8	
At-risk-of-poverty (% of Elderly population)						30.5	29.4	25.6	23.4	23.1	26.3	26.5		
Severe Material Deprivation (% of Elderly population)						15.7	16.3	15.5	16.9	14.7	14.5	14.5	13.6 p	
Relative median income of elderly (ratio with median income of people younger than 65)						0.78 b	0.82	0.84	0.88	0.88	0.85	0.84		
Aggregate replacement ratio (ratio)						0.32 b	0.36	0.36	0.37	0.40	0.40	0.39		
Expenditure in social protection indicators (% of GDP)	Sickness/Health care			6.3	7.1	6.9	6.7	7.0	7.5	7.0	6.9			
	Disability			2.5	2.8	2.9	2.8	2.7	2.7	2.6	2.5			
	Old age and survivors			7.6	8.4	8.5	8.5	8.7	9.0	9.2	9.0			
	Family/Children			1.5	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.5	1.5	1.5			
	Unemployment			0.2	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5			
	Housing and Social exclusion n.e.c.			0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2			
	Total (including Admin and Other expenditures)			18.8	21.0	21.0	20.6	21.1	21.8	21.4	21.1			
	of which: Means tested benefits			0.9	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.0	1.1	1.0	1.0			

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Italy

Italy		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	
Macro Economic Indicators (Annual % growth)	Real GDP	2.0	1.5	-1.1	-5.5	1.7	0.6	-2.8	-1.7	0.1	1.0	0.9	1.5	
	Total employment	2.0	1.2	0.2	-1.7	-0.6	0.3	-0.3	-1.8	0.1	0.7	1.3	1.1	
	Labour productivity	0.0	0.2	-1.3	-3.9	2.3	0.3	-2.5	0.1	0.0	0.3	-0.5	0.4	
	Annual average hours worked per person employed	0.0	0.3	-0.6	-1.7	0.1	-0.2	-2.2	-0.9	-0.1	0.1	0.4	-0.1	
	Real productivity per hour worked	0.0	-0.1	-0.7	-2.2	2.2	0.5	-0.3	0.9	0.2	0.2	-0.8	0.5	
	Harmonized CPI	2.2	2.0	3.5	0.8	1.6	2.9	3.3	1.2	0.2	0.1	-0.1	1.3	
	Price deflator GDP	1.9	2.4	2.5	2.0	0.3	1.5	1.4	1.2	1.0	0.9	0.8	0.6	
	Nominal compensation per employee	2.2	2.2	2.8	0.5	2.3	1.0	-1.1	0.8	0.2	1.0	0.4	0.2	
	Real compensation per employee (GDP deflator)	0.3	-0.2	0.4	-1.4	2.0	-0.5	-2.5	-0.4	-0.8	0.1	-0.4	-0.5	
	Real compensation per employee (private consumption deflator)	-0.1	0.2	-0.7	-0.2	0.6	-1.9	-4.2	-0.5	0.0	0.9	0.5	-1.2	
	Nominal unit labour costs	2.2	2.0	4.2	4.6	0.0	0.7	1.4	0.7	0.1	0.7	0.9	-0.2	
	Real unit labour costs	0.4	-0.5	1.7	2.5	-0.3	-0.8	0.0	-0.4	-0.9	-0.2	0.0	-0.8	
	Labour Market Indicators - Total	Total population (000)	58064	58224	58653	59001	59190	59365	59394	59685	60783	60796	60666	60589
		Population aged 15-64 (000)	38335	38307	38553	38715	38764	38841	38698	38697	39320	39193	39014	38878
Total employment (000)		22758	22894	23090	22699	22527	22598	22566	22191	22279	22465	22758	23023	
Employment aged 15-64 (000)		22388	22517	22699	22324	22152	22215	22149	21755	21810	21973	22241	22444	
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)		62.4	62.7	62.9	61.6	61.0	61.0	60.9	59.7	59.9	60.5	61.6	62.3	
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)		58.3	58.6	58.6	57.4	56.8	56.8	56.6	55.5	55.7	56.3	57.2	58.0	
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)		25.3	24.5	24.2	21.5	20.2	19.2	18.5	16.3	15.6	15.6	16.6	17.1	
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)		73.2	73.4	73.4	71.8	71.1	71.1	70.4	68.5	67.9	68.2	68.8	69.4	
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)		32.4	33.7	34.3	35.6	36.5	37.8	40.3	42.7	46.2	48.2	50.3	52.2	
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)		58.9	59.0	59.0	57.9	57.1	57.0	56.4	55.0	55.1	55.6	56.5	57.3	
Self-employed (% total employment)		24.6	24.3	23.7	23.4	23.7	23.5	23.5	23.4	23.3	23.0	22.6	21.9	
Part-time employment (% total employment)		13.1	13.4	14.1	14.1	14.8	15.2	16.8	17.6	18.1	18.3	18.5	18.5	
Temporary employment (% total employment)		7.9	7.9	8.2	7.7	8.1	8.7	9.3	8.9	9.5	9.9	9.9	11.1	
Employment in Services (% total employment)				66.5 b	67.1	67.6	68.0	68.7	69.4	69.5	69.6	69.9	70.1	
Employment in Industry (% total employment)				30.0 b	29.4	28.8	28.5	27.8	27.2	27.1	26.8	26.4	26.3	
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)				3.5 b	3.5	3.6	3.5	3.5	3.4	3.5	3.6	3.7	3.6	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)		62.6	62.4	62.9	62.3	62.0	62.1	63.5	63.4	63.9	64.0	64.9	65.4	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)		32.3	30.8	30.7	28.8	28.1	27.1	28.6	27.1	27.1	26.2	26.6	26.2	
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)		77.8	77.5	78.1	77.2	76.9	76.9	77.8	77.1	77.0	76.8	77.5	77.9	
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)		33.4	34.5	35.4	36.9	37.9	39.3	42.5	45.3	48.9	51.1	53.4	55.4	
Total unemployment (000)		1654	1481	1664	1907	2056	2061	2691	3069	3236	3032	3012	2907	
Unemployment rate (% labour force)		6.8	6.1	6.7	7.7	8.4	8.4	10.7	12.1	12.7	11.9	11.7	11.2	
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)		21.8	20.4	21.2	25.3	27.9	29.2	35.3	40.0	42.7	40.3	37.8	34.7	
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)		3.3	2.9	3.0	3.4	4.0	4.3	5.6	6.9	7.7	6.9	6.7	6.5	
Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)		48.5	46.9	45.2	44.3	48.0	51.4	52.6	56.4	60.8	58.1	57.4	57.8	
Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)		7.0	6.3	6.5	7.3	7.8	7.9	10.1	10.9	11.6	10.6	10.0	9.1	
Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)		52.3	52.6	52.2	51.0	50.2	50.5	50.6	49.5	49.6 b	50.2	51.2	51.8	
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)		74.3	74.4	74.3	73.1	72.5	71.9	71.0	69.7	69.8 b	70.1	70.6	70.9	
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)		80.6	80.2	80.7	79.4	78.4	79.2	78.8	78.1	77.8 b	78.5	79.8	80.6	
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)		57.9	58.1	58.1	56.8	56.2	56.3	56.3	55.2	55.4	56.0	57.0	57.7	
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)		68.9	70.2	69.5	68.5	68.1	66.5	65.6	63.3	62.6	63.3	63.3	63.8	
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)		66.7	66.1	66.0	62.6	60.8	60.5	58.5	56.1	56.7	56.9	57.8	59.1	
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)		57.8	57.9	58.0	56.8	56.2	56.2	56.2	55.2	55.3	55.9	56.9	57.6	
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)		63.1	65.3	64.5	63.9	63.8	62.7	61.8	60.1	60.1	60.8	61.0	61.3	
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)		65.9	66.1	65.3	62.1	60.8	60.8	59.2	57.2	57.6	57.6	58.4	59.4	
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)				1.6	1.6	1.7	1.8	2.3	2.5	2.9	2.9	2.9	2.8	
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)		0.6	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5	
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)		9.0	10.3	10.5	10.5	11.1	11.6	11.7	12.1	13.2	13.6	12.6	11.6	

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Italy	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017		
Labour Market Indicators - Male	Total population (000)	28139	28212	28411	28570	28649	28715	28727	28890	29485	29502	29456	29446	
	Population aged 15-64(000)	19114	19095	19198	19260	19262	19273	19211	19218	19566	19511	19432	19387	
	Total employment (000)	13755	13812	13820	13541	13375	13340	13194	12914	12945	13085	13233	13349	
	Employment aged 15-64 (000)	13463	13515	13513	13252	13088	13050	12873	12584	12590	12718	12853	12934	
	Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	75.4	75.7	75.3	73.7	72.7	72.5	71.5	69.7	69.7	70.6	71.7	72.3	
	Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)	70.4	70.6	70.1	68.5	67.5	67.3	66.3	64.7	64.7	65.5	66.5	67.1	
	Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)	30.4	29.4	29.0	25.9	24.0	22.8	21.8	18.7	18.2	18.6	19.2	20.1	
	Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)	87.2	87.4	86.8	84.7	83.6	83.4	81.7	79.2	78.2	78.6	79.3	79.9	
	Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)	43.7	45.0	45.3	46.6	47.6	48.2	50.4	52.8	56.5	59.3	61.7	62.8	
	FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	74.3	74.4	74.0	72.5	71.4	70.9	69.6	67.6	67.5	68.3	69.3	69.9	
	Self-employed (% total employment)	29.1	28.8	28.4	28.2	28.7	28.6	28.5	28.5	28.2	27.7	27.1	26.7	
	Part-time employment (% total employment)	4.3	4.6	4.8	4.7	5.1	5.4	6.6	7.4	7.8	8.0	8.2	8.3	
	Temporary employment (% total employment)	7.9	7.9	8.2	7.7	8.1	8.7	9.3	8.9	9.5	9.9	9.9	11.1	
	Employment in Services (% total employment)			56.5 b	56.5	56.9	57.5	58.0	58.8	58.7	59.0	59.3	59.3	
	Employment in Industry (% total employment)			39.5 b	39.3	38.9	38.4	37.7	37.0	37.1	36.6	36.1	36.1	
	Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)			4.0 b	4.1	4.3	4.2	4.3	4.2	4.3	4.5	4.6	4.6	
	Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)	74.5	74.3	74.3	73.5	73.1	72.8	73.7	73.3	73.6	74.1	74.8	75.0	
	Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)	37.6	36.0	35.7	33.8	32.8	31.2	32.9	30.7	31.0	30.4	30.2	30.0	
	Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)	91.3	91.0	91.0	90.0	89.4	89.2	89.4	88.3	87.7	87.7	88.2	88.5	
	Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)	45.0	46.2	46.8	48.4	49.5	50.5	53.6	56.6	60.2	63.3	65.9	67.0	
	Total unemployment (000)	788	708	804	976	1084	1084	1434	1674	1742	1670	1617	1539	
	Unemployment rate (% labour force)	5.4	4.9	5.5	6.7	7.5	7.5	9.8	11.5	11.9	11.3	10.9	10.3	
	Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)	19.2	18.4	18.8	23.2	26.9	27.1	33.7	39.0	41.3	38.8	36.5	33.0	
	Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)	2.5	2.2	2.4	2.8	3.5	3.8	5.0	6.5	7.1	6.6	6.2	6.1	
	Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)	46.7	44.9	43.2	41.8	46.8	50.9	51.2	56.2	59.6	58.1	57.1	58.6	
	Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)	7.2	6.6	6.7	7.8	8.8	8.5	11.1	12.0	12.8	11.8	11.0	9.9	
	Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)	71.3	71.4	70.5	69.0	67.8	67.7	66.5	64.4	64.1 b	64.9	66.0	66.8	
	Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)	83.9	84.2	83.9	82.4	81.8	81.2	80.3	79.1	79.1 b	79.8	80.7	81.0	
	Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)	86.2	86.5	86.6	85.0	84.3	85.0	84.2	83.4	83.2 b	84.5	85.7	85.7	
	Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)	69.7	69.8	69.4	67.8	66.8	66.6	65.9	64.3	64.3	65.1	66.0	66.5	
	Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)	87.5	85.9	83.1	81.2	79.5	77.0	74.1	71.4	71.0	71.2	70.9	72.0	
	Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)	83.7	83.0	81.7	76.5	74.9	75.0	70.6	66.9	67.0	68.7	70.9	72.6	
	Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)	69.5	69.6	69.2	67.6	66.6	66.3	65.6	64.2	64.1	64.9	65.7	66.3	
	Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)	81.0	81.9	80.5	78.2	77.1	75.6	72.5	69.2	69.3	70.3	70.5	71.0	
	Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)	82.5	82.6	81.1	76.9	75.6	75.6	72.2	68.4	68.5	69.9	72.1	73.0	
	Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)			0.9	0.9	0.9	1.1	1.4	1.6	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	
	Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	
	Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)	5.0	5.9	6.2	6.6	7.3	7.9	7.6	8.3	9.2	9.4	8.9	8.4	
	Labour Market Indicators - Female	Total population (000)	29926	30012	30242	30431	30541	30649	30668	30796	31298	31294	31209	31144
		Population aged 15-64(000)	19220	19212	19354	19455	19501	19568	19488	19479	19753	19682	19582	19492
		Total employment (000)	9002	9083	9270	9158	9152	9258	9372	9276	9334	9380	9525	9674
		Employment aged 15-64 (000)	8926	9002	9186	9072	9064	9165	9276	9171	9220	9255	9388	9510
		Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	49.6	49.9	50.6	49.7	49.5	49.9	50.5	49.9	50.3	50.6	51.6	52.5
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)		46.3	46.6	47.2	46.4	46.1	46.5	47.1	46.5	46.8	47.2	48.1	48.9	
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)		20.0	19.5	19.2	16.9	16.3	15.5	15.0	13.7	12.8	12.4	13.7	13.9	
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)		59.3	59.6	60.2	59.1	58.8	59.0	59.2	58.0	57.6	57.9	58.5	59.0	
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)		21.8	23.0	23.9	25.3	26.1	28.1	30.8	33.2	36.6	37.9	39.7	42.3	
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)		44.4	44.4	44.9	44.1	43.7	44.0	44.1	43.2	43.4	43.7	44.4	45.4	
Self-employed (% total employment)		17.7	17.4	16.8	16.3	16.3	16.1	16.3	16.2	16.5	16.5	16.3	15.4	
Part-time employment (% total employment)		26.3	26.8	27.7	27.8	28.8	29.1	30.9	31.7	32.1	32.4	32.7	32.5	
Temporary employment (% total employment)		12.6	12.8	12.6	12.0	11.8	12.0	12.2	11.7	11.6	12.0	12.1	13.4	
Employment in Services (% total employment)				81.3 b	82.5	83.2	83.1	83.6	83.9	84.2	84.3	84.5	84.8	
Employment in Industry (% total employment)				15.9 b	14.9	14.2	14.4	13.9	13.8	13.5	13.4	13.0	12.9	
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)				2.8 b	2.6	2.7	2.6	2.5	2.4	2.3	2.4	2.5	2.3	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)		50.8	50.6	51.6	51.1	51.1	51.4	53.4	53.6	54.4	54.1	55.2	55.9	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)		26.9	25.4	25.5	23.7	23.1	22.8	24.0	23.4	23.1	21.7	22.8	22.1	
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)		64.4	64.1	65.3	64.6	64.5	64.7	66.5	66.1	66.4	65.9	66.8	67.3	
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)		22.5	23.4	24.6	26.0	26.9	28.8	32.2	34.7	38.3	39.6	41.7	44.5	
Total unemployment (000)		866	773	861	930	972	977	1257	1394	1494	1362	1395	1368	
Unemployment rate (% labour force)		8.8	7.8	8.5	9.2	9.6	9.5	11.8	13.1	13.8	12.7	12.8	12.4	
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)		25.4	23.3	24.7	28.5	29.4	32.1	37.6	41.5	44.7	42.5	39.6	37.3	
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)		4.4	3.8	4.0	4.3	4.7	5.0	6.4	7.4	8.6	7.4	7.4	7.1	
Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)		50.0	48.7	47.1	46.9	49.4	51.9	54.2	56.5	62.1	58.0	57.7	57.0	
Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)		6.8	5.9	6.3	6.8	6.8	7.3	9.0	9.7	10.3	9.2	9.0	8.2	
Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)		33.3	33.5	33.5	32.8	32.4	32.9	34.0	34.0	34.1 b	34.5	35.1	35.5	
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)		64.7	64.5	64.6	63.6	63.2	62.7	61.9	60.4	60.6 b	60.4	60.6	60.8	
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)		75.8	75.0	76.0	74.8	73.6	74.5	74.7	73.9	73.7 b	73.9	75.5	77.0	
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)		46.1	46.3	46.8	45.9	45.7	46.1	46.6	46.1	46.4	46.9	47.9	48.8	
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)		57.1	59.9	59.8	59.5	59.5	59.0	60.0	57.8	56.9	57.8	58.1	58.2	
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)		48.5	48.7	50.1	48.6	47.2	47.0	47.0	45.8	46.7	45.6	45.1	45.9	
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)		46.0	46.2	46.8	45.9	45.7	46.1	46.7	46.1	46.4	46.9	48.0	48.8	
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)		51.5	54.2	53.7	54.4	54.4	53.8	54.9	54.1	53.9	54.3	54.7	54.9	
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)		49.5	50.1	50.2	48.1	47.3	47.5	47.4	46.9	47.4	46.1	45.6	46.7	
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)				2.6	2.8	2.8	2.8	3.5	3.6	4.2	4.2	4.0	3.9	
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)		0.9	0.9	0.9	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.5	0.6	
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)		14.8	16.8	16.7	15.9	16.6	16.7	17.2	17.4	18.6	19.3	17.6	16.0	

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Italy		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017			
Social Indicators	All	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of total population)	25.9	26.0	25.5	24.9	25.0	28.1	29.9	28.5	28.3	28.7	30.0			
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of total population)	19.3	19.5	18.9	18.4	18.7	19.8	19.5	19.3	19.4	19.9	20.6			
		At-risk-of-poverty threshold (PPS single person)	8344	8698	9158	9140	9135	9466	9297	9189	9152	9237	9739			
		Poverty gap (%)	24.1	22.7	23.2	23.1	24.8	26.6	26.0	28.2	28.2	29.3	31.6			
		Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of total population)		14.6	12.7	13.0	11.6	11.8	13.1	13.2	12.9	14.3	14.5			
		At-risk-of-poverty before social transfers excl. pensions (% of total population)	23.7	23.7	23.5	23.3	23.7	24.6	24.5	24.6	24.7	25.4	26.2			
		Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (%)	18.6	17.7	19.6	21.0	21.1	19.5	20.4	21.6	21.5	21.7	21.4			
		Severe Material Deprivation (% of total population)	6.4	7.0	7.5	7.3	7.4	11.1	14.5	12.3	11.6	11.5	12.1	9.2 p		
		Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of people aged 0-59)	11.3	10.2	10.4	9.2	10.6	10.5	10.6	11.3	12.1	11.7	12.8			
		Real Gross Household Disposable income (growth %)	1.1	1.4	-1.2	-2.0	-1.5	-0.3	-5.3	-0.8	0.3	1.2	1.2	0.5		
		Income quintile share ratio S80/S20	5.4	5.4	5.2	5.3	5.4	5.7	5.6	5.8	5.8	5.8	6.3			
		GINI coefficient	32.1	32.0	31.2	31.8	31.7	32.5	32.4	32.8	32.4	32.4	33.1			
		Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18-24)	20.4 b	19.5	19.6	19.1	18.6	17.8	17.3	16.8	15.0 b	14.7	13.8	14.0		
		NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of total population aged 15-24)	16.8 b	16.1	16.6	17.6	19.0	19.7	21.0	22.2	22.1	21.4	19.9	20.1		
		Social Indicators	Male	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of male population)	23.8	23.8	23.5	22.9	23.1	26.3	27.8	27.1	27.0	27.7	29.1	
At-risk-of-poverty (% of male population)	17.7			18.1	17.4	16.9	17.3	18.4	18.1	18.3	18.4	19.0	19.9			
Poverty gap (%)	24.7			23.3	23.0	22.8	25.2	28.1	27.3	29.3	29.4	30.4	32.3			
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of male population)				13.4	11.5	11.8	9.9	10.9	11.4	11.7	12.0	12.7	13.2			
Severe Material Deprivation (% of male population)	6.1			6.7	7.2	7.0	7.2	10.7	13.9	12.3	11.7	11.7	12.1	9.4 p		
Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of males aged 0-59)	9.8			8.8	8.8	7.7	9.1	9.2	9.2	10.3	11.4	10.7	12.2			
Life expectancy at birth (years)	78.5			78.8 b	78.9	79.4		80.1	79.8	80.3	80.7	80.3	81.0 b			
Healthy life years at birth (years) - men	65.2 bd			63.4 b	62.9	63.4		63.5	62.1	61.8	62.5	62.6	67.6 b			
Early leavers from education and training (% of males aged 18-24)	23.8 b			22.6	22.4	21.8	21.8	20.6	20.2	20.0	17.7 b	17.5	16.1	16.6		
NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of males aged 15-24)	15.4 b			15.2	15.2	17.0	18.9	19.4	21.1	22.8	22.7	21.9	20.1	20.3		
Social Indicators	Female			At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of female population)	27.9	28.0	27.4	26.7	26.8	29.8	31.9	29.8	29.5	29.6	30.8	
				At-risk-of-poverty (% of female population)	20.9	20.9	20.4	19.9	20.0	21.1	20.8	20.3	20.5	20.8	21.4	
				Poverty gap (%)	23.6	22.2	23.2	23.3	24.6	25.8	24.9	27.6	27.7	28.1	30.8	
				Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of female population)		15.6	13.7	14.1	13.3	12.7	14.8	14.6	13.7	15.7	15.7	
				Severe Material Deprivation (% of female population)	6.8	7.4	7.8	7.6	7.5	11.4	15.0	12.4	11.5	11.2	12.1	9.0 p
		Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of females aged 0-59)	12.9	11.7	12.0	10.7	12.1	11.8	12.0	12.3	12.8	12.7	13.5			
		Life expectancy at birth (years)	84.2	84.2 b	84.2	84.6		85.3	84.8	85.2	85.6	84.9	85.6 b			
		Healthy life years at birth (years) - women	64.7 bd	62.6 b	61.8	62.6		62.7	61.5	60.9	62.3	62.7	67.2 b			
		Early leavers from education and training (% of females aged 18-24)	17.0 b	16.4	16.7	16.2	15.3	14.9	14.3	13.6	12.2 b	11.8	11.3	11.2		
		NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of females aged 15-24)	18.3 b	17.2	18.0	18.1	19.0	19.9	20.8	21.4	21.4	20.8	19.6	19.8		
		Social Indicators	Children (0-17)	At-Risk-of-poverty or exclusion of children (% of people aged 0-17)	28.4	28.6	28.4	28.7	29.5	31.5	34.1	32.0	32.1	33.5	33.2	
				At-risk-of-poverty (% of Children population)	24.4	24.6	24.2	24.1	25.2	25.9	26.2	25.2	25.1	26.8	26.7	
				Severe Material Deprivation (% of Children population)	7.2	7.8	8.6	8.5	8.6	12.1	16.8	13.5	13.7	13.0	12.4	8.9 p
				Share of children living in low work intensity households (% of Children population)	7.4	6.7	7.0	6.1	7.5	7.5	7.1	8.0	9.3	8.6	9.3	
				Risk of poverty of children in households at work (Working Intensity > 0.2)	20.3	20.5	20.0	20.9	20.6	21.6	22.1	20.6	19.5	21.6	21.5	
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (0-17) (%)	23.3			20.9	21.9	24.2	23.2	21.0	22.0	25.4	23.9	22.1	24.2			
Social Indicators	Working age (18-64)	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of Working age population)	25.5	25.3	25.0	24.4	25.3	28.5	30.4	29.7	30.0	30.4	31.5			
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of Working age population)	17.1	17.2	16.8	16.5	17.5	19.0	18.7	19.1	19.7	19.8	20.9			
		Severe Material Deprivation (% of Working age population)	6.4	7.0	7.4	7.4	7.4	10.9	14.4	12.7	12.0	12.2	12.3	9.7 p		
		Very low work intensity (18-59)	12.6	11.3	11.5	10.2	11.5	11.5	11.7	12.4	13.0	12.7	13.9			
		In-work at-risk-of poverty rate (% of persons employed 18-64)	9.0	9.4	9.1	10.2	9.7	11.1	11.1	11.2	11.1	11.6	11.8			
		Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (18-64) (%)	20.5	20.0	21.9	23.3	22.6	21.2	22.4	22.7	22.4	23.9	22.6			
Social Indicators	Elderly (65+)	At-Risk-of-poverty or exclusion of elderly (% of people aged 65+)	24.8	25.5	24.4	22.9	20.4	24.0	24.7	22.0	20.2	19.9	23.2			
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of Elderly population)	21.7	22.2	20.9	19.6	16.7	17.0	16.1	15.0	14.2	14.7	15.3			
		Severe Material Deprivation (% of Elderly population)	6.1	6.5	6.7	5.9	6.3	10.8	12.7	10.3	8.8	8.2	11.1	8.2 p		
		Relative median income of elderly (ratio with median income of people younger than 65)	0.87	0.86	0.88	0.89	0.92	0.92	0.96	0.97	0.99	0.99	1.01			
		Aggregate replacement ratio (ratio)	0.58	0.49	0.51	0.51	0.53	0.55	0.59	0.62	0.64	0.66	0.69			
Expenditure in social protection indicators (% of GDP)		Sickness/Health care	6.6	6.4	6.7	7.0	7.0	6.8	6.8	6.8	6.8 p	6.6 p				
		Disability	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.6	1.6	1.5	1.6	1.7	1.7 p	1.7 p				
		Old age and survivors	15.0	14.5	14.9	15.9	16.3	16.2	16.7	17.0	16.8 p	16.8 p				
		Family/Children	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.3	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.6 p	1.7 p				
		Unemployment	0.5	1.1	1.1	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.6	1.8	1.7 p	1.7 p				
		Housing and Social exclusion n.e.c.	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3 p	0.3 p				
		Total (including Admin and Other expenditures)	25.6	25.7	26.7	28.8	28.9	28.5	29.3	29.8	29.9 p	29.9 p				
		of which: Means tested benefits	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.8	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	2.1 p	2.2 p				

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Cyprus

Cyprus		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	
Macro Economic Indicators (Annual % growth)	Real GDP	4.5	4.8	3.9	-1.8	1.3	0.3	-3.1	-5.9	-1.4	2.0	3.4 p	3.9 p	
	Total employment	1.9	4.4	3.5	0.0	0.5	0.0	-3.2	-5.9	-1.8	1.5	3.3 p	3.4 p	
	Labour productivity	2.6	0.4	0.3	-1.8	0.8	0.3	0.1	0.0	0.4	0.5	0.1 p	0.5 p	
	Annual average hours worked per person employed	-0.8	1.6	1.1	-0.7	-0.8	-0.8	-0.4	-1.6	-0.7	-0.2	-0.2 p	-0.1 p	
	Real productivity per hour worked	3.4	-1.2	-0.8	-1.2	1.6	1.1	0.5	1.6	1.0	0.7	0.3 p	0.6 p	
	Harmonized CPI	2.2	2.2	4.4	0.2	2.6	3.5	3.1	0.4	-0.3	-1.5	-1.2	0.7	
	Price deflator GDP	3.3	4.4	4.5	0.0	2.0	1.9	1.9	-1.1	-1.6	-1.2	-0.7 p	1.5 p	
	Nominal compensation per employee	4.2	1.9	3.2	5.7	0.7	2.1	1.7	-5.4	-3.6	-1.2	-0.2 p	0.7 p	
	Real compensation per employee (GDP deflator)	0.9	-2.4	-1.2	5.7	-1.3	0.2	-0.2	-4.4	-2.1	-0.1	0.0 p	-0.8 p	
	Real compensation per employee (private consumption deflator)	1.9	-0.3	-1.1	5.5	-1.9	-1.4	-1.3	-5.7	-3.3	0.3	0.5 p	0.1 p	
	Nominal unit labour costs	1.6	1.5	2.9	7.7	-0.2	1.8	1.6	-5.3	-4.0	-1.7	-0.8 p	0.2 p	
	Real unit labour costs	-1.6	-2.8	-1.6	7.7	-2.2	-0.1	-0.3	-4.3	-2.5	-0.5	-0.2 p	-1.2 p	
	Labour Market Indicators - Total	Total population (000)	744	758	776	797	819	840	862	866	858	847	848	855
		Population aged 15-64 (000)	509	521	539	557	576	592	609	610	599	584	581	582
		Total employment (000)	357	378	383	383 b	395	398	385	365	363	358	363	379
		Employment aged 15-64 (000)	348	368	371	371 b	382	386	375	357	355	350	354	369
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)		75.8	76.8	76.5	75.3	75.0	73.4	70.2	67.2	67.6	67.9	68.7	70.7	
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)		69.6	71.0	70.9	69.0	68.9	67.6	64.6	61.7	62.1	62.7	63.7	65.4	
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)		37.4	37.4	38.0	34.8	33.8	30.1	28.1	23.5	25.8	25.5	26.4	27.5	
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)		82.6	83.8	83.7	82.3	82.2	81.3	78.4	75.5	76.2	76.5	76.6	78.3	
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)		53.6	55.9	54.8	55.7	56.3	54.8	50.7	49.6	46.9	48.5	52.2	55.3	
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)		74.3	75.2	74.9	73.3 b	72.4	70.6	67.1	63.2	63.1	63.5	64.1	66.4	
Self-employed (% total employment)		19.3	18.6	18.1	17.4 b	16.5	16.1	14.8	15.9	16.1	13.6	13.0	12.4	
Part-time employment (% total employment)		6.6	6.4	6.8	7.5 b	8.3	9.0	9.7	11.9	13.5	13.0	13.4	12.3	
Temporary employment (% total employment)		6.0	5.8	6.3	5.9 b	5.6	5.6	7.3	8.1	10.3	11.0	9.8	10.3	
Employment in Services (% total employment)					75.2 bu	76.5 u	76.0 u	77.4 u	79.8 u		80.1 u	79.7 u	80.7 u	
Employment in Industry (% total employment)					22.0 bu	20.7 u	21.1 u	20.3 u	17.7 u		16.3 u	17.1 u	17.2 u	
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)				3.1 b	2.8 b	2.8	2.9	2.3	2.5	3.9	3.6	3.2	2.1	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)		73.0	73.9	73.6	73.0	73.6	73.5	73.5	73.6	74.3	73.9	73.4	73.7	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)		41.5	41.7	41.7	40.4	40.6	38.8	38.9	38.4	40.3	37.9	37.2	36.5	
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)		86.2	86.7	86.5	86.3	86.9	87.3	87.6	87.7	88.4	87.9	86.8	87.5	
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)		55.5	57.7	56.6	58.2	59.1	57.6	56.1	56.6	56.0	57.4	59.0	60.0	
Total unemployment (000)		17	15	15	22	26	34	52	69	70	63	54	47	
Unemployment rate (% labour force)		4.6	3.9	3.7	5.4	6.3	7.9	11.9	15.9	16.1	15.0	13.0	11.1	
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)		10.0	10.2	9.0	13.8	16.6	22.4	27.7	38.9	36.0	32.8	29.1	24.7	
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)		0.9	0.7	0.5	0.6 b	1.3	1.6	3.6	6.1	7.7	6.8	5.8	4.5	
Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)		19.3	18.6	13.6	10.4 b	20.4	20.8	30.1	38.3	47.7	45.6	44.4	40.5	
Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)		4.1	4.2	3.8	5.6 b	6.7	8.7	10.8	14.9	14.5	12.4	10.8	9.0	
Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)		65.6	66.1	63.6	64.3 b	66.1	64.8	57.9	55.5	54.5 b	55.3	56.9	57.9	
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)		78.4	79.3	79.5	77.8 b	77.1	75.9	73.3	69.7	69.6 b	69.3	69.8	73.0	
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)		87.0	87.6	87.6	86.2 b	84.7	83.3	80.8	79.0	79.7 b	80.2	80.0	80.7	
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)		69.3	70.9	70.5	68.8 b	68.1	66.5	63.3	60.7	60.8	61.6	63.2	65.0	
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)		66.1	66.4	73.0	71.2 b	72.1	70.8	67.0	61.2	63.0	64.0	67.1	69.2	
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)		78.2	76.7	72.4	67.8 b	71.8	73.4	73.4	73.1	75.3	72.9	63.6	63.3	
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)		69.3	70.8	70.4	68.6 b	68.0	66.6	63.2	60.3	60.4	61.3	63.2	64.8	
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)		65.0	67.1	71.7	69.9 b	72.3	71.3	68.0	64.2	65.6	65.4	67.1	69.4	
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)		75.1	75.2	73.4	70.6 b	70.6	69.7	69.3	67.8	70.7	69.2	63.5	64.9	
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)				1.9	2.3 b	2.7	3.8	4.7	6.2	7.8	7.8	7.8	7.0	
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)		0.5	0.3 u	0.5	0.6 b	0.8	0.4	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.6	0.9	1.4	
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)		1.8	1.5	1.2	1.4 b	2.3	3.4	3.5	4.6	4.6	4.6	3.6	2.6	

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Cyprus		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	
Labour Market Indicators - Male	Total population (000)	365	372	380	390	400	409	419	421	418	412	413	417	
	Population aged 15-64(000)	250	256	264	272	280	288	296	296	291	283	282	284	
	Total employment (000)	200	210	212	205 b	209	209	202	190	185	184	188	197	
	Employment aged 15-64 (000)	194	202	203	196 b	199	200	194	184	180	178	182	190	
	Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	86.2	86.4	85.2	82.8	81.7	79.6	76.1	72.6	71.6	72.3	73.8	75.6	
	Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)	79.4	80.0	79.2	76.3	75.3	73.7	70.4	67.0	66.0	66.7	68.6	69.8	
	Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)	41.0	39.1	39.4	36.4	34.4	31.8	30.5	24.0	25.8	24.0	26.5	24.5	
	Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)	92.0	92.4	91.4	89.2	88.3	86.4	83.3	80.4	79.6	80.6	81.7	83.7	
	Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)	71.6	72.5	70.9	71.2	70.5	69.2	63.5	61.1	57.1	57.8	61.0	65.0	
	FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	86.7	86.5	85.2	82.5 b	80.5	78.0	74.1	70.0	68.3	68.5	69.6	72.1	
	Self-employed (% total employment)	25.6	25.2	24.7	23.4 b	22.1	21.8	20.5	21.9	21.6	16.9	16.7	15.2	
	Part-time employment (% total employment)	2.8	3.0	3.4	4.0 b	5.1	6.1	6.4	8.4	10.3	10.3	11.3	9.1	
	Temporary employment (% total employment)	6.0	5.8	6.3	5.9 b	5.6	5.6	7.3	8.1	10.3	11.0	9.8	10.3	
	Employment in Services (% total employment)				63.6 bu		63.4 u	65.7 u					67.8 u	
	Employment in Industry (% total employment)				33.1 bu		32.8 u	31.3 u					27.2 u	
	Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)			3.9 b	3.3 b	3.7	3.8	3.0	3.7	5.9	5.2	4.9	3.2	
	Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)	82.7	82.9	82.0	80.7	80.4	80.4	80.7	80.6	80.0	78.8	78.7	78.6	
	Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)	45.0	43.9	43.1	42.1	40.9	41.4	42.8	40.8	41.2	36.8	35.8	33.4	
	Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)	95.3	95.0	94.0	93.5	93.4	93.1	93.8	94.0	93.5	92.6	92.2	93.0	
	Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)	74.1	74.8	73.0	74.4	74.3	72.9	71.2	71.2	69.9	70.0	70.5	71.6	
	Total unemployment (000)	8	7	7	11	14	18	29	38	38	33	27	24	
	Unemployment rate (% labour force)	3.9	3.4	3.2	5.3	6.2	8.1	12.6	16.6	17.1	15.1	12.7	10.9	
	Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)	8.9	11.0	8.7	13.6	15.9	23.3	28.8	41.1	37.4	34.7	25.8	26.8	
	Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)	0.7 u	0.8	0.5 u	0.6 bu	1.3	1.7	3.9	6.5	8.3	7.4	6.4	4.9	
	Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)	17.0 u	23.0	16.1 u	10.4 bu	20.9	21.4	31.4	39.1	48.6	49.2	50.5	45.3	
	Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)	4.0	4.8	3.7	5.7 b	6.5	9.6	12.3	16.8	15.4	12.8	9.2	9.0	
	Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)	83.1	84.7	80.2	78.4 b	76.2	74.4	67.2	62.2	59.9 b	61.8	64.3	67.3	
	Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)	89.3	88.4	88.8	86.9 b	86.2	84.4	79.5	77.7	75.1 b	75.3	77.9	80.0	
	Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)	91.5	92.0	90.9	89.2 b	88.8	87.0	85.5	82.9	83.8 b	84.4	83.6	85.2	
	Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)	80.1	80.6	80.6	78.0 b	76.2	74.2	70.4	66.9	65.7	65.9	68.4	69.5	
	Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)	75.4	80.5	80.9	78.4 b	79.9	77.0	72.9	67.2	67.5	70.8	73.9	76.9	
	Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)	72.7	67.8	58.5	48.3 b	53.2	58.4	63.0	68.7	68.3	70.2	59.8	60.3	
	Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)	80.2	80.5	80.3	78.0 b	76.0	74.0	70.2	66.4	65.3	65.8	68.2	69.4	
	Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)	75.3	80.6	82.1	76.8 b	81.6	80.5	77.1	73.9	72.8	73.5	73.9	77.2	
	Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)	74.4	74.6	68.3	61.7 b	62.7	62.6	62.2	63.6	65.1	65.9	64.5	64.6	
	Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)			1.2	1.7 b	2.0	3.2	3.9	5.0	6.5	7.0	7.8	6.3	
	Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)	0.4 u	0.2 u	0.3 u	0.5 bu	0.6 u	0.4 u	0.8	0.7	0.8	0.6 u	0.8	1.0	
	Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)	0.8	0.7 u	0.7 u	1.0 b	2.1	2.7	2.6	3.3	3.4	3.5	2.6	2.1	
	Labour Market Indicators - Female	Total population (000)	379	386	396	407	420	431	443	445	440	435	436	438
		Population aged 15-64(000)	259	265	275	284	295	304	314	314	308	301	299	299
		Total employment (000)	157	169	171	178 b	187	189	184	175	178	175	175	182
		Employment aged 15-64 (000)	155	166	168	175 b	183	186	181	173	176	172	172	179
		Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	65.9	67.7	68.2	68.3	68.8	67.7	64.8	62.2	63.9	64.0	64.1	66.2
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)		60.3	62.4	62.9	62.3	63.0	62.1	59.4	56.9	58.6	59.0	59.3	61.3	
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)		34.1	36.0	36.7	33.3	33.3	28.7	26.1	23.0	25.9	26.8	26.2	30.4	
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)		73.6	75.5	76.2	76.2	76.7	76.7	74.0	71.1	73.1	72.7	72.0	73.5	
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)		36.6	40.3	39.4	40.6	42.5	40.8	38.2	38.3	36.9	39.5	43.7	46.1	
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)		62.5	64.6	65.0	64.8 b	65.1	63.9	60.7	57.1	58.5	58.9	59.1	61.3	
Self-employed (% total employment)		11.3	10.5	9.9	10.6 b	10.2	9.7	8.7	9.4	10.3	10.2	9.1	9.3	
Part-time employment (% total employment)		11.3	10.4	10.8	11.5 b	11.8	12.1	13.1	15.6	16.8	15.8	15.6	15.6	
Temporary employment (% total employment)		16.4	16.8	17.6	17.5 b	18.3	18.6	18.9	21.7	21.5	20.9	19.2	16.9	
Employment in Services (% total employment)														
Employment in Industry (% total employment)														
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)				2.1 b	2.2 b	1.9	1.8	1.4	1.3	1.8	1.9	1.4	0.8	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)		63.8	65.4	65.7	66.0	67.4	67.4	66.9	67.2	69.1	69.4	68.5	69.2	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)		38.3	39.7	40.5	38.8	40.2	36.6	35.5	36.3	39.5	38.9	38.5	39.4	
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)		77.4	78.7	79.1	79.8	81.0	82.0	82.0	83.9	83.8	81.8	81.8	82.4	
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)		37.8	41.6	41.0	42.3	44.3	42.7	41.3	42.3	42.5	45.3	47.8	48.8	
Total unemployment (000)		9	8	8	10	13	16	23	31	32	30	27	23	
Unemployment rate (% labour force)		5.4	4.6	4.3	5.5	6.4	7.7	11.1	15.2	15.1	14.8	13.4	11.3	
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)		11.1	9.4	9.4	14.0	17.2	21.5	26.7	36.8	34.6	31.1	31.8	22.9	
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)		1.2	0.7 u	0.5 u	0.6 bu	1.3	1.5	3.1	5.6	7.0	6.2	5.1	4.0	
Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)		21.3	14.6 u	11.3 u	10.4 bu	19.7	20.0	28.4	37.2	46.6	41.8	38.3	35.5	
Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)		4.3	3.7	3.8	5.4 b	6.9	7.9	9.5	13.3	13.7	12.1	12.2	9.0	
Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)		50.3	49.6	49.1	52.4 b	57.4	56.0	50.2	49.7	49.5 b	49.3	49.7	49.1	
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)		67.4	69.9	69.2	68.6 b	68.1	67.1	66.8	61.4	63.7 b	62.9	61.1	65.1	
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)		82.6	83.4	84.5	83.6 b	81.1	80.5	76.9	75.7	76.5 b	76.8	77.2	77.3	
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)		58.6	61.2	60.4	60.1 b	60.2	59.1	56.5	54.5	56.1	57.3	58.3	60.7	
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)		57.6	54.0	65.6	64.2 b	64.7	64.5	61.2	55.8	58.7	57.8	60.6	61.9	
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)		80.7	81.2	81.1	79.2 b	81.3	80.2	77.4	74.6	78.1	74.0	65.8	65.2	
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)		58.2	60.7	60.3	59.4 b	60.0	59.3	56.1	54.1	55.4	56.7	58.2	60.2	
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)		57.8	57.5	63.2	64.0 b	64.6	63.2	60.0	56.5	60.1	58.7	61.2	62.8	
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)		75.5	75.5	77.0	76.4 b	75.3	73.8	72.9	69.8	73.5	70.7	62.9	65.1	
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)				2.7	3.1 b	3.5	4.5	5.5	7.5	9.1	8.7	7.8	7.7	
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)		0.6 u	0.4 u	0.6 u	0.7 bu	1.0	0.5 u	0.7 u	0.8	0.8	0.7 u	1.0	1.9	
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)		3.0	2.4	1.8	2.0 b	2.6	4.2	4.5	6.0	5.9	5.9	4.6	3.1	

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Cyprus		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	
Social Indicators	All	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of total population)	25.4	25.2	23.3 b	23.5	24.6	24.6	27.1	27.8	27.4	28.9	27.7	
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of total population)	15.6	15.5	15.9	15.8	15.6	14.8	14.7	15.3	14.4	16.2	16.1	
		At-risk-of-poverty threshold (PPS single person)	9817	10951	10945 b	11256	10816	11497	11444	10299	9457	9188	9591	
		Poverty gap (%)	18.9	19.7	15.3 b	17.2	18.0	19.0	19.0	17.7	18.5	19.8	17.3	
		Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of total population)			9.9	10.1	9.2	8.6	8.3	10.0	7.3	7.3	7.6	
		At-risk-of-poverty before social transfers excl. pensions (% of total population)	21.6	21.0	22.9 b	23.6	23.5	23.5	23.5	24.3	24.6	25.4	25.0	
		Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (%)	27.8	26.2	30.6 b	33.1	33.6	37.0	37.5	37.0	41.5	36.2	35.6	
		Severe Material Deprivation (% of total population)	12.6	13.3	9.1	9.5	11.2	11.7	15.0	16.1	15.3	15.4	13.6	11.7 p
		Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of people aged 0-59)	3.8	3.7	4.5 b	4.0	4.9	4.9	6.5	7.9	9.7	10.9	10.6	
		Real Gross Household Disposable income (growth %)	5.1	3.6	6.4	-2.6	1.5	-0.8	-4.1	-4.8	-8.5	1.9	5.9	
		Income quintile share ratio S80/S20	4.3	4.4	4.3 b	4.4	4.5	4.3	4.7	4.9	5.4	5.2	4.9	
		GINI coefficient	28.8	29.8	29.0 b	29.5	30.1	29.2	31.0	32.4	34.8	33.6	32.1	
		Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18-24)	14.9 b	12.5	13.7	11.7 b	12.7	11.3	11.4	9.1	6.8 b	5.2	7.6	8.6
	NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of total population aged 15-24)	10.7 b	9.0	9.7	9.9 b	11.7	14.6	16.0	18.7	17.0	15.3	16.0	16.1	
	Male	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of male population)	23.3	22.7	20.5 b	20.9	22.8	22.8	25.1	26.8	26.0	28.1	26.6	
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of male population)	13.5	13.5	13.7	13.7	13.8	12.9	12.9	14.1	13.1	15.3	15.0	
		Poverty gap (%)	17.2	18.3	14.0 b	14.6	16.6	17.9	18.3	17.4	18.0	21.3	18.9	
		Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of male population)			8.2	7.4	7.3	7.5	6.3	8.7	5.7	6.2	6.7	
		Severe Material Deprivation (% of male population)	12.5	12.5	9.0	9.1	11.5	12.0	15.1	16.6	15.6	15.9	14.0	11.9 p
		Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of males aged 0-59)	2.6	2.9	3.3 b	3.0	4.2	4.2	5.8	7.6	8.9	10.3	9.9	
Life expectancy at birth (years)		78.4	77.6	78.2	78.6	79.2	79.3	78.9	80.1	80.9	79.9	80.5		
Healthy life years at birth (years) - men		64.2 bd	63.1	63.9	64.8	65.1	61.6	63.4	64.3	66.1	63.1	67.5		
Early leavers from education and training (% of males aged 18-24)		22.5 b	19.5	19.0	15.2 b	16.2	15.1	16.5	14.8	11.2 b	7.7	11.4	9.4	
NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of males aged 15-24)		10.2 b	8.3	8.2	8.6 b	10.4	15.1	17.8	20.6	19.0	15.9	15.0	16.2	
Female		At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of female population)	27.4	27.6	25.9 b	26.0	26.3	26.4	29.0	28.8	28.8	29.8	28.7	
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of female population)	17.7	17.4	18.1	17.8	17.2	16.6	16.4	16.5	15.6	17.2	17.2	
		Poverty gap (%)	19.8	20.5	16.3 b	19.3	20.1	19.7	19.4	17.8	18.9	18.7	16.4	
	Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of female population)			11.5	12.6	10.9	9.6	10.3	11.2	8.9	8.2	8.6		
	Severe Material Deprivation (% of female population)	12.7	14.0	9.3	9.8	10.9	11.4	14.9	15.6	15.1	15.0	13.3	11.5 p	
	Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of females aged 0-59)	5.1	4.5	5.7 b	5.0	5.5	5.5	7.1	8.2	10.5	11.4	11.2		
	Life expectancy at birth (years)	82.2	82.1	82.9	83.6	83.9	83.1	83.4	85.0	84.7	83.7	84.9		
	Healthy life years at birth (years) - women	63.4 bd	62.8	64.5	65.3	64.2	61.0	64.0	65.0	66.3	63.4	68.8		
	Early leavers from education and training (% of females aged 18-24)	8.2 b	6.8	9.5	8.7 b	9.8	8.1	7.0	4.2	2.9 bu	3.1 u	4.3 u	7.8	
	NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of females aged 15-24)	11.2 b	9.6	10.9	11.1 b	12.8	14.2	14.4	17.0	15.3	14.7	16.9	16.0	
	Children (0-17)	At-Risk-of-poverty or exclusion of children (% of people aged 0-17)	21.3	20.8	21.5 b	20.2	21.8	23.4	27.5	27.7	24.7	28.9	29.6	
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of Children population)	11.5	12.4	14.0	12.3	12.6	12.8	13.9	15.5	12.8	16.7	17.1	
		Severe Material Deprivation (% of Children population)	12.1	11.7	9.7	9.3	12.5	14.8	18.1	18.7	15.6	17.2	17.7	14.0 p
Share of children living in low work intensity households (% of Children population)		3.0	2.8	3.4 b	3.1	3.6	3.2	5.0	6.4	7.3	9.4	9.0		
Risk of poverty of children in households at work (Working Intensity > 0.2)		10.4	10.5	12.5 b	10.6	10.6	11.2	11.6	11.8	9.1	11.8	12.3		
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (0-17) (%)		43.4	37.7	44.0 b	51.4	49.6	47.1	45.5	43.6	52.9	44.7	41.4		
Working age (18-64)	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of Working age population)	21.4	21.1	18.9 b	19.9	22.1	22.1	25.8	28.2	28.3	30.5	28.1		
	At-risk-of-poverty (% of Working age population)	10.6	10.1	10.8	11.2	11.9	11.5	12.2	14.4	13.4	15.9	15.1		
	Severe Material Deprivation (% of Working age population)	12.3	12.7	8.6	9.5	11.5	11.6	15.5	16.7	16.7	16.8	14.1	12.6 p	
	Very low work intensity (18-59)	4.1	4.0	5.0 b	4.4	5.3	5.5	6.9	8.4	10.6	11.4	11.1		
	In-work at-risk-of poverty rate (% of persons employed 18-64)	7.2	6.3	6.3 b	6.8	7.4	7.3	8.0	9.0	7.8	9.2	8.4		
	Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (18-64) (%)	34.2	34.0	36.5 b	38.1	37.4	42.5	41.9	38.2	43.7	36.7	37.9		
Elderly (65+)	At-Risk-of-poverty or exclusion of elderly (% of people aged 65+)	55.6	55.6	49.3 b	48.6	42.6	39.8	33.4	26.1	27.2	20.8	22.9		
	At-risk-of-poverty (% of Elderly population)	51.9	50.6	46.3	46.4	39.9	35.5	29.3	20.1	22.4	17.3	19.5		
	Severe Material Deprivation (% of Elderly population)	15.3	19.4	10.9	9.5	7.3	7.1	7.5	9.0	7.4	5.1	5.4	4.8 p	
	Relative median income of elderly (ratio with median income of people younger than 65)	0.57	0.57	0.59 b	0.61	0.65	0.67	0.70	0.77	0.75	0.80	0.79		
	Aggregate replacement ratio (ratio)	0.28	0.29	0.33 b	0.37	0.37	0.39	0.39	0.40	0.39	0.43	0.44		
Expenditure in social protection indicators (% of GDP)	Sickness/Health care	4.2	4.1	4.0	4.6	4.5	4.6	4.5	4.5	4.4	4.7			
	Disability	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7			
	Old age and survivors	7.5	7.5	7.6	8.4	9.2	10.0	11.1	12.0	11.8	11.7			
	Family/Children	1.8	1.7	1.9	2.0	1.9	1.8	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.3			
	Unemployment	1.1	0.8	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.2	1.6	2.0	1.5	1.2			
	Housing and Social exclusion n.e.c.	1.2	1.4	1.7	2.3	2.4	2.3	1.8	1.4	1.4	1.6			
	Total (including Admin and Other expenditures)	16.7	16.4	17.6	19.1	19.9	21.5	22.3	24.2	21.7	21.8			
	of which: Means tested benefits	1.5	1.7	2.0	2.5	2.7	2.6	2.9	2.7	2.6	2.8			

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Latvia

Latvia		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	
Macro Economic Indicators (Annual % growth)	Real GDP	11.9	10.0	-3.5	-14.4	-3.9	6.4	4.0	2.4	1.9	3.0	2.2	4.5	
	Total employment	5.8	3.8	-0.8	-14.3	-6.7	1.5	1.4	2.3	-1.3	1.4	-0.3	0.6	
	Labour productivity	5.8	5.9	-2.7	-0.1	2.9	4.8	2.5	0.1	3.3	1.5	2.5	3.9	
	Annual average hours worked per person employed	0.1	-1.5	6.6	-2.5	-0.9	0.9	-0.9	-0.3	0.6	-1.9	0.0	-1.5	
	Real productivity per hour worked	5.7	7.6	-8.8	2.5	3.8	3.9	3.5	0.5	2.7	3.5	2.5	5.5	
	Harmonized CPI	6.6	10.1	15.3	3.3	-1.2	4.2	2.3	0.0	0.7	0.2	0.1	2.9	
	Price deflator GDP	12.4	20.1	11.8	-9.7	-0.8	6.4	3.6	1.6	1.8	0.0	0.3	3.1	
	Nominal compensation per employee	22.5	34.9	17.7	-10.9	-6.6	2.4	7.7	5.5	8.6	7.7	6.8	7.9	
	Real compensation per employee (GDP deflator)	9.0	12.3	5.3	-1.4	-5.9	-3.8	3.9	3.8	6.7	7.7	6.5	4.7	
	Real compensation per employee (private consumption deflator)	15.0	22.5	2.1	-13.8	-5.5	-1.7	5.3	5.5	7.8	7.5	6.7	4.9	
	Nominal unit labour costs	15.8	27.3	21.0	-10.9	-9.3	-2.3	5.0	5.3	5.2	6.1	4.2	3.8	
	Real unit labour costs	2.9	6.0	8.3	-1.4	-8.5	-8.2	1.4	3.7	3.4	6.1	3.9	0.8	
	Labour Market Indicators - Total	Total population (000)	2228	2209	2192	2163	2121	2075	2045	2024	2001	1986	1969	1950
		Population aged 15-64 (000)	1526	1511	1499	1473	1436	1399	1373	1352	1325	1303	1282	1259
		Total employment (000)	1031	1057	1055	909	851	862	876	894	885	896	893	895
Employment aged 15-64 (000)		992	1016	1009	877	829	841	852	867	859	868	862	862	
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)		73.2	75.2	75.4	66.6	64.3	66.3	68.1	69.7	70.7	72.5	73.2	74.8	
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)		65.9	68.1	68.2	60.3	58.5	60.8	63.0	65.0	66.3	68.1	68.7	70.1	
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)		35.3	38.1	37.0	27.5	25.4	25.8	28.7	30.2	32.5	34.5	32.8	33.0	
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)		80.8	82.1	82.2	74.1	72.6	75.0	76.3	77.9	78.2	79.2	79.7	81.2	
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)		53.4	58.0	59.1	52.5	47.8	50.5	52.8	54.8	56.4	59.4	61.4	62.3	
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)		72.9	75.3	75.4	65.6	62.8	64.9	66.8	68.7	69.8	71.6	72.0	73.5	
Self-employed (% total employment)		10.1	9.3	8.9	10.0	10.1	10.2	10.5	10.7	10.7	11.8	12.0	11.9	
Part-time employment (% total employment)		5.9	5.6	5.9	8.2	9.3	8.8	8.9	7.5	6.8	7.2	8.5	7.7	
Temporary employment (% total employment)		7.9	4.9	4.2	5.1	8.1	6.9	5.5	4.5	3.7	3.9	3.9	3.1	
Employment in Services (% total employment)				62.7 b	67.0	68.3	68.3 u	68.2	68.0	68.7	68.4	68.0	69.6	
Employment in Industry (% total employment)				29.6 b	24.5	23.4	23.0 u	23.6	24.2	24.1	23.9	24.4	23.5	
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)				7.7 b	8.5	8.3	8.7	8.1	7.8	7.3	7.7	7.6	6.9	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)		71.0	72.6	74.2	73.5	73.0	72.8	74.4	74.0	74.6	75.7	76.3	77.0	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)		40.9	42.6	42.8	41.2	39.7	37.5	40.1	39.4	40.4	41.3	39.7	39.7	
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)		86.1	87.1	88.7	88.4	88.6	88.0	88.4	87.6	87.2	87.6	87.8	88.6	
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)		57.3	60.7	63.0	60.9	56.9	59.4	61.8	61.3	62.6	65.5	67.6	67.9	
Total unemployment (000)		78	68	88	193	206	167	155	120	108	98	95	85	
Unemployment rate (% labour force)		7.0	6.1	7.7	17.5	19.5	16.2	15.0	11.9	10.8	9.9	9.6	8.7	
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)		13.6	10.6	13.6	33.3	36.2	31.0	28.5	23.2	19.6	16.3	17.3	17.0	
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)		2.4	1.6	1.9	4.5	8.8	8.8	7.8	5.7	4.6	4.5	4.0	3.3	
Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)		34.0	27.0	24.1	25.8	45.0	54.5	52.1	48.4	42.9	45.3	41.4	37.6	
Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)		5.6	4.5	5.8	13.7	14.4	11.6	11.5	9.1	7.9	6.7	6.9	6.8	
Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)		54.3	59.3	57.4	48.1	47.1	48.5	51.8	50.9	51.3 b	53.2	56.7	58.4	
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)		76.2	77.5	77.7	68.2	65.1	66.8	66.9	69.7	70.9 b	71.7	71.1	72.9	
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)		86.6	87.8	87.4	83.5	80.7	84.4	86.2	85.2	84.2 b	85.8	87.2	87.6	
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)		65.8	68.1	68.1 b	61.0	59.5	61.4	64.0	66.0	67.0	68.8	69.6	70.9	
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)				80.8	63.2 u			76.6 u	76.6 u	78.9 u	77.4	79.0 u	61.2 u	
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)		76.4	64.2	69.1 b	56.6	53.3	57.5	57.6	59.2	61.6	63.4	63.3	64.4	
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)		65.3	67.4	67.9	60.3	58.4	60.7	63.2	65.4	66.5	68.5	69.2	70.5	
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)		62.2	67.0	59.3	48.5	53.7	57.2	53.0	59.1	62.3	62.1	75.7	63.8	
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)		71.6	73.5	71.7	62.0	60.0	62.2	62.2	62.3	64.4	64.2	63.0	66.9	
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)				2.0	4.2	5.1	4.3	4.2	3.2	2.7	2.7	3.2	2.9	
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)		0.7	0.6	0.6	0.4	0.5	0.8	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.5	
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)		6.9	6.1	4.7	7.7	8.1	7.6	6.4	6.1	5.0	4.4	4.1	4.1	

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Latvia	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017		
Labour Market Indicators - Male	Total population (000)	1022	1014	1007	993	971	948	935	927	917	911	904	896	
	Population aged 15-64(000)	734	728	725	712	693	674	663	654	642	633	623	612	
	Total employment (000)	526	540	531	435	403	416	428	441	439	444	438	441	
	Employment aged 15-64 (000)	506	519	508	420	393	407	417	428	427	431	425	428	
	Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	78.4	80.5	79.3	66.8	64.0	67.5	70.0	71.9	73.1	74.6	74.7	77.0	
	Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)	70.4	72.7	71.5	60.3	57.9	61.5	64.4	66.8	68.4	69.9	70.0	71.9	
	Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)	41.8	43.8	42.1	29.5	26.5	28.3	31.8	33.3	36.5	37.1	34.0	35.0	
	Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)	84.3	86.0	84.9	73.7	71.7	75.1	77.7	79.9	80.4	81.2	81.4	83.5	
	Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)	59.3	64.3	62.8	51.8	46.9	51.7	53.2	55.2	56.3	60.1	61.3	62.4	
	FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	78.4	81.0	79.6	66.1	62.8	66.5	69.2	71.4	72.8	74.5	74.2	76.4	
	Self-employed (% total employment)	11.7	11.3	11.4	12.9	12.4	12.6	12.8	12.8	13.3	14.8	15.0	14.0	
	Part-time employment (% total employment)	4.4	4.1	4.3	6.8	7.6	7.0	6.7	5.6	4.7	4.5	6.1	4.8	
	Temporary employment (% total employment)	7.9	4.9	4.2	5.1	8.1	6.9	5.5	4.5	3.7	3.9	3.9	3.1	
	Employment in Services (% total employment)			48.7 b	54.3 u	54.7 u	55.0 u	54.7 u	54.2 u	54.5	54.3	54.1	56.4 u	
	Employment in Industry (% total employment)			41.3 b	34.4 u	33.8 u	32.5 u	33.4 u	34.8 u	35.1	35.0	35.5	34.0 u	
	Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)			10.0 b	11.3	11.5	12.5	11.8	11.1	10.4	10.7	10.4	9.7	
	Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)	76.1	77.9	78.3	76.6	75.3	75.8	77.1	76.6	77.8	78.9	78.8	79.8	
	Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)	47.5	49.2	49.0	46.4	42.2	41.1	44.0	42.6	45.3	45.2	43.3	42.8	
	Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)	90.2	91.6	92.0	91.1	91.0	90.8	91.2	90.6	90.5	90.6	90.2	91.8	
	Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)	64.3	67.6	68.2	62.8	58.5	62.5	63.2	62.2	63.7	68.0	69.4	69.1	
	Total unemployment (000)	41	38	49	115	119	95	83	64	59	55	54	48	
	Unemployment rate (% labour force)	7.3	6.5	8.4	20.9	22.7	18.6	16.2	12.6	11.8	11.1	10.9	9.8	
	Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)	11.9	11.0	14.0	36.4	37.3	31.3	27.8	21.8	19.4	18.0	21.4	18.3	
	Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)	2.7	1.9	1.9	5.4	10.9	11.0	8.7	6.5	5.3	5.4	4.9	3.9	
	Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)	37.5	29.9	23.1	25.9	48.0	59.0	53.5	51.9	44.7	48.5	44.9	39.9	
	Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)	5.7	5.4	6.9	16.9	15.8	12.9	12.2	9.3	8.8	8.2	9.2	7.8	
	Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)	63.4	68.2	64.8	50.4	49.5	53.6	59.0	56.8	58.3 b	60.8	62.7	64.7	
	Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)	81.9	83.9	82.1	69.7	66.1	70.0	70.5	73.4	74.8 b	75.4	74.9	76.9	
	Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)	90.4	89.8	90.7	85.8	81.9	84.2	87.7	88.7	86.6 b	88.9	88.7	89.9	
	Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)	70.2	72.7	71.2 b	60.6	58.6	61.3	64.9	67.3	69.1	70.3	70.2	72.2	
	Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)		85.6 u								88.2 u			
	Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)	89.2	69.2	72.8 b	58.5	54.4	62.0	61.6	63.5	64.0	67.1	68.3	69.8	
	Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)	69.6	71.8	71.1	60.0	57.7	61.0	64.5	66.6	68.4	70.0	70.0	71.9	
	Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)	72.7	68.7	70.0	58.8	52.1	58.1	58.2	68.1	61.8	60.4	82.2	68.7	
	Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)	78.6	80.4	75.0	63.1	60.4	65.9	64.2	68.0	69.1	70.2	67.7	72.9	
	Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)			1.7	3.9	4.1	3.8	3.3	2.6	2.0	1.8	2.8	2.0	
	Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)	0.5 u	0.4	0.4	0.4 u		0.7	0.6	0.4 u	0.4 u	0.3 u	0.5	0.4 u	
	Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)	6.0	5.2	3.9	7.0	8.0	7.0	6.1	5.7	4.9	4.3	4.1	3.8	
	Labour Market Indicators - Female	Total population (000)	1206	1195	1185	1170	1150	1127	1110	1097	1084	1075	1065	1054
		Population aged 15-64(000)	792	783	775	761	743	725	710	698	683	670	659	647
		Total employment (000)	505	517	524	474	448	445	447	453	446	452	455	454
		Employment aged 15-64 (000)	486	497	501	456	436	434	435	438	432	437	437	434
		Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	68.4	70.3	71.9	66.5	64.5	65.3	66.4	67.7	68.5	70.5	71.8	72.7
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)		61.8	63.9	65.2	60.4	59.0	60.2	61.7	63.4	64.3	66.4	67.6	68.4	
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)		28.5	32.2	31.7	25.4	24.3	23.4	25.4	27.0	28.3	31.9	31.6	30.9	
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)		77.4	78.4	79.6	74.5	73.5	74.8	75.0	76.1	76.0	77.3	78.1	79.0	
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)		49.2	53.4	56.3	53.0	48.4	49.7	52.5	54.6	56.4	58.9	61.4	62.1	
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)		68.0	70.1	71.6	65.1	62.8	63.5	64.7	66.2	67.2	69.0	70.1	70.9	
Self-employed (% total employment)		8.4	7.1	6.3	7.4	8.0	8.0	8.3	8.7	8.2	8.9	9.2	10.0	
Part-time employment (% total employment)		7.5	7.1	7.6	9.4	10.9	10.4	11.0	9.4	8.9	10.0	10.8	10.6	
Temporary employment (% total employment)		4.9	2.5	1.9	2.7	4.7	5.0	3.0	3.1	2.2	2.7	2.6	2.1	
Employment in Services (% total employment)				5.5 b	5.9	5.4	5.1	4.6	4.6	4.2	4.8	4.8	4.2	
Employment in Industry (% total employment)				70.3	70.7	70.8	70.1	72.0	71.6	71.6	72.8	74.0	74.3	
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)				35.8	35.9	37.2	33.7	36.1	36.0	35.3	37.1	35.9	36.5	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)		66.4	67.8	70.3	70.7	70.8	70.1	72.0	71.6	71.6	72.8	74.0	74.3	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)		34.0	35.8	36.5	35.9	37.2	33.7	36.1	36.0	35.3	37.1	35.9	36.5	
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)		82.2	82.8	85.6	85.9	86.3	85.3	85.7	84.8	84.0	84.6	85.5	85.4	
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)		52.1	55.7	59.2	59.5	55.7	57.1	60.8	60.5	61.7	63.5	66.1	66.9	
Total unemployment (000)		36	30	40	78	87	71	73	57	49	43	42	38	
Unemployment rate (% labour force)		6.7	5.6	7.1	14.1	16.3	13.8	14.0	11.1	9.8	8.6	8.4	7.7	
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)		16.0	9.9	13.1	29.2	34.8	30.6	29.5	24.9	20.0	14.2	12.1	15.4	
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)		2.0	1.3	1.8	3.6	6.7	6.7	7.0	5.0	4.0	3.6	3.1	2.7	
Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)		30.0	23.5	25.3	25.6	41.0	48.5	50.4	44.4	40.6	41.2	37.0	34.6	
Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)		5.5	3.6	4.8	10.5	12.9	10.3	10.6	9.0	7.0	5.3	4.4	5.6	
Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)		41.0	46.9	47.1	44.7	43.1	40.3	40.0	41.0	39.1 b	39.9	47.2	48.0	
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)		71.1	71.6	73.4	66.7	64.1	63.6	63.1	65.8	66.9 b	67.7	66.7	68.2	
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)		84.5	86.7	85.7	82.3	80.0	84.5	85.4	83.3	83.0 b	84.3	86.4	86.3	
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)		61.8	64.0	65.3 b	61.4	60.2	61.5	63.1	64.7	65.1	67.4	68.9	69.7	
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)														
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)		59.9 u	58.8	65.0 b	54.7	52.2	52.6	53.1	54.7	59.2	59.6	58.5	58.9	
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)		61.4	63.3	64.8	60.7	59.0	60.4	62.0	64.2	64.8	67.2	68.5	69.1	
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)		52.2	65.3	51.8	39.5	55.1	56.4	48.4	50.8	62.7	63.1	69.4	57.1	
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)		66.3	68.2	69.1	61.1	59.7	59.3	60.6	57.9	60.7	60.0	59.7	62.6	
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)				2.4	4.6	6.0	4.7	5.2	3.7	3.3	3.5	3.6	3.7	
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)		0.8	0.8	0.8	0.4 u	0.6 u	0.9	0.6	0.6	0.8	0.7	0.6	0.6	
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)		8.0	7.0	5.5	8.4	8.3	8.1	6.8	6.6	5.0	4.5	4.0	4.5	

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Latvia		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	
All	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of total population)	42.2	35.1	34.2 b	37.9	38.2	40.1	36.2	35.1	32.7	30.9	28.5	28.2	
	At-risk-of-poverty (% of total population)	23.5	21.2	25.9	26.4	20.9	19.0	19.2	19.4	21.2	22.5	21.8	22.1	
	At-risk-of-poverty threshold (PPS single person)	2686	3352	4283	4279	3525	3566	3661	3868	4392	4855	5554	5602	
	Poverty gap (%)	24.4	24.8	28.6	29.0	28.9	31.7	28.6	27.5	23.6	25.5	24.0	25.3	
	Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of total population)			12.6	15.6	10.5	9.3	12.6 b	12.1	10.8	10.1	15.2	14.9	
	At-risk-of-poverty before social transfers excl. pensions (% of total population)	28.0	27.5	30.2	31.0	28.5	26.8	25.7	26.0	27.0	27.3	27.8	28.3	
	Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (%)	16.1	22.9	14.2	14.8	26.7	29.1	25.3	25.4	21.5	17.6	21.6	21.9	
	Severe Material Deprivation (% of total population)	31.3	24.0	19.3	22.1	27.6	31.0	25.6	24.0	19.2	16.4	12.8	11.3	
	Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of people aged 0-59)	7.1	6.2	5.4	7.4	12.6	12.6	11.7	10.0	9.6	7.8	7.2	7.8	
	Real Gross Household Disposable income (growth %)	15.7	10.6	3.6	-15.0	-5.3	-5.8	3.6	4.2	2.5	6.6	3.7		
	Income quintile share ratio S80/S20	7.8	6.4	7.3	7.4	6.8	6.5	6.5	6.3	6.5	6.5	6.2	6.3	
	GINI coefficient	38.9	35.4	37.5	37.5	35.9	35.1	35.7	35.2	35.5	35.4	34.5	34.5	
	Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18-24)	15.6 b	15.6	15.5	14.3	12.9	11.6	10.6	9.8	8.5 b	9.9	10.0	8.6	
	NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of total population aged 15-24)	11.5 b	11.9	11.8	17.5	17.8	16.0	14.9	13.0	12.0	10.5	11.2	10.3	
	Male	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of male population)	39.0	32.3	31.4 b	36.0	37.6	39.9	35.5	34.2	30.6	27.9	26.0	24.9
At-risk-of-poverty (% of male population)		20.9	18.7	23.3	24.4	21.4	19.8	19.3	18.9	19.5	19.7	19.4	19.1	
Poverty gap (%)		28.7	27.7	26.7	31.7	31.5	34.0	31.8	30.3	28.3	30.5	26.7	28.9	
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of male population)				10.7	13.2	10.6	9.4	13.4 b	12.7	10.1	8.6	13.4	12.8	
Severe Material Deprivation (% of male population)		29.2	22.1	17.6	21.3	26.9	30.4	24.7	23.1	18.1	15.4	12.1	10.7	
Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of males aged 0-59)		6.7	5.9	5.7	7.9	13.8	13.3	12.6	10.4	10.2	8.2	7.2	7.9	
Life expectancy at birth (years)		65.4	65.3	66.5	68.1	67.9	68.6	68.9	69.3 b	69.1	69.7	69.8		
Healthy life years at birth (years) - men		50.8 bd	51.4	51.6	52.6	53.1	53.6	54.6	51.7 b	51.5	51.8	52.3		
Early leavers from education and training (% of males aged 18-24)		19.3 b	20.6	20.0	17.6	16.7	15.8	14.7	13.6	11.7 b	13.4	13.7	12.0	
NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of males aged 15-24)		7.9 b	9.5	10.2	18.6	18.7	16.1	15.1	12.6	11.3	9.4	12.6	11.0	
Female		At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of female population)	44.8	37.4	36.6 b	39.4	38.6	40.3	36.8	35.9	34.4	33.4	30.6	31.1
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of female population)	25.7	23.4	28.1	28.0	20.4	18.3	19.1	19.8	22.5	24.8	23.9	24.6
		Poverty gap (%)	21.5	24.1	29.3	27.4	25.9	28.7	25.7	25.8	21.2	22.4	22.9	24.1
		Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of female population)			14.1	17.7	10.5	9.2	11.9 b	11.6	11.4	11.3	16.7	16.6
		Severe Material Deprivation (% of female population)	33.1	25.6	20.6	22.8	28.3	31.5	26.5	24.7	20.1	17.3	13.4	11.8
	Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of females aged 0-59)	7.5	6.5	5.2	7.0	11.4	12.0	10.8	9.6	9.1	7.4	7.2	7.6	
	Life expectancy at birth (years)	76.3	76.2	77.5	78.0	78.0	78.8	78.9	78.9 b	79.4	79.5	79.6		
	Healthy life years at birth (years) - women	52.5 bd	54.8	54.3	56.0	56.4	56.6	59.0	54.2 b	55.3	54.1	54.9		
	Early leavers from education and training (% of females aged 18-24)	11.5 b	10.5	10.8	11.0	9.0	7.5	6.3	5.8	5.1 b	6.2	6.2	5.0	
	NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of females aged 15-24)	15.1 b	14.4	13.5	16.3	16.9	16.0	14.6	13.4	12.8	11.7	9.7	9.5	
	Children (0-17)	At-Risk-of-poverty or exclusion of children (% of people aged 0-17)	42.7	32.8	32.4 b	38.4	42.2	44.1	40.0	38.4	35.3	31.3	24.7	23.9
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of Children population)	25.9	19.8	23.6	26.3	26.3	24.7	24.4	23.4	24.3	23.2	18.6	18.4
		Severe Material Deprivation (% of Children population)	30.2	20.5	19.2	24.6	30.7	32.4	27.3	25.4	19.9	17.0	11.9	10.3
		Share of children living in low work intensity households (% of Children population)	6.9	5.5	4.6	6.9	12.4	12.6	10.4	9.2	9.6	7.4	6.3	6.4
		Risk of poverty of children in households at work (Working Intensity > 0.2)	20.9	16.7	20.1	21.3	18.5	17.4	18.3	18.5	18.4	18.4	13.9	13.0
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (0-17) (%)		18.3	33.1	22.9	22.0	28.5	32.3	28.5	28.2	27.5	24.4	35.9	35.7	
Working age (18-64)	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of Working age population)	39.4	31.4	28.0 b	32.8	37.4	41.1	35.9	34.0	30.0	27.3	25.0	24.5	
	At-risk-of-poverty (% of Working age population)	20.9	17.7	19.4	20.5	20.4	20.2	19.3	18.8	18.4	18.6	17.7	17.5	
	Severe Material Deprivation (% of Working age population)	29.8	21.8	16.7	20.5	26.8	31.2	25.0	22.9	18.2	15.7	12.4	11.2	
	Very low work intensity (18-59)	7.2	6.4	5.7	7.6	12.6	12.6	12.1	10.2	9.6	7.9	7.5	8.2	
	In-work at-risk-of poverty rate (% of persons employed 18-64)	11.2	9.5	10.7	11.2	9.7	9.6	8.9	9.1	8.3	9.4	8.5	9.0	
	Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (18-64) (%)	17.7	25.3	17.5	18.0	27.1	28.9	25.2	25.4	23.0	20.2	23.7	25.5	
Elderly (65+)	At-Risk-of-poverty or exclusion of elderly (% of people aged 65+)	51.9	51.4	58.8 b	55.5	36.8	33.0	33.7	36.1	39.3	42.1	43.1	43.9	
	At-risk-of-poverty (% of Elderly population)	30.4	35.6	52.0	47.6	17.2	9.1	13.9	17.6	27.6	34.6	38.1	39.9	
	Severe Material Deprivation (% of Elderly population)	38.1	35.8	28.7	25.3	27.5	28.9	26.4	26.6	22.0	18.2	14.9	12.7	
	Relative median income of elderly (ratio with median income of people younger than 65)	0.67	0.64	0.53	0.57	0.78	0.86	0.80	0.77	0.71	0.65	0.63	0.61	
	Aggregate replacement ratio (ratio)	0.49	0.38	0.30	0.34	0.47	0.53	0.49	0.47	0.44	0.42	0.42	0.43	
Expenditure in social protection indicators (% of GDP)	Sickness/Health care	3.7	3.3	3.6	4.0	3.9	3.4	3.3	3.4	3.4	3.6 p			
	Disability	0.8	0.7	0.9	1.3	1.4	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.4 p			
	Old age and survivors	5.3	4.7	5.3	7.8	9.5	8.2	7.8	7.7	7.4	7.4 p			
	Family/Children	1.1	1.1	1.3	1.7	1.5	1.1	1.0	1.2	1.3	1.6 p			
	Unemployment	0.5	0.4	0.5	1.6	1.3	0.7	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.6 p			
	Housing and Social exclusion n.e.c.	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.2 p			
	Total (including Admin and Other expenditures)	11.9	10.6	12.1	16.8	18.3	15.3	14.4	14.6	14.4	14.9 p			
	of which: Means tested benefits	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.7	0.7	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.2 p			

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Lithuania

Lithuania		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	
Macro Economic Indicators (Annual % growth)	Real GDP	7.4	11.1	2.6	-14.8	1.6	6.0	3.8	3.5	3.5	2.0	2.3	3.8	
	Total employment	-0.3	2.0	-1.3	-7.7	-5.3	0.5	1.8	1.3	2.0	1.3	2.0	-0.5	
	Labour productivity	7.7	8.9	4.0	-7.7	7.3	5.5	2.0	2.1	1.5	0.7	0.4	4.4	
	Annual average hours worked per person employed	-0.3	1.6	1.6	-3.7	1.2	-1.4	-0.1	-0.9	-0.4	1.4	1.4	-2.2	
	Real productivity per hour worked	8.0	7.2	2.4	-4.2	6.1	7.0	2.1	3.0	1.9	-0.7	-1.0	6.7	
	Harmonized CPI	3.8	5.8	11.1	4.2	1.2	4.1	3.2	1.2	0.2	-0.7	0.7	3.7	
	Price deflator GDP	6.7	8.6	9.7	-3.3	2.4	5.2	2.7	1.3	1.0	0.3	1.0	4.3	
	Nominal compensation per employee	20.7	14.1	14.1	-9.3	-0.1	6.4	4.2	5.4	4.7	5.8	6.2	9.1	
	Real compensation per employee (GDP deflator)	13.1	5.1	4.0	-6.2	-2.5	1.1	1.5	4.0	3.7	5.4	5.2	4.7	
	Real compensation per employee (private consumption deflator)	16.4	7.8	2.7	-12.9	-1.3	2.1	1.1	4.1	4.5	6.5	5.5	5.2	
	Nominal unit labour costs	12.1	4.8	9.7	-1.7	-7.0	0.8	2.2	3.2	3.2	5.0	5.9	4.6	
	Real unit labour costs	4.9	-3.4	-0.1	1.7	-9.1	-4.2	-0.5	1.8	2.2	4.6	4.9	0.3	
	Labour Market Indicators - Total	Total population (000)	3290	3250	3213	3184	3142	3053	3004	2972	2943	2921	2889	2848
		Population aged 15-64 (000)	2209	2188	2169	2154	2127	2053	2016	1993	1971	1949	1916	1876
		Total employment (000)	1429	1452	1427	1317	1248	1254	1276	1293	1319	1335	1361	1355
		Employment aged 15-64 (000)	1405	1423	1397	1290	1224	1226	1244	1264	1288	1301	1318	1306
		Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	71.3	72.7	72.0	67.0	64.3	66.9	68.5	69.9	71.8	73.3	75.2	76.0
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)		63.6	65.0	64.4	59.9	57.6	60.2	62.0	63.7	65.7	67.2	69.4	70.4	
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)		23.7	24.8	26.0	20.6	18.3	19.0	21.5	24.6	27.6	28.3	30.2	30.4	
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)		81.1	82.2	80.9	75.9	73.6	76.9	78.5	79.6	80.8	81.6	82.7	83.3	
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)		49.7	53.2	53.0	51.2	48.3	50.2	51.7	53.4	56.2	60.4	64.6	66.1	
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)		70.0	71.8	71.4	65.9	63.4	65.8	67.3	68.9	70.8	72.1	74.0	74.7	
Self-employed (% total employment)		14.2	12.6	10.2	10.4	9.3	9.2	9.7	10.6	10.8	11.1	11.4	11.1	
Part-time employment (% total employment)		10.0	8.6	6.5	7.9	7.8	8.3	8.9	8.4	8.6	7.6	7.1	7.6	
Temporary employment (% total employment)		5.5	4.3	2.6 u	2.6	2.9	3.2	3.0	3.0	3.1	2.1	1.9	1.8	
Employment in Services (% total employment)														
Employment in Industry (% total employment)														
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)				8.0 b	8.9	8.7	8.3	8.8	8.4	9.0	8.8	7.7	7.4	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)		67.6	67.9	68.4	69.6	70.2	71.4	71.8	72.4	73.7	74.1	75.5	75.9	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)		26.3	27.1	30.0	29.3	28.4	28.2	29.3	31.5	34.2	33.8	35.3	35.0	
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)		85.7	85.6	85.4	87.0	88.4	89.8	89.7	89.5	89.7	89.3	89.3	89.3	
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)		52.9	55.3	55.4	57.2	56.5	58.0	58.7	60.1	63.0	66.2	70.0	71.3	
Total unemployment (000)		88	64	88	211	270	228	197	172	158	134	116	103	
Unemployment rate (% labour force)		5.8	4.3	5.8	13.8	17.8	15.4	13.4	11.8	10.7	9.1	7.9	7.1	
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)		10.0	8.4	13.3	29.6	35.7	32.6	26.7	21.9	19.3	16.3	14.5	13.3	
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)		2.6	1.4 u	1.3 u	3.3	7.4	8.0	6.6	5.1	4.8	3.9	3.0	2.7	
Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)		45.3	32.4 u	21.6 u	23.7	41.7	52.1	49.2	42.9	44.7	42.9	38.3	37.6	
Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)		2.6	2.3	4.0	8.7	10.2	9.2	7.8	6.9	6.6	5.5	5.1	4.6	
Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)		46.4	48.6	41.9	37.9	31.6	32.9	36.0	38.9	43.2 b	45.0	44.8	46.1	
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)		74.5	75.6	73.9	67.7	63.4	66.0	67.5	68.4	69.4 b	70.8	72.1	73.2	
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)		88.8	89.2	88.8	86.7	86.7	88.3	88.2	88.6	89.4 b	89.6	91.0	90.7	
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)		63.6	65.0	64.4	59.9	57.6	60.3	62.0	63.7	65.6	67.2	69.4	70.4	
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)														
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)		71.7 u	65.2 u	73.8 u	52.6 u	54.5 u	53.3 u	62.8 u	70.2 u	72.9 u	70.5 u	68.9 u	68.1 u	
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)		63.3	64.8	64.1	59.7	57.4	60.1	61.9	63.6	65.6	67.2	69.4	70.4	
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)											57.2 u	66.9 u	72.6 u	
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)		69.6	69.8	70.6	63.6	62.6	62.4	64.5	67.5	68.6	69.3	69.2	69.8	
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)				1.2 u	2.1	2.3	2.5	2.5	2.4	2.1	1.5	1.3	1.1	
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)		1.2 u	1.8	0.8	0.9	0.5	0.5 u	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.8	0.9		
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)	2.0	1.9	2.4	2.7	1.9	1.2	1.1	0.9	0.6	0.9	1.1	1.0		

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Lithuania	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Total population (000)	1528	1507	1487	1473	1450	1407	1384	1369	1356	1346	1330	1312
Population aged 15-64(000)	1065	1054	1046	1040	1024	990	972	962	953	944	928	911
Total employment (000)	720	736	720	630	591	604	618	636	647	654	663	660
Employment aged 15-64 (000)	707	719	703	616	579	590	603	620	632	637	643	636
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	74.9	76.6	75.6	66.8	63.5	67.2	69.1	71.2	73.1	74.6	76.2	76.5
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)	66.4	68.2	67.2	59.3	56.5	60.1	62.2	64.7	66.5	68.0	70.0	70.6
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)	26.2	29.4	30.1	21.2	19.1	20.9	22.8	27.6	31.0	30.8	32.5	32.3
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)	83.6	84.2	82.6	74.2	71.1	75.7	77.7	79.8	80.7	81.8	82.6	83.1
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)	55.5	60.7	60.2	55.5	52.1	54.1	55.9	56.1	58.8	62.4	66.8	67.2
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	74.4	76.2	75.5	66.1	62.8	66.5	68.5	70.9	72.9	74.0	75.5	75.8
Self-employed (% total employment)	17.5	16.2	13.4	13.5	11.8	11.3	12.1	13.1	12.9	13.7	14.5	14.1
Part-time employment (% total employment)	8.0	7.0	4.8	6.7	6.4	6.7	6.9	6.4	6.4	5.5	5.4	5.7
Temporary employment (% total employment)	5.5	4.3	2.6 u	2.6	2.9	3.2	3.0	3.0	3.1	2.1	1.9	1.8
Employment in Services (% total employment)												
Employment in Industry (% total employment)												
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)			10.1 b	11.4	11.2	10.5	11.4	10.8	11.5	11.4	10.3	9.8
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)	70.7	71.3	71.6	71.7	72.0	73.5	73.7	74.7	76.0	75.8	77.1	77.4
Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)	29.1	31.6	34.6	32.7	31.3	32.1	32.4	35.8	38.6	36.7	38.7	37.8
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)	88.4	87.7	87.3	88.0	89.0	90.7	90.5	90.6	90.8	90.4	90.2	90.4
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)	59.8	63.3	62.9	63.3	62.6	64.3	64.6	65.2	68.2	69.8	73.6	73.3
Total unemployment (000)	46	32	46	130	159	132	111	96	90	73	66	61
Unemployment rate (% labour force)	6.0	4.2	6.0	17.1	21.2	17.9	15.2	13.1	12.2	10.1	9.1	8.6
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)	10.0	7.0	13.0	35.1	39.0	34.9	29.7	23.0	19.6	16.0	15.9	14.6
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)	2.6 u	1.5 u	1.1 u	3.7	9.0	9.4	7.4	5.5	5.4	4.4	3.4	3.2
Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)	44.4 u	34.9 u	17.6 u	21.7	42.6	52.4	48.9	42.2	44.3	43.6	37.7	37.6
Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)	2.9	2.2	4.5	11.4	12.2	11.2	9.6	8.2	7.6	5.9	6.1	5.5
Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)	53.0	56.3	49.6	39.5	33.8	36.1	39.9	43.6	46.1 b	49.1	49.1	48.9
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)	80.2	80.9	78.4	69.4	64.7	68.8	71.2	72.1	72.4 b	73.7	75.2	76.1
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)	89.5	90.5	91.4	86.3	86.5	88.0	87.8	89.6	91.2 b	92.0	92.6	91.4
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)	66.3	68.1	67.2	59.3	56.5	60.2	62.2	64.7	66.5	68.0	69.9	70.6
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)												
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)		78.3 u										
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)	66.1	67.9	66.9	59.1	56.2	59.9	62.1	64.5	66.3	67.9	69.8	70.6
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)												
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)	72.7	76.2	76.0	66.2	63.9	66.4	68.0	71.3	71.6	72.8	72.4	71.2
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)			0.9 u	2.0	1.8	2.1	2.0	2.0	1.7	1.1	0.9 u	0.9 u
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)		1.1 u	1.6 u	0.8 u	0.9 u				0.7 u	0.6 u	0.8 u	0.9 u
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)	1.9 u	1.7 u	2.4 u	3.2	2.2	1.4	1.5	1.1 u	0.8 u	1.1	1.3	1.2
Total population (000)	1761	1743	1725	1711	1692	1645	1620	1603	1587	1575	1559	1536
Population aged 15-64(000)	1144	1134	1123	1115	1103	1063	1044	1031	1017	1004	988	965
Total employment (000)	709	715	707	687	657	650	658	657	672	681	698	695
Employment aged 15-64 (000)	698	703	694	674	646	636	642	644	656	663	674	670
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	68.0	69.1	68.7	67.2	65.0	66.6	67.9	68.6	70.6	72.2	74.3	75.5
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)	61.0	62.0	61.8	60.4	58.5	60.2	61.8	62.8	64.9	66.5	68.8	70.2
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)	21.0	20.0	21.8	20.1	17.4	17.0	20.1	21.5	24.1	25.7	27.8	28.4
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)	78.7	80.2	79.4	77.5	75.9	78.1	79.1	79.4	80.9	81.4	82.9	83.6
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)	45.2	47.5	47.4	47.8	45.5	47.2	48.5	51.2	54.3	58.8	62.8	65.2
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	66.2	67.7	67.7	65.8	63.9	65.1	66.2	67.2	69.0	70.5	72.8	73.7
Self-employed (% total employment)	10.9	9.0	7.0	7.5	7.0	7.3	7.5	8.2	8.9	8.6	8.4	8.3
Part-time employment (% total employment)	12.0	10.2	8.3	9.1	8.9	9.9	10.7	10.2	10.6	9.7	8.8	9.4
Temporary employment (% total employment)	2.1 u	2.2 u	1.6 u	1.5	1.5	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.8	1.6	1.6	1.2
Employment in Services (% total employment)												
Employment in Industry (% total employment)												
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)			5.8 b	6.5	6.4	6.3	6.3	6.1	6.6	6.4	5.2	5.1
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)	64.6	64.9	65.5	67.6	68.6	69.4	70.1	70.3	71.6	72.5	73.9	74.6
Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)	23.3	22.3	25.3	25.9	25.4	24.1	26.1	27.0	29.6	30.8	31.9	32.2
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)	83.2	83.6	83.6	86.0	87.8	88.9	89.0	88.4	88.7	88.2	88.5	88.1
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)	47.6	49.2	49.7	52.4	51.7	53.1	54.2	56.1	58.9	63.3	67.2	69.6
Total unemployment (000)	42	32	42	81	112	96	86	77	68	61	50	42
Unemployment rate (% labour force)	5.6	4.3	5.6	10.5	14.5	12.9	11.6	10.5	9.2	8.2	6.7	5.7
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)	10.0	10.4	13.9	22.4	31.6	29.4	22.7	20.4	18.7	16.6	12.6	11.7
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)	2.6 u	1.3 u	1.5 u	2.8	5.9	6.7	5.8	4.6	4.2	3.4	2.6	2.1
Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)	46.2 u	29.9 u	25.9 u	27.0	40.3	51.7	49.6	43.8	45.3	42.1	39.1	37.4
Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)	2.3	2.3	3.5	5.8	8.0	7.1	5.9	5.5	5.5	5.1	4.0	3.8
Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)	38.9	39.2	32.9	36.0	29.2	29.3	30.9	32.7	39.1 b	38.8	37.9	41.4
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)	68.8	70.4	69.3	65.8	62.0	63.0	63.6	64.3	66.2 b	67.6	68.6	70.0
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)	88.3	88.3	87.1	86.9	86.8	88.5	88.5	88.0	88.2 b	88.1	90.0	90.2
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)	61.0	62.1	61.8	60.5	58.6	60.3	61.8	62.8	64.8	66.5	68.9	70.2
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)												
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)												
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)	60.8	61.9	61.6	60.4	58.5	60.3	61.8	62.7	64.8	66.5	69.0	70.3
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)												
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)	66.5	64.4	65.7	61.6	61.6	58.9	61.8	64.4	66.0	66.4	66.5	68.5
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)			1.5 u	2.2	2.9	2.9	2.9	2.8	2.5	2.0	1.6	1.4
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)		1.4 u	2.0 u	0.7 u	0.9 u		0.7 u	1.0 u	1.0 u	0.8 u	0.8 u	0.9 u
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)	2.1 u	2.1 u	2.4 u	2.2	1.5	1.1 u	0.7 u	0.7 u		0.6 u	0.9 u	0.8 u

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Lithuania		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017			
Social Indicators	All	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of total population)	35.9	28.7	28.3	29.6	34.0	33.1	32.5	30.8	27.3	29.3	30.1			
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of total population)	20.0	19.1	20.9	20.3	20.5	19.2	18.6	20.6	19.1	22.2	21.9			
		At-risk-of-poverty threshold (PPS single person)	2772	3428	4111	4289	3611	3641	4034	4369	4557	4951	5567			
		Poverty gap (%)	29.1	25.7	25.6	23.8	32.6	29.0	22.6	24.8	22.7	26.0	28.0			
		Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of total population)			10.9	11.4	7.4	7.7 b	12.3	10.2	16.0	14.3	13.5			
		At-risk-of-poverty before social transfers excl. pensions (% of total population)	26.6	25.5	27.4	28.6	31.3	30.2	28.4	30.3	27.5	28.6	27.9			
		Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (%)	24.8	25.1	23.7	29.0	34.5	36.4	34.5	32.0	30.6	22.4	21.5			
		Severe Material Deprivation (% of total population)	25.3	16.6	12.5	15.6	19.9	19.0	19.8	16.0	13.6	13.9	13.5	12.4 p		
		Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of people aged 0-59)	8.3	6.4	6.1	7.2	9.5	12.7	11.4	11.0	8.8	9.2	10.2			
		Real Gross Household Disposable income (growth %)	10.0	2.0	7.5	-11.7	-0.4	1.1	0.3	4.7	1.8	3.8	4.5			
		Income quintile share ratio S80/S20	6.3	5.9	6.1	6.4	7.3	5.8	5.3	6.1	6.1	7.5	7.1			
		GINI coefficient	35.0	33.8	34.5	35.9	37.0	33.0	32.0	34.6	35.0	37.9	37.0			
		Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18-24)	8.8 b	7.8	7.5	8.7	7.9	7.4	6.5	6.3	5.9 b	5.5	4.8	5.4		
NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of total population aged 15-24)	8.3 b	7.1	8.8	12.1	13.2	11.8	11.2	11.1	9.9	9.2	9.4	9.1				
Social Indicators	Male	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of male population)	33.9	26.3	25.9	27.5	33.7	33.0	31.4	28.3	25.5	28.2	28.5			
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of male population)	19.1	16.7	18.5	18.9	21.2	19.1	18.1	19.4	17.8	21.8	20.4			
		Poverty gap (%)	30.6	28.2	28.4	29.0	36.6	29.1	24.3	25.2	26.0	27.7	30.5			
		Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of male population)			10.2	9.1	6.7	9.1 b	12.5	9.9	15.5	12.5	11.5			
		Severe Material Deprivation (% of male population)	23.6	15.8	11.9	15.0	19.9	18.7	19.0	14.2	12.8	13.4	13.2	11.5 p		
		Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of males aged 0-59)	8.3	6.5	6.5	7.7	10.0	12.9	11.8	10.9	9.2	9.3	11.3			
		Life expectancy at birth (years)	65.3	64.5	65.9	67.5	67.6	68.1	68.4	68.5	69.2	69.2	69.5			
		Healthy life years at birth (years) - men	52.6 bd	53.3	54.5	57.2	57.4	57.0	56.6	56.8	57.6	54.1	56.2			
		Early leavers from education and training (% of males aged 18-24)	11.5 bu	10.1 u	10.2 u	11.6	9.8	10.0	8.1	7.8	7.0 b	6.9	6.0 u	7.0		
		NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of males aged 15-24)	8.2 bu	6.3 u	8.6 u	13.7	14.7	13.1	12.8	11.6	9.5	9.1	10.0	9.1		
		Social Indicators	Female	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of female population)	37.7	30.9	30.4	31.4	34.2	33.3	33.4	33.0	28.8	30.4	31.5	
				At-risk-of-poverty (% of female population)	20.8	21.2	23.0	21.6	20.0	19.3	19.0	21.6	20.3	22.5	23.1	
				Poverty gap (%)	24.7	23.5	24.1	20.3	28.6	29.0	22.0	23.5	20.8	24.5	26.1	
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of female population)					11.5	13.3	8.0	6.5 b	12.2	10.4	16.4	15.9	15.1			
Severe Material Deprivation (% of female population)	26.7			17.3	13.0	16.2	19.8	19.3	20.5	17.6	14.3	14.4	13.8	13.1 p		
Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of females aged 0-59)	8.3			6.4	5.7	6.8	8.9	12.5	11.0	11.1	8.4	9.2	9.2			
Life expectancy at birth (years)	77.0			77.2	77.6	78.7	78.9	79.3	79.6	79.6	80.1	79.7	80.1			
Healthy life years at birth (years) - women	56.5 bd			58.1	59.6	61.2	62.3	62.0	61.6	61.6	61.7	58.8	59.4			
Early leavers from education and training (% of females aged 18-24)	6.0 bu			5.5 u	4.7 u	5.8	6.0	4.6 u	4.6 u	4.7 u	4.6 bu	4.0 u	3.6 u			
NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of females aged 15-24)	8.5 bu			7.9 u	9.1 u	10.5	11.6	10.4	9.5	10.6	10.3	9.3	8.8	9.2		
Social Indicators	Children (0-17)			At-Risk-of-poverty or exclusion of children (% of people aged 0-17)	37.2	29.9	29.1	30.8	35.8	34.6	31.9	35.4	28.9	32.7	32.4	
				At-risk-of-poverty (% of Children population)	25.1	22.1	23.3	23.3	24.8	25.2	20.8	26.9	23.5	28.9	25.6	
				Severe Material Deprivation (% of Children population)	24.0	15.9	11.8	15.8	20.0	16.7	16.9	18.5	13.7	13.8	11.5	13.0 p
		Share of children living in low work intensity households (% of Children population)	7.6	6.4	4.7	5.4	5.7	11.7	9.3	9.8	6.9	8.5	9.8			
		Risk of poverty of children in households at work (Working Intensity > 0.2)	19.9	17.3	20.5	20.1	21.9	18.5	15.5	21.2	18.8	23.0	19.6			
		Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (0-17) (%)	22.5	24.3	26.0	36.3	43.1	37.3	41.1	33.9	32.7	21.9	25.2			
Social Indicators	Working age (18-64)	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of Working age population)	34.2	25.8	25.0	27.7	34.6	33.3	31.7	29.3	25.6	26.4	27.3			
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of Working age population)	17.8	15.6	17.5	18.4	22.2	20.2	17.9	19.0	17.6	19.5	19.1			
		Severe Material Deprivation (% of Working age population)	24.2	15.8	11.5	14.7	18.7	18.0	19.5	14.6	12.3	12.7	13.0	11.0 p		
		Very low work intensity (18-59)	8.6	6.4	6.6	7.8	10.6	13.1	12.0	11.4	9.4	9.4	10.3			
		In-work at-risk-of poverty rate (% of persons employed 18-64)	10.1	8.1	9.5	10.5	12.7	9.6	7.7	9.2	8.4	10.2	8.7			
		Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (18-64) (%)	28.2	30.4	28.3	30.8	32.3	37.3	36.3	35.4	33.8	25.6	24.8			
Social Indicators	Elderly (65+)	At-Risk-of-poverty or exclusion of elderly (% of people aged 65+)	41.3	39.1	39.9	35.3	29.8	30.9	35.7	31.7	31.9	36.0	37.4			
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of Elderly population)	22.0	29.8	31.0	23.9	9.6	9.7	18.7	19.4	20.1	25.0	27.7			
		Severe Material Deprivation (% of Elderly population)	31.5	20.8	17.1	18.8	24.0	25.1	24.1	18.4	17.8	18.2	17.3	16.2 p		
		Relative median income of elderly (ratio with median income of people younger than 65)	0.74	0.69	0.70	0.73	0.93	0.90	0.78	0.81	0.77	0.73	0.71			
		Aggregate replacement ratio (ratio)	0.44	0.40	0.43	0.48	0.58	0.52	0.45	0.48	0.45	0.46	0.45			
Expenditure in social protection indicators (% of GDP)	Sickness/Health care	4.1	4.3	4.6	5.4	4.8	4.5	4.2	4.1	4.1	4.5 p					
	Disability	1.3	1.4	1.6	2.0	1.8	1.6	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.4 p					
	Old age and survivors	5.7	6.4	6.9	8.9	7.9	7.1	7.2	6.9	7.1	7.0 p					
	Family/Children	1.1	1.2	1.8	2.8	2.2	1.7	1.4	1.1	1.1	1.1 p					
	Unemployment	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.9	0.8	0.6	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.5 p					
	Housing and Social exclusion n.e.c.	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.7	0.8	0.7	0.6	0.4	0.3 p					
	Total (including Admin and Other expenditures)	13.3	14.2	15.9	21.0	19.0	16.9	16.2	15.3	15.2	15.5 p					
	of which: Means tested benefits	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.5	1.0	1.0	0.9	0.7	0.5	0.4 p					

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Luxembourg

Luxembourg		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	
Macro Economic Indicators (Annual % growth)	Real GDP	5.2	8.4	-1.3	-4.4	4.9	2.5	-0.4	3.7	5.8	2.9	3.1	2.3	
	Total employment	3.8	4.4	4.8	1.0	1.8	3.0	2.4	1.8	2.6	2.6	3.0	3.3	
	Labour productivity	1.3	3.8	-5.8	-5.4	3.0	-0.4	-2.7	1.8	3.1	0.3	0.0	-1.0	
	Annual average hours worked per person employed	0.2	0.9	0.0	-3.2	0.0	-0.1	-0.5	-0.4	0.4	0.9	-0.1	-0.1	
	Real productivity per hour worked	1.1	2.9	-5.8	-2.2	3.0	-0.3	-2.3	2.2	2.8	-0.6	0.1	-0.9	
	Harmonized CPI	3.0	2.7	4.1	0.0	2.8	3.7	2.9	1.7	0.7	0.1	0.0	2.1	
	Price deflator GDP	7.0	1.5	3.9	1.4	3.6	4.8	2.6	1.7	1.6	1.3	-1.3	2.1	
	Nominal compensation per employee	4.2	4.2	2.8	1.7	1.9	1.9	1.8	2.3	2.2	3.1	0.8	2.8	
	Real compensation per employee (GDP deflator)	-2.7	2.6	-1.1	0.3	-1.7	-2.7	-0.7	0.6	0.5	1.7	2.1	0.7	
	Real compensation per employee (private consumption deflator)	1.2	1.5	-1.3	1.7	-0.9	-1.8	-1.1	0.6	1.5	3.0	0.7	0.7	
	Nominal unit labour costs	2.9	0.4	9.1	7.4	-1.0	2.3	4.6	0.5	-0.9	2.8	0.7	3.8	
	Real unit labour costs	-3.9	-1.1	5.1	6.0	-4.5	-2.4	2.1	-1.2	-2.5	1.5	2.0	1.7	
	Labour Market Indicators - Total	Total population (000)	469	476	484	494	502	512	525 b	537	550	563	576	591 b
		Population aged 15-64 (000)	317	322	328	336	343	351	362	371	380	389	399	411 b
		Total employment (000)	195	203 b	202	217 b	221	225	236	239	246	258 b	261	272
Employment aged 15-64 (000)		195	203 b	202	215 b	219	222	234	236	243	255 b	259	270	
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)		69.1	69.6 b	68.8	70.4 b	70.7	70.1	71.4	71.1	72.1	70.9 b	70.7	71.5	
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)		63.6	64.2 b	63.4	65.2 b	65.2	64.6	65.8	65.7	66.6	66.1 b	65.6	66.3	
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)		23.3	22.5 b	23.8	26.7 b	21.2	20.7	21.7	21.9	20.4	29.1 b	24.9	25.8	
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)		81.0	81.9 b	80.0	81.2 b	82.3	82.0	83.1	82.9	83.7	82.6 b	82.5	83.7	
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)		33.2	32.0 b	34.1	38.2 b	39.6	39.3	41.0	40.5	42.5	38.4 b	39.6	39.8	
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)		63.7	63.9 b	63.2	64.7 b	65.3	64.7	65.9	65.8	66.8	65.7 b	65.2	65.9	
Self-employed (% total employment)		7.6	7.1 b	6.3	8.1 b	7.8	8.1	8.4	8.4	8.3	8.9 b	9.2	9.1	
Part-time employment (% total employment)		17.1	17.8 b	17.9	17.6 b	17.4	18.0	18.5	18.7	18.4	18.4 b	19.2	19.5	
Temporary employment (% total employment)		5.2	5.7 b	5.5	5.7 b	5.6	5.7	6.5	5.1	6.4	9.1 b	7.8	7.8	
Employment in Services (% total employment)														
Employment in Industry (% total employment)														
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)					1.7 b	1.3 b	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.4	1.3	0.9 b	0.9	1.2
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)		66.7	66.9 b	66.8	68.7 b	68.2	67.9	69.4	69.9	70.8	70.9 b	70.0	70.2	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)		27.8	26.5 b	29.0	32.3 b	24.7	24.9	26.8	25.9	26.3	35.2 b	30.7	30.5	
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)		84.5	84.7 b	83.4	84.8 b	85.7	85.6	87.0	87.5	88.0	87.7 b	87.2	88.0	
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)		33.6	32.7 b	35.1	39.4 b	40.6	40.4	41.9	42.5	44.5	40.3 b	41.6	41.1	
Total unemployment (000)		9 d	9	10	12	11	11	13	15	16	18	18	16	
Unemployment rate (% labour force)		4.6 d	4.2	4.9	5.1	4.6	4.8	5.1	5.9	6.0	6.5	6.3	5.6	
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)		15.5 d	15.6	17.3	16.5	15.8	16.4	18.0	16.9	22.3	16.6	19.1	15.3	
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)		1.4	1.2 b	1.6	1.2 b	1.3	1.4	1.6	1.8	1.6	1.9 b	2.2	2.1	
Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)		29.5	28.7 b	32.4	23.1 b	29.3	28.8	30.3	30.4	27.4	28.4 b	34.8	38.1	
Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)		4.5	4.0 b	5.2	5.5 b	3.5	4.2	5.0	4.0	6.0	6.1 b	5.8	4.7	
Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)		60.8	62.3 b	61.1	61.6 b	61.9	62.0	63.0	61.8	60.9 b	60.8 b	58.7	58.8	
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)		73.4	73.9 b	70.7	70.2 b	72.1	70.4	71.9	70.8	72.1 b	70.9 b	70.5	73.5	
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)		85.2	84.5 b	84.7	85.1 b	85.0	85.0	84.8	84.9	84.6 b	84.5 b	85.7	85.6	
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)		60.9	60.6 b	60.8	62.8 b	62.5	61.5	62.6	62.8	63.7	63.9 b	63.3	63.2	
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)		69.0	69.9 b	69.1	69.6 b	69.5	69.7	70.9	70.0	71.4	70.1 b	69.8	71.3	
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)		46.5	55.2 b	37.1	53.2 b	56.6	55.1	56.7	58.7	53.5	54.5 b	50.2	54.5	
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)		60.0	59.2 b	59.4	61.9 b	60.7	59.5	60.7	60.3	61.5	62.6 b	61.8	61.2	
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)		71.0	73.0 b	72.2	71.1 b	72.2	72.5	73.6	73.6	74.0	71.8 b	71.7	73.6	
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)		55.5	59.9 b	48.5	59.9 b	62.9	59.9	60.9	62.0	62.4	60.3 b	57.5	60.1	
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)				0.7	2.1 b	1.7	1.6	2.1	1.8	1.8	2.3 b	2.1	1.9	
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)		0.4 u	0.3 bu	0.7	0.7 b	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.7	2.7 b	2.5	2.0	
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)				0.4 u	5.1 b	4.7	4.9	5.1	5.9	5.8	5.1 b	4.4	4.0	

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Luxembourg		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	
Labour Market Indicators - Male	Total population (000)	232	236	240	245	249	255	262 b	268	275	282	289	297 b	
	Population aged 15-64(000)	160	163	166	170	174	178	184	189	194	199	204	210 b	
	Total employment (000)	111	114 b	116	124 b	125	127	132	134	136	141 b	143	146	
	Employment aged 15-64 (000)	111	114 b	115	122 b	124	126	130	132	134	140 b	142	145	
	Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	78.9	78.3 b	77.2	79.0 b	79.2	78.1	78.5	78.0	78.4	76.7 b	76.1	75.4	
	Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)	72.6	72.3 b	71.5	73.2 b	73.1	72.1	72.5	72.1	72.6	71.3 b	70.5	69.9	
	Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)	25.4	26.5 b	27.0	29.1 b	22.1	22.8	23.4	24.2	21.9	29.4 b	24.4	27.0	
	Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)	92.7	92.2 b	90.2	90.8 b	92.0	90.8	91.0	90.1	90.5	89.3 b	88.5	87.4	
	Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)	38.7	35.6 b	38.7	46.5 b	47.7	47.0	47.4	48.3	49.8	43.0 b	46.4	45.4	
	FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	78.4	77.7 b	76.6	78.0 b	78.6	77.2	77.3	76.9	77.4	75.5 b	74.6	74.0	
	Self-employed (% total employment)	8.9	8.1 b	6.6	9.8 b	9.0	9.2	9.2	9.3	9.5	10.0 b	10.5	10.1	
	Part-time employment (% total employment)	2.6	2.6 b	2.7	4.5 b	3.4	4.3	4.7	5.1	4.7	5.6 b	6.2	6.0	
	Temporary employment (% total employment)	5.2	5.7 b	5.5	5.7 b	5.6	5.7	6.5	5.1	6.4	9.1 b	7.8	7.8	
	Employment in Services (% total employment)													
	Employment in Industry (% total employment)													
	Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)			2.0 b	1.6 b	1.3	1.4	1.5	1.9	1.8	1.2 b	1.2	1.7	
	Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)	75.3	75.0 b	74.7	76.6 b	76.0	75.0	75.9	76.3	77.2	76.0 b	75.1	74.0	
	Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)	30.6	30.6 b	30.9	34.9 b	26.8	26.3	28.8	29.8	29.6	36.2 b	30.4	32.6	
	Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)	95.3	94.9 b	93.7	94.1 b	94.8	93.9	94.6	94.4	94.9	93.9 b	93.1	91.8	
	Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)	38.9	36.4 b	39.7	47.7 b	48.8	48.4	48.3	50.5	52.1	45.5 b	49.1	46.8	
	Total unemployment (000)	4 d	4	5	6	5	5	6	8	8	9	9	9	
	Unemployment rate (% labour force)	3.5 d	3.4	4.1	4.5	3.8	3.9	4.5	5.6	5.8	5.9	6.1	5.7	
	Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)	16.0 d	13.8	13.4	15.0	17.2	15.1	18.6	18.8	25.1	18.0	21.3	17.4	
	Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)	1.2	1.3 b	1.3	0.9 b	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.6	1.6	1.9 b	2.2	2.3	
	Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)	34.4	35.4 b	29.4	19.9 b	32.2	33.1	28.8	30.3	26.7	31.0 b	37.3	41.3	
	Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)	5.2	4.1 b	3.9	5.8 b	4.7	3.5	5.4	5.6	7.7	6.8 b	6.0	5.6	
	Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)	76.6	75.7 b	75.2	74.9 b	74.6	74.9	73.1	72.8	70.0 b	69.6 b	69.3	67.2	
	Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)	82.5	82.4 b	78.3	79.2 b	81.1	79.0	79.3	78.6	79.8 b	77.3 b	76.2	75.3	
	Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)	89.4	87.9 b	88.9	90.6 b	90.7	89.8	90.1	89.3	88.9 b	88.7 b	89.1	89.0	
	Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)	69.7	68.7 b	69.4	70.7 b	70.2	67.9	68.7	68.3	69.5	67.8 b	67.5	66.0	
	Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)	77.9	77.5 b	76.5	76.8 b	76.9	76.8	76.9	77.0	76.7	75.3 b	74.8	74.9	
	Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)	60.0	67.6 b	44.1	68.7 b	72.5	76.0	72.6	68.1	65.7	70.4 b	60.8	63.1	
	Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)	68.1	67.3 b	68.2	69.2 b	68.4	65.9	66.3	65.3	66.6	66.7 b	65.9	63.4	
	Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)	80.7	80.3 b	78.7	78.8 b	79.6	79.9	80.0	80.7	80.4	76.3 b	76.9	77.1	
	Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)	69.8	72.7 b	57.4	74.3 b	74.7	73.5	74.7	72.1	70.7	71.7 b	65.3	69.0	
	Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)				1.0 b	0.6 u	0.8	0.7 u	0.6 u	0.7	1.1 b	1.1	0.7	
	Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)			0.6 u	0.6 bu					0.5 u	2.0 b	1.7	1.7	
	Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)				3.5 b	3.2	3.0	3.4	4.1	3.9	4.4 b	3.6	3.3	
	Labour Market Indicators - Female	Total population (000)	237	240	244	249	253	257	263 b	269	275	281	287	294 b
		Population aged 15-64(000)	156	159	162	166	169	173	178	182	186	191	195	201 b
		Total employment (000)	84	89 b	87	93 b	96	98	104	105	110	116 b	118	126
		Employment aged 15-64 (000)	84	89 b	87	93 b	95	97	103	105	109	115 b	117	125
		Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	59.4	61.0 b	60.1	61.5 b	62.0	61.9	64.1	63.9	65.5	65.0 b	65.1	67.5
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)		54.6	56.1 b	55.1	57.0 b	57.2	56.9	59.0	59.1	60.5	60.8 b	60.4	62.5	
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)		21.2	18.4 b	20.6	24.2 b	20.3	18.5	20.1	19.4	18.8	28.8 b	25.4	24.5	
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)		69.5	71.7 b	69.5	71.4 b	72.6	72.9	75.0	75.5	76.8	75.7 b	76.4	79.8	
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)		27.8	28.6 b	29.3	29.4 b	31.3	31.3	34.3	32.4	35.0	33.7 b	32.4	33.9	
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)		50.1	50.8 b	50.2	52.0 b	52.7	52.9	55.1	55.0	56.8	56.4 b	56.1	58.3	
Self-employed (% total employment)		6.1	5.7 b	5.9	5.8 b	6.1	6.7	7.4	7.3	6.8	7.7 b	7.6	8.0	
Part-time employment (% total employment)		36.2	37.1 b	38.2	34.8 b	35.6	35.8	35.9	35.8	35.3	33.9 b	34.8	35.1	
Temporary employment (% total employment)		6.2	7.2 b	6.2	7.8 b	7.7	7.5	7.5	8.0	8.5	9.2 b	8.1	8.5	
Employment in Services (% total employment)														
Employment in Industry (% total employment)														
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)				1.2 b	0.8 bu	0.6 u	0.7 u	0.9 u	0.9 u	0.7 u	0.7 bu	0.5 u	0.6 u	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)		58.2	58.9 b	58.7	60.7 b	60.3	60.7	62.8	63.2	64.2	65.6 b	64.7	66.2	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)		25.0	22.3 b	27.1	29.5 b	22.7	23.4	24.7	21.8	23.0	34.1 b	31.0	28.3	
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)		73.8	74.7 b	72.9	75.3 b	76.4	77.1	79.2	80.5	80.9	81.3 b	81.1	84.0	
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)		28.5	29.1 b	30.3	30.6 b	32.0	32.1	35.2	34.2	36.5	35.0 b	33.9	35.1	
Total unemployment (000)		5 d	5	5	6	6	6	6	7	7	9	8	7	
Unemployment rate (% labour force)		5.9 d	5.1	5.9	5.9	5.5	6.0	5.8	6.2	6.4	7.1	6.5	5.5	
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)		14.9 d	18.2	22.0	18.2	14.3	17.9	17.3	14.2	18.7	15.2	16.8	12.8	
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)		1.6	1.0 bu	2.1	1.6 b	1.3	1.6	1.9	1.9	1.6	1.9 b	2.1	1.9	
Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)		26.0	22.3 bu	35.2	26.1 b	26.5	25.4	31.8	30.4	28.2	25.8 b	32.1	34.5	
Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)		3.8	3.9 b	6.5	5.2 b	2.3	4.9	4.6	2.4	4.2	5.3 b	5.6	3.7	
Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)		47.9	51.4 b	49.5	51.2 b	52.1	50.9	54.3	51.7	53.5 b	51.9 b	48.6	50.6	
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)		63.7	64.8 b	62.2	60.9 b	63.2	61.8	64.6	62.8	64.2 b	64.2 b	64.2	71.5	
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)		80.4	80.8 b	79.9	78.6 b	77.9	79.4	78.5	80.0	79.7 b	80.0 b	82.0	82.3	
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)		52.3	52.7 b	51.9	54.8 b	54.5	54.9	56.4	57.2	58.0	60.0 b	59.1	60.4	
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)		60.0	61.9 b	61.4	62.0 b	62.0	62.1	64.3	62.6	65.6	64.5 b	64.5	67.4	
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)		35.7	46.4 b	29.5	39.8 b	44.4	38.1	45.2	50.7	44.4	39.5 b	40.2	46.3	
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)		51.9	51.3 b	50.4	54.4 b	52.8	53.0	54.9	55.0	56.1	58.4 b	57.5	58.9	
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)		61.3	65.4 b	65.3	63.1 b	64.5	64.3	66.8	65.9	67.3	66.9 b	66.2	69.7	
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)		43.3	50.1 b	39.8	46.5 b	52.7	49.7	50.1	54.2	55.3	49.3 b	50.3	52.5	
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)				1.4	3.5 b	3.1	2.6	3.9	3.4	3.2	3.8 b	3.4	3.3	
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)		0.7 u		0.8 u	1.0 bu	1.0 u	1.0	1.0	0.9	1.0	3.6 b	3.3	2.3	
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)				0.7 u	7.1 b	6.6	7.3	7.3	8.3	8.2	5.9 b	5.3	4.8	

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Luxembourg		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017			
Social Indicators	All	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of total population)	16.5	15.9	15.5	17.8	17.1	16.8	18.4	19.0	19.0	18.5	19.8 b			
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of total population)	14.1	13.5	13.4	14.9	14.5	13.6	15.1	15.9	16.4	15.3	16.5 b			
		At-risk-of-poverty threshold (PPS single person)	15851	16108	16166	16265	15961	15961	15948	16818	16962	17571	16843 b			
		Poverty gap (%)	19.7	18.8	16.6	17.6	18.6	15.7	15.0	17.5	16.3	17.4	23.2 b			
		Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of total population)		8.9	8.4	8.8	6.0	6.5	7.1	9.2	8.7	12.0	9.7 b			
		At-risk-of-poverty before social transfers excl. pensions (% of total population)	23.6	23.4	23.6	27.0	29.1	27.2	29.0	29.4	27.6	27.2	27.1 b			
		Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (%)	40.3	42.3	43.2	44.8	50.2	50.0	47.9	45.9	40.6	43.8	39.1 b			
		Severe Material Deprivation (% of total population)	1.1	0.8	0.7	1.1	0.5	1.2	1.3	1.8	1.4	2.0	1.6 b			
		Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of people aged 0-59)	5.2	5.0	4.7	6.3	5.5	5.8	6.1	6.6	6.1	5.7	6.6 b			
		Real Gross Household Disposable income (growth %)	1.4	4.2	2.1	3.7	2.6	-0.7	3.8	1.7	3.1	2.8	2.9			
		Income quintile share ratio S80/S20	4.2	4.0	4.1	4.3	4.1	4.0	4.1	4.6	4.4	4.3	5.0 b			
		GINI coefficient	27.8	27.4	27.7	29.2	27.9	27.2	28.0	30.4	28.7	28.5	31.0 b			
		Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18-24)	14.0 b	12.5 b	13.4	7.7 b	7.1	6.2	8.1	6.1	6.1 b	9.3 b	5.5	7.3		
		NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of total population aged 15-24)	6.7 b	5.7 b	6.2	5.8 b	5.1	4.7	5.9	5.0	6.3	6.2 b	5.4	5.9		
		Social Indicators	Male	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of male population)	15.8	15.0	14.2	16.0	16.5	15.6	17.3	18.6	18.5	17.7	18.7 b	
				At-risk-of-poverty (% of male population)	13.8	12.9	12.5	13.8	14.6	12.7	14.7	15.7	16.3	15.0	15.6 b	
Poverty gap (%)	19.7			19.1	15.4	16.9	18.6	15.7	14.9	18.0	17.5	18.7	22.4 b			
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of male population)				7.9	7.7	7.7	5.2	5.6	6.4	8.5	7.2	11.3	9.9 b			
Severe Material Deprivation (% of male population)	0.9			0.8	0.6	0.9	0.4	1.3	1.3	1.5	1.4	1.8	1.7 b			
Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of males aged 0-59)	4.5			4.3	3.8	4.9	4.8	5.1	5.1	6.5	5.6	5.5	6.4 b			
Life expectancy at birth (years)	76.8			76.7	78.1	78.1	77.9	78.5	79.1	79.8	79.4	80.0	80.1 b			
Healthy life years at birth (years) - men	61.2			62.3	64.8	65.1	64.4	65.8	65.8	63.8	64.0	63.7	61.4 b			
Early leavers from education and training (% of males aged 18-24)	17.6 b			16.6 b	15.8	8.9 b	8.0	7.6	10.7	8.4	8.3 b	10.5 b	6.8	9.8		
NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of males aged 15-24)	6.1 b			4.7 b	4.6	6.0 b	5.6	4.6	6.3	5.9	7.8	6.6 b	5.1	6.2		
Social Indicators	Female			At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of female population)	17.1	16.9	16.7	19.6	17.7	18.0	19.4	19.4	19.5	19.3	20.9 b	
				At-risk-of-poverty (% of female population)	14.3	14.1	14.3	16.0	14.4	14.5	15.6	16.0	16.6	15.7	17.5 b	
				Poverty gap (%)	20.3	18.7	17.6	19.2	18.8	15.9	15.5	17.4	15.8	16.8	23.5 b	
				Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of female population)		9.8	9.2	9.9	6.9	7.5	7.8	9.8	10.3	12.6	9.6 b	
				Severe Material Deprivation (% of female population)	1.3	0.8	0.7	1.3	0.7	1.1	1.3	2.0	1.4	2.1	1.5 b	
				Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of females aged 0-59)	5.9	5.8	5.5	7.8	6.3	6.6	7.2	6.6	6.6	5.8	6.9 b	
		Life expectancy at birth (years)	81.9	82.2	83.1	83.3	83.5	83.6	83.8	83.9	85.2	84.7	85.4 b			
		Healthy life years at birth (years) - women	62.1	64.6	64.2	65.9	66.4	67.1	66.4	62.9	63.5	60.6	58.9 b			
		Early leavers from education and training (% of females aged 18-24)	10.4 b	8.4 b	10.9	6.6 b	6.0	4.8 u	5.5	3.7 u	3.7 bu	8.1 b	4.2 u	4.6 u		
		NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of females aged 15-24)	7.3 b	6.6 b	7.8	5.5 b	4.7	4.9	5.5	4.0	4.6	5.7 b	5.7	5.7		
		Social Indicators	Children (0-17)	At-Risk-of-poverty or exclusion of children (% of people aged 0-17)	20.4	21.2	20.9	23.7	22.3	21.7	24.6	26.0	26.4	23.0	22.7 b	
				At-risk-of-poverty (% of Children population)	19.6	19.9	19.8	22.3	21.4	20.3	22.6	23.9	25.4	21.5	21.8 b	
				Severe Material Deprivation (% of Children population)	1.6	0.7	0.9	1.2	0.2	1.2	1.7	2.4	1.8	3.0	1.2 b	
				Share of children living in low work intensity households (% of Children population)	3.1	3.5	3.2	4.1	3.2	2.9	4.0	4.5	4.2	2.6	3.4 b	
				Risk of poverty of children in households at work (Working Intensity > 0.2)	17.9	18.1	18.2	20.3	19.7	19.0	20.8	21.6	22.6	20.0	19.4 b	
				Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (0-17) (%)	40.2	40.1	41.3	43.7	50.4	50.0	50.7	46.3	40.4	43.1	43.1 b	
Social Indicators	Working age (18-64)	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of Working age population)	16.8	16.0	15.8	18.2	17.5	17.6	18.8	19.0	19.4	19.2	21.0 b			
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of Working age population)	13.5	12.7	12.9	14.2	13.9	13.1	14.5	15.0	15.8	14.9	16.3 b			
		Severe Material Deprivation (% of Working age population)	1.1	0.9	0.7	1.3	0.7	1.4	1.4	1.7	1.5	2.0	2.0 b			
		Very low work intensity (18-59)	5.9	5.6	5.2	7.1	6.4	6.9	6.8	7.4	6.8	6.7	7.7 b			
		In-work at-risk-of poverty rate (% of persons employed 18-64)	10.3	9.3	9.4	10.1	10.6	9.8	10.3	11.2	11.1	11.6	12.0 b			
		Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (18-64) (%)	42.3	44.8	44.9	46.2	50.5	50.8	47.3	46.8	41.3	45.2	39.4 b			
Social Indicators	Elderly (65+)	At-Risk-of-poverty or exclusion of elderly (% of people aged 65+)	8.3	7.2	5.4	6.2	6.1	4.7	6.1	7.0	6.4	8.2	9.1 b			
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of Elderly population)	7.9	7.2	5.4	6.0	5.9	4.7	6.1	6.2	6.3	7.9	9.0 b			
		Severe Material Deprivation (% of Elderly population)	0.4	0.6	0.0	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.9	0.1	0.3	0.2 b			
		Relative median income of elderly (ratio with median income of people younger than 65)	0.96	0.96	0.97	1.01	1.05	1.05	1.10	1.13	1.11	1.08	1.22 b			
		Aggregate replacement ratio (ratio)	0.66	0.61	0.58	0.62	0.68	0.74	0.79	0.78	0.85	0.80	0.88 b			
Expenditure in social protection indicators (% of GDP)		Sickness/Health care	5.1	5.0	5.2	5.8	5.6	5.4	5.7	5.8	5.6	5.4				
		Disability	2.6	2.4	2.4	2.6	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.4				
		Old age and survivors	7.4	7.1	7.4	8.3	8.0	8.0	8.5	8.5	8.3	8.4				
		Family/Children	3.4	3.2	4.1	4.1	3.9	3.5	3.6	3.6	3.4	3.4				
		Unemployment	1.0	0.9	0.9	1.3	1.2	1.1	1.3	1.5	1.4	1.4				
		Housing and Social exclusion n.e.c.	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8				
		Total (including Admin and Other expenditures)	20.5	19.5	20.9	23.4	22.5	21.8	22.7	23.1	22.4	22.1				
		of which: Means tested benefits	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8				

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Hungary		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	
Macro Economic Indicators (Annual % growth)	Real GDP	3.9	0.4	0.9	-6.6	0.7	1.7	-1.6	2.1	4.2	3.4	2.2	4.0	
	Total employment	0.4	0.1	-2.0	-2.5	-1.1	0.0	0.2	1.1	4.8	2.4	2.6	2.0	
	Labour productivity	3.4	0.3	2.9	-4.2	1.8	1.7	-1.8	1.0	-0.6	0.9	-0.4	2.0	
	Annual average hours worked per person employed	-0.2	-0.2	0.2	-0.9	-9.5 b	-0.4 b	-1.1	-0.3	0.4	-0.2	0.6	-1.1	
	Real productivity per hour worked	3.6	0.5	2.7	-3.3	12.4 b	2.1	-0.7	1.3	-1.0	1.1	-1.0	3.1	
	Harmonized CPI	4.0	7.9	6.0	4.0	4.7	3.9	5.7	1.7	0.0	0.1	0.4	2.4	
	Price deflator GDP	3.5	5.4	5.0	4.0	2.3	2.3	3.4	2.9	3.4	1.9	1.0	3.7	
	Nominal compensation per employee	5.3	5.2	7.3	-1.4	1.5	3.4	1.7	1.8	0.8	-1.5	4.0	7.9	
	Real compensation per employee (GDP deflator)	1.7	-0.2	2.2	-5.3	-0.8	1.1	-1.6	-1.1	-2.5	-3.3	3.0	4.1	
	Real compensation per employee (private consumption deflator)	1.2	-2.5	1.2	-5.3	-3.1	-0.5	-3.7	0.1	0.8	-1.6	3.5	5.4	
	Nominal unit labour costs	1.8	4.9	4.3	2.9	-0.3	1.7	3.6	0.8	1.4	-2.4	4.4	5.8	
	Real unit labour costs	-1.8	-0.5	-0.7	-1.1	-2.6	-0.6	0.2	-2.0	-1.9	-4.2	3.5	2.1	
	Labour Market Indicators - Total	Total population (000)	10077	10066	10045	10031	10014	9986	9932 b	9909	9877	9856	9830	9798
		Population aged 15-64 (000)	6932	6931	6913	6898	6874	6857	6816	6776	6720	6664	6609	6546
		Total employment (000)	3928	3902	3848	3748	3732	3759	3827	3893	4101	4211	4352	4421
Employment aged 15-64 (000)		3904	3873	3818	3717	3701	3724	3793	3860	4070	4176	4309	4373	
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)		62.6	62.3	61.5	60.1	59.9	60.4	61.6	63.0	66.7	68.9	71.5	73.3	
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)		57.4	57.0	56.4	55.0	54.9	55.4	56.7	58.1	61.8	63.9	66.5	68.2	
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)		21.6	21.1	20.2	18.1	18.3	18.0	18.4	20.1	23.5	25.7	28.1	29.0	
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)		74.5	74.7	74.5	72.9	72.5	73.0	74.6	75.7	79.2	80.6	82.2	83.7	
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)		33.2	32.2	30.9	31.9	33.6	35.3	36.1	37.9	41.7	45.3	49.8	51.7	
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)		62.0	61.6	60.8	59.2	58.9	59.2	60.5	62.2	65.3	67.4	70.3	72.5	
Self-employed (% total employment)		12.2	12.0	11.9	12.2	12.0	11.7	11.4	10.9	10.6	10.6	10.4	10.1	
Part-time employment (% total employment)		3.7	3.9	4.3	5.2	5.5	6.4	6.7	6.4	6.0	5.7	4.8	4.3	
Temporary employment (% total employment)		6.3	6.5	7.3	7.7	8.6	8.2	9.0	9.9	9.7	10.1	8.2	7.3	
Employment in Services (% total employment)				63.3 b	64.2	64.7	64.2	65.1	65.3	64.9	64.7	64.5	63.3	
Employment in Industry (% total employment)				32.4 b	31.3	30.8	31.0	29.9	30.0	30.5	30.4	30.6	31.7	
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)				4.3 b	4.6	4.5	4.9	5.0	4.7	4.6	4.9	5.0	5.0	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)		62.0	61.6	61.2	61.2	61.9	62.4	63.7	64.7	67.0	68.6	70.1	71.2	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)		26.7	25.7	25.1	24.7	24.8	24.3	25.7	27.4	29.5	31.0	32.3	32.4	
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)		79.9	80.1	80.3	80.3	80.9	81.3	82.9	83.3	85.0	85.8	86.1	86.9	
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)		34.5	33.7	32.6	34.1	36.5	38.8	39.5	41.2	44.6	48.1	52.1	53.6	
Total unemployment (000)		317	312	326 d	418	469	466	473	441	343	308	235	192	
Unemployment rate (% labour force)		7.5	7.4	7.8 d	10.0	11.2	11.0	11.0	10.2	7.7	6.8	5.1	4.2	
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)		19.1	18.1	19.5 d	26.4	26.4	26.0	28.2	26.6	20.4	17.3	12.9	10.7	
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)		3.4	3.5	3.6	4.2	5.5	5.2	5.0	4.9	3.7	3.1	2.4	1.7	
Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)		45.3	46.7	46.2	41.5	49.0	47.6	45.3	48.6	47.5	45.6	46.5	40.4	
Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)		5.1	4.6	4.9	6.5	6.6	6.3	7.2	7.3	6.0	5.4	4.2	3.5	
Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)		37.9	37.7	38.2	36.9	37.0	37.3	38.1	39.2	45.3 b	48.1	51.7	55.1	
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)		70.5	69.9	68.3	66.5	65.8	65.9	67.3	68.5	71.8 b	73.7	76.1	77.6	
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)		82.1	80.3	79.5	78.4	78.2	79.3	79.5	80.0	81.8 b	83.0	85.0	85.1	
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)		57.3	57.0	56.3	55.0	54.9	55.4	56.6	58.0	61.7	63.9	66.5	68.2	
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)		60.8	63.5	64.5	65.9	67.9	61.7	62.2	65.1	71.6	67.0	67.7	57.9	
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)		63.4	65.6	71.6	61.7	49.7	51.2	59.4	63.5	69.9	68.9	62.4	63.5	
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)		57.3	56.9	56.2	54.8	54.8	55.3	56.4	57.9	61.6	63.8	66.4	68.1	
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)		61.3	64.4	64.0	65.3	67.1	64.1	66.5	67.8	72.5	70.5	76.9	76.4	
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)		60.9	63.3	66.0	62.5	59.0	59.0	66.6	67.6	64.3	72.5	67.3	68.6	
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)				0.1	1.3	1.4	1.6	2.0	2.1	1.8	1.5	1.0	0.8	
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)		0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)		4.0	3.8	4.1	4.6	4.8	5.2	5.2	5.2	3.9	3.2	2.8	2.6	

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Hungary		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	
Labour Market Indicators - Male	Total population (000)	4785	4779	4770	4763	4757	4744	4725 b	4716	4703	4696	4689	4675	
	Population aged 15-64(000)	3407	3408	3403	3398	3391	3385	3367	3351	3327	3303	3282	3256	
	Total employment (000)	2139	2129	2094	2025	1993	2021	2049	2104	2221	2284	2363	2417	
	Employment aged 15-64 (000)	2123	2112	2076	2007	1975	2001	2029	2085	2203	2264	2337	2390	
	Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	70.1	69.8	68.7	66.5	65.5	66.4	67.3	69.3	73.5	75.8	78.6	81.0	
	Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)	63.9	63.7	62.7	60.7	59.9	60.7	61.6	63.7	67.8	70.3	73.0	75.2	
	Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)	24.6	24.4	23.3	20.0	19.9	19.7	19.8	23.0	26.4	28.1	31.5	32.9	
	Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)	81.3	81.6	81.3	79.1	78.0	79.5	80.2	81.4	85.3	86.8	88.2	90.1	
	Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)	41.2	40.1	37.7	38.7	38.6	39.3	41.4	44.8	49.6	54.4	59.7	62.6	
	FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	69.8	69.5	68.3	66.0	65.0	65.7	66.7	69.0	72.6	74.8	78.0	80.7	
	Self-employed (% total employment)	15.5	14.9	15.0	15.2	15.0	15.0	14.1	13.6	13.4	13.0	12.7	11.9	
	Part-time employment (% total employment)	2.4	2.5	3.0	3.6	3.7	4.4	4.3	4.2	4.1	4.0	3.1	2.7	
	Temporary employment (% total employment)	6.3	6.5	7.3	7.7	8.6	8.2	9.0	9.9	9.7	10.1	8.2	7.3	
	Employment in Services (% total employment)				52.2 b	52.4	53.2	53.8	54.2	53.6	53.2	53.1	51.8	
	Employment in Industry (% total employment)				41.9 b	41.3	40.4	40.4	39.2	39.3	40.1	40.0	40.1	41.4
	Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)				6.0 b	6.3	6.5	6.8	7.0	6.6	6.3	6.8	6.8	6.8
	Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)	68.9	68.6	68.0	67.7	67.8	68.4	69.6	71.0	73.4	75.3	76.9	78.2	
	Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)	30.2	29.5	28.7	27.7	27.5	27.0	27.9	31.0	33.0	34.4	36.1	36.5	
	Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)	86.9	87.2	87.3	87.1	87.3	88.2	89.4	89.5	91.2	92.0	92.4	93.3	
	Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)	43.0	42.1	39.8	41.5	42.2	43.7	45.4	49.0	53.2	57.8	62.4	64.5	
	Total unemployment (000)	165	164	174 d	232	262	252	262	239	182	162	128	96	
	Unemployment rate (% labour force)	7.2	7.1	7.7 d	10.3	11.6	11.1	11.3	10.2	7.6	6.6	5.1	3.8	
	Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)	18.6	17.6	18.9 d	27.9	27.8	27.0	29.1	25.6	20.0	18.3	12.9	9.7	
	Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)	3.3	3.3	3.6	4.3	5.7	5.2	5.2	5.0	3.6	3.1	2.3	1.5	
	Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)	46.2	46.3	47.3	41.4	49.4	47.3	45.5	48.6	48.0	47.1	45.8	40.6	
	Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)	5.6	5.1	5.4	7.7	7.6	7.3	8.1	7.9	6.6	6.3	4.7	3.5	
	Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)	45.9	46.0	46.9	45.1	44.0	45.8	46.8	47.2	54.7 b	58.5	62.2	66.0	
	Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)	77.5	76.6	74.9	72.6	71.1	71.5	72.3	74.2	78.2 b	80.5	82.9	84.8	
	Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)	86.7	86.2	84.6	83.3	82.8	84.7	85.7	86.8	88.4 b	89.8	91.2	92.4	
	Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)	63.9	63.6	62.6	60.6	59.8	60.7	61.5	63.6	67.7	70.2	73.0	75.3	
	Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)	73.2	78.8	78.8	76.4	72.6	75.1	80.4	83.0	84.0	76.1	74.6	66.1	
	Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)	81.3	75.0	80.8	72.0 u	56.9 u	60.6	69.0	77.9	92.5 u	77.5 u	69.7	60.9	
	Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)	63.8	63.5	62.5	60.5	59.7	60.5	61.4	63.4	67.6	70.0	72.8	75.1	
	Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)	72.3	75.3	71.7	73.2	70.8	72.5	72.5	78.1	83.8	82.8	85.9	84.1	
	Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)	72.7	72.1	76.1	74.1	64.3	69.0	75.7	79.1	79.4	81.3	76.2	70.7	
	Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)			0.1 u	1.0	1.1	1.3	1.4	1.6	1.5	1.2	0.8	0.6	
	Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)	0.2 u	0.2 u	0.2 u	0.3	0.2 u	0.2	0.2 u	0.2	0.2 u	0.2 u	0.1 u	0.1 u	
	Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)	3.9	3.7	3.8	4.4	4.5	5.0	4.9	4.9	3.6	3.0	2.6	2.3	
	Labour Market Indicators - Female	Total population (000)	5292	5287	5276	5268	5257	5242	5207 b	5193	5174	5160	5142	5122
		Population aged 15-64(000)	3525	3523	3510	3500	3483	3473	3449	3425	3393	3361	3328	3290
		Total employment (000)	1790	1773	1755	1723	1740	1738	1778	1789	1880	1927	1989	2004
		Employment aged 15-64 (000)	1781	1761	1742	1711	1726	1723	1764	1776	1867	1912	1972	1984
		Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	55.6	55.2	54.8	54.0	54.6	54.7	56.2	56.9	60.2	62.1	64.6	65.7
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)		51.1	50.7	50.3	49.6	50.2	50.3	51.9	52.6	55.9	57.8	60.2	61.3	
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)		18.6	17.7	17.1	16.2	16.6	16.2	17.0	20.5	23.1	24.6	24.8	24.8	
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)		67.8	67.9	67.9	66.9	67.0	66.6	69.0	70.0	73.2	74.4	76.2	77.2	
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)		26.6	25.8	25.3	26.3	29.4	31.9	31.7	32.1	35.2	37.7	41.5	42.4	
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)		54.6	54.2	53.7	52.7	53.2	53.0	54.6	55.6	58.3	60.3	62.9	64.5	
Self-employed (% total employment)		8.3	8.5	8.1	8.7	8.5	7.9	8.2	7.8	7.4	7.7	7.8	7.8	
Part-time employment (% total employment)		5.3	5.5	5.9	7.1	7.7	8.7	9.4	9.0	8.3	7.7	6.8	6.3	
Temporary employment (% total employment)		5.6	6.2	6.4	7.1	8.4	7.7	7.8	9.6	9.5	10.2	9.3	8.7	
Employment in Services (% total employment)														
Employment in Industry (% total employment)														
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)					2.3 b	2.6	2.3	2.6	2.8	2.6	2.6	2.8	2.8	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)		55.5	54.9	54.7	55.0	56.3	56.6	58.0	58.6	60.7	62.2	63.5	64.2	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)		23.2	21.8	21.4	21.5	22.0	21.5	23.4	23.6	25.9	27.5	28.3	28.2	
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)		73.1	73.2	73.4	73.6	74.6	74.4	76.5	77.1	78.8	79.6	79.8	80.4	
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)		27.7	26.9	26.6	28.1	31.7	34.8	34.5	34.7	37.4	39.9	43.5	44.3	
Total unemployment (000)		152	148	153 d	186	208	214	211	202	162	146	107	96	
Unemployment rate (% labour force)		7.8	7.7	8.0 d	9.7	10.7	11.0	10.6	10.1	7.9	7.0	5.1	4.6	
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)		19.8	18.6	20.4 d	24.5	24.7	24.7	27.1	27.9	20.9	16.0	12.9	12.1	
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)		3.5	3.6	3.6	4.1	5.2	5.3	4.8	4.9	3.7	3.1	2.4	1.8	
Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)		44.3	47.2	45.0	41.6	48.5	47.9	45.0	48.5	46.8	44.0	47.3	40.1	
Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)		4.6	4.1	4.4	5.3	5.4	5.3	6.3	6.6	5.4	4.4	3.6	3.4	
Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)		32.6	32.1	32.3	31.4	32.2	31.5	31.8	33.4	38.1 b	39.9	43.6	46.9	
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)		62.8	62.6	61.1	59.5	59.8	59.6	61.6	62.0	64.6 b	66.1	68.2	69.3	
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)		78.5	75.6	75.6	74.8	74.8	75.3	75.0	75.1	77.0 b	78.0	80.5	79.6	
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)		51.1	50.7	50.3	49.6	50.2	50.4	51.9	52.6	55.9	57.8	60.2	61.3	
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)		48.2	49.9	49.4	55.2	64.3	51.3	48.3	48.2	57.3	55.4	59.1	46.9 u	
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)			57.2 u	64.0	54.0 u	40.9 u	40.8 u	47.5 u		50.9 u	58.6 u	50.7 u	67.6 u	
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)		51.1	50.6	50.2	49.4	50.0	50.2	51.7	52.5	55.8	57.7	60.1	61.1	
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)		52.1	55.3	57.5	59.0	64.3	57.8	61.4	58.8	62.1	59.5	68.8	69.2	
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)		50.1	55.8	59.3	55.4	53.8	48.6	57.5	57.0	52.4	65.1	58.5	66.3	
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)				0.2 u	1.6	1.8	2.0	2.7	2.7	2.2	1.8	1.3	1.0	
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)		0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.2 u	0.2 u	
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)		4.1	3.9	4.4	4.9	5.1	5.5	5.5	5.6	4.3	3.4	3.0	3.0	

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Hungary		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	
All	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of total population)	31.4	29.4	28.2	29.6	29.9	31.5	33.5	34.8	31.8	28.2	26.3	25.6	
	At-risk-of-poverty (% of total population)	15.9	12.3	12.4	12.4	12.3	14.1	14.3	15.0	15.0	14.9	14.5	13.4	
	At-risk-of-poverty threshold (PPS single person)	3646	3894	3958	4097	4025	4281	4563	4366	4535	4751	5032	5025	
	Poverty gap (%)	24.1	19.8	17.3	16.3	16.5	18.2	20.9	21.0	22.3	21.8	18.8	16.7	
	Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of total population)			7.7	8.6	5.7	8.3	7.6	7.3	8.6	7.2	7.9	5.8	
	At-risk-of-poverty before social transfers excl. pensions (% of total population)	29.6	29.3	30.4	28.9	28.4	29.0	27.3	27.0	26.6	25.7	25.8	25.0	
	Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (%)	46.3	58.0	59.2	57.1	56.7	51.4	47.6	44.4	43.6	42.0	43.8	46.4	
	Severe Material Deprivation (% of total population)	20.9	19.9	17.9	20.3	21.6	23.4	26.3	27.8	24.0	19.4	16.2	14.5	
	Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of people aged 0-59)	13.1	11.3	12.0	11.3	11.9	12.8	13.5	13.6	12.8	9.4	8.2	6.6	
	Real Gross Household Disposable income (growth %)	1.8	-2.9	-2.3	-4.2	-2.5	3.8	-3.2	1.8	3.8	2.0			
	Income quintile share ratio S80/S20	5.5	3.7	3.6	3.5	3.4	3.9	4.0	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3	
	GINI coefficient	33.3	25.6	25.2	24.7	24.1	26.9	27.2	28.3	28.6	28.2	28.2	28.1	
	Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18-24)	12.5 b	11.4	11.7	11.5	10.8	11.4	11.8	11.9	11.4 b	11.6 b	12.4	12.5	
	NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of total population aged 15-24)	12.4 b	11.5	11.5	13.6	12.6	13.2	14.8	15.5	13.6	11.6 b	11.0	11.0	
Male	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of male population)	31.1	28.6	27.3	29.1	29.4	31.1	32.9	34.4	31.4	28.0	26.0	25.0	
	At-risk-of-poverty (% of male population)	16.3	12.3	12.4	12.8	12.6	14.5	14.8	15.5	15.5	15.6	14.4	13.1	
	Poverty gap (%)	25.3	20.5	17.9	16.3	16.9	18.9	21.6	23.1	22.8	21.7	18.8	17.9	
	Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of male population)			7.8	9.2	6.2	8.4	7.7	7.9	9.1	7.7	8.9	6.7	
	Severe Material Deprivation (% of male population)	20.8	19.6	17.3	20.2	21.5	23.0	25.8	27.7	23.7	19.1	16.1	14.3	
	Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of males aged 0-59)	12.5	10.8	11.1	10.6	11.3	12.5	13.2	13.7	12.3	8.7	8.1	6.3	
	Life expectancy at birth (years)	69.2	69.4	70.0	70.3	70.7	71.2	71.6	72.2	72.3	72.3	72.6		
	Healthy life years at birth (years) - men	54.4 d	55.1	54.8	55.9	56.3	57.6	59.2	59.1	58.9	58.2	59.5		
	Early leavers from education and training (% of males aged 18-24)	13.7 b	12.5	12.4	12.2	11.5	12.3	12.3	12.5	12.5 b	12.0 b	12.9	12.0	
	NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of males aged 15-24)	11.0 b	9.9	10.1	12.7	11.7	12.1	13.6	13.6	12.0	10.4 b	8.9	7.9	
	Female	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of female population)	31.8	30.1	29.0	30.0	30.3	32.0	34.0	35.2	32.3	28.4	26.5	26.1
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of female population)	15.5	12.3	12.4	12.1	12.0	13.7	14.0	14.5	14.5	14.4	14.5	13.7
		Poverty gap (%)	23.3	18.9	17.0	16.3	15.6	17.9	19.8	20.2	21.6	22.0	18.8	16.0
		Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of female population)			7.5	8.1	5.4	8.3	7.5	6.8	8.2	6.9	7.1	5.0
Severe Material Deprivation (% of female population)		21.0	20.1	18.4	20.4	21.6	23.7	26.8	27.8	24.4	19.6	16.3	14.7	
Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of females aged 0-59)		13.7	11.8	12.9	12.0	12.5	13.2	13.7	13.6	13.3	10.2	8.3	6.8	
Life expectancy at birth (years)		77.8	77.8	78.3	78.4	78.6	78.7	78.7	79.1	79.4	79.0	79.7		
Healthy life years at birth (years) - women		57.2 d	57.8	58.2	58.2	58.6	59.1	60.5	60.1	60.8	60.1	60.2		
Early leavers from education and training (% of females aged 18-24)		11.3 b	10.2	11.0	10.8	10.1	10.6	11.2	11.4	10.3 b	11.2 b	11.8	13.0	
NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of females aged 15-24)		13.9 b	13.0	12.9	14.5	13.4	14.3	16.0	17.4	15.3	12.8 b	13.3	14.3	
Children (0-17)		At-Risk-of-poverty or exclusion of children (% of people aged 0-17)	37.7	34.1	33.4	37.2	38.7	40.4	41.9	43.9	41.8	36.1	33.6	31.6
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of Children population)	24.8	18.8	19.7	20.6	20.3	23.7	22.9	23.8	25.0	22.7	19.9	14.8
		Severe Material Deprivation (% of Children population)	24.8	24.4	21.5	25.5	28.8	30.4	34.1	35.6	31.9	24.9	21.1	19.2
		Share of children living in low work intensity households (% of Children population)	14.0	10.0	11.1	11.9	13.9	14.8	16.4	15.1	15.2	11.2	9.2	7.5
	Risk of poverty of children in households at work (Working Intensity > 0.2)	15.7	12.6	13.3	14.1	12.4	15.0	12.5	14.0	15.2	16.0	15.6	12.7	
	Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (0-17) (%)	43.6	57.8	57.7	55.5	57.2	51.3	47.7	45.7	45.2	48.1	54.4	64.1	
Working age (18-64)	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of Working age population)	31.1	29.8	29.1	30.2	30.5	32.2	34.0	36.0	32.4	28.9	27.2	26.3	
	At-risk-of-poverty (% of Working age population)	14.5	11.6	12.0	11.9	11.9	13.8	14.0	15.2	14.9	15.5	15.0	14.2	
	Severe Material Deprivation (% of Working age population)	20.2	19.0	17.6	20.1	21.3	23.3	26.1	28.1	23.8	19.2	16.5	14.7	
	Very low work intensity (18-59)	12.8	11.8	12.3	11.1	11.3	12.3	12.6	13.2	12.1	8.9	7.9	6.3	
	In-work at-risk-of poverty rate (% of persons employed 18-64)	6.9	5.8	5.8	6.2	5.4	6.2	5.7	7.0	6.7	9.3	9.7	10.2	
	Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (18-64) (%)	49.1	59.3	60.3	58.0	57.0	51.9	48.5	44.1	43.6	39.7	41.0	42.0	
Elderly (65+)	At-Risk-of-poverty or exclusion of elderly (% of people aged 65+)	23.9	21.1	17.5	17.5	16.8	19.0	22.0	20.2	19.0	17.1	15.1	16.8	
	At-risk-of-poverty (% of Elderly population)	9.4	6.1	4.3	4.6	4.1	4.9	6.3	4.6	4.5	4.6	6.8	9.1	
	Severe Material Deprivation (% of Elderly population)	18.6	17.2	14.4	14.6	14.1	16.2	18.6	17.8	16.5	14.2	10.2	9.4	
	Relative median income of elderly (ratio with median income of people younger than 65)	0.94	0.97	1.0	1.02	1.01	0.99	0.96	1.03	1.05	1.01	1.01	0.98	
	Aggregate replacement ratio (ratio)	0.54	0.58	0.61	0.62	0.60	0.60	0.58	0.62	0.62	0.65	0.67	0.64	
Expenditure in social protection indicators (% of GDP)	Sickness/Health care	6.3	5.6	5.5	5.6	5.6	5.4	5.0	4.9	4.8	5.6			
	Disability	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.0	1.8	1.7	1.6	1.5	1.4	1.4			
	Old age and survivors	9.1	9.5	9.9	10.1	10.2	10.3	10.9	10.8	10.2	9.7			
	Family/Children	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.9	2.9	2.7	2.6	2.5	2.3	2.4			
	Unemployment	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.9	0.9	0.8	0.6	0.5	0.4	0.3			
	Housing and Social exclusion n.e.c.	0.7	1.0	0.8	0.8	0.6	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4			
	Total (including Admin and Other expenditures)	21.9	22.1	22.3	22.7	22.5	21.6	21.3	20.8	19.8	20.0			
	of which: Means tested benefits	0.9	1.4	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.0	0.9	0.9	0.7	0.8			

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Malta

Malta		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	
Macro Economic Indicators (Annual % growth)	Real GDP	1.8	4.0	3.3	-2.5	3.5	1.3	2.7	4.6	8.1	9.6	5.2	6.4	
	Total employment	1.5	2.2	2.5	0.0	1.7	2.9	2.5	3.7	5.1	3.9	4.2	5.0	
	Labour productivity	0.3	1.7	0.8	-2.5	1.8	-1.6	0.2	0.8	2.8	5.5	1.0	1.4	
	Annual average hours worked per person employed	0.2	-0.4	0.5	0.3	-2.7	-3.0	-1.2	-1.0	-1.7	-0.9	3.6	-2.4	
	Real productivity per hour worked	0.1	2.2	0.3	-2.7	4.6	1.5	1.4	1.8	4.6	6.4	-2.5	3.8	
	Harmonized CPI	2.6	0.7	4.7	1.8	2.0	2.5	3.2	1.0	0.8	1.2	0.9	1.3	
	Price deflator GDP	2.7	2.8	3.0	2.7	3.8	2.3	2.0	1.9	2.5	2.7	1.6	2.5	
	Nominal compensation per employee	4.4	3.7	4.1	3.0	2.0	3.3	3.6	2.1	1.6	5.0	2.8	1.8	
	Real compensation per employee (GDP deflator)	1.7	0.9	1.0	0.3	-1.8	1.0	1.5	0.2	-0.9	2.2	1.2	-0.7	
	Real compensation per employee (private consumption deflator)	1.8	3.0	-0.6	1.1	-0.1	0.8	0.3	1.1	0.8	3.8	1.9	0.6	
	Nominal unit labour costs	4.1	2.0	3.2	5.6	0.2	5.0	3.4	1.2	-1.2	-0.4	1.8	0.4	
	Real unit labour costs	1.3	-0.9	0.3	2.8	-3.5	2.7	1.3	-0.7	-3.6	-3.1	0.1	-2.0	
	Labour Market Indicators - Total	Total population (000)	405	406	408	411	414	415	418	423	429	440	450	460
		Population aged 15-64 (000)	280	282	286	288	289	288	287	289	291	297	303	309
Total employment (000)		151	155	159	160	163	167	170	176	182	186	192	199	
Employment aged 15-64 (000)		150	155	158	158	161	164	168	173	178	182	189	195	
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)		57.9	58.6	59.2	59.0	60.1	61.6	63.1	64.8	66.4	67.8	69.6	71.4	
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)		53.9	55.0	55.5	55.3	56.2	57.9	59.1	60.8	62.4	63.9	65.8	67.6	
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)		44.8	46.8	46.6	44.1	44.2	45.0	43.8	46.0	46.2	45.5	46.2	47.2	
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)		64.4	66.2	67.2	68.1	68.6	70.6	72.6	74.0	75.9	77.4	78.8	80.6	
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)		30.7	29.5	30.1	29.1	31.9	33.2	34.7	36.3	37.8	40.3	44.1	45.3	
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)		56.4	56.9	57.4	57.1	58.1	59.3	60.5	61.8	62.8	64.5	66.3	68.4	
Self-employed (% total employment)		13.8	14.2	13.7	13.8	14.4	13.5	13.5	13.9	13.8	13.9	13.6	13.7	
Part-time employment (% total employment)		9.7	10.6	11.1	11.0	11.6	12.6	13.2	14.2	15.5	14.5	14.0	13.2	
Temporary employment (% total employment)		2.2	3.1	2.8	3.1	3.4	4.6	5.1	5.6	5.5	5.3	5.1	4.0	
Employment in Services (% total employment)					73.4 u	73.0			76.6 u		77.7 u			
Employment in Industry (% total employment)					25.2 u	25.7			22.4 u		21.1 u			
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)				1.8 b	1.4	1.3	1.1	1.0	1.2	1.2	1.5	1.3	1.1	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)		57.9	58.8	59.1	59.4	60.4	61.8	63.1	65.0	66.3	67.6	69.1	70.4	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)		53.0	54.1	52.7	51.6	50.9	51.9	50.9	52.8	52.4	51.6	51.9	52.7	
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)		67.9	69.8	70.7	71.9	72.9	74.7	76.5	78.1	79.6	81.0	82.0	83.3	
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)		31.5	30.6	31.4	30.9	33.3	34.2	36.0	38.5	40.3	42.4	45.5	46.5	
Total unemployment (000)		11	11	10	12	12	11	11	12	11	11	9	8	
Unemployment rate (% labour force)		6.8	6.5	6.0	6.9	6.9	6.4	6.3	6.4	5.8	5.4	4.7	4.0	
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)		15.5	13.5	11.7	14.5	13.2	13.3	14.1	13.0	11.7	11.8	11.0	10.4	
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)		2.7	2.7	2.6	2.9	3.1	3.0	3.1	2.9	2.7	2.4	1.9	1.7	
Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)		39.6	41.3	42.7	42.0	44.9	47.3	48.5	45.7	46.9	43.6	40.9	42.7	
Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)		8.2	7.3	6.1	7.5	6.7	6.9	7.2	6.9	6.1	6.1	5.7	5.5	
Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)		46.7	47.3	47.9	47.2	47.6	49.1 b	49.5	50.9	52.6 b	54.2	56.6	57.2	
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)		82.8	81.4	79.8	79.8	79.5	77.6 b	80.9	80.4	81.8 b	82.3	82.3	84.8	
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)		83.0	86.8	87.0	85.6	86.5	88.2 b	88.1	88.1	88.3 b	90.4	91.5	92.8	
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)		54.0	55.1	55.6	55.3	56.2	57.9	59.0	60.9	62.5	63.9	65.8	67.7	
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)		53.3	49.2	51.6	48.8	55.6	53.0	59.1	52.0	58.0	65.2	70.0	69.7	
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)		47.2	52.1	54.6	57.3	59.6	61.2	62.5	62.3	62.8	62.6	63.6	57.6	
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)		53.9	54.8	55.3	55.0	56.0	57.7	58.9	60.8	62.3	63.6	65.5	67.4	
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)		55.1	54.5	54.9	53.7	57.0	54.1	57.9	57.2	65.4	70.1	72.8	69.8	
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)		53.5	59.1	63.7	62.3	63.3	65.1	64.8	63.4	64.2	64.7	68.6	68.7	
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)				1.8	1.9	2.5	2.4	2.2	2.7	2.4	2.2	1.7	1.3	
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)		0.8	0.8			0.2 u		0.3 u	0.2 u	0.2 u		0.2 u	0.2 u	
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)			1.5	1.3	1.1	1.1	2.2	2.5	1.9	1.3	1.2	0.7	0.7	

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Malta	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017		
Labour Market Indicators - Male	Total population (000)	201	202	203	205	206	206	208	210	215	220	226	232	
	Population aged 15-64(000)	142	143	145	147	147	146	146	147	149	153	156	159	
	Total employment (000)	105	105	106	106	107	108	108	110	112	114	117	121	
	Employment aged 15-64 (000)	104	105	105	104	105	106	106	107	109	111	115	118	
	Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	79.6	79.0	78.5	77.5	78.2	79.0	79.2	79.4	80.4	81.4	83.2	84.1	
	Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)	73.6	73.5	72.9	71.9	72.5	73.8	73.8	74.1	74.9	76.2	78.3	79.6	
	Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)	47.5	48.9	48.0	45.8	45.9	48.0	46.7	47.5	45.7	45.9	48.4	49.4	
	Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)	89.7	90.3	89.5	89.3	89.1	90.0	89.7	89.6	90.6	91.3	92.5	92.9	
	Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)	50.6	47.4	47.9	46.3	50.0	51.5	53.1	53.9	55.7	58.8	61.8	64.2	
	FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	80.0	79.7	78.9	77.6	78.3	78.8	78.8	78.8	79.5	80.8	82.5	83.7	
	Self-employed (% total employment)	17.4	17.7	17.5	17.5	18.7	17.6	17.6	18.5	18.1	18.3	18.3	17.6	
	Part-time employment (% total employment)	4.3	3.9	4.1	4.6	4.9	5.4	5.7	6.7	7.0	6.3	5.9	5.4	
	Temporary employment (% total employment)	2.2	3.1	2.8	3.1	3.4	4.6	5.1	5.6	5.5	5.3	5.1	4.0	
	Employment in Services (% total employment)					65.8				70.3 u				
	Employment in Industry (% total employment)					32.3				28.1 u				
	Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)			2.5 b	1.9	1.9	1.6	1.3	1.7	1.7	2.2	1.9	1.7	
	Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)	78.5	78.0	77.2	77.0	77.8	78.6	78.3	79.4	79.9	80.8	82.0	82.9	
	Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)	56.8	57.5	55.3	54.6	53.6	55.7	54.0	55.9	52.9	53.3	54.4	55.3	
	Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)	94.1	94.4	93.8	93.9	94.5	94.9	94.3	94.4	95.1	95.4	95.9	96.0	
	Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)	51.9	48.8	49.5	48.9	52.3	53.0	54.9	57.2	60.1	62.1	64.0	65.9	
	Total unemployment (000)	7	6	6	7	8	7	7	8	7	7	5	5	
	Unemployment rate (% labour force)	6.1	5.8	5.6	6.5	6.7	6.0	5.7	6.5	6.1	5.5	4.4	3.9	
	Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)	16.4	15.0	13.1	16.2	14.4	13.7	13.5	15.2	13.7	13.9	11.2	10.7	
	Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)	2.9	2.8	2.7	3.1	3.4	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.2	3.0	2.0	1.8	
	Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)	46.9	48.2	47.7	47.8	49.9	55.5	57.6	51.0	52.2	54.4	45.3	45.8	
	Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)	9.3	8.6	7.2	8.8	7.7	7.6	7.3	8.5	7.2	7.4	6.1	5.9	
	Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)	75.2	74.6	73.5	72.7	73.2	74.5 b	73.1	73.5	74.9 b	76.8	78.6	79.1	
	Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)	92.8	90.8	90.2	88.6	88.7	87.4 b	90.3	88.6	90.3 b	90.6	91.4	92.3	
	Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)	91.0	92.2	92.8	91.9	91.5	92.5 b	92.4	92.9	92.4 b	93.1	94.7	95.0	
	Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)	73.8	73.7	72.8	72.1	72.6	73.9	73.6	74.3	75.0	76.1	78.3	79.7	
	Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)	65.3	59.0 u	71.5	58.9	69.3	71.4	81.1	67.5	74.0	76.5	78.3	78.2	
	Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)	71.8	72.2	76.7	72.2	69.7	69.2	76.7	72.1	74.6	80.0	81.5	72.3	
	Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)	73.5	73.5	72.5	71.8	72.3	73.8	73.6	74.2	74.9	75.9	77.9	79.6	
	Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)	72.6	66.4	74.9	68.0	69.6	74.7	77.1	70.5	76.9	83.2	82.6	76.2	
	Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)	79.4	76.5	83.2	79.9	82.5	76.8	77.2	75.6	75.0	80.3	85.1	80.3	
	Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)			1.0	1.4	1.7	1.5	1.4	1.8	1.5	1.6	1.2	0.9	
	Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)	0.4 u	0.4 u											
	Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)		0.6 u	0.5 u	0.5 u	0.4 u	1.0	1.2	1.0	0.7 u	0.6 u	0.4 u	0.4 u	
	Labour Market Indicators - Female	Total population (000)	204	204	205	206	208	209	210	212	215	219	224	229
		Population aged 15-64(000)	138	139	141	142	142	141	141	142	142	145	147	150
		Total employment (000)	47	50	53	54	56	58	62	66	70	72	75	78
		Employment aged 15-64 (000)	46	50	53	54	56	58	62	66	69	71	74	78
		Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	35.7	37.7	39.4	40.0	41.6	43.8	46.6	49.8	52.0	53.6	55.5	58.0
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)		33.7	36.0	37.7	38.0	39.5	41.5	44.0	47.0	49.5	51.0	52.7	55.0	
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)		42.0	44.5	45.0	42.2	42.4	41.8	40.7	44.4	46.8	45.1	43.9	44.9	
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)		38.2	41.3	44.1	45.9	47.5	50.8	54.9	57.8	60.6	62.9	64.3	67.5	
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)		11.2	12.1	12.7	12.2	14.1	15.1	16.3	18.7	19.9	21.9	26.4	26.3	
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)		32.7	34.0	35.6	36.1	37.7	39.9	42.3	45.0	46.1	48.1	50.0	52.7	
Self-employed (% total employment)		5.8	7.0	6.2	6.7	6.1	6.0	6.1	6.2	6.9	6.9	6.0	7.8	
Part-time employment (% total employment)		21.5	24.6	25.1	23.4	24.4	25.8	26.2	26.5	28.8	27.3	26.5	25.0	
Temporary employment (% total employment)		5.5	7.2	5.4	6.4	6.6	7.6	7.5	7.9	8.6	8.1	8.7	6.2	
Employment in Services (% total employment)														
Employment in Industry (% total employment)														
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)														
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)		36.8	39.1	40.4	41.2	42.5	44.7	47.5	50.2	52.2	53.8	55.6	57.4	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)		49.1	50.5	50.0	48.3	48.1	48.0	47.7	49.5	51.8	49.8	49.2	50.0	
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)		40.8	44.3	46.7	48.9	50.6	54.0	58.1	61.1	63.4	65.8	67.3	69.7	
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)		11.6	12.8	13.6	13.2	14.6	15.6	17.3	19.7	20.7	22.6	27.0	27.0	
Total unemployment (000)		4	4	4	4	4	4	5	4	4	4	4	3	
Unemployment rate (% labour force)		8.3	7.9	6.8	7.6	7.1	7.1	7.3	6.3	5.3	5.2	5.2	4.1	
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)		14.4	11.8	10.0	12.5	11.8	12.9	14.7	10.4	9.6	9.4	10.9	10.2	
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)		2.3	2.5	2.3	2.5	2.6	2.5	2.7	2.3	2.0	1.3	1.8	1.6	
Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)		27.7	31.1	34.6	32.5	36.1	34.6	36.3	36.6	37.2	25.3	35.2	38.3	
Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)		7.1	6.0	5.0	6.1	5.7	6.2	7.0	5.1	5.0	4.7	5.4	5.1	
Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)		21.3	22.6	24.2	23.2	23.6	24.6 b	26.8	28.4	29.9 b	30.5	32.9	34.5	
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)		62.2	65.3	64.2	66.4	66.3	66.3 b	69.4	70.9	72.9 b	73.6	72.7	76.7	
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)		74.8	80.6	80.4	79.3	81.5	83.6 b	83.8	83.3	84.0 b	87.8	88.5	90.4	
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)		33.8	35.9	37.7	37.9	39.1	41.3	44.0	46.9	49.4	51.0	52.8	55.1	
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)		39.7 u	42.0 u	35.1 u	40.0	45.7	39.9	35.8	35.4 u	43.4	53.8	58.1	60.0	
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)		28.3 u	37.3	38.7	43.9	51.1	53.4	49.5	55.6	54.5	46.9	45.3	42.9	
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)		33.7	35.6	37.3	37.7	39.0	41.1	43.8	46.8	49.0	50.9	52.6	54.7	
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)		36.7 u	44.6	39.8	40.1	46.4	38.7	38.4	41.5	54.2	57.9	61.6	63.1	
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)		33.4	42.5	46.3	46.3	47.4	54.1	52.7	54.0	55.4	49.2	51.6	55.2	
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)				3.2	2.9	4.0	4.2	3.6	4.1	3.8	3.2	2.6	1.8	
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)		1.5 u	1.6 u							0.5 u				
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)			3.4	3.0	2.3	2.4	4.5	4.8	3.4	2.3	2.1	1.2	1.3	

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Malta		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017			
Social Indicators	All	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of total population)	19.5	19.7	20.1	20.3	21.2	22.1	23.1	24.0	23.8	22.4	20.1			
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of total population)	14.2	15.1	15.3	14.9	15.5	15.6	15.1	15.7	15.9	16.3	16.5			
		At-risk-of-poverty threshold (PPS single person)	7246	7465	7958	8146	8023	8417	8760	9034	9300	10009	10155			
		Poverty gap (%)	18.2	18.1	20.3	16.2	17.3	17.7	16.1	19.1	17.8	17.3	15.9			
		Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of total population)			7.7	7.7	9.1	11.4	9.7	8.5	10.6	12.7	11.3			
		At-risk-of-poverty before social transfers excl. pensions (% of total population)	21.3	21.5	22.9	22.9	23.5	23.2	24.0	23.3	23.8	23.7	23.8			
		Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (%)	33.3	29.8	33.2	34.9	34.0	32.8	37.1	32.6	33.2	31.2	30.7			
		Severe Material Deprivation (% of total population)	3.9	4.4	4.3	5.0	6.5	6.6	9.2	9.5	10.2	8.1	4.4	3.3 p		
		Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of people aged 0-59)	9.7	9.6	8.6	9.2	9.2	8.9	9.0	9.0	9.8	9.2	7.3			
		Real Gross Household Disposable income (growth %)														
		Income quintile share ratio S80/S20	4.0	3.9	4.3	4.0	4.3	4.0	3.9	4.1	4.0	4.2	4.2			
		GINI coefficient	27.1	26.3	28.1	27.4	28.6	27.2	27.1	27.9	27.7	28.1	28.5			
		Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18-24)	32.2 b	30.2	27.2	25.7	23.8	22.7 b	21.1	20.5	20.3 b	19.8	19.7	18.6 b		
		NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of total population aged 15-24)	10.3 b	11.5	8.3	9.9	9.5	10.2	10.6	9.9	10.5	10.4	8.5	8.0 b		
		Social Indicators	Male	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of male population)	17.9	18.6	18.7	19.1	20.1	20.9	21.9	23.1	22.9	21.9	20.0	
At-risk-of-poverty (% of male population)	13.5			14.7	13.9	14.3	14.8	15.0	14.4	15.4	15.7	16.1	16.5			
Poverty gap (%)	18.3			16.7	21.7	15.9	17.7	17.1	16.7	19.0	18.5	18.3	16.2			
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of male population)					7.7	6.3	8.4	10.2	10.0	7.2	10.6	13.6	10.9			
Severe Material Deprivation (% of male population)	3.6			4.0	4.1	4.8	6.3	6.4	8.6	9.4	9.9	8.2	4.7	3.3 p		
Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of males aged 0-59)	8.0			8.2	6.9	7.3	7.4	7.0	7.6	7.6	8.8	8.8	7.2			
Life expectancy at birth (years)	77.0			77.5	77.1	77.9	79.3	78.6	78.6	79.6	79.8	79.7	80.6			
Healthy life years at birth (years) - men	68.3			69.2	68.8	69.4	70.1	69.9	71.5	71.6	72.3	72.6	71.1			
Early leavers from education and training (% of males aged 18-24)	36.1 b			34.8	31.1	30.1	29.9	28.8 b	25.2	23.2	22.2 b	22.9	22.9	21.9 b		
NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of males aged 15-24)	9.8 b			11.9	6.8	9.4	8.2	9.7	10.0	9.8	9.0	9.6	6.8	7.8 b		
Social Indicators	Female			At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of female population)	21.1	20.9	21.5	21.6	22.4	23.2	24.3	24.9	24.7	23.0	20.1	
				At-risk-of-poverty (% of female population)	14.9	15.5	16.7	15.5	16.2	16.1	15.8	16.1	16.0	16.6	16.4	
				Poverty gap (%)	18.2	18.7	19.0	16.6	16.6	19.1	16.0	19.1	17.1	16.7	15.0	
				Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of female population)			7.8	9.0	9.7	12.6	9.5	9.8	10.7	11.8	11.7	
				Severe Material Deprivation (% of female population)	4.2	4.8	4.6	5.2	6.6	6.9	9.7	9.6	10.5	8.0	4.2	3.4 p
		Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of females aged 0-59)	11.5	11.1	10.4	11.3	11.0	10.9	10.5	10.4	10.7	9.7	7.4			
		Life expectancy at birth (years)	81.9	82.2	82.3	82.7	83.6	83.0	83.0	84.0	84.2	84.0	84.4			
		Healthy life years at birth (years) - women	69.5	71.1	72.1	71.0	71.3	70.7	72.2	72.7	74.3	74.6	72.4			
		Early leavers from education and training (% of females aged 18-24)	28.1 b	25.3	23.2	21.1	17.4	16.3 b	16.8	17.7	18.3 b	16.6	16.3	15.1 b		
		NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of females aged 15-24)	10.9 b	11.2	9.8	10.4	10.9	10.7	11.3	10.1	12.0	11.1	10.2	8.2 b		
		Social Indicators	Children (0-17)	At-Risk-of-poverty or exclusion of children (% of people aged 0-17)	22.2	23.9	25.0	26.5	26.7	27.8	31.0	32.0	31.3	28.2	24.0	
				At-risk-of-poverty (% of Children population)	17.6	19.8	20.4	21.2	22.1	23.0	23.1	24.0	24.1	23.4	21.0	
				Severe Material Deprivation (% of Children population)	4.9	6.4	6.3	7.2	7.7	7.7	12.3	11.8	13.9	10.4	6.4	5.1 p
				Share of children living in low work intensity households (% of Children population)	9.4	10.0	9.8	10.4	9.7	10.0	10.4	11.2	12.3	10.8	8.4	
				Risk of poverty of children in households at work (Working Intensity > 0.2)	12.3	13.6	14.1	15.9	16.0	16.9	17.0	17.8	16.8	15.8	15.2	
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (0-17) (%)	36.5			31.0	33.6	35.0	31.4	29.9	36.0	28.8	25.9	24.3	27.6			
Social Indicators	Working age (18-64)	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of Working age population)	17.4	17.8	17.5	18.1	19.6	20.7	21.1	22.5	21.8	20.5	17.3			
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of Working age population)	11.2	12.6	12.0	12.1	13.1	13.1	12.4	13.6	13.2	13.1	13.0			
		Severe Material Deprivation (% of Working age population)	3.5	4.0	4.0	4.6	6.4	6.8	8.9	9.5	9.8	8.4	4.1	3.2 p		
		Very low work intensity (18-59)	9.8	9.4	8.2	8.9	9.0	8.6	8.6	8.3	9.0	8.7	7.0			
		In-work at-risk-of poverty rate (% of persons employed 18-64)	4.1	4.6	5.1	5.4	5.8	6.1	5.2	5.9	5.7	5.3	5.7			
		Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (18-64) (%)	38.1	33.0	37.8	38.3	36.7	35.8	40.1	32.0	34.3	33.5	33.7			
Social Indicators	Elderly (65+)	At-Risk-of-poverty or exclusion of elderly (% of people aged 65+)	25.7	22.8	26.0	22.2	21.7	21.0	22.3	20.8	23.3	23.7	26.1			
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of Elderly population)	23.5	20.3	24.3	19.7	18.2	17.6	17.3	14.9	16.9	21.0	24.2			
		Severe Material Deprivation (% of Elderly population)	4.4	3.1	3.1	4.1	5.0	4.7	6.4	7.1	8.1	4.7	3.5	2.2 p		
		Relative median income of elderly (ratio with median income of people younger than 65)	0.80	0.78	0.73	0.77	0.81	0.79	0.80	0.79	0.78	0.75	0.72			
		Aggregate replacement ratio (ratio)	0.45	0.47	0.41	0.45	0.44	0.48	0.46	0.56	0.56	0.54	0.54			
Expenditure in social protection indicators (% of GDP)		Sickness/Health care	5.4	5.5	5.7	6.3	5.9	5.8	5.9	6.1	5.9	5.7				
		Disability	1.1	1.1	0.9	0.9	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.6				
		Old age and survivors	9.0	8.9	9.1	9.9	10.2	10.0	10.2	9.8	9.3	8.9				
		Family/Children	1.1	1.0	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.2				
		Unemployment	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.5				
		Housing and Social exclusion n.e.c.	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4				
		Total (including Admin and Other expenditures)	17.8	17.8	18.1	19.6	19.3	18.9	19.1	18.9	18.3	17.5				
		of which: Means tested benefits	3.0	3.0	2.4	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.4	2.4	2.3	2.3				

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Netherlands		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	
Macro Economic Indicators (Annual % growth)	Real GDP	3.5	3.7	1.7	-3.8	1.4	1.7	-1.1	-0.2	1.4	2.3	2.2 p	3.2 p	
	Total employment	2.2	3.0	1.6	-0.9	-0.7	0.9	-0.2	-1.2	-0.1	0.9 p	1.1 p	2.2 p	
	Labour productivity	1.3	0.7	0.1	-2.9	2.1	0.8	-0.9	1.0	1.5	1.3 p	1.1 p	0.9 p	
	Annual average hours worked per person employed	-0.2	-0.1	0.0	-0.6	0.0	0.1	-0.7	0.3	0.8	-0.4 p	0.9 p	-0.2 p	
	Real productivity per hour worked	1.6	0.8	0.0	-2.4	2.1	0.7	-0.2	0.7	0.7	1.7 p	0.2 p	1.1 p	
	Harmonized CPI	1.6	1.6	2.2	1.0	0.9	2.5	2.8	2.6	0.3	0.2	0.1	1.3	
	Price deflator GDP	2.6	2.1	2.5	0.4	0.8	0.1	1.4	1.4	0.1	0.8	0.6 p	1.1 p	
	Nominal compensation per employee	1.6	3.2	3.8	2.4	0.4	1.8	2.1	2.1	1.6	-0.3 p	1.6 p	1.3 p	
	Real compensation per employee (GDP deflator)	-0.9	1.1	1.3	2.0	-0.4	1.6	0.7	0.7	1.5	-1.1 p	1.0 p	0.1 p	
	Real compensation per employee (private consumption deflator)	0.0	1.6	1.5	1.4	-0.5	-0.7	-0.7	-0.4	1.3	-0.6 p	1.4 p	0.0 p	
	Nominal unit labour costs	0.3	2.4	3.7	5.5	-1.7	1.0	3.0	1.1	0.1	-1.6 p	0.4 p	0.4 p	
	Real unit labour costs	-2.2	0.3	1.3	5.1	-2.5	0.9	1.5	-0.2	-0.1	-2.4 p	-0.2 p	-0.8 p	
	Labour Market Indicators - Total	Total population (000)	16334	16358	16405	16486	16575	16656	16730	16780	16829	16901	16979	17082
		Population aged 15-64 (000)	11019	11031	11055	11091	11124	11154	11117	11077	11060	11066	11094	11140
		Total employment (000)	8261	8464	8593	8596	8370 b	8291 b	8345	8285	8236	8319	8427	8605
Employment aged 15-64 (000)		8152	8345	8468	8443	8227 b	8152 b	8175	8104	8029	8116	8223	8376	
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)		76.3	77.8	78.9	78.8	76.8 b	76.4 b	76.6	75.9	75.4	76.4	77.1	78.0	
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)		74.3	76.0	77.2	77.0	74.7 b	74.2 b	74.4	73.6	73.1	74.1	74.8	75.8	
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)		66.2	68.4	69.3	68.0	63.0 b	61.3 b	61.1	60.1	58.8	60.8	60.8	62.3	
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)		84.2	85.4	86.8	86.3	84.7 b	84.0 b	83.6	82.2	81.7	82.2	82.9	83.5	
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)		47.7	50.9	53.0	55.1	53.7 b	55.2 b	57.6	59.2	59.9	61.7	63.5	65.7	
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)		61.1	62.4	63.4	63.3	61.3 b	60.9 b	60.9	60.2	59.9	60.7	61.8	62.8	
Self-employed (% total employment)		12.2	12.6	12.7	13.1	14.4 b	14.5 b	14.8	15.6	16.1	16.3	16.4	16.4	
Part-time employment (% total employment)		45.8	46.3	46.8	47.7	48.3 b	48.3 b	49.0	49.8	49.6	50.0	49.7	49.8	
Temporary employment (% total employment)		12.9	13.9	13.7	13.4	13.9 b	13.9 b	14.8	15.5	16.4	15.2	15.6	16.5	
Employment in Services (% total employment)				79.8 b	80.8	81.3 b	82.2 b	82.0	82.9 b	82.9	82.7	82.7	83.0	
Employment in Industry (% total employment)				17.8 b	16.8	16.1 b	15.4 b	15.6	15.3 b	15.1	15.4	15.3	15.0	
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)				2.5 b	2.4	2.6 b	2.4 b	2.4	1.8 b	2.0	2.0	2.0	1.9	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)		77.4	78.5	79.3	79.7	78.2 b	78.1 b	79.0	79.4	79.0	79.6	79.7	79.7	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)		70.8	72.7	73.2	72.8	69.0 b	68.1 b	69.2	69.2	67.4	68.5	68.2	68.3	
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)		87.1	87.6	88.5	88.8	87.9 b	87.4 b	87.6	87.4	87.1	87.1	86.9	86.7	
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)		49.6	52.8	54.7	56.8	55.9 b	57.9 b	60.8	63.5	64.9	67.1	68.4	69.5	
Total unemployment (000)		419	355	318	381	435	434	516	647	660	614	538	438	
Unemployment rate (% labour force)		5.0	4.2	3.7	4.4	5.0	5.0	5.8	7.3	7.4	6.9	6.0	4.9	
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)		10.0	9.4	8.6	10.2	11.1	10.0	11.7	13.2	12.7	11.3	10.8	8.9	
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)		1.7	1.2	0.9	0.8	1.2 b	1.6 b	1.9	2.5	2.9	3.0	2.5	1.9	
Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)		42.3	38.5	34.0	24.4	27.1 b	32.3 b	32.9	34.9	39.2	42.9	41.5	39.5	
Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)		4.6	4.3	3.9	4.8	6.0 b	6.8 b	8.1	9.1	8.6	7.7	7.4	6.1	
Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)		60.6	61.9	63.7	63.6	61.4 b	61.7 b	61.7	60.3 b	58.8 b	60.0	60.7	61.3	
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)		79.1	80.3	81.5	81.7	80.3 b	79.6 b	79.6	77.8 b	77.9 b	78.2	79.4	80.1	
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)		86.4	87.7	88.3	88.1	87.2 b	87.0 b	87.3	87.6 b	87.7 b	88.2	88.4	88.8	
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)		75.1	76.7	77.8	77.6	75.3 b	74.8 b	75.0	74.4	73.9	74.9	75.6	76.7	
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)		74.1	75.5	77.9	76.6	73.3 b	73.4 b	75.4	72.6	73.0	72.0	74.8	76.1	
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)		47.2	50.2	55.7	54.0	51.4 b	50.6 b	51.6	48.4	49.1	48.9	49.3	50.0	
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)		76.2	77.7	78.7	78.6	76.2 b	75.8 b	76.1	75.5	75.0	76.1	76.9	78.0	
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)		72.1	72.8	74.7	74.0	72.0 b	72.4 b	73.1	71.9	72.4	71.5	74.0	75.4	
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)		59.5	62.2	65.6	64.6	62.3 b	60.7 b	60.5	58.2	58.0	57.8	58.1	59.1	
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)				1.1	1.3	1.3 b	1.4 b	1.7	6.6	6.7	6.3	5.7	5.0	
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)		0.6	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.8 b	1.2 b	1.3	1.5	1.6	1.8	1.7	1.6	
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)		3.8	3.2	3.0	3.1	3.5 b	3.3 b	3.6	3.9	4.1	3.9	3.6	3.0	

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Netherlands		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	
Labour Market Indicators - Male	Total population (000)	8077	8089	8112	8156	8203	8243	8283	8307	8334	8373	8417	8475	
	Population aged 15-64(000)	5562	5563	5572	5589	5605	5616	5595	5571	5561	5563	5578	5604	
	Total employment (000)	4552	4631	4676	4648	4526 b	4475 b	4501	4459	4460	4482	4536	4617	
	Employment aged 15-64 (000)	4471	4547	4588	4540	4425 b	4377 b	4376	4324	4305	4336	4383	4449	
	Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	83.5	84.8	85.5	84.9	82.8 b	82.4 b	82.3	81.1	81.1	81.9	82.6	83.3	
	Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)	80.9	82.2	83.2	82.4	80.0 b	79.3 b	79.3	78.2	78.1	79.0	79.6	80.4	
	Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)	67.2	68.9	69.8	67.5	62.6 b	60.0 b	59.7	59.2	58.7	59.9	59.6	61.0	
	Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)	91.4	92.1	93.0	92.0	90.0 b	89.8 b	89.1	86.8	86.9	87.5	88.1	88.4	
	Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)	58.0	61.5	63.7	65.0	64.5 b	64.5 b	66.9	68.9	69.4	71.1	72.8	74.8	
	FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	77.9	79.2	79.9	79.0	76.7 b	76.2 b	75.9	74.5	74.4	75.2	76.2	76.6	
	Self-employed (% total employment)	14.9	15.5	15.6	15.9	17.8 b	17.9 b	18.2	19.1	19.7	19.5	19.7	19.6	
	Part-time employment (% total employment)	22.1	22.5	22.8	23.6	24.2 b	23.9 b	24.6	26.0	26.1	26.5	26.2	27.0	
	Temporary employment (% total employment)	12.9	13.9	13.7	13.4	13.9 b	13.9 b	14.8	15.5	16.4	15.2	15.6	16.5	
	Employment in Services (% total employment)			70.0 b	71.4	72.0 b	73.3 b	72.9	73.8 b	74.0	73.6	73.5	74.1	
	Employment in Industry (% total employment)			26.8 b	25.5	24.5 b	23.5 b	23.9	23.8 b	23.4	23.8	23.8	23.4	
	Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)			3.2 b	3.2	3.4 b	3.2 b	3.1	2.5 b	2.6	2.6	2.7	2.5	
	Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)	83.9	84.6	85.3	85.3	83.7 b	83.2 b	83.9	84.3	84.2	84.6	84.4	84.2	
	Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)	71.5	73.0	73.7	72.7	68.6 b	67.0 b	67.7	68.4	67.0	67.5	67.2	67.0	
	Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)	94.1	94.0	94.5	94.4	93.3 b	93.0 b	93.0	92.3	92.2	92.1	91.7	91.3	
	Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)	60.4	64.0	65.9	67.6	67.3 b	67.5 b	70.6	74.2	75.5	77.6	78.2	79.0	
	Total unemployment (000)	188	154	141	184	213	216	260	346	343	313	268	216	
	Unemployment rate (% labour force)	4.1	3.3	3.0	3.9	4.5	4.6	5.5	7.2	7.2	6.5	5.6	4.5	
	Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)	10.0	9.4	9.3	11.4	12.0	10.5	11.8	13.5	12.4	11.3	11.4	9.0	
	Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)	1.6	1.1	0.9	0.8	1.2 b	1.6 b	1.8	2.6	2.8	3.0	2.4	1.8	
	Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)	45.0	40.8	36.5	23.4	27.2 b	33.7 b	33.5	35.5	39.8	45.6	42.3	39.1	
	Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)	4.3	4.1	4.0	5.2	6.1 b	7.0 b	8.0	9.2	8.3	7.7	7.6	6.0	
	Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)	76.6	77.6	78.4	77.7	74.8 b	74.4 b	74.1	71.7 b	70.9 b	71.8	72.9	73.5	
	Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)	84.8	85.9	87.2	86.8	85.4 b	84.9 b	84.6	82.9 b	83.0 b	83.7	84.8	85.4	
	Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)	88.7	90.0	90.5	90.2	89.3 b	89.7 b	90.0	89.7 b	90.3 b	91.1	91.3	91.7	
	Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)	81.5	82.7	83.5	82.8	80.5 b	79.9 b	79.7	78.8	78.6	79.5	80.2	81.0	
	Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)	80.3	81.2	83.4	82.5	79.7 b	78.0 b	80.5	79.7	80.7	79.5	80.5	82.6	
	Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)	60.4	65.8	71.6	67.3	62.7 b	62.7 b	64.0	57.9	60.1	61.2	60.3	59.9	
	Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)	82.4	83.5	84.2	83.5	81.2 b	80.6 b	80.5	79.5	79.4	80.3	81.1	81.9	
	Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)	78.4	80.0	80.2	79.3	77.5 b	79.1 b	79.1	79.8	80.6	79.0	81.1	81.8	
	Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)	69.3	72.2	75.6	73.6	70.2 b	69.1 b	69.3	66.0	66.7	68.1	66.5	67.5	
	Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)			0.6	0.8	0.9 b	1.0 b	1.2	4.5	4.5	4.1	3.8	3.3	
	Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.6 b	0.9 b	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.4	1.3	1.3	
	Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)	3.1	2.7	2.6	2.7	3.2 b	3.1 b	3.3	3.6	3.5	3.3	3.2	2.7	
	Labour Market Indicators - Female	Total population (000)	8257	8269	8293	8329	8372	8412	8447	8472	8495	8528	8562	8606
		Population aged 15-64(000)	5457	5468	5483	5502	5519	5538	5522	5506	5499	5503	5516	5536
		Total employment (000)	3709	3832	3917	3948	3844 b	3816 b	3845	3827	3776	3836	3891	3988
		Employment aged 15-64 (000)	3681	3798	3880	3903	3802 b	3775 b	3799	3780	3724	3779	3841	3927
		Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	69.0	70.7	72.2	72.7	70.8 b	70.4 b	71.0	70.6	69.7	70.8	71.6	72.8
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)		67.7	69.6	71.1	71.5	69.3 b	68.9 b	69.4	69.0	68.1	69.2	70.1	71.3	
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)		65.1	67.9	68.8	68.4	63.5 b	62.6 b	62.5	61.0	58.8	61.7	62.1	63.6	
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)		77.0	78.7	80.5	80.7	79.3 b	78.1 b	78.1	77.5	76.5	77.0	77.7	78.6	
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)		37.2	40.1	42.2	44.7	42.8 b	45.9 b	48.3	49.5	50.4	52.4	54.2	56.6	
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)		46.0	47.3	48.7	49.3	47.8 b	47.6 b	47.4	47.5	46.9	47.6	49.1	50.5	
Self-employed (% total employment)		8.9	9.1	9.3	9.7	10.4 b	10.6 b	10.8	11.5	11.9	12.5	12.5	12.7	
Part-time employment (% total employment)		74.5	74.8	75.2	75.7	76.2 b	76.6 b	77.0	77.1	76.7	76.9	76.4	75.8	
Temporary employment (% total employment)		16.1	17.5	17.7	18.0	17.5 b	17.2 b	17.9	18.6	19.2	18.4	19.0	19.9	
Employment in Services (% total employment)											93.1 u	93.1 u		
Employment in Industry (% total employment)											5.6 u	5.7 u		
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)				1.6 b	1.5	1.6 b	1.5 b	1.5	1.1 b	1.2	1.3	1.3		
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)		70.7	72.2	73.3	74.1	72.6 b	72.9 b	74.0	74.4	73.8	74.7	75.0	75.2	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)		70.1	72.4	72.6	72.9	69.4 b	69.2 b	70.8	70.0	67.7	69.4	69.2	69.7	
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)		80.1	81.2	82.5	83.0	82.4 b	81.8 b	82.3	82.6	81.9	82.1	82.2	82.0	
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)		38.6	41.4	43.5	46.0	44.5 b	48.2 b	51.0	52.8	54.3	56.7	58.6	60.2	
Total unemployment (000)		231	201	176	197	222	218	255	301	317	301	271	221	
Unemployment rate (% labour force)		6.2	5.2	4.5	4.9	5.5	5.4	6.2	7.3	7.8	7.3	6.5	5.3	
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)		10.1	9.3	7.8	9.0	10.1	9.5	11.6	12.9	13.1	11.2	10.3	8.8	
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)		1.7	1.3	0.9	0.9	1.2 b	1.7 b	2.0	2.5	3.0	2.9	2.7	2.1	
Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)		39.6	36.3	31.4	25.6	27.1 b	31.0 b	32.3	34.3	38.5	40.2	40.7	39.9	
Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)		4.9	4.5	3.8	4.5	6.0 b	6.6 b	8.2	9.0	8.9	7.8	7.1	6.1	
Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)		47.4	48.9	51.2	51.2	49.4 b	50.3 b	50.4	50.0 b	47.8 b	49.0	49.3	49.5	
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)		73.2	74.4	75.7	76.6	75.3 b	74.3 b	74.5	72.6 b	72.5 b	72.6	73.8	74.6	
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)		83.7	85.1	85.8	85.7	84.9 b	84.1 b	84.5	85.4 b	84.9 b	85.3	85.5	86.0	
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)		68.5	70.5	72.0	72.3	70.1 b	69.8 b	70.2	69.9	69.0	70.3	71.0	72.3	
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)		68.8	70.4	73.0	71.6	68.2 b	69.5 b	71.1	66.7	66.6	65.9	70.2	70.9	
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)		34.8	35.9	41.8	42.8	41.1 b	39.8 b	40.4	39.6	39.2	38.0	39.5	41.0	
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)		69.8	71.7	73.0	73.5	71.1 b	71.0 b	71.6	71.4	70.4	71.9	72.6	73.9	
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)		67.4	67.3	70.4	70.0	67.7 b	67.5 b	68.8	66.0	66.4	65.9	68.7	70.5	
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)		49.8	52.8	56.2	56.1	54.9 b	52.8 b	52.2	51.1	49.9	48.5	50.6	51.3	
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)				1.7	1.8	1.8 b	1.9 b	2.2	9.1	9.4	8.9	7.9	7.0	
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)		0.9	0.9	0.8	0.8	1.0 b	1.6 b	1.5	2.0	2.0	2.1	2.0	2.0	
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)		4.7	3.9	3.4	3.5	3.9 b	3.6 b	3.8	4.4	4.8	4.5	4.0	3.4	

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Netherlands		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017			
Social Indicators	All	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of total population)	16.0	15.7	14.9	15.1	15.1	15.7	15.0	15.9	16.5	16.4	16.7 b			
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of total population)	9.7	10.2	10.5	11.1	10.3	11.0	10.1	10.4	11.6	11.6	12.7 b			
		At-risk-of-poverty threshold (PPS single person)	9897	10522	11485	11618	11288	11300	11387	11536	11283	11632	12596 b			
		Poverty gap (%)	16.9	17.0	14.9	16.5	16.2	15.5	17.3	16.5	16.9	16.8	17.3 b			
		Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of total population)			6.4	4.7	8.2	7.7	5.8	6.5	7.7	7.3	7.2 b			
		At-risk-of-poverty before social transfers excl. pensions (% of total population)	21.0	20.6	19.9	20.5	21.1	20.9	20.6	20.8	21.3	22.3	22.1 b			
		Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (%)	53.8	50.5	47.2	45.9	51.2	47.4	51.0	50.0	45.5	48.0	42.5 b			
		Severe Material Deprivation (% of total population)	2.3	1.7	1.5	1.4	2.2	2.5	2.3	2.5	3.2	2.6	2.6 b	2.6 p		
		Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of people aged 0-59)	10.9	9.7	8.2	8.5	8.4	8.9	8.9	9.3	10.2	10.2	9.7 b			
		Real Gross Household Disposable income (growth %)	1.5	1.7	0.7	1.1	-0.6	0.1	-1.0	-1.4	1.2	1.1	2.2	1.4		
		Income quintile share ratio S80/S20	3.8	4.0	4.0	4.0	3.7	3.8	3.6	3.6	3.8	3.8	3.9 b			
		GINI coefficient	26.4	27.6	27.6	27.2	25.5	25.8	25.4	25.1	26.2	26.7	26.9 b			
		Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18-24)	12.6 b	11.7	11.4	10.9	10.0 b	9.2	8.9	9.3 b	8.7 b	8.2	8.0	7.1		
NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of total population aged 15-24)	4.0 b	3.5	3.4	4.1	4.3 b	4.3	4.9	5.6 b	5.5	4.7	4.6	4.0				
Social Indicators	Male	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of male population)	14.6	14.6	14.3	14.3	14.1	14.9	13.6	14.9	15.8	15.9	16.1 b			
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of male population)	9.5	9.6	10.5	10.8	9.7	10.8	9.5	10.2	11.3	11.8	12.8 b			
		Poverty gap (%)	18.9	17.5	14.6	16.9	15.1	15.3	17.3	15.1	17.7	15.5	17.7 b			
		Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of male population)			6.9	5.4	6.8	8.1	4.8	6.3	6.6	6.8	6.9 b			
		Severe Material Deprivation (% of male population)	1.7	1.7	1.5	1.4	2.3	2.4	2.3	2.4	2.7	2.5	2.3 b	2.5 p		
		Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of males aged 0-59)	9.0	8.6	7.0	7.6	7.4	8.0	7.8	8.3	9.6	9.6	8.8 b			
		Life expectancy at birth (years)	77.7	78.1	78.4 b	78.7	78.9	79.4	79.3	79.5	80.0	79.9	80.0 b			
		Healthy life years at birth (years) - men	65.2	66.1	62.5 b	61.7	61.3	64.0	63.5	61.4	63.3	61.1	62.8 b			
		Early leavers from education and training (% of males aged 18-24)	15.1 b	14.0	14.0	13.1	12.1 b	11.1	10.5	11.2 b	10.6 b	9.9	10.1	9.4		
		NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of males aged 15-24)	3.7 b	3.1	3.1	4.1	4.4 b	4.4	4.6	5.6 b	5.2	4.6	4.7	4.2		
		Social Indicators	Female	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of female population)	17.4	16.9	15.5	15.9	16.0	16.6	16.3	16.9	17.2	16.9	17.3 b	
				At-risk-of-poverty (% of female population)	9.9	10.7	10.4	11.3	10.8	11.1	10.6	10.6	11.9	11.5	12.7 b	
				Poverty gap (%)	16.7	16.9	17.0	16.3	16.4	16.5	17.1	17.2	16.2	17.8	17.1 b	
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of female population)					5.8	4.1	9.5	7.3	6.8	6.7	8.7	7.7	7.5 b			
Severe Material Deprivation (% of female population)	2.8			1.7	1.6	1.5	2.2	2.6	2.4	2.6	3.6	2.6	2.9 b	2.6 p		
Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of females aged 0-59)	12.8			10.8	9.4	9.3	9.3	9.7	10.0	10.4	10.9	10.9	10.5 b			
Life expectancy at birth (years)	82.0			82.5	82.5 b	82.9	83.0	83.1	83.0	83.2	83.5	83.2	83.2 b			
Healthy life years at birth (years) - women	63.5			64.3	59.9 b	60.1	60.2	59.0	58.9	57.5	59.0	57.2	57.8 b			
Early leavers from education and training (% of females aged 18-24)	10.1 b			9.3	8.8	8.6	7.8 b	7.2	7.2	7.4 b	6.8 b	6.4	5.8	4.6		
NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of females aged 15-24)	4.4 b			4.0	3.8	4.1	4.2 b	4.2	5.1	5.7 b	5.9	4.7	4.4	3.8		
Social Indicators	Children (0-17)			At-Risk-of-poverty or exclusion of children (% of people aged 0-17)	17.5	17.2	15.5	17.5	16.9	18.0	16.9	17.0	17.1	16.8	17.6 b	
				At-risk-of-poverty (% of Children population)	13.5	14.0	12.9	15.4	13.7	15.5	13.2	12.6	13.7	14.0	14.8 b	
				Severe Material Deprivation (% of Children population)	3.2	1.9	2.2	1.5	2.0	2.9	3.3	2.3	3.7	2.6	2.5 b	2.4 p
		Share of children living in low work intensity households (% of Children population)	8.5	6.2	5.1	5.4	5.8	6.3	6.4	6.4	7.3	6.5	7.9 b			
		Risk of poverty of children in households at work (Working Intensity > 0.2)	9.2	11.3	10.1	12.2	11.2	11.8	10.1	10.1	10.0	10.5	9.8 b			
		Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (0-17) (%)	49.3	43.6	43.9	38.9	45.6	36.2	44.5	47.3	43.2	43.8	38.1 b			
Social Indicators	Working age (18-64)	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of Working age population)	17.5	16.5	15.8	15.9	16.5	17.0	16.5	18.0	18.9	19.1	18.4 b			
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of Working age population)	9.3	8.9	9.9	10.3	10.1	10.5	10.1	10.9	12.4	12.5	13.2 b			
		Severe Material Deprivation (% of Working age population)	2.3	1.9	1.6	1.6	2.7	2.8	2.4	3.0	3.6	3.1	3.0 b	3.1 p		
		Very low work intensity (18-59)	11.9	11.0	9.5	9.7	9.4	9.8	9.9	10.5	11.4	11.7	10.4 b			
		In-work at-risk-of poverty rate (% of persons employed 18-64)	4.4	4.5	4.7	5.0	5.1	5.4	4.6	4.5	5.3	5.1	5.6 b			
		Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (18-64) (%)	55.7	55.3	50.0	49.3	53.5	51.6	53.7	51.3	46.8	49.8	43.1 b			
Social Indicators	Elderly (65+)	At-Risk-of-poverty or exclusion of elderly (% of people aged 65+)	6.4	9.8	9.7	8.1	6.2	6.9	6.2	6.1	6.9	6.1	10.0 b			
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of Elderly population)	5.8	9.5	9.4	7.7	5.9	6.5	5.5	5.5	5.9	5.6	9.0 b			
		Severe Material Deprivation (% of Elderly population)	0.7	0.7	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.7	0.8	1.0	0.5	1.2 b	0.8 p		
		Relative median income of elderly (ratio with median income of people younger than 65)	0.87	0.83	0.84	0.86	0.87	0.87	0.90	0.90	0.89	0.89	0.82 b			
		Aggregate replacement ratio (ratio)	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.44	0.47	0.46	0.47	0.47	0.50	0.52	0.50 b			
Expenditure in social protection indicators (% of GDP)		Sickness/Health care	8.4	8.5	8.7	9.8	10.0	10.1	10.4	10.2	10.0	9.4				
		Disability	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.4	2.4	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.2	2.7				
		Old age and survivors	10.3	10.4	10.2	11.0	11.2	11.6	12.0	12.2	12.3	12.1				
		Family/Children	1.4	0.9	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.0	1.0	0.9	1.1				
		Unemployment	1.3	1.0	0.9	1.1	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.6	1.6	1.5				
		Housing and Social exclusion n.e.c.	1.3	1.4	1.5	1.7	1.6	1.7	1.8	1.9	1.9	1.7				
		Total (including Admin and Other expenditures) of which: Means tested benefits	26.5	26.1	26.4	29.4	29.7	30.2	31.0	31.2	30.9	30.2				
	2.6	3.0	3.1	3.5	3.6	3.7	3.8	3.9	3.8	4.1						

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Austria

Austria		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	
Macro Economic Indicators (Annual % growth)	Real GDP	3.5	3.7	1.5	-3.8	1.8	2.9	0.7	0.0	0.8	1.1	1.5	3.0	
	Total employment	1.8	1.8	1.9	-0.5	0.8	1.6	1.0	0.3	1.0	0.6	1.2	1.7	
	Labour productivity	1.7	1.9	-0.4	-3.3	1.1	1.3	-0.4	-0.3	-0.1	0.5	0.2	1.3	
	Annual average hours worked per person employed	-1.0	-0.6	-0.4	-2.6	-0.4	0.4	-1.4	-1.0	-0.6	-1.4	0.7	0.2	
	Real productivity per hour worked	2.7	2.5	0.0	-0.7	1.5	1.0	1.1	0.6	0.5	1.9	-0.4	1.1	
	Harmonized CPI	1.7	2.2	3.2	0.4	1.7	3.6	2.6	2.1	1.5	0.8	1.0	2.2	
	Price deflator GDP	1.9	2.2	2.0	1.9	0.9	1.8	2.1	1.6	2.0	2.3	1.1	1.6	
	Nominal compensation per employee	3.1	3.0	3.3	1.6	1.1	2.1	2.7	2.2	1.9	2.1	2.4	1.6	
	Real compensation per employee (GDP deflator)	1.2	0.7	1.3	-0.2	0.2	0.2	0.6	0.6	-0.1	-0.2	1.3	0.1	
	Real compensation per employee (private consumption deflator)	1.4	0.8	0.1	1.2	-0.6	-1.5	0.1	0.1	0.4	1.3	1.4	-0.6	
	Nominal unit labour costs	1.4	1.1	3.7	5.1	0.0	0.7	3.1	2.5	2.0	1.6	2.1	0.3	
	Real unit labour costs	-0.4	-1.2	1.8	3.1	-0.9	-1.1	1.0	0.9	0.0	-0.7	1.1	-1.2	
	Labour Market Indicators - Total	Total population (000)	8254	8283	8308	8335	8352	8375	8408	8452	8508	8585	8700	8773
		Population aged 15-64 (000)	5584	5589	5607	5625	5633	5663	5688	5705	5732	5775	5849	5884
Total employment (000)		3826	3924 b	3994	3982	4017	4052	4085	4105	4113	4148	4220	4260	
Employment aged 15-64 (000)		3783	3864 b	3929	3909	3944	3982	4013	4030	4034	4068	4143	4185	
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)		71.6	72.8 b	73.8	73.4	73.9	74.2	74.4	74.6	74.2	74.3	74.8	75.4	
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)		68.6	69.9 b	70.8	70.3	70.8	71.1	71.4	71.4	71.1	71.1	71.5	72.2	
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)		52.3	53.8 b	54.4	53.1	52.8	53.9	53.7	53.1	52.1	51.3	51.0	50.6	
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)		82.2	82.9 b	83.4	82.9	83.3	84.1	84.3	84.0	83.4	83.5	83.6	84.1	
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)		33.0	36.0 b	38.8	39.4	41.2	39.9	41.6	43.8	45.1	46.3	49.2	51.3	
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)		64.0	65.1 b	65.7	64.9	65.1	65.3	65.4	65.5	64.7	64.7	65.1	65.8	
Self-employed (% total employment)		11.6	11.3 b	11.2	11.5	11.7	11.3	11.2	11.4	11.3	11.4	11.2	10.9	
Part-time employment (% total employment)		21.5	22.0 b	22.7	23.9	24.4	24.5	25.2	26.0	26.9	27.3	27.8	27.9	
Temporary employment (% total employment)		7.7	7.4 b	7.5	7.8	8.3	8.3	7.9	8.1	7.9	7.8	7.7	8.0	
Employment in Services (% total employment)				68.9 b	70.1	69.3	69.5	69.8	69.7 u	69.9	70.3	71.4		
Employment in Industry (% total employment)				26.5 b	25.3	25.2	26.3	26.4	26.2	26.1 u	26.1	25.9	25.2	
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)				4.6 b	4.6	4.7	4.4	4.2	4.0	4.3	4.0	3.9	3.5	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)		72.4	73.5 b	73.9	74.3	74.4	74.6	75.1	75.5	75.4	75.5	76.2	76.4	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)		57.9	59.4 b	59.5	59.5	58.3	59.2	59.2	58.8	58.0	57.4	57.5	56.1	
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)		86.1	86.5 b	86.5	87.0	87.1	87.6	88.1	88.3	88.0	88.0	88.4	88.7	
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)		34.3	37.2 b	39.7	40.5	42.2	41.4	43.1	45.5	46.9	48.6	51.7	53.6	
Total unemployment (000)		212	200	172	223	203	194	209	231	245	252	270	248	
Unemployment rate (% labour force)		5.3	4.9	4.1	5.3	4.8	4.6	4.9	5.4	5.6	5.7	6.0	5.5	
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)		9.8	9.4	8.5	10.7	9.5	8.9	9.4	9.7	10.3	10.6	11.2	9.8	
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)		1.5	1.3 b	1.0	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.5	1.7	1.9	1.8	
Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)		28.0	27.2 b	24.3	21.7	25.4	26.3	24.9	24.6	27.2	29.2	32.3	33.4	
Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)		5.7	5.6 b	5.1	6.4	5.5	5.3	5.6	5.7	6.0	6.1	6.5	5.5	
Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)		53.9 b	56.1 b	55.4	54.0	54.8	55.1	54.7	54.1	53.0 b	52.9	53.9	54.1	
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)		74.2 b	75.4 b	76.9	76.3	77.0	76.8	77.1	77.5	75.9 b	75.7	75.9	76.6	
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)		85.1 b	86.0 b	85.6	85.8	85.3	85.9	86.7	86.0	85.3 b	85.4	86.2	86.4	
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)		69.5	70.9 b	71.9	71.6	71.9	72.2	72.6	72.7	72.3	72.5	73.3	73.8	
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)		69.2	69.7 b	70.6	68.2	69.8	69.6	71.2	71.9	73.0	72.5	72.8	74.5	
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)		55.3	56.5 b	56.5	55.5	57.0	58.2	57.0	55.2	54.2	53.7	52.6	54.3	
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)		70.0	71.2 b	72.3	71.9	72.0	72.3	72.7	72.8	72.6	72.8	73.4	74.0	
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)		64.9	67.0 b	67.5	67.2	69.5	69.9	71.1	72.2	72.7	72.7	73.7	74.7	
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)		59.5	61.2 b	61.3	60.3	62.4	63.0	62.0	60.7	59.5	59.0	58.4	59.1	
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)				3.2	3.5	2.9	3.1	3.4	3.8	3.9	4.2	4.2	4.0	
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)		0.8	0.7 b	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	1.0	0.9	1.0	0.9	1.1	1.1	
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)		4.1	3.8 b	3.5	3.7	3.7	3.4	3.5	3.3	3.6	3.7	3.3	3.0	

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Austria		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	
Labour Market Indicators - Male	Total population (000)	4014	4030	4042	4057	4066	4079	4098	4124	4155	4200	4273	4312	
	Population aged 15-64(000)	2797	2799	2807	2814	2818	2831	2844	2854	2869	2896	2944	2964	
	Total employment (000)	2085	2138 b	2164	2134	2148	2162	2171	2180	2175	2194	2234	2254	
	Employment aged 15-64 (000)	2058	2100 b	2122	2087	2104	2120	2129	2134	2126	2145	2187	2209	
	Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	78.1	79.5 b	80.1	78.7	79.0	79.2	79.3	79.1	78.3	78.4	78.7	79.4	
	Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)	74.9	76.3 b	76.8	75.5	76.0	76.2	76.2	76.0	75.2	75.1	75.4	76.2	
	Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)	55.8	57.0 b	57.6	55.8	56.6	58.0	57.1	56.4	54.3	54.0	52.9	52.1	
	Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)	88.4	89.0 b	88.9	87.4	87.7	88.4	88.3	87.5	86.6	86.6	86.6	87.2	
	Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)	41.9	46.0 b	48.9	49.1	49.9	48.2	50.2	52.8	54.3	54.1	57.6	60.1	
	FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	76.7	78.1 b	78.2	76.6	76.6	77.0	77.0	76.6	75.5	75.5	75.6	76.4	
	Self-employed (% total employment)	14.2	13.6 b	13.6	13.9	14.2	13.7	13.5	13.8	13.8	13.8	13.7	13.4	
	Part-time employment (% total employment)	5.9	6.2 b	7.0	7.5	8.0	7.8	8.0	9.0	9.6	9.8	10.5	10.6	
	Temporary employment (% total employment)	7.7	7.4 b	7.5	7.8	8.3	8.3	7.9	8.1	7.9	7.8	7.7	8.0	
	Employment in Services (% total employment)			56.9 b	58.1	58.2	57.1	57.2	58.0 u	57.7 u	57.4	57.7	59.0 u	
	Employment in Industry (% total employment)			38.6 b	37.3	37.1	38.3	38.4	37.8 u	37.9 u	38.5	38.2	37.4 u	
	Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)			4.5 b	4.6	4.8	4.5	4.4	4.2	4.4	4.1	4.1	3.6	
	Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)	78.9	80.0 b	80.0	80.0	80.0	79.9	80.2	80.4	80.0	80.1	80.7	81.0	
	Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)	61.8	62.9 b	62.9	62.9	62.6	63.6	63.1	62.3	60.7	60.7	60.2	58.4	
	Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)	92.2	92.5 b	92.1	91.9	91.9	92.0	92.3	92.1	91.5	91.6	91.8	92.3	
	Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)	44.1	47.6 b	49.9	50.5	51.4	50.4	52.2	55.1	56.8	57.4	61.2	63.0	
	Total unemployment (000)	108	100	88	124	113	103	113	124	135	142	153	142	
	Unemployment rate (% labour force)	5.0	4.5	3.9	5.5	5.0	4.6	5.0	5.4	5.9	6.1	6.5	5.9	
	Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)	9.8	9.3	8.4	11.2	9.6	8.8	9.6	9.4	10.6	11.1	12.1	10.8	
	Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)	1.5	1.2 b	1.0	1.2	1.4	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.7	1.9	2.2	2.0	
	Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)	30.1	26.9 b	26.0	22.0	27.9	27.8	26.0	25.9	28.2	31.8	34.3	33.7	
	Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)	6.1	5.8 b	5.3	7.0	6.0	5.6	6.0	5.8	6.4	6.7	7.3	6.3	
	Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)	63.6 b	65.8 b	65.0	62.8	62.8	63.6	62.3	61.2	59.1 b	59.3	60.5	60.6	
	Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)	79.6 b	81.0 b	81.9	80.2	80.6	80.4	80.5	80.9	79.8 b	79.1	79.4	80.4	
	Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)	87.7 b	89.1 b	88.7	88.6	88.8	89.0	89.6	88.6	87.2 b	87.4	88.5	89.2	
	Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)	75.5	76.9 b	77.4	76.4	76.7	76.8	76.8	76.8	76.2	76.0	76.7	77.3	
	Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)	77.8	80.6 b	80.1	75.8	75.7	76.2	77.3	77.5	78.2	78.2	77.1	80.8	
	Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)	65.0	66.3 b	67.9	64.1	66.5	68.5	67.4	65.7	62.1	62.0	60.9	61.4	
	Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)	75.9	77.1 b	77.7	76.5	76.7	76.8	76.8	76.7	76.2	76.0	76.6	77.2	
	Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)	72.5	77.4 b	75.4	75.5	75.1	77.0	77.5	79.4	78.6	78.9	78.5	81.0	
	Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)	68.9	70.1 b	71.2	67.8	70.6	71.4	71.2	69.0	66.4	67.1	66.1	66.7	
	Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)			1.2	1.7	1.4	1.5	1.6	1.9	1.9	2.1	2.4	2.2	
	Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)	0.7	0.6 b	0.7	0.9	0.8	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.9	0.8	1.0	1.1	
	Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)	3.5	3.1 b	2.9	3.0	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.0	3.4	3.5	3.0	2.8	
	Labour Market Indicators - Female	Total population (000)	4240	4253	4266	4278	4285	4296	4310	4328	4352	4385	4428	4460
		Population aged 15-64(000)	2787	2790	2800	2811	2816	2832	2844	2852	2863	2879	2905	2920
		Total employment (000)	1741	1786 b	1831	1849	1869	1890	1913	1925	1938	1954	1986	2006
		Employment aged 15-64 (000)	1725	1763 b	1807	1822	1840	1862	1885	1897	1908	1923	1956	1977
		Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	65.2	66.2 b	67.6	68.2	68.8	69.2	69.6	70.0	70.1	70.2	70.9	71.4
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)		62.2	63.5 b	64.8	65.2	65.7	66.1	66.7	66.9	66.9	67.1	67.7	68.2	
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)		48.8	50.6 b	51.3	50.5	48.9	49.8	50.3	49.8	49.9	48.7	49.0	49.0	
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)		76.0	76.7 b	77.8	78.4	78.9	79.8	80.4	80.5	80.3	80.3	80.6	81.0	
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)		24.5	26.5 b	29.3	30.3	33.0	32.2	33.5	35.2	36.4	38.8	41.1	42.8	
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)		52.4	53.2 b	54.4	54.3	54.9	55.0	55.1	55.6	55.1	55.1	55.8	56.6	
Self-employed (% total employment)		8.5	8.6 b	8.4	8.6	8.8	8.5	8.4	8.6	8.5	8.7	8.4	8.2	
Part-time employment (% total employment)		40.1	40.8 b	41.2	42.6	43.2	43.5	44.6	45.1	46.3	46.8	47.1	47.2	
Temporary employment (% total employment)		8.0	8.0 b	8.1	8.1	8.0	8.5	8.4	8.2	8.3	8.2	8.2	8.4	
Employment in Services (% total employment)														
Employment in Industry (% total employment)														
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)				4.7 b	4.7	4.6	4.3	3.9	3.8	4.1	3.9	3.6	3.3	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)		66.0	67.1 b	67.8	68.7	68.9	69.3	70.0	70.7	70.8	70.9	71.7	71.8	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)		54.1	56.0 b	56.2	56.2	54.0	54.8	55.4	55.3	55.4	54.1	54.6	53.7	
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)		80.1	80.5 b	80.9	82.1	82.4	83.2	84.0	84.5	84.5	84.4	84.9	85.0	
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)		25.2	27.5 b	30.1	31.1	33.6	33.0	34.5	36.4	37.5	40.2	42.7	44.5	
Total unemployment (000)		103	100	84	99	91	91	96	108	110	110	117	106	
Unemployment rate (% labour force)		5.6	5.3	4.4	5.1	4.6	4.6	4.8	5.3	5.4	5.3	5.6	5.0	
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)		9.8	9.6	8.6	10.1	9.4	9.1	9.2	10.0	9.9	10.0	10.2	8.7	
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)		1.4	1.5 b	1.0	1.1	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.4	1.4	1.7	1.7	
Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)		25.7	27.6 b	22.6	21.3	22.4	24.5	23.7	23.1	25.9	25.9	29.7	33.1	
Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)		5.3	5.4 b	4.8	5.7	5.1	5.0	5.1	5.5	5.5	5.4	5.6	4.7	
Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)		48.8 b	51.0 b	50.2	49.4	50.5	50.3	50.5	49.9	49.5 b	49.1	49.9	49.9	
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)		68.3 b	69.2 b	71.4	72.1	73.0	73.0	73.3	73.9	71.6 b	72.0	72.0	72.5	
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)		81.5 b	81.8 b	81.5	82.4	81.0	82.2	83.2	82.9	83.3 b	83.1	83.8	83.6	
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)		63.5	64.9 b	66.4	66.8	67.1	67.6	68.3	68.6	68.5	69.0	69.9	70.3	
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)		61.5	60.4 b	62.8	61.6	64.5	63.9	66.0	67.4	69.1	67.3	68.9	68.6	
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)		45.1	45.9 b	44.8	47.0	47.5	47.8	46.7	44.9	46.4	45.5	44.7	46.8	
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)		64.1	65.4 b	66.9	67.2	67.3	67.8	68.5	68.9	68.9	69.5	70.2	70.8	
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)		59.0	59.0 b	61.5	60.8	65.2	64.4	66.3	66.6	67.9	67.6	69.8	69.4	
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)		50.4	52.5 b	51.6	52.6	54.3	54.8	53.1	52.7	52.7	51.2	50.8	51.4	
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)				5.6	5.6	4.6	5.0	5.4	6.0	6.1	6.4	6.3	6.1	
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)		0.9	0.8 b	1.1	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.2	1.0	1.1	1.0	1.1	1.2	
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)		4.9	4.7 b	4.2	4.4	4.2	3.8	3.8	3.8	3.9	3.9	3.7	3.1	

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Austria		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017			
Social Indicators	All	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of total population)	17.8	16.7	20.6 b	19.1	18.9	19.2	18.5	18.8	19.2	18.3	18.0			
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of total population)	12.6	12.0	15.2	14.5	14.7	14.5	14.4	14.4	14.1	13.9	14.1			
		At-risk-of-poverty threshold (PPS single person)	10452	10686	11359 b	11683	11710	12255	12361	12542	12997	13189	13514			
		Poverty gap (%)	15.5	17.0	19.9 b	19.2	21.8	19.1	20.1	21.3	20.1	20.5	19.8			
		Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of total population)		5.5	5.6	6.2	6.5	9.8 b	8.7	8.9	8.5	8.8	8.1			
		At-risk-of-poverty before social transfers excl. pensions (% of total population)	25.1	24.7	25.9 b	25.3	26.0	27.1	25.8	25.9	25.4	25.6	26.3			
		Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (%)	49.8	51.4	41.3 b	42.7	43.5	46.5	44.2	44.4	44.5	45.7	46.4			
		Severe Material Deprivation (% of total population)	3.6	3.3	5.9	4.6	4.3	4.0	4.0	4.2	4.0	3.6	3.0			
		Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of people aged 0-59)	8.1	8.2	7.4 b	7.1	7.8	8.6	7.7	7.8	9.1	8.2	8.1			
		Real Gross Household Disposable income (growth %)	2.5	2.2	1.0	-0.2	-0.8	-0.5	1.5	-1.8	0.2	0.4	2.6			
		Income quintile share ratio S80/S20	3.7	3.8	4.2 b	4.2	4.3	4.1	4.2	4.1	4.1	4.0	4.1			
		GINI coefficient	25.3	26.2	27.7 b	27.5	28.3	27.4	27.6	27.0	27.6	27.2	27.2			
		Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18-24)	10.0 b	10.8	10.2	8.8	8.3	8.5	7.8	7.5	7.0 b	7.3	6.9	7.4		
		NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of total population aged 15-24)	7.8 b	7.4 b	7.4	8.2	7.4	7.3	6.8	7.3	7.7	7.5	7.7	6.5		
		Social Indicators	Male	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of male population)	15.7	14.5	18.9 b	17.6	17.3	17.9	17.3	17.4	17.7	17.5	16.9	
				At-risk-of-poverty (% of male population)	11.0	10.6	14.2	13.8	13.4	14.0	13.5	13.5	13.3	13.5	13.5	
Poverty gap (%)	17.5			18.7	21.0 b	19.1	22.2	19.1	20.4	22.7	19.9	20.8	20.6			
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of male population)				3.5	4.9	4.4	5.8	8.5 b	7.5	7.9	6.6	8.1	8.0			
Severe Material Deprivation (% of male population)	3.8			3.1	5.5	4.2	3.9	3.6	3.8	4.3	3.8	3.8	2.9			
Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of males aged 0-59)	7.0			6.6	6.1 b	5.5	6.7	7.5	6.7	7.0	7.8	7.3	7.5			
Life expectancy at birth (years)	77.1			77.4	77.7 b	77.6	77.8	78.3	78.4	78.6	79.1	78.8	79.3			
Healthy life years at birth (years) - men	58.7			58.7	58.5 b	59.5	59.4	59.5	60.2	59.7	57.6	57.9	57.0			
Early leavers from education and training (% of males aged 18-24)	10.3 b			11.5	10.4	8.6	8.4	9.0	8.0	7.9	7.6 b	7.8	7.7	9.0		
NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of males aged 15-24)	7.5 b			7.0 b	6.8	7.7	7.2	7.3	6.6	7.2	8.0	7.7	8.0	7.0		
Social Indicators	Female			At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of female population)	19.7	18.9	22.3 b	20.5	20.5	20.3	19.6	20.1	20.5	19.1	18.9	
				At-risk-of-poverty (% of female population)	14.0	13.3	16.1	15.3	15.8	15.0	15.3	15.2	14.9	14.3	14.6	
				Poverty gap (%)	14.1	15.9	18.7 b	19.2	21.6	19.1	20.0	20.7	20.1	19.6	18.7	
				Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of female population)		7.3	6.3	7.9	7.1	11.0 b	9.9	10.0	10.4	9.6	8.2	
				Severe Material Deprivation (% of female population)	3.4	3.5	6.3	4.9	4.6	4.4	4.2	4.2	4.2	3.3	3.1	
				Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of females aged 0-59)	9.2	9.8	8.6 b	8.7	8.9	9.7	8.7	8.5	10.5	9.1	8.8	
		Life expectancy at birth (years)	82.8	83.1	83.3 b	83.2	83.5	83.8	83.6	83.8	84.0	83.7	84.1			
		Healthy life years at birth (years) - women	61.0	61.4	59.9 b	60.8	60.8	60.1	62.5	60.2	57.8	58.1	57.1			
		Early leavers from education and training (% of females aged 18-24)	9.8 b	10.2	9.9	8.9	8.3	8.0	7.6	7.1	6.5 b	6.8	6.0	5.8		
		NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of females aged 15-24)	8.1 b	7.9 b	8.0	8.7	7.7	7.2	7.0	7.4	7.4	7.3	7.4	6.0		
		Social Indicators	Children (0-17)	At-Risk-of-poverty or exclusion of children (% of people aged 0-17)	19.3	18.5	22.9 b	20.8	22.4	22.1	20.9	22.9	23.3	22.3	20.0	
				At-risk-of-poverty (% of Children population)	14.7	14.8	18.1	17.1	19.0	17.8	17.5	18.6	18.2	17.8	16.5	
				Severe Material Deprivation (% of Children population)	4.2	3.7	6.7	5.0	5.6	5.8	5.8	6.4	6.0	4.2	3.5	
				Share of children living in low work intensity households (% of Children population)	7.0	6.3	5.5 b	5.7	5.9	7.0	6.1	7.2	8.6	7.5	6.5	
				Risk of poverty of children in households at work (Working Intensity > 0.2)	11.2	11.6	15.6 b	14.2	15.4	14.4	14.1	15.3	13.6	14.7	13.5	
				Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (0-17) (%)	60.0	59.0	51.0 b	52.1	49.7	54.8	52.7	52.9	51.7	54.2	57.4	
Social Indicators	Working age (18-64)	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of Working age population)	17.4	16.7	19.8 b	18.7	18.3	18.8	18.4	18.3	18.9	18.4	18.6			
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of Working age population)	11.0	10.6	13.3	13.0	12.9	13.1	13.3	12.9	12.9	13.0	13.6			
		Severe Material Deprivation (% of Working age population)	3.8	3.4	6.0	4.9	4.5	4.0	4.1	4.3	4.0	4.0	3.4			
		Very low work intensity (18-59)	8.4	8.8	8.0 b	7.5	8.4	9.1	8.2	7.9	9.3	8.4	8.7			
		In-work at-risk-of poverty rate (% of persons employed 18-64)	6.3	6.1	8.5 b	8.2	7.5	7.6	8.2	7.9	7.2	7.8	8.3			
		Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (18-64) (%)	52.6	54.5	44.1 b	45.2	47.1	48.6	45.5	46.3	46.9	47.6	47.5			
Social Indicators	Elderly (65+)	At-Risk-of-poverty or exclusion of elderly (% of people aged 65+)	17.3	15.1	21.2 b	18.6	17.4	17.4	16.2	16.2	15.7	14.0	13.7			
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of Elderly population)	16.2	14.0	18.9	17.4	16.8	16.2	15.1	15.4	14.2	13.2	13.2			
		Severe Material Deprivation (% of Elderly population)	2.1	2.1	4.4	2.8	1.9	2.1	1.9	1.8	2.0	1.4	1.2			
		Relative median income of elderly (ratio with median income of people younger than 65)	0.94	0.93	0.88 b	0.89	0.90	0.92	0.93	0.95	0.95	0.98	0.97			
		Aggregate replacement ratio (ratio)	0.65	0.62	0.61 b	0.56	0.57	0.59	0.58	0.59	0.60	0.62	0.62			
Expenditure in social protection indicators (% of GDP)		Sickness/Health care	6.8	6.8	7.0	7.4	7.3	7.2	7.3	7.3	7.3	7.4				
		Disability	2.2	2.0	2.0	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.0	1.9				
		Old age and survivors	12.9	12.7	13.0	14.0	14.1	13.9	14.2	14.5	14.7	14.7				
		Family/Children	2.9	2.8	2.9	3.1	3.1	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.7	2.8				
		Unemployment	1.5	1.4	1.3	1.6	1.6	1.5	1.5	1.6	1.6	1.6				
		Housing and Social exclusion n.e.c.	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.7				
		Total (including Admin and Other expenditures) of which: Means tested benefits	27.5	27.0	27.6	29.6	29.6	28.8	29.2	29.6	29.6	29.8	29.8			

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Poland

Poland	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017		
Macro Economic Indicators (Annual % growth)	Real GDP	6.2	7.0	4.2	2.8	3.6	5.0	1.6	1.4	3.3	3.8	3.0	4.6	
	Total employment	3.2	4.5	3.8	0.4	-2.7 b	0.6	0.1	-0.1	1.7	1.5	0.6 p	1.4 p	
	Labour productivity	2.9	2.4	0.4	2.4	6.4 b	4.4	1.5	1.5	1.5	2.3	2.4 p	3.2 p	
	Annual average hours worked per person employed	0.1	-0.1	-0.4	-0.8	-0.3 b	-0.3 b	-0.3	-0.2	0.3	0.4	0.1 p	-1.1 p	
	Real productivity per hour worked	2.8	2.6	0.8	3.2	6.7 b	4.7	1.8	1.6	1.2	1.9	2.3 p	4.3 p	
	Harmonized CPI	1.3	2.6	4.2	4.0	2.6	3.9	3.7	0.8	0.1	-0.7	-0.2	1.6	
	Price deflator GDP	1.7	3.7	3.9	3.8	1.7	3.2	2.3	0.3	0.5	0.8	0.3	1.9	
	Nominal compensation per employee	2.1	5.7	8.3	3.4	8.9 b	5.3 b	3.6	1.7	2.2	1.7	5.1 p		
	Real compensation per employee (GDP deflator)	0.4	2.0	4.2	-0.4	7.2 b	2.0 b	1.2	1.4	1.7	0.9	4.7 p		
	Real compensation per employee (private consumption deflator)	0.9	3.1	3.9	-0.6	6.1 b	1.4 b	-0.1	0.9	2.1	2.4	5.3 p		
	Nominal unit labour costs	-0.7	3.2	7.8	0.9	2.4 b	0.8	2.0	0.2	0.6	-0.6	2.6 p		
	Real unit labour costs	-2.5	-0.5	3.8	-2.7	0.7 b	-2.4 b	-0.3	-0.1	0.2	-1.3	2.3 p		
	Labour Market Indicators - Total	Total population (000)	38157	38125	38116	38136	38023 b	38063	38064	38063	38018	38006	37967	37973
		Population aged 15-64 (000)	26892	26987	27083	27160	27044	27077	26986	26843	26639	26431	26199	25957
Total employment (000)		14594	15241	15800	15868	15473 b	15562	15591	15568	15862	16084	16197	16423	
Employment aged 15-64 (000)		14338	14997	15557	15630	15233 b	15313	15340	15313	15591	15812	15902	16079	
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)		60.1	62.7	65.0	64.9	64.3 b	64.5	64.7	64.9	66.5	67.8	69.3	70.9	
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)		54.5	57.0	59.2	59.3	58.9 b	59.3	59.7	60.0	61.7	62.9	64.5	66.1	
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)		24.0	25.8	27.3	26.8	26.4 b	24.9	24.7	24.2	25.8	26.0	28.4	29.6	
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)		71.8	74.9	77.5	77.6	77.2 b	77.3	77.2	77.0	78.4	79.5	80.3	81.4	
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)		28.1	29.7	31.6	32.3	34.1 b	36.9	38.7	40.6	42.5	44.3	46.2	48.3	
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)		59.0	61.7	64.1	64.0	63.4 b	63.7	64.0	64.2	65.8	67.0	68.6	70.2	
Self-employed (% total employment)		19.9	19.2	18.8	18.8	19.1 b	19.1	18.9	18.5	18.3	18.3	18.1	17.8	
Part-time employment (% total employment)		8.9	8.5	7.7	7.7	7.7 b	7.3	7.2	7.1	7.1	6.8	6.4	6.6	
Temporary employment (% total employment)		21.1	21.4	19.9	19.9	20.6 b	20.7	20.6	20.7	21.8	21.4	21.0	19.7	
Employment in Services (% total employment)				54.4 b	55.8	56.8 b	56.6	57.1	57.5	58.0	58.0	58.0	58.2	
Employment in Industry (% total employment)				32.3 b	31.4	30.6 b	31.0	30.7	30.8	30.8	30.7	31.6	31.8	
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)				13.3 b	12.7	12.6 b	12.4	12.2	11.7	11.2	11.3	10.4	10.0	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)		63.4	63.2	63.8	64.7	65.3 b	65.7	66.5	67.0	67.9	68.1	68.8	69.6	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)		34.2	33.0	33.1	33.8	34.6 b	33.5	33.6	33.3	33.9	32.8	34.5	34.8	
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)		81.7	81.7	82.5	83.4	84.1 b	84.2	84.6	84.6	85.1	85.1	84.9	84.9	
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)		30.7	31.8	33.3	34.5	36.7 b	39.6	41.8	44.0	45.6	46.9	48.3	50.1	
Total unemployment (000)		2311	1579	1165	1359 d	1650	1659	1749	1793	1567	1304	1063	844	
Unemployment rate (% labour force)		13.9	9.6	7.1	8.1 d	9.7	9.7	10.1	10.3	9.0	7.5	6.2	4.9	
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)		29.8	21.6	17.2	20.6 d	23.7	25.8	26.5	27.3	23.9	20.8	17.7	14.8	
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)		7.8	4.9	2.4	2.5	3.0 b	3.6	4.1	4.4	3.8	3.0	2.2	1.5	
Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)		56.1	51.3	33.5	30.3	31.1 b	37.2	40.3	42.5	42.7	39.3	35.0	31.0	
Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)		10.2	7.1	5.7	7.0	8.2 b	8.6	8.9	9.1	8.1	6.8	6.1	5.2	
Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)		38.6	41.0	43.0	41.6	39.9 b	39.7	39.8	38.5	39.3 b	40.8	40.7	41.8	
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)		62.9	65.2	67.1	66.3	65.4 b	65.8	65.4	65.2	66.1 b	67.2	68.5	69.6	
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)		83.5	84.5	85.1	85.3	84.6 b	84.6	84.7	84.8	86.3 b	87.1	87.5	88.1	
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)		54.5	57.0	59.2	59.3	58.9 b	59.3	59.7	60.0	61.7	62.9	64.5	66.1	
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)		53.8 u	70.8 u	85.3 u	73.3 u	58.8 bu	75.3 u	74.5 u	70.7 u	73.9 u	79.0 u	64.3 u	79.8	
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)		50.5	62.6	63.5	61.9	60.5 b	57.1	61.9	56.7	62.4	57.4	59.4	68.9	
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)		54.6	57.1	59.3	59.4	59.0 b	59.3	59.7	60.0	61.7	62.9	64.5	66.1	
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)		37.3	34.2	40.3	34.2 u	41.9 bu	54.6 u	62.4 u	62.0 u	64.2	69.7	61.4 u	67.8	
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)		34.2	38.7	45.5	51.7	54.8 b	55.6	61.6	58.0	62.5	58.0	63.0	70.3	
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)				1.5	1.7	1.8 b	1.8	2.0 b	2.1	2.2	1.9	1.6	1.4	
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)		0.8 b	0.8	0.6 b	0.6	0.7 b	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.5	
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)		5.1	4.8	3.8	3.8	3.7 b	3.7	3.7	3.9	3.7	3.2	2.8	2.5	

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Poland	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017		
Labour Market Indicators - Male	Total population (000)	18454	18427	18412	18415	18412 b	18430	18427	18426	18404	18397	18377	18378	
	Population aged 15-64(000)	13363	13406	13449	13485	13482	13496	13454	13388	13293	13196	13086	12974	
	Total employment (000)	8081	8403	8718	8722	8566 b	8648	8651	8641	8778	8867	8933	9066	
	Employment aged 15-64 (000)	7927	8258	8573	8578	8418 b	8496	8498	8486	8607	8690	8737	8842	
	Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	67.3	70.2	73.0	72.6	71.3 b	71.9	72.0	72.1	73.6	74.7	76.4	78.2	
	Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)	60.9	63.6	66.3	66.1	65.3 b	66.0	66.3	66.6	68.2	69.2	71.0	72.8	
	Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)	26.9	29.2	31.0	30.4	30.5 b	29.6	29.2	28.6	30.0	30.5	32.8	33.9	
	Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)	78.3	81.1	84.0	83.7	82.5 b	83.0	82.9	82.7	83.9	84.9	86.1	87.3	
	Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)	38.4	41.4	44.1	44.3	45.2 b	47.8	49.3	51.3	53.1	54.2	55.7	58.3	
	FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	67.2	70.3	73.3	72.8	71.6 b	72.1	72.4	72.6	74.1	75.0	76.8	78.7	
	Self-employed (% total employment)	23.4	22.7	22.3	22.4	22.8 b	22.8	22.6	22.4	22.3	22.2	22.2	22.3	
	Part-time employment (% total employment)	6.2	5.8	5.1	5.0	5.0 b	4.7	4.5	4.5	4.4	4.2	3.7	3.7	
	Temporary employment (% total employment)	21.1	21.4	19.9	19.9	20.6 b	20.7	20.6	20.7	21.8	21.4	21.0	19.7	
	Employment in Services (% total employment)			42.8 b	43.9	44.9 b	44.5	44.7	44.9	45.6	45.5	45.1	45.2	
	Employment in Industry (% total employment)			43.8 b	43.3	42.2 b	42.5	42.4	42.6	42.2	42.3	43.6	43.7	
	Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)			13.4 b	12.8	12.9 b	13.0	12.9	12.5	12.2	12.3	11.4	11.1	
	Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)	70.1	70.0	70.9	71.8	72.1 b	72.6	73.3	73.9	74.6	74.8	75.7	76.6	
	Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)	37.5	36.5	36.5	38.1	39.3 b	38.7	38.5	38.4	38.8	38.4	39.8	39.7	
	Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)	88.2	87.9	88.8	89.4	89.6 b	89.7	90.0	90.0	90.5	90.6	90.8	91.1	
	Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)	42.6	44.7	46.8	47.5	48.9 b	51.6	53.5	55.9	57.2	57.5	58.6	60.8	
	Total unemployment (000)	1191	817	583	716 d	881	856	900	927	815	701	581	464	
	Unemployment rate (% labour force)	13.0	9.0	6.4	7.8 d	9.4	9.0	9.4	9.7	8.5	7.3	6.1	4.9	
	Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)	28.3	20.0	15.2	20.2 d	22.4	23.6	24.1	25.4	22.7	20.7	17.4	14.6	
	Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)	7.1	4.6	2.0	2.2	2.9 b	3.3	3.7	4.0	3.7	2.9	2.2	1.6	
	Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)	54.7	50.8	31.8	27.9	30.8 b	36.3	39.0	41.5	42.9	39.6	35.8	31.9	
	Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)	10.6	7.3	5.6	7.7	8.8 b	9.1	9.3	9.7	8.8	7.9	6.9	5.8	
	Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)	48.9	51.8	55.0	53.4	49.5 b	49.2	49.6	49.0	49.7 b	51.5	51.9	52.9	
	Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)	71.4	73.9	76.1	75.1	74.0 b	74.7	74.3	74.2	75.2 b	76.1	77.5	78.9	
	Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)	86.8	88.3	89.2	89.9	88.6 b	88.9	89.1	89.5	90.9 b	91.5	92.1	93.2	
	Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)	60.9	63.6	66.3	66.1	65.3 b	66.0	66.3	66.6	68.2	69.2	71.0	72.8	
	Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)		77.2 u	89.0 u	82.0 u		83.3 u	84.7 u	83.6 u	82.3 u	84.6 u	71.6 u	84.5 u	
	Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)	61.0 u	68.1 u	66.0 u	68.3 u	75.4 bu	70.5 u	73.7 u	71.8 u	70.2 u	70.2	72.3	74.7	
	Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)	60.9	63.7	66.4	66.2	65.3 b	66.0	66.3	66.6	68.2	69.2	71.0	72.8	
	Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)	41.5 u	43.4 u	50.6 u	43.3 u	44.8 bu	59.8 u	69.8 u	73.9 u	72.4 u	71.7 u	61.6 u	73.2 u	
	Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)	43.5 u	51.9 u	51.9	60.9 u	68.4 bu	65.0 u	72.0 u	66.8	71.9	73.7	76.5	75.5	
	Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)			1.1	1.2	1.3 b	1.3	1.4 b	1.4	1.4	1.3	1.1	0.9	
	Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)	0.7 b	0.6	0.5 b	0.5	0.5 b	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.4	
	Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)	4.1	3.8	3.0	3.0	3.0 b	3.0	3.0	3.2	3.0	2.6	2.3	2.2	
	Labour Market Indicators - Female	Total population (000)	19703	19699	19704	19721	19611 b	19633	19636	19636	19614	19608	19590	19595
		Population aged 15-64(000)	13529	13580	13634	13675	13562	13580	13531	13455	13346	13235	13112	12983
		Total employment (000)	6513	6838	7082	7147	6908 b	6914	6940	6927	7084	7217	7264	7357
		Employment aged 15-64 (000)	6411	6738	6984	7052	6815 b	6817	6842	6828	6984	7121	7165	7237
		Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	53.1	55.5	57.3	57.6	57.3 b	57.2	57.5	57.6	59.4	60.9	62.2	63.6
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)		48.2	50.6	52.4	52.8	52.6 b	52.7	53.1	53.4	55.2	56.6	58.1	59.5	
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)		21.0	22.4	23.7	23.2	22.1 b	20.0	19.9	19.5	21.3	21.3	23.7	25.2	
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)		65.3	68.8	71.0	71.6	71.7 b	71.5	71.5	71.2	72.7	73.9	74.5	75.3	
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)		19.0	19.4	20.7	21.9	24.2 b	27.2	29.2	31.0	32.9	35.5	37.6	39.3	
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)		51.2	53.6	55.4	55.7	55.4 b	55.5	55.8	56.0	57.6	59.2	60.5	61.8	
Self-employed (% total employment)		15.5	15.0	14.5	14.3	14.5 b	14.6	14.2	13.7	13.3	13.4	13.0	12.3	
Part-time employment (% total employment)		12.2	11.7	10.9	10.9	10.9 b	10.5	10.6	10.4	10.3	9.9	9.7	10.0	
Temporary employment (% total employment)		20.5	22.3	22.2	21.4	21.8 b	21.1	21.3	21.6	23.2	23.1	23.1	22.5	
Employment in Services (% total employment)				68.7 b	70.4	71.6 b	71.6	72.5	73.2	73.4	73.3	73.8	74.0	
Employment in Industry (% total employment)				18.1 b	17.0	16.2 b	16.7	16.2	16.2	16.6	16.5	16.9	17.3	
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)				13.2 b	12.6	12.2 b	11.8	11.3	10.6	10.0	10.2	9.3	8.7	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)		56.8	56.5	57.0	57.8	58.5 b	58.9	59.7	60.1	61.1	61.4	62.0	62.6	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)		30.7	29.3	29.6	29.4	29.6 b	28.1	28.4	27.9	28.7	26.9	28.9	29.7	
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)		75.4	75.6	76.3	77.5	78.6 b	78.6	79.1	79.1	79.6	79.6	79.0	78.7	
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)		20.3	20.6	21.6	23.2	25.9 b	29.0	31.3	33.3	35.2	37.3	39.0	40.5	
Total unemployment (000)		1120	763	582	644 d	769	802	850	866	752	603	482	380	
Unemployment rate (% labour force)		15.1	10.3	7.9	8.6 d	10.0	10.4	10.9	11.1	9.6	7.7	6.2	4.9	
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)		31.6	23.7	19.7	21.1 d	25.4	28.8	30.0	30.1	25.5	20.9	18.0	15.1	
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)		8.6	5.4	2.8	2.9	3.2 b	4.0	4.6	4.8	4.1	3.0	2.1	1.5	
Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)		57.7	51.8	35.1	33.0	31.5 b	38.2	41.8	43.5	42.6	38.8	34.0	30.0	
Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)		9.7	7.0	5.9	6.2	7.5 b	8.1	8.5	8.4	7.3	5.6	5.2	4.5	
Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)		29.7	31.6	32.4	31.1	30.8 b	30.7	30.2	28.3	29.0 b	29.8	29.3	30.4	
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)		53.8	56.1	57.4	56.9	56.0 b	55.8	55.4	55.0	55.9 b	57.1	58.0	58.7	
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)		81.0	81.7	82.2	82.1	81.8 b	81.6	81.5	81.6	83.0 b	84.1	84.3	84.6	
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)		48.2	50.6	52.4	52.7	52.6 b	52.7	53.1	53.4	55.2	56.6	58.1	59.4	
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)													72.1 u	
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)		41.0 u	58.2 u	61.4 u	57.9 u	49.2 bu	47.3 u	49.9 u	40.4 u	55.1 u	46.0 u	48.2	63.4	
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)		48.3	50.7	52.4	52.8	52.6 b	52.7	53.1	53.4	55.2	56.6	58.1	59.4	
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)		32.5 u		28.2 u								61.2 u	59.4 u	
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)		27.4 u	29.4 u	39.8 u	45.8	45.6 bu	48.7 u	53.2 u	49.9 u	55.3	46.7	51.5	65.6	
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)				2.0	2.1	2.3 b	2.4	2.8 b	2.9	3.1	2.6	2.2	2.0	
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)		1.0 b	0.9	0.8 b	0.8	0.8 b	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)		6.5	6.1	4.8	4.7	4.5 b	4.4	4.5	4.8	4.7	4.0	3.4	3.0	

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Poland		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	
All	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of total population)	39.5	34.4	30.5 b	27.8	27.8	27.2	26.7	25.8	24.7	23.4	21.9		
	At-risk-of-poverty (% of total population)	19.1	17.3	16.9	17.1	17.6	17.7	17.1	17.3	17.0	17.6	17.3		
	At-risk-of-poverty threshold (PPS single person)	3057	3365	4039	4417	4547	4993	5181	5495	5736	5970	6510		
	Poverty gap (%)	25.0	24.0	20.6	22.7	22.2	21.4	22.2	22.6	23.2	22.3	24.4		
	Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of total population)			10.4	10.2	10.5	10.1	10.7	9.0	10.7	10.1	9.7		
	At-risk-of-poverty before social transfers excl. pensions (% of total population)	28.6	26.5	25.1	23.6	24.4	24.1	22.9	23.0	23.1	22.9	22.9		
	Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (%)	33.2	34.7	32.7	27.5	27.9	26.6	25.3	24.8	26.4	23.1	24.5		
	Severe Material Deprivation (% of total population)	27.6	22.3	17.7	15.0	14.2	13.0	13.5	11.9	10.4	8.1	6.7		
	Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of people aged 0-59)	12.4	10.1	8.0	6.9	7.3	6.9	6.9	7.2	7.3	6.9	6.4		
	Real Gross Household Disposable income (growth %)	4.6	5.1	4.4	5.9	2.1	0.4	1.1	1.4	2.9	3.7	6.0		
	Income quintile share ratio S80/S20	5.6	5.3	5.1	5.0	5.0	5.0	4.9	4.9	4.9	4.9	4.8		
	GINI coefficient	33.3	32.2	32.0	31.4	31.1	31.1	30.9	30.7	30.8	30.6	29.8		
	Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18-24)	5.4	5.0	5.0 b	5.3	5.4 b	5.6	5.7	5.6 b	5.4 b	5.3	5.2	5.0	
	NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of total population aged 15-24)	12.6	10.6	9.0 b	10.1	10.8 b	11.5	11.8	12.2 b	12.0	11.0	10.5	9.5	
Male	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of male population)	39.0	33.5	29.9 b	27.0	27.0	26.6	26.1	25.5	24.7	23.7	21.6		
	At-risk-of-poverty (% of male population)	19.7	17.6	17.0	16.9	17.4	17.8	17.1	17.3	17.2	18.1	17.1		
	Poverty gap (%)	25.9	25.4	21.5	23.7	23.3	22.8	23.3	23.4	24.4	24.1	25.6		
	Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of male population)			10.7	10.4	10.2	10.4	10.4	9.1	10.8	10.0	9.7		
	Severe Material Deprivation (% of male population)	27.4	21.9	17.6	14.6	14.1	12.9	13.2	11.8	10.6	8.5	6.7		
	Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of males aged 0-59)	11.8	9.5	7.3	6.4	6.7	6.4	6.5	6.9	7.1	6.8	6.1		
	Life expectancy at birth (years)	70.9	71.0	71.3	71.5	72.2	72.6	73.0	73.7	73.5	73.9	73.9		
	Healthy life years at birth (years) - men	58.4 bd	57.6	58.6	58.3	58.5	59.1	59.1	59.2	59.8	60.1	61.3		
	Early leavers from education and training (% of males aged 18-24)	6.9	6.2	6.1 b	6.6	7.2 b	7.4	7.8	7.9 b	7.3 b	7.2	6.4	6.0	
	NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of males aged 15-24)	12.1	9.3	7.3 b	9.4	10.5 b	11.2	11.5	12.1 b	12.0	11.2	10.0	8.3	
	Female	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of female population)	40.0	35.1	31.2 b	28.6	28.5	27.7	27.3	26.2	24.7	23.2	22.2	
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of female population)	18.5	17.1	16.7	17.4	17.7	17.6	17.1	17.3	16.8	17.2	17.4	
		Poverty gap (%)	24.2	22.8	20.0	21.8	21.0	20.3	21.2	21.9	22.3	21.1	22.9	
		Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of female population)			10.2	10.1	10.7	9.9	11.0	9.0	10.6	10.2	9.7	
Severe Material Deprivation (% of female population)		27.8	22.7	17.9	15.3	14.4	13.2	13.8	12.0	10.2	7.8	6.6		
Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of females aged 0-59)		13.1	10.7	8.6	7.4	8.0	7.4	7.2	7.4	7.5	7.1	6.8		
Life expectancy at birth (years)		79.7	79.8	80.0	80.1	80.7	81.1	81.1	81.2	81.7	81.6	82.0		
Healthy life years at birth (years) - women		62.9 bd	61.5	63.0	62.5	62.3	63.3	62.8	62.7	62.7	63.2	64.6		
Early leavers from education and training (% of females aged 18-24)		3.9	3.8	3.9 b	3.9	3.5 b	3.7	3.5	3.2 b	3.3 b	3.2	3.9	3.9	
NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of females aged 15-24)		13.1	11.9	10.8 b	10.8	11.0 b	11.8	12.2	12.3 b	12.0	10.8	11.1	10.7	
Children (0-17)		At-Risk-of-poverty or exclusion of children (% of people aged 0-17)	42.0	37.1	32.9 b	31.0	30.8	29.8	29.3	29.8	28.2	26.6	24.2	
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of Children population)	26.3	24.2	22.4	23.0	22.5	22.0	21.5	23.2	22.3	22.4	21.1	
		Severe Material Deprivation (% of Children population)	28.2	22.5	17.5	15.3	14.9	13.2	13.7	11.8	10.2	7.9	5.8	
		Share of children living in low work intensity households (% of Children population)	8.7	6.6	5.0	4.7	4.8	4.1	4.6	5.0	5.1	5.0	4.9	
	Risk of poverty of children in households at work (Working Intensity > 0.2)	21.9	20.8	19.8	20.3	19.4	19.7	18.8	20.3	19.5	19.5	18.2		
	Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (0-17) (%)	27.6	29.9	31.1	23.6	26.7	26.9	25.6	22.4	24.2	20.6	24.6		
Working age (18-64)	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of Working age population)	40.2	34.9	30.6 b	27.3	27.6	27.0	26.7	26.1	25.2	24.1	22.7		
	At-risk-of-poverty (% of Working age population)	19.1	17.2	16.3	16.0	16.9	17.1	16.5	16.7	16.7	17.6	17.3		
	Severe Material Deprivation (% of Working age population)	27.2	21.9	17.2	14.4	13.6	12.5	13.2	12.0	10.5	8.2	7.1		
	Very low work intensity (18-59)	13.6	11.2	8.9	7.6	8.1	7.8	7.6	7.8	8.0	7.6	6.9		
	In-work at-risk-of poverty rate (% of persons employed 18-64)	12.8	11.7	11.5	11.0	11.5	11.2	10.4	10.8	10.7	11.3	10.9		
	Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (18-64) (%)	35.7	36.5	34.5	30.4	29.9	28.2	27.0	26.8	28.3	24.8	26.1		
Elderly (65+)	At-Risk-of-poverty or exclusion of elderly (% of people aged 65+)	32.5	27.3	26.9 b	25.8	24.4	24.7	23.4	19.7	18.2	17.0	16.1		
	At-risk-of-poverty (% of Elderly population)	7.8	7.8	11.7	14.4	14.2	14.7	14.0	12.3	11.7	12.1	12.8		
	Severe Material Deprivation (% of Elderly population)	29.2	23.7	20.8	17.3	16.5	15.4	14.8	11.5	9.7	7.9	5.9		
	Relative median income of elderly (ratio with median income of people younger than 65)	1.07	1.04	0.97	0.92	0.93	0.94	0.95	0.98	0.99	0.99	0.97		
	Aggregate replacement ratio (ratio)	0.59	0.58	0.56	0.56	0.57	0.55	0.58	0.60	0.63	0.62	0.62		
Expenditure in social protection indicators (% of GDP)	Sickness/Health care	3.8 p	3.9 p	4.4 p	4.6 p	4.4 p	4.2	4.1	4.2	4.0				
	Disability	2.1 p	1.8 p	1.7 p	1.6 p	1.7 p	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.5				
	Old age and survivors	11.4 p	10.7 p	10.9 p	11.7 p	11.1 p	10.6	10.9	11.3	11.2				
	Family/Children	0.9 p	0.9 p	1.2 p	1.3 p	1.3 p	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.5				
	Unemployment	0.6 p	0.4 p	0.4 p	0.4 p	0.4 p	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2				
	Housing and Social exclusion n.e.c.	0.3 p	0.3 p	0.2 p	0.2 p	0.3 p	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2				
	Total (including Admin and Other expenditures)	19.7 p	18.4 p	19.3 p	20.3 p	19.7 p	18.7	18.9	19.4	19.1				
	of which: Means tested benefits	1.0 p	0.9 p	0.8 p	0.7 p	0.7 p	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.7				

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Portugal

Portugal	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017		
Macro Economic Indicators (Annual % growth)	Real GDP	1.6	2.5	0.2	-3.0	1.9	-1.8	-4.0	-1.1	0.9	1.8	1.6 p	2.7 e	
	Total employment	0.4	0.0	0.4	-2.7	-1.4	-1.9	-4.1	-2.9	1.4	1.4	1.6 p	3.3 e	
	Labour productivity	1.2	2.5	-0.2	-0.3	3.4	0.1	0.1	1.8	-0.5	0.4	0.0 p	-0.6 e	
	Annual average hours worked per person employed	-0.6	0.9	-0.7	0.0	0.1	-1.2	-0.9	0.6	0.4	0.4	-0.6 p	-0.1 ep	
	Real productivity per hour worked	1.8	1.6	0.5	-0.3	3.2	1.4	1.0	1.2	-0.9	0.0	0.5 p	-0.5 e	
	Harmonized CPI	3.0	2.4	2.7	-0.9	1.4	3.6	2.8	0.4	-0.2	0.5	0.6	1.6	
	Price deflator GDP	3.2	3.0	1.7	1.1	0.6	-0.3	-0.4	2.3	0.8	2.0	1.5 p	1.4 e	
	Nominal compensation per employee	1.8	3.5	2.6	2.4	2.1	-1.9	-3.1	3.6	-1.8	0.4	2.1 p	1.1 ep	
	Real compensation per employee (GDP deflator)	-1.3	0.5	0.9	1.3	1.4	-1.6	-2.7	1.3	-2.5	-1.6	0.6 p	-0.2 ep	
	Real compensation per employee (private consumption deflator)	-1.2	1.0	0.0	3.3	0.7	-5.2	-5.7	3.2	-1.6	-0.1	1.4 p	-0.4 ep	
	Nominal unit labour costs	0.7	1.0	2.8	2.7	-1.2	-2.0	-3.2	1.8	-1.3	0.0	2.1 p	1.7 e	
	Real unit labour costs	-2.5	-2.0	1.1	1.6	-1.9	-1.7	-2.8	-0.5	-2.0	-2.0	0.6 p	0.3 ep	
	Labour Market Indicators - Total	Total population (000)	10512	10533	10553	10563	10573	10573	10542	10487	10427	10375	10341	10310
		Population aged 15-64 (000)	7018	7028	7039	7034	7025	7001	6962	6904	6836	6779	6740	6691
Total employment (000)		5079	5093	5117	4969	4898	4740 b	4547	4429	4500	4549	4605	4757	
Employment aged 15-64 (000)		4751	4756	4786	4645	4577	4453 b	4256	4158	4255	4309	4371	4515	
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)		72.6	72.5	73.1	71.1	70.3	68.8 b	66.3	65.4	67.6	69.1	70.6	73.4	
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)		67.6	67.6	68.0	66.1	65.3	63.8 b	61.4	60.6	62.6	63.9	65.2	67.8	
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)		34.8	34.4	34.1	30.8	27.9	26.6 b	23.0	21.7	22.4	22.8	23.9	25.9	
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)		81.2	80.9	81.6	79.7	79.2	77.8 b	75.5	74.6	77.4	78.8	80.2	82.5	
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)		50.1	51.0	50.7	49.7	49.5	47.8 b	46.5	46.9	47.8	49.9	52.1	56.2	
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)		70.8	70.5	71.3	69.3	68.4	65.9 b	63.0	62.3	64.8	66.3	68.1	71.0	
Self-employed (% total employment)		23.5	23.7	23.4	23.2	22.2	20.9 b	21.4	21.3	19.2	17.9	17.1	16.5	
Part-time employment (% total employment)		8.2	8.9	8.8	8.5	8.5	10.3 b	11.2	11.1	10.1	9.8	9.5	8.9	
Temporary employment (% total employment)		15.2	16.9	16.9	16.2	17.5	17.3 b	16.3	16.7	17.4	18.3	18.5	18.5	
Employment in Services (% total employment)				62.1 b	63.3	64.1	65.3 b	66.7	68.5	69.6	69.9	70.2	70.4	
Employment in Industry (% total employment)				30.7 b	29.5	28.8	28.2 b	26.5	24.9	24.9	25.3	25.4	25.6	
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)				7.2 b	7.3	7.1	6.5 b	6.8	6.6	5.5	4.8	4.5	4.0	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)		73.6	73.9	73.9	73.4	73.7	73.6 b	73.4	73.0	73.2	73.4	73.7	74.7	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)		41.7	41.3	40.9	38.7	36.1	38.2 b	37.1	35.0	34.3	33.5	33.2	34.0	
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)		87.7	87.7	88.0	87.8	88.7	88.4 b	88.5	88.3	88.6	88.8	89.1	89.6	
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)		53.4	54.6	54.3	53.8	54.3	53.6 b	53.3	54.4	55.3	57.0	58.5	61.5	
Total unemployment (000)		478	494	476	574	645	688	835	855	729	648	571	465	
Unemployment rate (% labour force)		8.9	9.1	8.8	10.7	12.0	12.9	15.8	16.4	14.1	12.6	11.2	9.0	
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)		21.2	21.4	21.6	25.3	28.2	30.2	38.0	38.1	34.7	32.0	28.2	23.8	
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)		3.9	3.8	3.6	4.2	5.7	6.2 b	7.7	9.3	8.4	7.2	6.2	4.5	
Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)		50.4	47.1	47.3	44.0	52.0	48.4 b	48.8	56.4	59.6	57.4	55.4	49.9	
Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)		6.9	6.9	6.8	7.9	8.2	11.5 b	14.1	13.3	11.9	10.7	9.3	8.1	
Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)		71.5	71.4	71.6	68.9	68.1	65.7 b	62.9	61.6	63.0 b	64.3	65.5	68.4	
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)		80.2	80.0	80.7	80.2	79.9	79.3 b	76.0	75.8	77.6 b	78.7	79.4	81.8	
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)		86.4	86.0	86.7	86.6	85.4	83.6 b	82.1	80.5	82.7 b	83.7	85.1	86.8	
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)		67.5	67.5	67.8	66.1	65.3	63.8 b	61.5	60.8	62.7	64.0	65.3	67.8	
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)		69.2	71.1	79.0	70.7	64.2	70.0 b	63.6	56.7	60.7	70.2	68.0	70.9	
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)		71.1	71.5	72.0	65.7	65.4	62.4 b	57.5	54.4	59.0	58.9	64.3	67.5	
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)		67.3	67.2	67.5	65.7	64.9	63.4 b	60.9	60.4	62.2	63.5	64.7	67.2	
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)		68.2	70.8	73.9	73.0	71.6	75.6 b	71.3	67.2	73.8	75.1	76.7	80.3	
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)		72.5	73.4	73.9	68.8	68.0	66.5 b	64.9	61.1	64.2	65.5	68.1	72.0	
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)				1.8	1.7	1.8	4.0 b	4.8	5.0	4.8	4.7	4.4	3.9	
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)		0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.6 b	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.5	
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)		1.6	1.4	1.3	1.3	1.3	3.2 b	4.3	5.3	5.3	5.1	4.6	4.1	

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Portugal	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017		
Labour Market Indicators - Male	Total population (000)	5059	5064	5070	5066	5064	5054	5030	4996	4958	4924	4902	4882	
	Population aged 15-64(000)	3442	3446	3450	3442	3435	3419	3395	3361	3321	3286	3262	3236	
	Total employment (000)	2725	2725	2725	2612	2569	2487 b	2357	2288	2320	2334	2361	2442	
	Employment aged 15-64 (000)	2538	2539	2542	2436	2390	2306 b	2177	2116	2164	2182	2210	2286	
	Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	79.2	79.1	79.4	76.4	75.4	73.2 b	69.8	68.7	71.3	72.6	74.2	77.3	
	Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)	73.7	73.6	73.8	70.8	69.8	67.7 b	64.5	63.5	65.8	66.9	68.3	71.1	
	Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)	38.7	38.5	37.7	32.5	29.7	28.7 b	24.8	22.9	22.9	24.1	25.5	27.6	
	Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)	87.5	87.2	87.6	84.7	84.1	81.7 b	78.6	77.1	80.6	81.8	83.0	85.6	
	Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)	58.2	58.7	58.3	57.5	55.8	54.2 b	51.6	53.5	54.3	56.0	58.5	63.0	
	FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	79.1	78.9	79.6	76.3	74.8	71.5 b	67.6	66.6	69.3	70.8	72.6	76.0	
	Self-employed (% total employment)	25.3	25.8	25.2	25.7	24.9	25.0 b	25.6	25.6	23.9	22.3	21.3	20.6	
	Part-time employment (% total employment)	4.2	4.7	4.1	4.4	5.0	7.1 b	8.4	8.2	7.6	7.1	6.8	6.1	
	Temporary employment (% total employment)	15.2	16.9	16.9	16.2	17.5	17.3 b	16.3	16.7	17.4	18.3	18.5	18.5	
	Employment in Services (% total employment)			51.2 b	52.1	52.8	53.6 b	55.0	57.9	59.1	59.3	59.3	59.4	
	Employment in Industry (% total employment)			42.2 b	40.8	39.7	39.2 b	37.1	34.1	34.0	34.7	34.9	35.2	
	Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)			6.6 b	7.1	7.4	7.2 b	7.9	8.0	7.0	6.0	5.7	5.4	
	Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)	79.2	79.2	79.2	78.2	77.8	78.0 b	77.3	76.5	76.7	76.7	77.2	77.9	
	Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)	45.5	44.7	43.6	40.1	38.0	40.4 b	39.2	36.2	34.8	34.2	35.0	35.6	
	Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)	92.9	92.9	93.2	92.5	92.7	92.4 b	92.1	91.1	91.6	91.7	91.9	92.3	
	Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)	62.7	63.2	62.9	62.6	62.0	61.6 b	60.4	62.7	64.0	65.0	66.9	69.3	
	Total unemployment (000)	248	249	246	309	331	349	434	436	363	324	289	225	
	Unemployment rate (% labour force)	8.6	8.7	8.6	11.0	11.9	12.6	15.9	16.3	13.8	12.4	11.1	8.6	
	Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)	19.9	18.9	19.0	24.6	27.3	29.0	36.7	36.7	33.9	29.7	27.4	22.5	
	Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)	3.4	3.2	3.2	3.7	5.1	6.1 b	7.8	9.4	8.4	7.3	6.4	4.3	
	Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)	51.3	47.5	48.5	40.6	51.4	48.0 b	48.9	57.6	60.8	58.8	57.3	50.5	
	Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)	6.8	6.2	5.9	7.7	8.2	11.7 b	14.4	13.3	11.9	10.1	9.5	8.0	
	Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)	80.4	80.0	79.8	76.5	75.4	72.7 b	68.9	67.2	69.1 b	70.7	71.8	75.9	
	Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)	82.7	82.5	83.9	83.8	83.5	81.2 b	77.8	77.9	81.1 b	81.1	82.1	84.0	
	Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)	88.5	89.3	90.3	87.6	86.1	83.7 b	82.6	82.7	85.5 b	85.2	86.8	87.9	
	Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)	73.5	73.4	73.5	70.8	69.7	67.7 b	64.6	63.7	65.9	66.8	68.2	71.0	
	Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)	77.5	83.0	88.6	85.3	72.2	72.2 b	71.8	66.5	66.9	72.4	70.0	76.8	
	Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)	78.1	78.0	78.3	70.2	71.7	66.8 b	56.4	54.9	59.4	67.9	70.2	73.0	
	Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)	73.5	73.2	73.2	70.5	69.4	67.5 b	64.2	63.4	65.4	66.5	67.8	70.4	
	Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)	73.6	78.7	83.9	79.9	78.2	77.4 b	76.9	73.0	77.7	76.0	80.0	82.6	
	Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)	77.4	79.2	79.3	73.1	72.8	68.6 b	65.4	61.2	66.6	69.8	71.1	76.1	
	Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)			0.9	0.9	0.9	2.8 b	3.6	3.7	3.6	3.4	3.3	2.8	
	Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)			0.2			0.4 b	0.5	0.4	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.3	
	Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)	1.0	0.9	0.8	1.1	1.0	2.4 b	3.5	4.5	4.4	4.2	4.1	3.5	
	Labour Market Indicators - Female	Total population (000)	5453	5468	5484	5497	5510	5519	5512	5492	5469	5451	5440	5427
		Population aged 15-64(000)	3576	3582	3589	3591	3590	3582	3567	3544	3515	3493	3477	3454
		Total employment (000)	2354	2367	2391	2357	2329	2253 b	2190	2141	2180	2214	2244	2314
		Employment aged 15-64 (000)	2213	2217	2243	2209	2187	2147 b	2079	2042	2091	2127	2161	2229
		Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	66.3	66.3	67.1	66.1	65.6	64.6 b	63.0	62.3	64.2	65.9	67.4	69.8
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)		61.8	61.8	62.5	61.5	61.0	60.1 b	58.5	57.9	59.6	61.1	62.4	64.8	
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)		30.7	30.1	30.3	29.2	26.0	24.5 b	21.2	20.4	21.9	21.5	22.3	24.1	
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)		75.2	74.8	75.8	74.9	74.5	74.1 b	72.5	72.2	74.3	76.1	77.6	79.7	
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)		42.8	44.3	44.0	42.8	43.8	42.0 b	42.0	41.0	42.1	44.5	46.3	50.2	
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)		63.0	62.7	63.4	62.8	62.4	60.6 b	58.7	58.3	60.5	62.2	63.9	66.5	
Self-employed (% total employment)		21.4	21.4	21.5	20.4	19.2	16.5 b	16.9	16.7	14.3	13.3	12.7	12.2	
Part-time employment (% total employment)		12.8	13.7	14.1	13.2	14.2	13.8 b	14.2	14.0	12.6	12.5	12.1	11.7	
Temporary employment (% total employment)		17.5	18.8	19.7	19.3	19.7	19.1 b	17.5	18.5	18.6	19.1	19.6	19.4	
Employment in Services (% total employment)														
Employment in Industry (% total employment)														
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)				7.9 b	7.5	6.8	5.7 b	5.7	5.2	4.1	3.5	3.2	2.6	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)		68.2	68.7	68.9	68.9	69.7	69.5 b	69.7	69.8	70.0	70.3	70.5	71.6	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)		37.6	37.8	38.1	37.2	34.2	35.9 b	34.9	33.8	33.8	32.8	31.2	32.3	
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)		82.6	82.7	82.9	83.3	84.9	84.5 b	85.0	85.5	85.8	86.0	86.6	87.0	
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)		45.2	47.0	46.7	46.0	47.4	46.4 b	47.0	46.9	47.5	49.9	51.0	54.6	
Total unemployment (000)		230	245	229	264	314	339	400	419	366	324	282	239	
Unemployment rate (% labour force)		9.1	9.6	9.0	10.3	12.2	13.2	15.6	16.6	14.5	12.9	11.3	9.5	
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)		22.8	24.6	24.6	26.1	29.2	31.5	39.4	39.7	35.5	34.4	29.1	25.3	
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)		4.5	4.5	4.1	4.8	6.3	6.4 b	7.6	9.1	8.5	7.2	6.0	4.7	
Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)		49.6	46.7	46.3	47.3	52.4	48.7 b	48.6	55.0	58.5	56.1	53.4	49.4	
Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)		7.0	7.7	7.7	8.1	8.2	11.4 b	13.7	13.4	12.0	11.3	9.0	8.3	
Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)		62.6	62.7	63.2	61.1	60.4	58.4 b	56.6	55.6	56.4 b	57.5	58.8	60.3	
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)		77.9	77.6	77.6	76.8	76.5	77.5 b	74.4	74.0	74.4 b	76.4	76.8	79.8	
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)		85.0	83.9	84.4	85.9	85.1	83.4 b	81.8	79.1	80.9 b	82.8	84.0	86.2	
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)		61.7	61.7	62.3	61.5	61.0	60.1 b	58.5	58.1	59.7	61.3	62.5	64.8	
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)		61.1	59.7	69.7	59.2	59.0	68.3 b	57.6	48.8	54.9	68.3	66.5	66.2	
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)		64.6	65.5	66.2	61.6	60.1	58.7 b	58.3	54.0	58.7	52.7	59.9	63.4	
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)		61.4	61.4	61.9	61.1	60.7	59.4 b	57.9	57.6	59.1	60.7	61.9	64.1	
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)		63.1	63.6	65.4	67.9	66.4	74.1 b	66.0	62.1	70.5	74.3	74.0	78.5	
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)		68.1	68.0	68.9	65.0	63.7	64.7 b	64.4	61.1	62.3	62.1	65.7	68.6	
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)				2.7	2.6	2.7	5.4 b	6.0	6.3	6.0	6.0	5.6	5.1	
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)		0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.8 b	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.4	0.6	
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)		2.1	1.9	1.7	1.6	1.7	4.0 b	5.2	6.2	6.3	6.0	5.3	4.8	

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Portugal		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017			
Social Indicators	All	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of total population)	25.0	25.0	26.0	24.9	25.3	24.4	25.3	27.5	27.5	26.6	25.1			
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of total population)	18.5	18.1	18.5	17.9	17.9	18.0	17.9	18.7	19.5	19.5	19.0			
		At-risk-of-poverty threshold (PPS single person)	5157	5349	5702	5655	5837	5773	5877	5892	6075	6190	6429			
		Poverty gap (%)	23.5	24.3	23.2	23.6	22.7	23.2	24.1	27.4	30.3	29.0	26.7			
		Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of total population)		14.1	13.1	9.8	13.2	13.6	11.4	11.7	12.0	13.6	11.5			
		At-risk-of-poverty before social transfers excl. pensions (% of total population)	25.1	24.2	24.9	24.3	26.4	25.4	25.3	25.5	26.7	26.4	25.0			
		Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (%)	26.3	25.2	25.7	26.3	32.2	29.1	29.3	26.7	27.0	26.1	24.0			
		Severe Material Deprivation (% of total population)	9.1	9.6	9.7	9.1	9.0	8.3	8.6	10.9	10.6	9.6	8.4	6.9 p		
		Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of people aged 0-59)	6.6	7.2	6.3	7.0	8.6	8.3	10.1	12.2	12.2	10.9	9.1			
		Real Gross Household Disposable income (growth %)	0.2	1.4	1.2	1.5	1.0	-5.3	-5.3	-1.0	-0.5	2.5	2.7	1.7		
		Income quintile share ratio S80/S20	6.7	6.5	6.1	6.0	5.6	5.7	5.8	6.0	6.2	6.0	5.9			
		GINI coefficient	37.7	36.8	35.8	35.4	33.7	34.2	34.5	34.2	34.5	34.0	33.9			
		Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18-24)	38.5 b	36.5	34.9	30.9	28.3	23.0 b	20.5	18.9	17.4 b	13.7	14.0	12.6		
		NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of total population aged 15-24)	10.6 b	11.2	10.2	11.2	11.4	12.6 b	13.9	14.1	12.3	11.3	10.6	9.3		
Social Indicators	Male	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of male population)	23.9	24.0	25.0	24.0	24.8	23.8	24.6	27.5	26.7	25.9	24.1			
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of male population)	17.7	17.2	17.9	17.3	17.3	17.6	17.5	18.8	18.9	18.8	18.2			
		Poverty gap (%)	22.4	24.3	22.5	24.9	23.1	23.4	25.3	28.4	31.2	30.1	27.1			
		Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of male population)		13.1	12.0	9.2	13.0	13.3	10.9	12.1	12.0	14.0	11.2			
		Severe Material Deprivation (% of male population)	8.7	9.2	9.5	8.9	9.2	7.8	8.3	10.9	10.1	9.5	7.9	6.5 p		
		Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of males aged 0-59)	6.1	6.7	5.8	6.6	8.4	7.9	9.9	12.3	11.9	10.6	8.8			
		Life expectancy at birth (years)	75.5	75.9	76.2	76.5	76.8	77.3	77.3 b	77.6	78.0 b	78.1	78.1			
		Healthy life years at birth (years) - men	60.0	58.5	59.2	58.3	59.3	60.7	64.5 b	63.9	58.3 b	58.2	59.9			
		Early leavers from education and training (% of males aged 18-24)	46.1 b	42.8	41.4	35.8	32.4	28.1 b	26.9	23.4	20.7 b	16.4	17.4	15.3		
		NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of males aged 15-24)	9.9 b	9.8	8.9	10.6	10.4	12.2 b	14.6	14.2	12.3	10.4	10.8	9.2		
		Social Indicators	Female	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of female population)	26.0	26.0	26.8	25.8	25.8	25.1	25.9	27.4	28.1	27.3	26.0	
				At-risk-of-poverty (% of female population)	19.1	19.0	19.1	18.4	18.4	18.4	18.2	18.7	20.0	20.1	19.6	
				Poverty gap (%)	23.9	24.2	23.6	23.0	22.6	23.0	23.2	27.0	29.3	28.7	26.5	
				Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of female population)		15.0	14.1	10.4	13.5	13.8	11.9	11.4	12.0	13.2	11.8	
Severe Material Deprivation (% of female population)	9.4			9.9	9.9	9.2	8.8	8.7	8.9	11.0	11.1	9.7	8.8	7.2 p		
Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of females aged 0-59)	7.2			7.8	6.8	7.3	8.9	8.6	10.3	12.1	12.4	11.1	9.4			
Life expectancy at birth (years)	82.3			82.5	82.7	82.6	83.2	83.8	83.6 b	84.0	84.4 b	84.3	84.3			
Healthy life years at birth (years) - women	57.9			57.9	57.6	56.4	56.7	58.6	62.6 b	62.2	55.4 b	55.0	57.4			
Early leavers from education and training (% of females aged 18-24)	30.7 b			30.0	28.2	25.8	24.0	17.7 b	14.0	14.3	14.1 b	11.0	10.5	9.7		
NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of females aged 15-24)	11.4 b			12.6	11.6	11.8	12.5	12.9 b	13.2	13.9	12.3	12.2	10.3	9.5		
Social Indicators	Children (0-17)			At-Risk-of-poverty or exclusion of children (% of people aged 0-17)	25.5	26.9	29.5	28.7	28.7	28.6	27.8	31.7	31.4	29.6	27.0	
				At-risk-of-poverty (% of Children population)	20.8	20.9	22.8	22.9	22.4	22.4	21.8	24.4	25.6	24.8	22.4	
				Severe Material Deprivation (% of Children population)	9.6	11.8	11.8	10.5	10.8	11.3	10.3	13.9	12.9	11.0	9.6	7.4 p
				Share of children living in low work intensity households (% of Children population)	4.4	5.1	5.9	6.2	8.0	7.2	8.5	9.7	9.8	8.7	6.4	
		Risk of poverty of children in households at work (Working Intensity > 0.2)	17.7	17.6	19.5	19.3	17.1	18.3	16.4	18.2	19.9	19.8	19.1			
		Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (0-17) (%)	25.2	22.9	24.3	25.4	30.4	27.5	26.4	23.0	23.8	20.8	21.7			
Social Indicators	Working age (18-64)	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of Working age population)	22.9	23.1	24.5	23.5	24.1	23.2	25.6	28.5	28.3	27.4	25.6			
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of Working age population)	15.7	15.2	16.3	15.8	15.7	16.2	16.9	18.4	19.1	18.8	18.2			
		Severe Material Deprivation (% of Working age population)	7.7	8.6	8.9	8.3	8.3	7.6	8.2	10.7	10.3	9.6	8.6	6.6 p		
		Very low work intensity (18-59)	7.3	7.9	6.5	7.2	8.8	8.6	10.6	13.0	12.9	11.6	10.0			
		In-work at-risk-of poverty rate (% of persons employed 18-64)	10.4	9.3	11.3	10.3	9.6	10.2	9.9	10.4	10.7	10.9	10.8			
		Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (18-64) (%)	31.1	30.9	30.3	30.7	37.7	33.6	34.0	30.0	30.3	30.4	27.8			
Social Indicators	Elderly (65+)	At-Risk-of-poverty or exclusion of elderly (% of people aged 65+)	32.2	30.0	27.7	26.0	26.1	24.5	22.2	20.3	21.1	21.7	21.8			
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of Elderly population)	26.1	25.5	22.3	20.1	21.0	20.0	17.4	14.6	15.1	17.0	18.3			
		Severe Material Deprivation (% of Elderly population)	13.3	10.7	10.1	10.6	9.6	7.7	8.4	9.0	9.8	8.4	6.7	7.2 p		
		Relative median income of elderly (ratio with median income of people younger than 65)	0.79	0.80	0.83	0.85	0.82	0.87	0.92	0.94	0.94	0.92	0.91			
		Aggregate replacement ratio (ratio)	0.59	0.47	0.51	0.50	0.53	0.56	0.58	0.59	0.63	0.62	0.64			
Expenditure in social protection indicators (% of GDP)	Sickness/Health care	6.5	6.2	6.2	7.0	6.7	6.1	6.2	6.2	6.1	6.0					
	Disability	2.2	2.2	2.1	2.0	2.0	2.0	1.8	2.0	1.9	1.8					
	Old age and survivors	10.9	10.9	11.5	12.4	12.6	13.4	13.7	14.6	14.7	14.4					
	Family/Children	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.4	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2					
	Unemployment	1.2	1.1	1.0	1.3	1.4	1.3	1.7	1.8	1.5	1.1					
	Housing and Social exclusion n.e.c.	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2					
	Total (including Admin and Other expenditures) of which: Means tested benefits	23.7	23.0	23.4	25.8	25.8	25.8	26.4	27.6	26.9	25.7					

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Romania

Romania		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Macro Economic Indicators (Annual % growth)	Real GDP	8.1	6.9	8.3	-5.9	-2.8	2.0	1.2	3.5	3.1	4.0	4.8 p	6.9 p
	Total employment	0.7	0.4	0.0	-2.0	-0.3	-0.8	-4.8 b	-0.9	0.8	-1.3	-0.9 p	2.6 p
	Labour productivity	7.3	6.5	8.2	-4.0	-2.5	2.9	6.4 b	4.4	2.3	5.3	5.8 p	4.2 p
	Annual average hours worked per person employed	0.9	0.5	0.0	-0.6	-0.4	1.8	-4.3 b	-0.3 b	-0.8	-0.4	0.4 p	0.1 p
	Real productivity per hour worked	6.4	6.0	8.2	-3.5	-2.2	1.1	11.2 b	4.7	3.1	5.7	5.4 p	4.1 p
	Harmonized CPI	6.6	4.9	7.9	5.6	6.1	5.8	3.4	3.2	1.4	-0.4	-1.1	1.1
	Price deflator GDP	10.5	15.7	15.9	4.0	3.5	4.0	4.6	3.4	1.7	2.6	2.1 p	5.3 p
	Nominal compensation per employee	12.4	9.1	34.0	-2.6	7.3	-4.1	9.4 b	3.8 b	6.8	1.9	10.1 p	16.0 p
	Real compensation per employee (GDP deflator)	1.7	-5.7	15.7	-6.4	3.7	-7.8	4.6 b	0.4 b	5.0	-0.7	7.9 p	10.2 p
	Real compensation per employee (private consumption deflator)	5.5	4.0	24.2	-7.8	1.2	-9.3	5.8 b	0.6 b	5.3	2.3	11.3 p	14.7 p
	Nominal unit labour costs	4.8	2.4	23.8	1.4	10.1	-6.7	2.9 b	-0.6	4.3	-3.3	4.1 p	11.3 p
	Real unit labour costs	-5.3	-11.5	6.9	-2.4	6.4	-10.3	-1.8 b	-3.9 b	2.7	-5.8	2.1 p	5.7 p
	Total population (000)	21257	21131	20635	20440	20295	20199	20096	20020	19947 e	19871 e	19760	19644
	Population aged 15-64 (000)	14535	14452	14076	13919	13814	13745	13669	13622	13556 e	13414 e	13259	13092
	Total employment (000)	9291	9353	9369	9244	8713 b	8528	8605	8549	8614	8535	8449	8671
	Employment aged 15-64 (000)	8838	8843	8882	8805	8307 b	8139	8222	8179	8254	8235	8166	8363
	Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	64.8	64.4	64.4	63.5	64.8 b	63.8	64.8	64.7	65.7	66.0	66.3	68.8
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)	58.8	58.8	59.0	58.6	60.2 b	59.3	60.2	60.1	61.0	61.4	61.6	63.9	
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)	24.0	24.4	24.8	24.5	24.3 b	23.4	23.7	22.9	22.5	24.5	22.3	24.5	
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)	74.7	74.6	74.4	73.7	76.8 b	75.8	76.6	76.3	77.1	77.4	77.6	79.9	
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)	41.7	41.4	43.1	42.6	40.7 b	39.9	41.6	41.8	43.1	41.1	42.8	44.5	
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	63.8	63.7	63.5	62.6	63.5 b	62.5	63.5	63.3	64.2	64.3	64.9	67.5	
Self-employed (% total employment)	20.7	21.2	20.8	20.8	22.6 b	20.9	21.2	21.1	20.5	19.4	18.1	18.1	
Part-time employment (% total employment)	8.6	8.6	8.6	8.5	9.9 b	9.5	9.3	9.0	8.7	8.8	7.4	6.8	
Temporary employment (% total employment)	1.3	1.1	0.9	0.7	0.8 b	1.1	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.1	
Employment in Services (% total employment)			41.7 b	42.8	42.6 b	44.1	43.9	44.3	44.5	47.5	48.5	48.6	
Employment in Industry (% total employment)			33.3 b	31.5	29.7 b	29.9	29.5	29.5	30.1	29.4	30.8	31.1	
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)			25.0 b	25.7	27.7 b	26.0	26.6	26.2	25.4	23.1	20.7	20.3	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)	63.6	63.0	62.9	63.1	64.9 b	64.1	64.8	64.9	65.7	66.1	65.6	67.3	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)	30.6	30.5	30.4	30.9	31.2 b	30.7	30.5	30.1	29.6	31.3	28.0	30.0	
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)	79.9	79.0	78.3	78.5	81.9 b	80.9	81.5	81.5	82.1	82.5	81.9	83.4	
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)	42.8	42.4	44.2	43.9	42.1 b	41.4	43.0	43.4	44.6	42.7	44.2	46.0	
Total unemployment (000)	719	634	549	624	652	659	627	653	629	624	530	449	
Unemployment rate (% labour force)	7.2	6.4	5.6	6.5	7.0	7.2	6.8	7.1	6.8	6.8	5.9	4.9	
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)	20.2	19.3	17.6	20.0	22.1	23.9	22.6	23.7	24.0	21.7	20.6	18.3	
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)	4.1	3.2	2.4	2.2	2.4 b	2.9	3.0	3.2	2.8	3.0	3.0	2.0	
Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)	57.0	50.0	41.3	31.6	34.5 b	41.0	44.2	45.2	41.1	43.9	50.0	41.4	
Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)	6.6	6.1	5.7	6.4	6.9 b	7.3	6.9	7.1	7.1	6.8	5.8	5.5	
Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)	53.4	53.8	54.6	54.7	55.8 b	51.9	53.5	54.0	55.5 b	53.7	52.8	54.9	
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)	71.0	70.1	69.5	68.5	69.6 b	69.2	69.7	68.8	70.4 b	69.7	70.3	72.5	
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)	87.4	86.9	86.9	86.0	85.8 b	85.9	85.4	85.8	86.0 b	86.9	87.8	89.2	
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)	58.8	58.8	59.0	58.6	60.2 b	59.3	60.2	60.1	61.0	61.4	61.6	63.9	
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)													
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)	67.9	64.3	58.7	60.8 u									
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)	58.8	58.8	59.0	58.6	60.2 b	59.3	60.2	60.1	61.0	61.4	61.6	63.9	
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)													
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)		62.4 u	64.5 u	74.3 u			69.4 u	61.7 u	53.9 u			69.5 u	
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)			2.2	2.0	2.4 b	2.3	2.3	2.5	2.6	2.9	2.4	2.3	
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)	0.1 u												
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)	3.7	3.5	2.9	3.8	4.4 b	4.9	4.5	4.4	4.1	3.9	3.8	3.0	

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Romania	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Total population (000)	10352	10290	10049	9952	9880	9833	9777	9761	9746 e	9707 e	9650	9603
Population aged 15-64(000)	7227	7185	7024	6967	6914	6879	6838	6839	6830 e	6764 e	6689	6622
Total employment (000)	5052	5116	5157	5101	4881 b	4734	4800	4791	4844	4848	4806	4893
Employment aged 15-64 (000)	4835	4863	4925	4890	4689 b	4555	4622	4621	4677	4704	4668	4744
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	71.2	71.0	71.6	70.7	73.1 b	71.5	72.8	72.8	74.0	74.7	75.0	77.3
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)	64.6	64.8	65.7	65.2	67.9 b	66.3	67.6	67.6	68.7	69.5	69.7	71.8
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)	27.3	28.3	29.1	28.3	28.5 b	26.8	27.5	27.0	26.6	29.4	27.2	28.4
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)	80.8	80.6	80.9	80.5	84.8 b	83.1	84.1	83.8	84.6	85.2	85.5	87.6
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)	50.0	50.3	53.0	52.3	49.9 b	48.6	51.2	51.4	53.2	51.2	53.0	55.3
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	70.4	70.5	70.9	70.1	72.0 b	70.5	71.8	71.6	72.7	73.1	73.7	76.1
Self-employed (% total employment)	27.2	27.5	26.8	26.9	29.2 b	26.6	26.9	26.6	26.0	24.4	23.0	23.0
Part-time employment (% total employment)	8.7	8.3	8.1	8.0	9.8 b	8.8	8.7	8.6	8.2	8.5	7.3	6.7
Temporary employment (% total employment)	1.3	1.1	0.9	0.7	0.8 b	1.1	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.1
Employment in Services (% total employment)			36.2 b	37.1	36.5 b	38.0	37.9	38.1	38.2	40.6	40.9	41.2
Employment in Industry (% total employment)			39.7 b	38.1	36.3 b	36.9	36.0	36.0	36.6	35.9	37.6	37.7
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)			24.1 b	24.8	27.2 b	25.1	26.1	25.9	25.2	23.6	21.6	21.2
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)	70.7	70.1	70.6	70.9	73.7 b	72.1	73.2	73.4	74.3	75.3	74.8	76.2
Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)	35.1	35.9	35.9	35.9	36.5 b	35.3	35.3	35.1	34.8	37.0	33.9	34.6
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)	87.1	85.9	85.8	86.3	90.9 b	89.0	89.9	90.0	90.5	91.6	91.0	92.2
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)	52.0	52.1	55.1	54.5	52.3 b	51.3	53.6	53.9	55.4	53.8	55.1	57.4
Total unemployment (000)	452	405	362	398	399	397	381	400	384	395	339	290
Unemployment rate (% labour force)	8.1	7.2	6.5	7.3	7.6	7.7	7.4	7.7	7.3	7.5	6.6	5.6
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)	20.5	20.3	17.7	20.5	22.1	24.0	22.2	23.2	23.6	20.6	19.9	18.1
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)	4.7	3.6	2.9	2.5	2.8 b	3.2	3.3	3.4	3.1	3.3	3.3	2.4
Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)	57.5	49.9	42.9	32.2	36.7 b	41.8	44.2	44.1	41.8	43.8	50.1	43.6
Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)	7.8	7.6	6.8	7.6	8.1 b	8.5	7.9	8.1	8.2	7.6	6.7	6.3
Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)	65.7	66.3	67.2	67.2	70.0 b	62.9	65.2	66.7	67.9 b	69.0	68.6	71.2
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)	75.8	75.2	75.7	75.2	77.2 b	76.7	77.7	76.7	78.5 b	77.5	78.2	80.7
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)	88.3	87.6	87.8	86.5	86.8 b	87.5	87.4	87.8	88.0 b	89.5	90.5	90.8
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)	64.6	64.8	65.6	65.2	67.9 b	66.3	67.6	67.6	68.7	69.5	69.7	71.8
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)												
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)	76.2 u	71.6 u	72.3 u									
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)	64.6	64.8	65.6	65.2	67.9 b	66.3	67.6	67.6	68.7	69.5	69.7	71.8
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)												
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)												
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)			2.6	2.4	3.0 b	2.8	2.7	2.9	3.0	3.4	2.7	2.6
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)												
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)	2.1	1.8	1.0	1.8	3.0 b	4.1	3.9	3.9	3.7	3.0	3.1	2.3
Total population (000)	10905	10841	10586	10488	10414	10366	10319	10259	10201 e	10164 e	10111	10042
Population aged 15-64(000)	7309	7267	7053	6952	6900	6866	6832	6783	6726 e	6650 e	6570	6470
Total employment (000)	4239	4237	4212	4143	3832 b	3794	3805	3758	3770	3687	3643	3777
Employment aged 15-64 (000)	4003	3980	3958	3915	3618 b	3584	3600	3558	3577	3531	3499	3620
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	58.5	57.9	57.3	56.3	56.5 b	56.2	56.7	56.5	57.3	57.2	57.4	60.2
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)	53.0	52.8	52.5	52.0	52.5 b	52.3	52.8	52.6	53.3	53.2	53.3	55.8
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)	20.6	20.2	20.2	20.6	19.9 b	19.7	19.6	18.6	18.0	19.3	17.1	20.4
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)	68.6	68.5	67.8	66.9	68.6 b	68.3	68.9	68.6	69.3	69.2	69.2	71.8
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)	34.5	33.6	34.4	34.1	32.6 b	32.2	33.1	33.2	34.2	32.1	33.6	34.9
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	57.3	56.9	56.0	55.1	55.1 b	54.5	55.2	55.0	55.7	55.4	56.0	58.8
Self-employed (% total employment)	13.0	13.5	13.4	13.3	14.2 b	13.8	14.0	13.9	13.5	12.8	11.7	11.8
Part-time employment (% total employment)	8.5	8.9	9.3	9.1	10.0 b	10.3	10.0	9.6	9.5	9.2	7.7	6.9
Temporary employment (% total employment)	1.1	1.1	0.8	0.7	0.6 b	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.7
Employment in Services (% total employment)			48.6 b	50.1	50.5 b	51.8 u	51.7 u	52.3 u	52.6 u	56.8	58.6 u	58.3 u
Employment in Industry (% total employment)			25.4 b	23.2	21.1 b	21.0 u	21.1 u	21.2 u	21.8 u	20.9	21.8 u	22.6 u
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)			26.0 b	26.7	28.4 b	27.2	27.2	26.5	25.6	22.4	19.6	19.1
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)	56.6	56.0	55.2	55.4	56.2 b	56.1	56.4	56.3	56.9	56.7	56.2	58.2
Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)	25.9	24.9	24.7	25.8	25.6 b	25.8	25.5	24.7	24.0	25.2	21.8	25.0
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)	72.6	72.0	70.7	70.6	72.7 b	72.6	72.9	72.7	73.3	72.9	72.4	74.2
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)	34.8	33.9	34.7	34.7	33.1 b	32.7	33.7	34.1	35.0	32.8	34.4	35.7
Total unemployment (000)	266	229	187	226	252	262	246	253	245	229	191	159
Unemployment rate (% labour force)	6.0	5.2	4.4	5.4	6.2	6.5	6.1	6.3	6.1	5.8	5.0	4.0
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)	19.7	17.6	17.3	19.2	22.1	23.7	23.0	24.6	24.7	23.4	21.8	18.6
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)	3.4	2.7	1.8	1.8	1.9 b	2.6	2.7	3.0	2.4	2.6	2.5	1.5
Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)	56.2	50.2	38.4	30.6	31.1 b	39.8	44.1	46.8	40.0	44.1	49.8	37.5
Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)	5.2	4.7	4.5	5.2	5.7 b	6.1	5.9	6.1	5.9	5.9	4.8	4.7
Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)	45.3	45.8	46.1	46.0	45.8 b	44.0	45.1	44.5	45.2 b	41.1	39.5	41.0
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)	65.6	64.3	62.6	61.0	60.9 b	60.6	60.5	59.7	61.2 b	60.9	61.4	63.3
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)	86.5	86.1	86.1	85.4	84.9 b	84.4	83.5	83.8	84.1 b	84.5	85.3	87.8
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)	53.0	52.7	52.5	52.0	52.5 b	52.3	52.8	52.6	53.3	53.2	53.3	55.8
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)												
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)		56.3 u										
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)	53.0	52.8	52.5	52.0	52.5 b	52.3	52.8	52.6	53.3	53.2	53.3	55.8
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)												
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)												
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)			1.7	1.5	1.6 b	1.7	1.8	1.9	2.0	2.3	1.9	1.8
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)												
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)	5.6	5.5	5.2	6.4	6.1 b	5.8	5.3	5.0	4.5	5.0	4.8	4.0

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Romania		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017			
Social Indicators	All	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of total population)		47.0	44.2	43.0	41.5	40.9	43.2	41.9	40.3	37.4	38.8	35.5 p		
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of total population)		24.6	23.6	22.1	21.6	22.3	22.9	23.0	25.1	25.4	25.3	23.5 p		
		At-risk-of-poverty threshold (PPS single person)		1670	1837	2066	2122	2186	2226	2332	2408	2614	2877	3177 p		
		Poverty gap (%)		36.6	32.3	31.4	31.3	31.4	31.1	33.6	34.6	38.2	36.2	34.4 p		
		Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of total population)					18.0	17.5	18.7	17.1	19.5	19.3	20.2			
		At-risk-of-poverty before social transfers excl. pensions (% of total population)		31.5	30.8	28.7	27.8	29.2	28.8	28.2	28.8	29.3	29.5	28.0 p		
		Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (%)		21.9	23.4	23.0	22.3	23.6	20.5	18.4	12.9	13.3	14.2	16.1 p		
		Severe Material Deprivation (% of total population)		38.0	32.7	32.1	30.5	29.5	31.1	29.8	25.9	22.7	23.8	19.4 p		
		Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of people aged 0-59)		9.9	8.5	8.1	7.7	7.3	7.9	7.6	7.2	7.9	8.2	6.9 p		
		Real Gross Household Disposable income (growth %)	10.4	14.5	12.4	-5.8	-2.0	-3.2	-3.1	32.7	6.1	7.2				
		Income quintile share ratio S80/S20		8.1	7.0	6.5	6.1	6.2	6.6	6.8	7.2	8.3	7.2	7.0 p		
		GINI coefficient		38.3 b	35.9	34.5	33.5	33.5	34.0	34.6	35.0	37.4	34.7	35.1 p		
		Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18-24)	17.9 b	17.3	15.9	16.6	19.3 b	18.1	17.8	17.3	18.1 b	19.1	18.5	18.1		
		NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of total population aged 15-24)	14.8 b	13.3	11.6	13.9	16.6 b	17.5	16.8	17.0	17.0	18.1	17.4	15.2		
		Social Indicators	Male	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of male population)		46.1	43.0	41.8	40.5	39.9	42.5	41.3	40.0	36.5	37.8	34.6 p
At-risk-of-poverty (% of male population)				24.1	22.8	21.2	21.0	21.9	23.1	23.0	25.3	25.1	24.8	22.9 p		
Poverty gap (%)				36.6	32.9	31.7	31.9	33.5	31.8	35.1	38.3	39.1	37.6	35.4 p		
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of male population)							17.3	17.4	18.4	16.8	19.3	19.5	20.2			
Severe Material Deprivation (% of male population)				37.6	32.2	31.7	30.0	29.3	31.3	30.3	26.6	23.1	23.8	19.4 p		
Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of males aged 0-59)				8.8	7.3	6.7	6.5	6.1	6.5	6.3	6.4	6.9	7.2	6.1 p		
Life expectancy at birth (years)	69.2			69.5	69.7	69.8	70.0 b	71.1	70.9	71.6	71.4	71.5	71.7			
Healthy life years at birth (years) - men				60.5	60.0	59.8	57.3 b	57.4	57.6	58.6	59.0	59.0	59.8			
Early leavers from education and training (% of males aged 18-24)	17.8 b			17.1	15.9	16.1	19.5 b	19.1	18.5	18.7	19.5 b	19.5	18.4	18.0		
NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of males aged 15-24)	13.0 b			11.6	8.8	11.2	14.2 b	16.3	15.2	15.3	15.3	15.0	14.1	12.1		
Social Indicators	Female			At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of female population)		48.0	45.3	44.2	42.4	41.9	43.8	42.5	40.7	38.2	39.8	36.3 p
				At-risk-of-poverty (% of female population)		25.1	24.3	23.0	22.1	22.6	22.8	22.9	24.9	25.7	25.7	24.1 p
				Poverty gap (%)		36.9	31.5	31.0	30.5	29.0	29.3	32.5	32.6	37.1	34.8	33.8 p
				Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of female population)					18.7	17.7	19.0	17.3	19.7	19.2	20.2	
				Severe Material Deprivation (% of female population)		38.4	33.2	32.5	30.9	29.8	30.9	29.3	25.2	22.4	23.7	19.5 p
		Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of females aged 0-59)		11.0	9.8	9.5	8.9	8.6	9.3	8.9	8.0	8.9	9.2	7.7 p		
		Life expectancy at birth (years)	76.2	76.8	77.5	77.4	77.7 b	78.2	78.1	78.7	78.7	78.7	79.1			
		Healthy life years at birth (years) - women		62.5	62.9	61.7	57.5 b	57.0	57.7	57.9	59.0	59.4	59.0			
		Early leavers from education and training (% of females aged 18-24)	18.0 b	17.4	16.0	17.2	19.0 b	17.2	16.9	15.9	16.7 b	18.5	18.7	18.1		
		NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of females aged 15-24)	16.6 b	15.1	14.5	16.8	19.2 b	18.7	18.5	18.7	18.8	21.4	20.8	18.4		
		Social Indicators	Children (0-17)	At-Risk-of-poverty or exclusion of children (% of people aged 0-17)		51.8	50.9	50.6	48.1	49.2	52.5	51.4	50.7	46.8	49.2	41.2 p
				At-risk-of-poverty (% of Children population)		33.0	33.3	31.9	32.1	33.0	33.3	34.7	39.3	38.1	37.2	31.9 p
				Severe Material Deprivation (% of Children population)		42.3	38.5	39.1	35.8	35.7	38.8	36.4	31.0	28.9	30.2	20.8 p
				Share of children living in low work intensity households (% of Children population)		8.6	6.1	5.3	4.7	4.7	5.6	6.1	6.1	7.5	8.5	5.9 p
				Risk of poverty of children in households at work (Working Intensity > 0.2)		28.1	29.9	28.9	30.8	31.0	31.0	32.4	36.3	34.2	32.6	28.4 p
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (0-17) (%)				23.4	23.6	22.0	19.6	22.9	20.0	18.0	10.3	12.6	16.4	19.9 p		
Social Indicators	Working age (18-64)	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of Working age population)		42.9	40.8	40.7	39.9	39.7	42.3	40.7	38.7	35.7	37.0	34.4 p		
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of Working age population)		20.7	19.8	19.4	19.5	20.9	21.9	21.7	23.4	23.3	23.3	22.0 p		
		Severe Material Deprivation (% of Working age population)		33.8	29.4	29.6	28.5	27.8	29.4	28.2	24.3	21.2	22.1	18.7 p		
		Very low work intensity (18-59)		10.4	9.3	9.0	8.7	8.2	8.7	8.1	7.6	8.0	8.1	7.2 p		
		In-work at-risk-of poverty rate (% of persons employed 18-64)		16.5	16.9	17.2	17.6	18.9	18.9	18.1	19.7	18.6	18.6	16.9 p		
		Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (18-64) (%)		23.6	26.4	25.7	25.3	26.2	21.8	19.9	14.6	14.3	15.0	16.7 p		
Social Indicators	Elderly (65+)	At-Risk-of-poverty or exclusion of elderly (% of people aged 65+)		57.9	49.4	43.3	40.1	36.2	35.4	35.8	35.0	33.3	34.0	33.3 p		
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of Elderly population)		29.4	26.5	21.4	17.6	14.8	14.4	14.5	15.7	19.4	19.1	20.1 p		
		Severe Material Deprivation (% of Elderly population)		50.1	39.0	34.0	32.4	29.2	28.5	28.4	26.5	21.5	22.5	20.6 p		
		Relative median income of elderly (ratio with median income of people younger than 65)		0.76	0.85	0.93	0.97	1.01	1.03	1.04	1.04	1.0	0.97	0.94 p		
		Aggregate replacement ratio (ratio)		0.44	0.50	0.56	0.64	0.67	0.67	0.68	0.65	0.63	0.66	0.62 p		
Expenditure in social protection indicators (% of GDP)	Sickness/Health care	3.2	3.4	3.4	4.0	4.4	4.0	4.0	3.9	3.9	3.8					
	Disability	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.5	1.6	1.4	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.1					
	Old age and survivors	5.7	5.8	6.9	8.4	8.8	8.6	8.2	8.0	8.0	7.9					
	Family/Children	1.8	1.6	1.5	1.7	1.7	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.3					
	Unemployment	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.4	0.6	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1					
	Housing and Social exclusion n.e.c.	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2					
	Total (including Admin and Other expenditures)	12.8	13.2	13.7	16.4	17.4	16.5	15.4	14.9	14.8	14.6					
	of which: Means tested benefits	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.9	1.2	0.8	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6					

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Slovenia

Slovenia		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	
Macro Economic Indicators (Annual % growth)	Real GDP	5.7	6.9	3.3	-7.8	1.2	0.6	-2.7	-1.1	3.0	2.3	3.1	5.0	
	Total employment	1.6	3.4	2.6	-1.8	-2.1	-1.7	-0.9	-1.1	0.4	1.2	1.9	2.8	
	Labour productivity	4.0	3.5	0.7	-6.1	3.4	2.4	-1.8	0.0	2.6	1.0	1.2	2.2	
	Annual average hours worked per person employed	-1.7	-0.8	1.1	0.3	0.1	-1.0	-1.1	1.1	1.2	0.4	-1.2	-0.7	
	Real productivity per hour worked	5.8	4.3	-0.4	-6.4	3.3	3.4	-0.6	-1.1	1.4	0.7	2.5	2.9	
	Harmonized CPI	2.5	3.8	5.5	0.8	2.1	2.1	2.8	1.9	0.4	-0.8	-0.2	1.6	
	Price deflator GDP	2.2	4.2	4.5	3.4	-1.0	1.1	0.5	1.6	0.8	1.0	0.9	2.0	
	Nominal compensation per employee	5.4	6.2	7.2	1.8	4.0	1.5	-1.0	0.5	1.4	1.4	2.9	2.8	
	Real compensation per employee (GDP deflator)	3.1	1.9	2.6	-1.5	5.1	0.4	-1.4	-1.1	0.6	0.4	1.9	0.8	
	Real compensation per employee (private consumption deflator)	2.8	2.3	1.6	1.0	1.9	-0.5	-3.7	-1.4	1.0	2.2	3.0	1.2	
	Nominal unit labour costs	1.3	2.6	6.4	8.5	0.6	-0.8	0.8	0.5	-1.2	0.4	1.6	0.6	
	Real unit labour costs	-1.0	-1.5	1.8	5.0	1.6	-1.9	0.4	-1.1	-2.1	-0.6	0.7	-1.4	
	Labour Market Indicators - Total	Total population (000)	2003	2010	2010 b	2032	2047	2050	2055	2059	2061	2063	2064	2066
		Population aged 15-64 (000)	1407	1410	1403	1414	1421	1420	1416	1409	1400	1389	1378	1367
		Total employment (000)	961	985	996	981	966	936	924	906	917	917	915	959
		Employment aged 15-64 (000)	937	957	975	955	942	915	907	888	893	902	903	944
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)		71.5	72.4	73.0	71.9	70.3	68.4	68.3	67.2	67.7	69.1	70.1	73.4	
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)		66.6	67.8	68.6	67.5	66.2	64.4	64.1	63.3	63.9	65.2	65.8	69.3	
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)		35.0	37.6	38.4	35.3	34.1	31.5	27.3	26.5	26.8	29.6	28.6	34.7	
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)		84.2	85.3	86.8	84.8	83.7	83.1	83.3	81.9	81.9	82.9	83.5	86.1	
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)		32.6	33.5	32.8	35.6	35.0	31.2	32.9	33.5	35.4	36.6	38.5	42.7	
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)		69.9	71.0	71.6	69.9	68.1	66.4	66.4	65.2	65.7	66.9	67.7	70.9	
Self-employed (% total employment)		11.3	11.1	9.9	10.7	12.4	12.6	12.2	12.1	12.7	12.5	11.8	11.8	
Part-time employment (% total employment)		8.0	8.1	8.1	9.5	10.3	9.5	9.0	9.3	10.0	10.1	9.3	10.3	
Temporary employment (% total employment)		12.7	13.7	13.0	12.4	12.5	13.4	12.8	12.7	12.9	14.0	13.3	13.8	
Employment in Services (% total employment)				57.5 bu	59.1	59.9	60.9	61.7	61.5	60.8 u	62.1 u	62.5 u	61.9 u	
Employment in Industry (% total employment)				35.6 bu	33.8	33.2	32.2	31.3	31.4	31.5 u	32.1 u	33.3 u	33.4 u	
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)				6.9 b	7.1	7.0	6.9	7.0	7.2	7.7	5.8	4.2	4.6	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)		70.9	71.3	71.8	71.8	71.5	70.3	70.4	70.5	70.9	71.8	71.6	74.2	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)		40.6	41.8	42.9	40.9	39.9	37.4	34.4	33.8	33.6	35.3	33.7	39.1	
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)		89.0	89.3	90.1	89.6	90.0	90.1	90.8	90.7	90.3	90.8	90.5	91.9	
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)		33.4	34.6	34.2	36.9	36.5	33.3	35.1	36.0	38.4	39.7	41.2	45.6	
Total unemployment (000)		61	50	46	61	75	83	90	102	98	90	80	67	
Unemployment rate (% labour force)		6.0	4.9	4.4	5.9	7.3	8.2	8.9	10.1	9.7	9.0	8.0	6.6	
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)		13.9	10.1	10.4	13.6	14.7	15.7	20.6	21.6	20.2	16.3	15.2	11.2	
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)		2.9	2.2	1.9	1.8	3.2	3.6	4.3	5.2	5.3	4.7	4.3	3.1	
Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)		49.3	45.7	42.2	30.1	43.3	44.2	47.9	51.0	54.5	52.3	53.3	47.5	
Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)		5.6	4.2	4.5	5.6	5.9	5.9	7.1	7.3	6.8	5.8	5.1	4.4	
Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)		55.9	56.2	55.0	53.7	51.1	46.7	47.2	45.5	48.5 b	49.0	46.1	49.7	
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)		74.1	75.1	76.4	74.6	73.0	70.6	70.7	69.5	69.5 b	69.7	71.0	73.6	
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)		88.2	87.7	87.9	88.4	87.3	86.4	85.1	83.8	83.2 b	84.4	85.2	87.1	
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)		66.6	67.8	68.6	67.7	66.3	64.4	64.1	63.5	64.2	65.2	65.8	69.3	
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)		67.1 u	82.7 u	76.8 u	70.5 u	59.8 u	58.9 u	73.1	57.3 u	60.4	60.3	64.3	73.0	
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)		51.9 u	60.3	65.3	52.2	59.3	65.4	60.9	56.5	54.1	67.2	66.7	68.6	
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)		66.6	67.8	68.6	67.7	66.3	64.7	64.1	63.5	64.5	65.7	66.2	69.6	
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)		62.1	65.2	66.8	66.9	63.9	57.7	60.6	59.3	56.9	60.0	59.7	65.4	
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)		69.5	69.2	69.0	65.7	65.8	63.4	64.9	61.0	58.6	61.7	63.2	66.6	
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)				1.3	1.8	1.9	1.9	1.8	2.3	2.5	3.1	2.8	2.8	
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)		0.5	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.4 u	0.4 u	0.3 u	0.4 u	0.4 u	0.4 u	
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)		2.4	2.1	1.4	2.0	1.7	1.8	1.8	2.5	3.4	2.5	1.9	1.3	

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Slovenia		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	
Labour Market Indicators - Male	Total population (000)	981	987	987 b	1004	1014	1015	1017	1019	1021	1022	1023	1025	
	Population aged 15-64(000)	716	719	715	727	733	731	728	724	720	714	708	703	
	Total employment (000)	524	540	543	531	524	506	500	495	499	501	491	516	
	Employment aged 15-64 (000)	510	525	532	516	509	495	490	484	486	492	484	506	
	Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	76.3	77.5	77.4	75.6	74.0	71.8	71.8	71.2	71.6	73.3	73.3	76.9	
	Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)	71.1	72.7	72.7	71.0	69.6	67.7	67.4	67.1	67.5	69.2	68.9	72.5	
	Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)	39.2	43.2	43.0	39.1	37.6	35.7	30.4	29.7	29.5	32.0	31.1	38.6	
	Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)	87.1	88.1	88.6	86.4	85.2	84.8	85.4	84.3	84.6	86.1	85.6	88.5	
	Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)	44.5	45.3	44.7	46.4	45.5	39.5	40.7	41.8	41.8	42.6	43.6	48.0	
	FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	75.6	77.0	76.8	74.6	72.9	70.7	71.0	70.3	70.9	72.2	72.2	75.8	
	Self-employed (% total employment)	15.6	14.9	13.3	14.8	16.2	16.3	16.1	15.9	16.7	16.2	15.5	14.9	
	Part-time employment (% total employment)	6.0	6.5	6.2	7.4	7.4	7.1	6.3	6.5	6.8	7.0	6.0	6.7	
	Temporary employment (% total employment)	12.7	13.7	13.0	12.4	12.5	13.4	12.8	12.7	12.9	14.0	13.3	13.8	
	Employment in Services (% total employment)			46.6 bu	49.1 u	49.3 u	48.9	50.2 u	50.5 u	49.6 u	50.7 u	49.7 u	49.0 u	
	Employment in Industry (% total employment)			46.2 bu	43.7 u	43.6 u	43.6	42.2 u	42.1 u	42.6 u	43.6 u	45.3 u	45.8 u	
	Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)			7.2 b	7.2	7.2	7.5	7.6	7.4	7.7	5.8	5.0	5.2	
	Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)	74.9	75.8	75.8	75.6	75.4	73.9	73.7	74.2	74.3	75.4	74.5	77.1	
	Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)	44.4	47.6	47.7	45.4	44.4	42.0	38.1	37.1	36.6	38.9	36.8	42.9	
	Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)	91.0	91.3	91.6	91.3	91.7	91.8	92.4	92.6	92.2	92.9	92.0	93.4	
	Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)	45.8	46.7	46.4	48.2	47.5	42.7	43.6	45.1	45.7	46.4	47.1	51.8	
	Total unemployment (000)	27	22	23	33	42	45	46	51	49	44	40	32	
	Unemployment rate (% labour force)	4.9	4.0	4.0	5.9	7.5	8.2	8.4	9.5	9.0	8.1	7.5	5.8	
	Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)	11.6	9.4	9.9	13.8	15.2	15.0	20.3	20.1	19.4	17.7	15.6	9.9	
	Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)	2.4	1.8	1.7	1.7	3.4	3.7	4.1	4.9	4.9	4.1	4.1	3.1	
	Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)	49.7	45.3	41.4	28.3	45.0	45.1	48.8	51.9	55.0	50.7	54.1	52.7	
	Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)	5.2	4.5	4.7	6.2	6.8	6.3	7.7	7.5	7.1	6.9	5.8	4.3	
	Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)	64.1	65.4	63.4	62.5	60.8	55.5	56.1	55.1	55.6 b	56.9	53.7	59.0	
	Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)	79.3	80.2	80.8	78.0	76.1	74.0	74.5	73.9	73.5 b	74.2	74.9	77.5	
	Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)	89.5	88.9	88.7	90.3	89.6	87.4	87.4	86.3	86.5 b	88.3	86.5	89.1	
	Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)	71.2	72.6	72.4	70.9	69.6	67.4	66.9	67.3	68.6	68.2	72.1	72.1	
	Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)	61.1 u	92.3 u	88.9 u	89.1 u	70.4 u	67.3 u	85.2 u	79.2 u	70.5 u	72.1 u	81.4 u	78.4 u	
	Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)	69.1 u	76.5	87.8	75.1	73.5	83.6	84.9	78.0	75.1	83.8	82.1	82.2	
	Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)	71.1	72.6	72.6	71.0	69.6	67.6	67.0	66.6	67.6	69.2	68.8	72.5	
	Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)	67.8	71.5	73.3	70.7	70.9	64.9	64.1	66.1	63.4	65.2	61.2	67.4	
	Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)	73.0	75.4	74.3	70.9	70.0	69.7	73.3	72.9	67.8	70.0	71.1	74.2	
	Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)			0.9	1.4	1.3	1.4	1.5	1.8	1.9	2.1	1.7	1.7	
	Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)	0.4 u	0.4 u	0.4 u	0.4 u	0.4 u	0.4 u	0.2 u	0.3 u	0.3 u	0.3 u	0.4 u	0.4 u	
	Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)	2.0	1.8	1.1	1.7	1.5	1.5	1.5	2.3	3.0	2.1	1.6	1.3	
	Labour Market Indicators - Female	Total population (000)	1022	1023	1024 b	1028	1033	1036	1039	1040	1040	1041	1041	1041
		Population aged 15-64(000)	691	691	687	687	688	690	688	685	680	675	670	664
		Total employment (000)	438	446	453	450	443	430	424	411	418	417	424	443
		Employment aged 15-64 (000)	427	432	443	439	432	420	416	404	407	410	419	437
		Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	66.5	67.1	68.5	67.9	66.5	64.8	64.6	63.0	63.6	64.7	66.7	69.7
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)		61.8	62.6	64.2	63.8	62.6	60.9	60.5	59.2	60.0	61.0	62.6	65.8	
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)		30.3	31.4	33.2	31.0	30.0	26.9	23.7	23.0	24.0	27.1	26.1	30.4	
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)		81.2	82.4	84.8	83.2	82.1	81.3	81.0	79.3	79.1	79.5	81.2	83.5	
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)		21.0	22.2	21.1	24.8	24.5	22.7	25.0	25.2	29.0	30.5	33.4	37.5	
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)		64.0	64.9	66.1	65.1	63.1	61.9	61.6	59.9	60.3	61.4	63.2	65.9	
Self-employed (% total employment)		6.2	6.6	5.9	5.9	7.8	8.1	7.6	7.5	8.0	8.0	7.6	8.2	
Part-time employment (% total employment)		10.4	10.0	10.4	12.1	13.6	12.2	12.6	13.7	13.7	13.7	13.1	14.5	
Temporary employment (% total employment)		17.0	18.4	17.7	15.7	16.8	17.3	16.4	15.0	14.7	16.4	16.2	16.8	
Employment in Services (% total employment)					71.0 u									
Employment in Industry (% total employment)					22.1 u									
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)				6.5 b	6.9	6.7	6.3	6.4	6.8	7.6	5.9	3.3	4.0	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)		66.7	66.6	67.5	67.9	67.4	66.5	66.9	66.6	67.2	67.9	68.6	71.2	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)		36.4	35.4	37.4	35.8	34.8	32.3	30.0	30.2	30.4	31.7	30.6	34.9	
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)		87.0	87.3	88.5	87.9	88.1	88.4	89.1	88.7	88.3	88.6	88.9	90.3	
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)		21.4	23.1	22.2	25.6	25.5	23.7	26.5	27.0	31.1	32.9	35.2	39.5	
Total unemployment (000)		34	28	23	28	33	38	44	50	49	46	40	36	
Unemployment rate (% labour force)		7.2	5.9	4.8	5.8	7.1	8.2	9.4	10.9	10.6	10.1	8.6	7.5	
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)		16.8	11.2	11.3	13.4	13.8	16.8	21.0	23.7	21.3	14.6	14.7	13.0	
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)		3.5	2.7	2.1	1.9	2.9	3.5	4.4	5.5	5.7	5.4	4.5	3.2	
Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)		48.9	46.1	43.0	32.1	41.2	43.1	47.0	50.0	54.0	53.8	52.5	42.8	
Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)		6.1	4.0	4.2	4.8	4.8	5.4	6.3	7.1	6.5	4.6	4.5	4.5	
Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)		49.4	48.9	47.9	46.4	43.0	39.5	39.3	36.4	42.2 b	42.0	39.6	41.4	
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)		67.8	68.6	71.0	70.3	68.9	66.0	65.7	63.8	64.0 b	63.4	65.7	68.2	
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)		87.2	86.7	87.3	87.1	85.7	85.7	83.5	82.0	80.8 b	81.7	84.3	85.7	
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)		61.9	62.8	64.5	64.3	62.9	61.3	61.1	60.0	60.9	61.6	63.3	66.3	
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)				61.8 u	48.1 u	45.0 u	41.9 u	60.4 u	34.8 u	48.4 u	50.1 u	53.1 u	67.4 u	
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)		30.2 u	35.3 u	26.9 u	23.4 u	40.8 u	40.0	30.5 u	29.8	27.8	42.4	44.2	51.8	
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)		61.8	62.7	64.4	64.1	62.8	61.6	61.0	60.3	61.2	61.9	63.5	66.6	
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)		56.3	59.0	60.8	63.5	57.5	50.0	57.3	53.6	51.0	55.8	58.6	63.5	
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)		65.9	62.2	62.7	59.8	60.8	55.9	54.5	46.9	48.4	51.9	54.1	58.7	
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)				1.8	2.2	2.5	2.4	2.2	2.9	3.3	4.3	4.1	4.0	
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)		0.5 u	0.5 u	0.5 u	0.6 u	0.7 u	0.5 u	0.5 u	0.6 u	0.4 u	0.4 u	0.4 u	0.3 u	
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)		2.9	2.4	1.7	2.3	2.0	2.0	2.1	2.8	3.8	3.1	2.3	1.5	

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Slovenia		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017			
Social Indicators	All	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of total population)	17.1	17.1	18.5	17.1	18.3	19.3	19.6	20.4	20.4	19.2	18.4			
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of total population)	11.6	11.5	12.3	11.3	12.7	13.6	13.5	14.5	14.5	14.3	13.9			
		At-risk-of-poverty threshold (PPS single person)	7292	7753	8287	8599	8009	8364	8563	8527	8597	9061	9300			
		Poverty gap (%)	18.6	19.4	19.3	20.2	20.2	19.9	19.1	20.4	22.0	20.3	20.2			
		Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of total population)			7.7	7.0	6.9	7.5	6.1	7.5	9.5	8.1	8.5			
		At-risk-of-poverty before social transfers excl. pensions (% of total population)	24.2	23.1	23.0	22.0	24.2	24.2	25.2	25.3	25.1	24.8	24.3			
		Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (%)	52.1	50.2	46.5	48.6	47.5	43.8	46.4	42.7	42.2	42.3	42.8			
		Severe Material Deprivation (% of total population)	5.1	5.1	6.7	6.1	5.9	6.1	6.6	6.7	6.6	5.8	5.4	4.5 p		
		Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of people aged 0-59)	6.9	7.3	6.7	5.6	7.0	7.6	7.5	8.0	8.7	7.4	7.4			
		Real Gross Household Disposable income (growth %)	3.1	4.5	2.7	-0.4	-0.5	0.1	-4.2	-1.9	1.6	2.1	4.6			
		Income quintile share ratio S80/S20	3.4	3.3	3.4	3.2	3.4	3.5	3.4	3.6	3.7	3.6	3.6			
		GINI coefficient	23.7	23.2	23.4	22.7	23.8	23.8	23.7	24.4	25.0	24.5	24.4			
		Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18-24)	5.6 b	4.1	5.1	5.3	5.0	4.2	4.4	3.9	4.4 b	5.0	4.9	4.3		
		NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of total population aged 15-24)	8.5 b	6.7	6.5	7.5	7.1	7.1	9.3	9.2	9.4	9.5	8.0	6.5		
		Social Indicators	Male	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of male population)	15.3	15.0	16.6	15.1	16.5	17.4	18.3	19.4	19.3	17.5	16.9	
At-risk-of-poverty (% of male population)	10.3			10.0	11.0	9.8	11.3	12.2	12.5	13.5	13.7	13.0	12.5			
Poverty gap (%)	20.0			19.2	20.8	21.1	20.9	20.1	19.8	20.9	23.2	21.4	21.9			
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of male population)					6.3	5.8	5.6	5.9	4.9	5.7	8.5	7.0	7.5			
Severe Material Deprivation (% of male population)	5.1			4.9	6.4	5.9	5.6	5.8	6.8	6.6	6.7	5.4	5.2	4.2 p		
Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of males aged 0-59)	6.1			6.4	6.2	4.8	6.0	6.7	6.8	7.4	7.7	6.5	6.7			
Life expectancy at birth (years)	74.5			74.6	75.5	75.9	76.4 b	76.8	77.1	77.2	78.2	77.8	78.2			
Healthy life years at birth (years) - men	57.7			58.7	59.4	60.6	53.4 b	54.0	56.5	57.6	57.8	58.5	58.7			
Early leavers from education and training (% of males aged 18-24)	7.1 b			5.8	7.2	7.2	6.4	5.7	5.4	5.0	6.0 b	6.4	6.7	5.8		
NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of males aged 15-24)	8.4 b			6.8	6.7	7.9	8.1	7.8	9.7	9.8	9.7	9.9	9.1	6.7		
Social Indicators	Female			At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of female population)	18.8	19.2	20.3	19.1	20.1	21.1	20.8	21.4	21.5	20.8	19.9	
				At-risk-of-poverty (% of female population)	12.9	12.9	13.6	12.8	14.1	15.0	14.6	15.4	15.2	15.6	15.2	
				Poverty gap (%)	18.3	19.7	18.7	20.2	19.1	19.5	18.4	20.1	20.8	19.4	19.6	
				Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of female population)			9.0	8.1	8.0	9.1	7.3	9.2	10.5	9.1	9.5	
				Severe Material Deprivation (% of female population)	5.1	5.3	6.9	6.3	6.3	6.4	6.5	6.7	6.6	6.2	5.5	4.7 p
		Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of females aged 0-59)	7.7	8.2	7.3	6.5	8.0	8.6	8.3	8.5	9.8	8.3	8.2			
		Life expectancy at birth (years)	82.0	82.0	82.6	82.7	83.1 b	83.3	83.3	83.6	84.1	83.9	84.3			
		Healthy life years at birth (years) - women	61.0	62.3	60.9	61.5	54.6 b	53.8	55.6	59.5	59.6	57.7	57.9			
		Early leavers from education and training (% of females aged 18-24)	4.0 bu	2.2 u	2.6 u	3.2 u	3.3 u	2.5 u	3.2 u	2.6 u	2.7 bu	3.4 u	3.1 u	2.5 u		
		NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of females aged 15-24)	8.6 b	6.6	6.2	6.9	6.0	6.3	8.8	8.6	9.2	9.1	6.9	6.3		
		Social Indicators	Children (0-17)	At-Risk-of-poverty or exclusion of children (% of people aged 0-17)	14.3	14.7	15.3	15.1	15.2	17.3	16.4	17.5	17.7	16.6	14.9	
				At-risk-of-poverty (% of Children population)	11.5	11.3	11.6	11.2	12.6	14.7	13.5	14.7	14.8	14.2	11.9	
				Severe Material Deprivation (% of Children population)	3.9	4.4	5.2	5.4	5.1	5.3	5.9	6.0	4.9	4.7	4.5	3.0 p
				Share of children living in low work intensity households (% of Children population)	3.5	4.5	3.7	2.5	3.4	4.4	3.2	4.0	4.6	3.7	3.4	
				Risk of poverty of children in households at work (Working Intensity > 0.2)	9.0	8.4	9.0	9.5	9.9	11.3	11.1	11.4	11.0	11.2	9.4	
Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (0-17) (%)	56.1			54.8	50.4	53.7	51.4	45.4	47.7	45.2	46.2	45.8	50.0			
Social Indicators	Working age (18-64)	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of Working age population)	16.5	16.6	18.0	16.2	18.1	18.7	19.7	20.6	21.3	19.7	19.1			
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of Working age population)	9.7	9.8	10.5	9.2	11.0	11.7	12.2	13.0	13.7	13.6	13.4			
		Severe Material Deprivation (% of Working age population)	5.1	5.0	6.9	6.2	6.1	6.2	6.9	6.8	7.1	6.0	5.5	4.6 p		
		Very low work intensity (18-59)	7.9	8.1	7.7	6.5	8.0	8.6	8.8	9.2	10.1	8.6	8.7			
		In-work at-risk-of poverty rate (% of persons employed 18-64)	4.8	4.7	5.1	4.8	5.3	6.0	6.5	7.1	6.4	6.7	6.1			
		Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (18-64) (%)	55.5	53.3	49.0	52.1	49.8	45.8	49.0	44.9	42.7	43.1	43.2			
Social Indicators	Elderly (65+)	At-Risk-of-poverty or exclusion of elderly (% of people aged 65+)	22.5	22.4	24.4	23.3	22.8	24.2	22.8	23.0	20.1	20.2	19.9			
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of Elderly population)	19.9	19.4	21.3	20.0	20.2	20.9	19.6	20.5	17.1	17.2	17.6			
		Severe Material Deprivation (% of Elderly population)	6.3	6.6	7.4	6.5	6.3	6.8	6.6	6.7	6.7	6.1	5.8	5.5 p		
		Relative median income of elderly (ratio with median income of people younger than 65)	0.85	0.87	0.84	0.86	0.87	0.87	0.87	0.87	0.91	0.90	0.89			
		Aggregate replacement ratio (ratio)	0.41	0.44	0.44	0.45	0.45	0.47	0.47	0.46	0.45	0.46	0.47			
Expenditure in social protection indicators (% of GDP)		Sickness/Health care	7.0	6.6	6.9	7.6	7.7	7.6	7.9	7.5	7.2	7.6 p				
		Disability	1.8	1.7	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.6	1.5	1.4	1.3 p				
		Old age and survivors	9.9	9.6	9.4	10.7	11.1	11.3	11.5	11.9	11.5	11.3 p				
		Family/Children	1.9	1.7	1.7	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1	1.9	1.8	1.8 p				
		Unemployment	0.6	0.4	0.4	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.7	0.8	0.7	0.6 p				
		Housing and Social exclusion n.e.c.	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.8 p				
		Total (including Admin and Other expenditures)	22.3	20.9	21.0	23.7	24.4	24.5	24.9	24.7	23.9	23.8 p				
		of which: Means tested benefits	2.0	1.8	1.7	2.0	2.0	2.0	1.9	1.8	1.8	1.8 p				

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Slovakia

Slovakia		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	
Macro Economic Indicators (Annual % growth)	Real GDP	8.5	10.8	5.6	-5.4	5.0	2.8	1.7	1.5	2.8	3.9	3.3	3.4	
	Total employment	2.1	2.1	3.2	-2.0	-1.5	1.8	0.1	-0.8	1.4	2.0	2.4	2.2	
	Labour productivity	6.2	8.5	2.3	-3.5	6.7	1.0	1.6	2.3	1.3	1.8	0.9	1.2	
	Annual average hours worked per person employed	0.3	0.9	0.1	-0.7	1.4	-0.7	-0.2	-1.0	-0.7	-0.3	-0.8	-1.5	
	Real productivity per hour worked	5.9	7.5	2.2	-2.8	5.2	1.7	1.8	3.3	2.0	2.2	1.7	2.7	
	Harmonized CPI	4.3	1.9	3.9	0.9	0.7	4.1	3.7	1.5	-0.1	-0.3	-0.5	1.4	
	Price deflator GDP	2.9	1.1	2.8	-1.2	0.5	1.6	1.3	0.5	-0.2	-0.2	-0.4	1.3	
	Nominal compensation per employee	8.0	8.7	6.6	2.6	5.4	2.0	2.6	2.6	1.8	3.5	2.3	4.1	
	Real compensation per employee (GDP deflator)	4.9	7.5	3.7	3.8	4.9	0.3	1.3	2.1	2.0	3.6	2.8	2.7	
	Real compensation per employee (private consumption deflator)	3.6	6.7	2.6	1.6	4.7	-2.0	-1.1	1.1	1.9	3.8	2.8	2.6	
	Nominal unit labour costs	1.6	0.2	4.2	6.3	-1.1	1.0	1.0	0.3	0.5	1.6	1.4	2.8	
	Real unit labour costs	-1.2	-1.0	1.3	7.7	-1.7	-0.6	-0.4	-0.2	0.7	1.8	1.8	1.5	
	Labour Market Indicators - Total	Total population (000)	5373	5373	5376	5382	5390	5392	5404	5411	5416	5421	5426	5435
		Population aged 15-64 (000)	3842	3857	3871	3884	3885	3882	3881	3870	3853	3834	3810	3780
		Total employment (000)	2302	2358	2434	2366	2318	2315 b	2329	2329	2363	2424	2492	2531
		Employment aged 15-64 (000)	2295	2351	2423	2357	2307	2303 b	2317	2318	2349	2405	2472	2502
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)		66.0	67.2	68.8	66.4	64.6	65.0 b	65.1	65.0	65.9	67.7	69.8	71.1	
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)		59.4	60.7	62.3	60.2	58.8	59.3 b	59.7	59.9	61.0	62.7	64.9	66.2	
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)		25.9	27.6	26.2	22.8	20.6	20.0 b	20.1	20.4	21.8	23.3	25.2	26.9	
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)		77.2	78.0	80.1	77.8	75.8	76.5 b	76.4	76.0	76.8	78.1	80.0	80.0	
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)		33.1	35.6	39.2	39.5	40.5	41.3 b	43.1	44.0	44.8	47.0	49.0	53.0	
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)		65.4	66.7	68.2	65.6	63.8	63.9 b	64.0	63.8	64.4	65.8	68.0	69.4	
Self-employed (% total employment)		12.5	12.8	13.7	15.5	15.8	15.9 b	15.4	15.5	15.3	15.0	15.3	15.2	
Part-time employment (% total employment)		2.7	2.5	2.5	3.4	3.8	4.0 b	4.0	4.5	5.1	5.8	5.8	5.8	
Temporary employment (% total employment)		4.1	4.0	3.6	3.6	4.3	5.0 b	5.1	5.3	7.2	8.0	7.8	7.3	
Employment in Services (% total employment)				55.9 b	58.4 b	59.6	59.3 b	59.1	60.8	61.0	60.6	60.6	60.0	
Employment in Industry (% total employment)				40.2 b	38.0 b	37.2	37.6 b	37.6	35.9	35.5	36.2	36.6	37.4	
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)				3.9 b	3.6 b	3.2	3.1 b	3.3	3.3	3.5	3.2	2.9	2.7	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)		68.6	68.3	68.8	68.4	68.7	68.7 b	69.4	69.9	70.3	70.9	71.9	72.1	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)		35.3	34.6	32.4	31.4	31.1	30.1 b	30.5	30.8	31.0	31.7	32.4	33.2	
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)		87.6	86.9	87.8	87.2	86.9	87.0 b	87.1	87.2	87.3	87.3	87.6	86.6	
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)		36.7	38.8	41.9	42.8	45.1	46.0 b	48.5	49.5	50.1	51.8	53.9	56.4	
Total unemployment (000)		353	293	254	321	386	363 d	378	386	359	314	267	224	
Unemployment rate (% labour force)		13.5	11.2	9.6	12.1	14.5	13.7 d	14.0	14.2	13.2	11.5	9.7	8.1	
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)		27.0	20.6	19.3	27.6	33.9	33.7 d	34.0	33.7	29.7	26.5	22.2	18.9	
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)		10.2	8.3	6.6	6.5	9.2	9.2 b	9.4	10.0	9.3	7.6	5.8	5.1	
Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)		76.3	74.2	69.6	54.0	64.0	67.9 b	67.3	70.2	70.2	65.8	60.2	62.4	
Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)		9.4	7.0	6.2	8.6	10.4	10.1 b	10.4	10.4	9.2	8.4	7.2	6.3	
Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)		28.9	29.1	32.3	30.3	29.7	30.3 b	30.7	31.3	32.7 b	34.4	37.2	38.8	
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)		71.9	73.2	74.8	72.0	69.9	70.1 b	70.3	69.9	71.0 b	72.6	74.3	75.3	
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)		84.8	84.2	85.6	83.2	82.2	81.5 b	80.1	79.5	80.0 b	80.3	81.3	82.0	
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)		59.4	60.7	62.2	60.1	58.8	59.3 b	59.7	59.9	60.9	62.7	64.9	66.2	
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)		82.5	61.0 u	77.4	70.9	63.7	64.6 bu	70.1	78.6	80.3	76.7	77.5	79.2	
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)											78.8 u	60.3 u	67.1 u	
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)		59.5	60.7	62.2	60.2	58.8	59.3 b	59.7	59.8	60.9	62.8	64.9	66.2	
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)		53.7	67.4	70.8	58.8	54.3	54.7 b	64.2	65.7	64.4	55.5	62.3	68.3	
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)			60.9 u	59.5	67.9	64.2	69.3 b	62.5	68.2	70.3	66.7	64.9	68.6	
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)				0.7	0.9	1.3	1.4 b	1.4	1.6	1.7	2.1	2.3	2.1	
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)		0.5	0.4	0.3	0.5	0.5	0.5 b	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.4	0.5	
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)		2.0	2.2	1.8	1.7	1.7	1.6 b	1.5	1.8	1.7	2.0	1.6	1.7	

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Slovakia		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	
Labour Market Indicators - Male	Total population (000)	2610	2611	2614	2618	2624	2625	2632	2636	2639	2642	2646	2652	
	Population aged 15-64(000)	1913	1923	1932	1941	1943	1944	1945	1941	1934	1926	1916	1903	
	Total employment (000)	1292	1322	1364	1326	1285	1292 b	1304	1295	1316	1349	1378	1385	
	Employment aged 15-64 (000)	1288	1319	1357	1320	1279	1285 b	1296	1288	1308	1337	1367	1370	
	Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	74.6	76.0	77.4	74.6	71.9	72.5 b	72.8	72.2	73.2	75.0	76.9	77.5	
	Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)	67.0	68.4	70.0	67.6	65.2	66.1 b	66.7	66.4	67.6	69.5	71.4	72.0	
	Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)	29.2	30.9	30.8	26.8	23.8	24.8 b	24.1	24.4	26.8	28.4	31.9	32.4	
	Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)	84.1	85.0	86.4	84.2	81.4	82.5 b	83.0	82.2	83.2	85.1	86.3	86.3	
	Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)	49.8	52.5	56.7	54.9	54.0	52.5 b	53.6	53.3	53.1	53.6	55.1	56.6	
	FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	74.4	75.9	77.2	74.0	71.2	71.7 b	71.9	71.2	72.0	73.6	75.5	76.2	
	Self-employed (% total employment)	16.7	17.2	18.4	20.2	21.2	20.8 b	19.8	20.1	19.7	18.9	19.2	19.1	
	Part-time employment (% total employment)	1.2	1.0	1.3	2.6	2.6	2.7 b	2.8	3.3	3.7	4.0	4.1	4.0	
	Temporary employment (% total employment)	4.1	4.0	3.6	3.6	4.3	5.0 b	5.1	5.3	7.2	8.0	7.8	7.3	
	Employment in Services (% total employment)			42.1 b	44.8 b	45.5	45.1 b	44.7	46.2	47.2	46.8	46.9	45.7	
	Employment in Industry (% total employment)			52.6 b	50.4 b	50.1	50.5 b	50.8	49.2	47.9	48.6	49.0	50.5	
	Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)			5.3 b	4.8 b	4.4	4.4 b	4.5	4.6	4.9	4.6	4.1	3.8	
	Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)	76.4	75.9	76.4	76.3	76.1	76.6 b	77.1	77.2	77.6	77.5	78.3	78.2	
	Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)	39.7	38.9	37.8	37.1	36.4	37.2 b	37.1	37.6	38.0	38.3	39.8	39.6	
	Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)	94.0	93.1	93.4	93.6	92.9	93.5 b	93.8	93.6	94.0	93.6	93.5	93.1	
	Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)	55.2	57.0	59.9	58.7	59.7	58.8 b	60.3	59.5	58.9	58.4	60.1	60.0	
	Total unemployment (000)	180	144	124	169	211	203 d	204	210	194	155	133	119	
	Unemployment rate (% labour force)	12.4	10.0	8.4	11.5	14.3	13.7 d	13.5	14.0	12.8	10.3	8.8	7.9	
	Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)	26.6	20.6	18.6	27.9	34.8	33.3 d	35.0	34.9	29.5	25.8	19.8	18.1	
	Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)	9.4	7.4	5.8	5.8	9.0	9.4 b	9.3	10.0	9.4	6.9	5.5	5.2	
	Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)	76.6	75.2	69.1	50.9	63.2	69.2 b	68.8	71.7	72.9	66.9	62.3	65.7	
	Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)	10.5	7.9	7.0	10.3	12.6	12.3 b	13.0	13.1	11.2	9.9	7.9	7.2	
	Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)	32.5	33.6	39.1	39.0	37.0	35.3 b	36.0	36.9	37.0 b	39.8	43.6	45.0	
	Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)	80.5	82.1	82.9	80.0	77.2	77.5 b	78.2	76.9	78.1 b	79.4	80.7	80.9	
	Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)	90.8	89.9	91.7	89.5	88.1	87.1 b	85.9	85.7	87.4 b	88.2	87.4	88.6	
	Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)	67.0	68.4	69.9	67.5	65.2	66.1 b	66.7	66.3	67.6	69.4	71.3	71.9	
	Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)	97.4 u		90.3 u	93.5 u	82.0 u	75.4 bu			84.0 u	100.0	87.9 u	87.2 u	
	Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)													
	Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)	67.0	68.4	69.9	67.5	65.2	66.1 b	66.7	66.3	67.6	69.5	71.4	72.0	
	Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)	66.7	75.0	79.5	73.7	71.1	67.8 b	64.5	67.9	77.5	65.9	70.2	76.7	
	Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)			60.8 u		87.8 u	84.2 bu	75.8 u	85.7 u	81.6 u		69.8	80.9	
	Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)			0.5	0.8	1.2	1.2 b	1.3	1.4	1.6	1.8	2.1	1.7	
	Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)	0.3	0.2	0.2 u	0.3	0.4	0.4 b	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.4	
	Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)	1.4	1.7	1.6	1.4	1.3	1.3 b	1.1	1.5	1.3	1.6	1.3	1.5	
	Labour Market Indicators - Female	Total population (000)	2763	2763	2762	2764	2767	2767	2773	2775	2777	2779	2780	2784
		Population aged 15-64(000)	1929	1935	1939	1942	1941	1939	1937	1929	1919	1908	1895	1877
		Total employment (000)	1010	1036	1070	1040	1033	1023 b	1026	1034	1047	1075	1114	1146
		Employment aged 15-64 (000)	1008	1032	1066	1036	1029	1018 b	1021	1029	1041	1068	1105	1132
		Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	57.5	58.7	60.3	58.2	57.4	57.4 b	57.3	57.8	58.6	60.3	62.7	64.7
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)		51.9	53.0	54.6	52.8	52.3	52.5 b	52.7	53.4	54.3	55.9	58.3	60.3	
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)		22.5	24.1	21.5	18.7	17.4	15.0 b	15.9	16.2	16.5	18.0	18.2	21.1	
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)		70.2	71.0	73.7	71.2	70.1	70.4 b	69.6	69.6	70.2	70.9	73.5	73.4	
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)		18.9	21.2	24.2	26.1	28.7	31.4 b	33.6	35.7	37.2	41.0	43.5	49.6	
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)		56.6	57.8	59.4	57.3	56.4	56.1 b	56.0	56.3	56.9	58.0	60.5	62.5	
Self-employed (% total employment)		7.3	7.2	7.7	9.6	9.2	9.7 b	9.8	9.7	9.8	10.1	10.5	10.4	
Part-time employment (% total employment)		4.5	4.3	4.1	4.5	5.2	5.6 b	5.5	6.2	6.8	8.0	7.9	8.0	
Temporary employment (% total employment)		4.6	4.7	4.3	3.7	5.2	6.1 b	6.4	6.3	7.7	10.1	9.1	8.8	
Employment in Services (% total employment)														
Employment in Industry (% total employment)														
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)				2.2 b	2.0 b	1.8	1.4 b	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.3	1.4	1.3	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)		60.9	60.8	61.3	60.6	61.3	60.8 b	61.7	62.5	62.9	64.3	65.4	65.9	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)		30.9	30.2	26.7	25.4	25.5	22.7 b	23.6	23.7	23.6	24.9	24.7	26.5	
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)		81.2	80.7	82.1	80.7	80.9	80.4 b	80.4	80.5	80.4	80.8	81.5	79.8	
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)		20.9	23.3	26.4	29.0	32.3	34.6 b	38.0	40.4	42.1	45.8	48.2	53.0	
Total unemployment (000)		173	149	130	152	175	160 d	174	176	165	159	134	105	
Unemployment rate (% labour force)		14.8	12.8	11.0	12.9	14.7	13.7 d	14.5	14.5	13.6	12.9	10.8	8.4	
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)		27.5	20.7	20.3	27.1	32.6	34.3 d	32.5	31.6	30.1	27.5	26.3	20.2	
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)		11.2	9.3	7.7	7.4	9.5	9.0 b	9.5	10.0	9.1	8.3	6.2	4.9	
Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)		75.9	73.3	70.0	57.4	65.1	66.3 b	65.4	68.5	67.1	64.7	58.1	58.7	
Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)		8.3	6.1	5.3	6.7	8.1	7.7 b	7.7	7.5	7.1	6.8	6.5	5.3	
Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)		27.0	26.4	28.5	25.2	24.9	27.1 b	27.3	27.7	29.6 b	30.5	32.5	34.1	
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)		63.0	63.7	66.2	63.5	62.1	62.1 b	61.4	62.2	63.3 b	64.8	67.0	68.9	
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)		78.5	79.0	79.7	77.7	77.5	76.9 b	75.6	74.4	73.9 b	74.2	76.7	77.1	
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)		51.9	53.0	54.6	52.8	52.4	52.5 b	52.7	53.3	54.3	55.9	58.3	60.3	
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)													68.7 u	
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)														
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)		52.0	53.0	54.6	52.8	52.4	52.6 b	52.7	53.3	54.3	56.0	58.3	60.3	
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)		40.8	61.0	61.0	45.4	37.2	42.1 bu	64.0	63.6	52.3	46.6	55.5	62.8	
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)				58.2 u	69.2 u					60.8 u	69.7 u	59.3 u	57.8 u	
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)				0.9	1.0	1.4	1.6 b	1.5	1.9	1.8	2.5	2.7	2.4	
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)		0.8	0.5	0.5	0.7	0.7	0.6 b	0.6	0.9	0.8	0.6	0.5	0.6	
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)		2.7	2.7	2.1	2.1	2.2	1.9 b	2.0	2.2	2.1	2.5	2.0	1.9	

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Slovakia		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017			
Social Indicators	All	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of total population)	26.7	21.4	20.6	19.6	20.6	20.5	19.8	18.4	18.4	18.1				
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of total population)	11.6	10.6	10.9	11.0	12.0	13.0	13.2	12.8	12.6	12.3	12.7			
		At-risk-of-poverty threshold (PPS single person)	2772	3365	4058	4694	5016	5385	5879	5743	5883	6132	6304			
		Poverty gap (%)	20.0	19.2	18.1	23.2	25.7	22.8	20.5	24.1	29.0	28.9	26.1			
		Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of total population)			4.9	5.4	6.0	7.8	8.6	7.1	9.8	7.4	7.7			
		At-risk-of-poverty before social transfers excl. pensions (% of total population)	20.0	18.2	18.4	17.1	19.8	19.5	20.0	20.1	19.6	19.0	18.4			
		Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (%)	42.0	41.8	40.8	35.7	39.4	33.3	34.0	36.3	35.7	35.3	31.0			
		Severe Material Deprivation (% of total population)	18.2	13.7	11.8	11.1	11.4	10.6	10.5	10.2	9.9	9.0	8.2			
		Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of people aged 0-59)	6.2	6.4	5.2	5.6	7.9	7.7	7.2	7.6	7.1	7.1	6.5			
		Real Gross Household Disposable income (growth %)	3.5	9.2	4.9	1.4	0.5	-1.9	-0.6	0.1	2.6	4.2	3.2			
		Income quintile share ratio S80/S20	4.1	3.5	3.4	3.6	3.8	3.8	3.7	3.6	3.9	3.5	3.6			
		GINI coefficient	28.1	24.5	23.7	24.8	25.9	25.7	25.3	24.2	26.1	23.7	24.3			
		Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18-24)	6.6 b	6.5	6.0	4.9	4.7	5.1 b	5.3	6.4	6.7 b	6.9	7.4	9.3		
NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of total population aged 15-24)	14.4 b	12.5	11.1	12.5	14.1	13.8 b	13.8	13.7	12.8	13.7	12.3	12.1				
Social Indicators	Male	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of male population)	25.6	19.4	18.9	18.0	19.6	19.5	19.7	19.3	18.1	18.1	18.1			
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of male population)	11.8	9.9	10.1	10.1	11.7	12.8	13.2	12.8	12.7	12.1	12.7			
		Poverty gap (%)	20.8	22.4	21.0	24.7	28.0	24.5	20.5	25.5	30.7	32.6	27.8			
		Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of male population)			4.6	5.1	4.6	7.6	8.5	6.7	10.3	7.2	7.4			
		Severe Material Deprivation (% of male population)	17.8	12.8	11.1	10.5	11.1	10.1	10.1	10.0	9.7	8.9	8.1			
		Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of males aged 0-59)	5.8	5.7	4.5	5.1	7.4	7.5	7.0	7.2	7.2	7.4	6.6			
		Life expectancy at birth (years)	70.4	70.6	70.9 b	71.4	71.8	72.3	72.5	72.9	73.3	73.1	73.8			
		Healthy life years at birth (years) - men	54.5 bd	55.6	52.1 b	52.4	52.4	52.1	53.4	54.5	55.5	54.8	56.4			
		Early leavers from education and training (% of males aged 18-24)	7.3 b	7.2	7.1	5.7	4.6	5.4 b	6.0	6.7	6.9 b	6.9	7.6	8.5		
		NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of males aged 15-24)	12.8 b	11.0	9.6	12.2	13.8	13.9 b	14.5	14.2	12.8	13.3	10.9	10.5		
		Social Indicators	Female	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of female population)	27.6	23.1	22.0	21.1	21.6	21.7	21.3	20.2	18.7	18.6	18.2	
				At-risk-of-poverty (% of female population)	11.5	11.2	11.5	11.8	12.2	13.1	13.3	12.9	12.6	12.4	12.8	
				Poverty gap (%)	19.6	17.2	16.5	21.8	24.3	21.0	20.6	23.0	26.1	25.5	24.3	
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of female population)					5.2	5.6	7.3	8.0	8.7	7.4	9.4	7.7	8.0			
Severe Material Deprivation (% of female population)	18.6			14.5	12.3	11.6	11.8	11.0	10.8	10.5	10.0	9.1	8.3			
Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of females aged 0-59)	6.6			7.2	5.9	6.0	8.4	7.8	7.5	7.9	7.0	6.9	6.3			
Life expectancy at birth (years)	78.4			78.4	79.0 b	79.1	79.3	79.8	79.9	80.1	80.5	80.2	80.7			
Healthy life years at birth (years) - women	54.6 bd			56.1	52.5 b	52.6	52.0	52.3	53.1	54.3	54.6	55.1	57.0			
Early leavers from education and training (% of females aged 18-24)	5.8 b			5.8	4.9	4.1	4.9	4.6 b	4.6	6.1	6.6 b	6.8	7.2	10.3		
NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of females aged 15-24)	16.0 b			14.1	12.5	12.9	14.4	13.7 b	13.1	13.1	12.8	14.2	13.7	13.8		
Social Indicators	Children (0-17)			At-Risk-of-poverty or exclusion of children (% of people aged 0-17)	30.4	25.8	24.3	23.7	25.3	26.0	26.6	25.5	23.6	24.9	24.4	
				At-risk-of-poverty (% of Children population)	17.1	17.2	16.7	16.8	18.8	21.2	21.9	20.3	19.2	20.1	20.8	
				Severe Material Deprivation (% of Children population)	19.9	16.3	12.6	12.7	13.5	12.4	11.9	13.0	12.1	11.2	9.7	
		Share of children living in low work intensity households (% of Children population)	4.4	5.5	4.4	5.4	8.1	7.3	7.2	8.4	8.1	8.0	8.2			
		Risk of poverty of children in households at work (Working Intensity > 0.2)	14.4	13.0	13.7	12.7	13.0	16.1	16.4	13.4	12.7	14.2	14.6			
		Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (0-17) (%)	39.6	36.5	38.2	30.3	35.8	28.6	29.8	33.7	36.2	37.6	28.8			
Social Indicators	Working age (18-64)	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of Working age population)	25.8	20.1	19.3	18.5	20.2	20.6	19.9	19.4	18.1	17.8	17.6			
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of Working age population)	10.6	9.3	9.5	9.6	11.2	12.4	12.3	12.1	12.3	11.6	12.0			
		Severe Material Deprivation (% of Working age population)	17.1	12.3	10.8	10.6	11.0	10.3	10.1	9.7	9.4	8.4	7.9			
		Very low work intensity (18-59)	6.7	6.7	5.4	5.6	7.9	7.8	7.2	7.3	6.9	6.9	6.0			
		In-work at-risk-of poverty rate (% of persons employed 18-64)	6.3	4.9	5.8	5.2	5.7	6.3	6.2	5.8	5.7	6.1	6.5			
		Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (18-64) (%)	43.6	45.3	43.5	39.2	41.4	34.7	35.6	37.3	35.6	34.5	31.8			
Social Indicators	Elderly (65+)	At-Risk-of-poverty or exclusion of elderly (% of people aged 65+)	25.6	22.1	21.9	19.7	16.7	14.5	16.3	13.6	13.4	12.8	12.3			
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of Elderly population)	8.5	8.5	9.9	10.8	7.7	6.3	7.8	6.0	6.2	5.6	5.7			
		Severe Material Deprivation (% of Elderly population)	21.0	17.7	15.3	11.7	11.1	9.7	10.8	9.2	9.2	9.2	8.0			
		Relative median income of elderly (ratio with median income of people younger than 65)	0.85	0.81	0.79	0.81	0.83	0.86	0.81	0.90	0.91	0.91	0.91			
		Aggregate replacement ratio (ratio)	0.57	0.54	0.54	0.55	0.61	0.62	0.56	0.61	0.62	0.62	0.62			
Expenditure in social protection indicators (% of GDP)		Sickness/Health care	4.6	4.6	5.0	5.6	5.4	5.3	5.3	5.5	5.6	5.5 p				
		Disability	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6 p				
		Old age and survivors	6.8	6.6	6.5	7.6	7.6	7.5	7.7	7.9	8.2	8.1 p				
		Family/Children	1.6	1.5	1.4	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.6 p				
		Unemployment	0.5	0.5	0.6	1.0	1.0	0.8	0.7	0.6	0.5	0.5 p				
		Housing and Social exclusion n.e.c.	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4 p				
		Total (including Admin and Other expenditures)	16.0	15.7	15.7	18.5	18.2	17.8	18.0	18.3	18.5	18.2 p				
		of which: Means tested benefits	1.0	1.0	0.8	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.8 p				

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Finland

Finland		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	
Macro Economic Indicators (Annual % growth)	Real GDP	4.1	5.2	0.7	-8.3	3.0	2.6	-1.4	-0.8	-0.6	0.1	2.1	2.6	
	Total employment	1.8	2.1	2.2	-2.4	-0.7	1.3	0.9	-0.7	-0.5	-0.1	0.3	1.1	
	Labour productivity	2.2	3.0	-1.5	-6.0	3.7	1.3	-2.3	0.0	-0.2	0.3	1.9	1.5	
	Annual average hours worked per person employed	-0.3	-0.1	-0.4	-1.4	0.4	-0.3	-0.7	-0.7	-0.2	0.1	-0.2	-0.4	
	Real productivity per hour worked	2.4	3.1	-1.1	-4.7	3.3	1.6	-1.6	0.6	0.0	0.2	2.0	1.9	
	Harmonized CPI	1.3	1.6	3.9	1.6	1.7	3.3	3.2	2.2	1.2	-0.2	0.4	0.8	
	Price deflator GDP	0.9	2.8	3.1	1.9	0.4	2.6	3.0	2.6	1.7	1.9	0.8	0.9	
	Nominal compensation per employee	3.4	3.3	4.3	2.0	2.2	3.6	2.8	1.4	1.0	1.5	1.3	-1.1	
	Real compensation per employee (GDP deflator)	2.5	0.6	1.2	0.1	1.9	1.0	-0.2	-1.2	-0.7	-0.4	0.5	-2.0	
	Real compensation per employee (private consumption deflator)	2.1	1.7	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.3	-0.4	-0.9	-0.3	1.6	0.9	-1.9	
	Nominal unit labour costs	1.2	0.3	5.8	8.5	-1.4	2.3	5.2	1.4	1.1	1.2	-0.6	-2.5	
	Real unit labour costs	0.4	-2.5	2.7	6.5	-1.7	-0.3	2.2	-1.1	-0.6	-0.7	-1.4	-3.4	
	Labour Market Indicators - Total	Total population (000)	5256	5277	5300	5326	5351	5375	5401	5427	5451	5472	5487	5503
		Population aged 15-64 (000)	3508	3507	3531	3543	3553	3547	3533	3517	3500	3484	3468	3459
Total employment (000)		2444	2492	2531 b	2457	2448	2474	2483	2457	2447	2437	2448	2473	
Employment aged 15-64 (000)		2416	2459	2497 b	2423	2410	2429	2431	2403	2386	2368	2380	2403	
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)		73.9	74.8	75.8	73.5	73.0	73.8	74.0	73.3	73.1	72.9	73.4	74.2	
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)		69.3	70.3	71.1	68.7	68.1	69.0	69.4	68.9	68.7	68.5	69.1	70.0	
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)		42.1	44.6	44.7	39.6	38.8	40.4	41.8	41.5	41.4	40.5	41.7	42.5	
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)		82.4	83.4	84.3	82.4	81.6	82.3	82.0	81.0	80.5	80.0	79.9	80.6	
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)		54.5	55.0	56.5	55.5	56.2	57.0	58.2	58.5	59.1	60.0	61.4	62.5	
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)		70.7	71.7	72.6 b	70.2	69.6	70.2	70.4	69.9	69.6	69.4	69.6	70.3	
Self-employed (% total employment)		12.3	12.0	12.3 b	13.1	12.8	12.9	13.1	13.0	13.5	13.8	13.5	12.8	
Part-time employment (% total employment)		13.5	13.4	12.7	13.3	13.8	14.1	14.1	14.0	14.1	14.1	14.9	15.0	
Temporary employment (% total employment)		10.5	10.3	9.4	8.7	10.2	10.5	10.5	10.2	10.2	10.2	10.7	10.9	
Employment in Services (% total employment)				70.6 b	71.7	72.5	73.0	73.3	73.2	74.2	74.4	74.3	74.3	
Employment in Industry (% total employment)				25.2 b	24.0	23.3	23.0	22.9	22.9	22.0	21.8	22.3	22.3	
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)				4.2 b	4.3	4.1	4.0	3.8	3.8	3.9	3.8	3.5	3.4	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)		75.2	75.6	76.0	75.0	74.5	74.9	75.2	75.2	75.4	75.8	75.9	76.7	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)		51.8	53.4	53.5	50.4	49.4	50.5	51.6	51.8	52.1	52.2	52.2	53.2	
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)		87.8	88.0	88.6	88.2	87.5	87.7	87.3	86.8	86.6	86.6	86.5	86.8	
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)		58.5	58.8	59.7	59.1	60.2	60.9	62.3	62.9	63.8	65.2	66.4	67.8	
Total unemployment (000)		204	183	172	221	224	209	207	219	232	252	237	234	
Unemployment rate (% labour force)		7.7	6.9	6.4	8.2	8.4	7.8	7.7	8.2	8.7	9.4	8.8	8.6	
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)		18.7	16.5	16.5	21.5	21.4	20.1	19.0	19.9	20.5	22.4	20.1	20.1	
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)		1.9	1.5	1.2	1.4	2.0	1.7	1.6	1.7	1.9	2.3	2.3	2.1	
Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)		24.9	22.6	18.2	16.7	23.8	22.0	21.2	20.6	22.1	24.4	25.7	24.2	
Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)		9.7	8.8	8.8 b	10.9	10.6	10.1	9.8	10.3	10.7	11.7	10.5	10.7	
Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)		58.4	58.6	59.3 b	56.8	55.0	55.5	55.2	54.1	53.5 b	53.1	54.3	53.2	
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)		75.6	76.2	77.3 b	74.8	74.1	74.7	74.6	73.6	73.2 b	72.7	73.0	73.4	
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)		85.0	85.2	85.6 b	84.4	84.1	84.3	84.4	83.8	83.5 b	83.1	83.0	84.5	
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)		69.6	70.5	71.3 b	68.9	68.5	69.4	69.7	69.2	69.2	69.0	69.7	70.5	
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)		68.7	73.9	76.2 b	72.0	70.7	70.8	73.8	69.5	70.7	70.4	71.3	72.8	
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)		47.7	49.4	51.6 b	51.5	46.9	47.4	48.8	50.9	47.6	45.9	44.1	48.0	
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)		69.7	70.5	71.3 b	68.9	68.5	69.4	69.6	69.2	69.2	69.2	69.8	70.6	
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)		69.5	74.7	75.9 b	72.9	71.6	71.9	75.5	74.0	72.4	70.1	71.2	71.5	
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)		53.3	55.8	58.3 b	57.9	53.5	54.1	55.9	56.3	54.0	52.7	51.2	54.1	
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)				2.7	3.0	3.0	2.9	2.8	3.0	3.4	3.7	3.8	3.5	
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)		2.3	2.3	2.1	2.1	2.3	2.4	2.3	2.3	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.5	
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)		3.4	3.0	2.8	3.4	3.7	3.7	4.1	4.6	5.1	5.3	5.7	5.2	

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Finland		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	
Labour Market Indicators - Male	Total population (000)	2572	2584	2597	2612	2625	2638	2653	2667	2680	2692	2701	2712	
	Population aged 15-64(000)	1773	1773	1785	1791	1796	1793	1787	1779	1771	1763	1757	1755	
	Total employment (000)	1266	1290	1315 b	1255	1259	1278	1277	1261	1254	1249	1267	1282	
	Employment aged 15-64 (000)	1249	1268	1291 b	1233	1234	1249	1244	1228	1215	1206	1225	1238	
	Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	76.3	77.2	78.4	74.7	74.5	75.6	75.5	74.7	74.0	73.9	75.0	75.9	
	Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)	71.4	72.1	73.1	69.5	69.4	70.6	70.5	69.9	69.5	69.3	70.5	71.4	
	Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)	42.6	44.5	44.3	37.7	37.7	39.5	41.0	39.1	39.8	38.1	40.1	41.4	
	Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)	85.2	86.0	87.3	84.3	83.9	84.8	84.4	83.9	82.7	82.5	83.0	83.3	
	Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)	54.8	55.1	57.1	54.6	55.6	56.8	56.6	56.5	56.8	57.4	59.8	61.7	
	FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	74.6	75.5	76.6 b	72.8	72.6	73.3	73.4	72.8	71.9	71.8	72.6	73.5	
	Self-employed (% total employment)	16.4	16.0	16.1 b	17.3	17.0	17.1	17.4	17.3	17.9	18.2	17.8	16.5	
	Part-time employment (% total employment)	8.6	8.3	7.9	8.3	8.9	9.4	9.1	8.8	9.2	9.7	10.0	9.9	
	Temporary employment (% total employment)	10.5	10.3	9.4	8.7	10.2	10.5	10.5	10.2	10.2	10.2	10.7	10.9	
	Employment in Services (% total employment)			55.4 b	56.7	58.3	58.4	58.5	58.4	59.7	60.1	60.2	60.0	
	Employment in Industry (% total employment)			39.0 b	37.5	36.2	36.1	36.1	36.2	34.9	34.4	35.0	35.3	
	Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)			5.7 b	5.8	5.5	5.5	5.4	5.4	5.5	5.5	4.9	4.7	
	Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)	77.1	77.2	77.9	76.4	76.4	77.2	77.1	76.8	76.8	77.2	77.7	78.5	
	Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)	52.6	53.3	53.4	49.7	49.4	50.5	51.2	50.8	51.5	51.1	51.2	52.3	
	Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)	90.3	90.4	91.2	90.6	90.5	90.9	90.4	90.1	89.5	89.6	89.7	89.8	
	Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)	58.9	59.1	60.6	58.7	60.1	61.4	61.6	61.5	61.9	63.2	65.1	67.5	
	Total unemployment (000)	101	90	85	122	126	117	115	122	129	137	126	125	
	Unemployment rate (% labour force)	7.4	6.5	6.1	8.9	9.1	8.4	8.3	8.8	9.3	9.9	9.0	8.9	
	Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)	19.0	16.4	17.1	24.1	23.8	21.8	19.9	22.9	22.8	25.4	21.8	20.9	
	Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)	2.1	1.7	1.2	1.6	2.5	2.2	2.1	2.0	2.2	2.7	2.5	2.4	
	Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)	28.0	26.0	20.3	18.2	27.6	26.0	24.9	23.2	24.1	27.8	28.2	27.0	
	Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)	10.0	8.8	9.2 b	12.0	11.8	11.0	10.2	11.6	11.7	13.0	11.2	11.0	
	Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)	62.4	62.7	63.5 b	60.0	59.1	60.3	59.0	58.2	58.1 b	58.4	61.2	59.5	
	Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)	78.5	79.1	80.4 b	76.6	76.1	77.3	76.9	76.3	75.0 b	75.1	75.6	76.3	
	Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)	87.7	87.5	88.8 b	86.9	86.8	87.2	86.9	86.3	85.6 b	84.8	85.4	87.2	
	Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)	71.5	72.2	73.2 b	69.6	69.5	70.7	70.7	70.1	69.6	69.5	70.7	71.5	
	Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)	74.4	78.1	79.9 b	72.0	74.1	77.0	76.8	70.9	73.0	73.6	77.7	79.0	
	Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)	59.6	60.7	61.3 b	60.4	56.8	57.5	58.1	60.8	60.1	58.6	56.1	61.5	
	Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)	71.5	72.2	73.2 b	69.6	69.5	70.8	70.6	70.0	69.7	69.6	70.8	71.5	
	Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)	74.8	78.6	76.7 b	71.5	73.1	74.7	78.5	75.4	72.6	73.7	75.5	74.3	
	Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)	60.7	62.0	66.7 b	65.0	61.6	61.1	62.2	64.4	62.1	59.7	60.5	64.7	
	Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)			1.6	2.0	2.0	1.9	1.9	2.0	2.4	2.7	2.7	2.6	
	Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)	2.0	2.0	1.8	1.9	1.9	2.0	2.0	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1	
	Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)	3.3	3.0	2.8	3.7	3.9	3.9	4.4	4.9	5.5	5.6	6.0	5.3	
	Labour Market Indicators - Female	Total population (000)	2683	2693	2704	2715	2726	2737	2749	2760	2771	2780	2786	2791
		Population aged 15-64(000)	1735	1734	1746	1752	1757	1753	1746	1738	1729	1720	1711	1705
		Total employment (000)	1178	1202	1216 b	1202	1188	1196	1206	1195	1193	1188	1182	1191
		Employment aged 15-64 (000)	1167	1191	1206 b	1191	1176	1179	1187	1176	1171	1162	1154	1165
		Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	71.5	72.5	73.1	72.4	71.5	71.9	72.5	71.9	72.1	71.8	71.7	72.4
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)		67.3	68.5	69.0	67.9	66.9	67.4	68.2	67.8	68.0	67.7	67.6	68.5	
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)		41.6	44.7	45.1	41.5	39.9	41.2	42.7	43.9	43.0	42.8	43.3	43.7	
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)		79.6	80.6	81.2	80.5	79.2	79.6	79.4	78.1	78.1	77.3	76.7	77.9	
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)		54.3	55.0	55.8	56.3	56.9	57.2	59.7	60.5	61.4	62.5	63.0	63.4	
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)		67.1	68.2	69.0 b	67.8	67.0	67.4	67.8	67.3	67.5	67.3	66.9	67.4	
Self-employed (% total employment)		8.0	7.8	8.2 b	8.6	8.5	8.5	8.5	8.5	9.0	9.1	8.9	8.7	
Part-time employment (% total employment)		18.7	18.8	17.8	18.5	19.0	19.0	19.4	19.4	19.3	18.7	20.2	20.5	
Temporary employment (% total employment)		18.4	17.8	17.1	16.7	16.8	16.8	16.7	16.8	16.6	16.2	16.6	17.1	
Employment in Services (% total employment)				2.6 b	2.7	2.7	2.3	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.1	1.9	2.0	
Employment in Industry (% total employment)														
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)														
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)		73.3	73.8	73.9	73.5	72.5	72.7	73.4	73.4	73.9	74.4	74.1	74.9	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)		51.0	53.6	53.5	51.2	49.3	50.5	52.0	52.9	52.6	53.3	53.1	54.2	
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)		85.3	85.6	85.9	85.7	84.4	84.3	84.1	83.3	83.6	83.6	82.8	83.6	
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)		58.2	58.4	58.8	59.5	60.3	60.4	62.9	64.3	65.5	67.2	67.6	68.2	
Total unemployment (000)		104	93	87	99	98	91	92	97	103	115	111	109	
Unemployment rate (% labour force)		8.1	7.2	6.7	7.6	7.6	7.1	7.1	7.5	8.0	8.8	8.6	8.4	
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)		18.4	16.6	15.8	19.0	19.0	18.4	18.0	17.1	18.4	19.7	18.6	19.3	
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)		1.8	1.4	1.1	1.1	1.4	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.6	1.8	2.0	1.8	
Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)		21.9	19.3	16.1	14.8	18.9	16.8	16.5	17.3	19.6	20.3	22.9	20.9	
Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)		9.4	8.9	8.4 b	9.7	9.4	9.3	9.4	9.0	9.7	10.5	9.9	10.5	
Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)		53.4	53.5	53.7 b	52.5	49.4	48.9	49.8	48.3	46.5 b	44.8	43.7	42.7	
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)		72.1	72.8	73.5 b	72.7	71.6	71.6	71.8	70.4	70.9 b	69.7	69.6	69.8	
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)		83.0	83.4	83.3 b	82.6	82.1	82.2	82.5	82.0	81.9 b	81.9	81.3	82.6	
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)		67.7	68.9	69.3 b	68.3	67.4	68.0	68.6	68.4	68.7	68.6	68.6	69.4	
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)		62.2	68.8	71.5 b	71.9	67.4	64.2	70.4	68.0	68.1	66.9	64.3	65.4	
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)		38.3	39.8	42.3 b	42.7	37.7	37.8	39.3	40.4	33.9	34.3	33.3	35.0	
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)		67.8	68.9	69.3 b	68.2	67.5	68.0	68.6	68.4	68.8	68.7	68.8	69.7	
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)		63.8	70.3	74.9 b	74.4	70.0	69.0	72.7	72.7	72.3	66.6	67.1	68.5	
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)		47.4	50.5	50.8 b	51.4	46.4	48.0	49.9	48.9	46.4	46.5	43.5	45.2	
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)				3.9	4.0	4.0	3.8	3.7	4.0	4.5	4.7	5.0	4.5	
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)		2.6	2.6	2.5	2.4	2.6	2.8	2.8	2.6	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.9	
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)		3.6	3.1	2.8	3.1	3.5	3.5	3.8	4.2	4.6	4.9	5.3	5.1	

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Finland		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017			
Social Indicators	All	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of total population)	17.1	17.4	17.4	16.9	16.9	17.9	17.2	16.0	17.3	16.8	16.6	15.7		
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of total population)	12.6	13.0	13.6	13.8	13.1	13.7	13.2	11.8	12.8	12.4	11.6	11.5		
		At-risk-of-poverty threshold (PPS single person)	8886	9145	9933	10421	10327	10760	11146	11507	11550	11658	11859	11853		
		Poverty gap (%)	14.5	14.1	15.7	15.1	13.8	13.5	15.0	15.0	13.9	13.2	13.9	13.7		
		Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of total population)		7.6	6.8	6.5	7.7	7.5	7.4	7.0	7.0	8.3	6.0	6.0		
		At-risk-of-poverty before social transfers excl. pensions (% of total population)	28.6	28.9	27.3	26.2	27.0	27.4	26.9	26.4	27.6	26.8	27.0	26.7		
		Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (%)	55.9	55.0	50.2	47.3	51.5	50.0	50.9	55.3	53.6	53.7	57.0	56.9		
		Severe Material Deprivation (% of total population)	3.3	3.6	3.5	2.8	2.8	3.2	2.9	2.5	2.8	2.2	2.2	2.1		
		Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of people aged 0-59)	9.1	8.8	7.5	8.4	9.3	10.0	9.3	9.0	10.0	10.8	11.4	10.7		
		Real Gross Household Disposable income (growth %)	2.8	3.8	2.4	0.8	2.5	1.1	0.1	0.4	-0.7	1.4	1.1			
		Income quintile share ratio S80/S20	3.6	3.7	3.8	3.7	3.6	3.7	3.6	3.7	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.5		
		GINI coefficient	25.9	26.2	26.3	25.9	25.4	25.8	25.9	25.4	25.6	25.2	25.4	25.3		
		Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18-24)	9.7	9.1	9.8	9.9	10.3	9.8	8.9	9.3	9.5 b	9.2	7.9	8.2		
		NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of total population aged 15-24)	7.7	7.0	7.8	9.9	9.0	8.4	8.6	9.3	10.2	10.6	9.9	9.4		
		Social Indicators	Male	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of male population)	16.3	15.8	15.9	15.8	16.0	17.3	17.0	15.7	16.9	16.8	16.6	15.6
				At-risk-of-poverty (% of male population)	12.0	12.1	12.7	12.9	12.4	13.2	12.9	11.3	12.3	12.2	11.7	11.5
Poverty gap (%)	14.6			14.7	17.1	16.6	14.7	15.2	16.4	17.2	15.3	15.3	15.1	14.5		
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of male population)				6.5	6.2	5.1	7.4	6.8	6.6	6.5	6.6	7.6	5.5	5.9		
Severe Material Deprivation (% of male population)	3.0			3.0	3.2	2.9	2.6	3.2	3.0	2.5	2.7	2.1	2.0	2.0		
Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of males aged 0-59)	9.3			8.6	7.3	8.7	9.6	10.4	10.2	10.0	11.0	11.9	12.4	11.7		
Life expectancy at birth (years)	75.9			76.0 b	76.5	76.6	76.9	77.3	77.7		78.4	78.7	78.6			
Healthy life years at birth (years) - men	53.2			56.8 b	58.6	58.2	58.5	57.7	57.3		58.7	59.4	59.1			
Early leavers from education and training (% of males aged 18-24)	11.8			11.2	12.1	10.7	11.6	11.2	9.8	10.4	11.9 b	10.6	9.0	9.5		
NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of males aged 15-24)	7.2			6.4	7.7	10.5	9.4	8.7	8.6	10.6	11.9	11.5	10.7	10.0		
Social Indicators	Female			At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of female population)	17.9	19.0	18.9	17.9	17.7	18.5	17.4	16.2	17.6	16.8	16.6	15.7
				At-risk-of-poverty (% of female population)	13.1	13.8	14.5	14.7	13.8	14.2	13.6	12.3	13.3	12.6	11.6	11.4
				Poverty gap (%)	14.1	13.5	14.1	14.6	12.9	12.4	13.9	13.2	13.0	12.3	12.5	13.0
				Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of female population)		8.5	7.4	7.7	8.1	8.1	8.1	7.4	7.3	8.9	6.5	6.2
				Severe Material Deprivation (% of female population)	3.6	4.1	3.8	2.7	3.1	3.2	2.9	2.5	2.9	2.3	2.4	2.2
				Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of females aged 0-59)	8.8	9.0	7.6	8.0	9.0	9.5	8.3	8.0	9.0	9.6	10.4	9.7
		Life expectancy at birth (years)	83.1	83.1 b	83.3	83.5	83.5	83.8	83.7		84.1	84.4	84.4			
		Healthy life years at birth (years) - women	52.8	58.0 b	59.5	58.6	57.9	58.3	56.2		57.5	56.3	57.0			
		Early leavers from education and training (% of females aged 18-24)	7.8	7.2	7.7	9.0	9.0	8.4	8.1	8.3	7.2 b	7.9	6.9	6.9		
		NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of females aged 15-24)	8.1	7.7	7.9	9.2	8.6	8.2	8.6	8.1	8.5	9.6	9.2	8.8		
		Social Indicators	Children (0-17)	At-Risk-of-poverty or exclusion of children (% of people aged 0-17)	13.8	15.1	15.1	14.0	14.2	16.1	14.9	13.0	15.6	14.9	14.7	15.1
				At-risk-of-poverty (% of Children population)	9.8	10.9	12.0	12.1	11.4	11.8	11.1	9.3	10.9	10.0	9.3	10.2
				Severe Material Deprivation (% of Children population)	2.6	3.4	3.1	2.5	2.3	3.2	2.8	1.8	2.0	2.0	1.8	1.8
				Share of children living in low work intensity households (% of Children population)	6.5	6.0	4.9	5.8	5.9	7.6	5.9	6.1	6.6	7.2	8.2	8.7
				Risk of poverty of children in households at work (Working Intensity > 0.2)	6.5	8.2	9.1	7.9	7.6	7.5	7.7	6.3	8.5	7.2	6.0	6.2
				Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (0-17) (%)	67.3	65.3	59.6	56.5	61.6	60.9	63.0	68.2	66.3	67.3	69.6	67.4
Social Indicators	Working age (18-64)	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of Working age population)	16.8	16.8	16.5	16.2	17.1	18.0	17.3	16.7	17.9	18.1	18.2	16.7		
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of Working age population)	11.2	11.5	11.8	12.2	12.3	12.8	12.4	11.3	12.5	12.7	12.2	11.6		
		Severe Material Deprivation (% of Working age population)	3.8	3.9	3.7	3.1	3.3	3.5	3.4	3.1	3.4	2.6	2.5	2.5		
		Very low work intensity (18-59)	10.0	9.8	8.4	9.3	10.6	10.9	10.6	10.1	11.3	12.1	12.6	11.6		
		In-work at-risk-of poverty rate (% of persons employed 18-64)	4.4	5.0	5.1	3.7	3.7	3.9	3.8	3.8	3.7	3.5	3.1	2.7		
		Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (18-64) (%)	59.3	58.2	54.1	50.8	53.8	52.9	53.4	57.8	54.9	54.5	57.2	58.6		
Social Indicators	Elderly (65+)	At-Risk-of-poverty or exclusion of elderly (% of people aged 65+)	23.0	23.1	23.9	23.1	19.5	19.8	19.5	16.8	17.0	14.5	13.6	13.2		
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of Elderly population)	21.8	21.6	22.5	22.1	18.3	18.9	18.4	16.1	16.0	13.8	12.3	12.3		
		Severe Material Deprivation (% of Elderly population)	2.2	2.6	3.2	2.2	1.7	2.1	1.5	1.1	1.7	1.2	1.7	1.1		
		Relative median income of elderly (ratio with median income of people younger than 65)	0.73	0.74	0.72	0.73	0.78	0.78	0.78	0.78	0.79	0.81	0.83	0.84		
		Aggregate replacement ratio (ratio)	0.47	0.47	0.49	0.48	0.50	0.50	0.49	0.49	0.51	0.52	0.53	0.53		
Social Indicators	Expenditure in social protection indicators (% of GDP)	Sickness/Health care	6.4	6.2	6.5	7.2	7.2	7.2	7.4	7.5	7.5	7.2				
		Disability	3.1	3.0	3.1	3.4	3.4	3.3	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.2				
		Old age and survivors	9.3	9.1	9.2	10.9	11.2	11.2	11.9	12.5	13.0	13.2				
		Family/Children	2.8	2.8	2.8	3.2	3.2	3.1	3.2	3.3	3.2	3.2				
		Unemployment	2.1	1.8	1.7	2.3	2.3	2.0	2.0	2.3	2.6	2.7				
		Housing and Social exclusion n.e.c.	0.8	0.8	1.0	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.6				
		Total (including Admin and Other expenditures)	25.4	24.5	25.1	29.0	29.3	28.9	30.1	31.1	31.9	31.6				
		of which: Means tested benefits	1.2	1.1	1.0	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.5	1.6	1.8	1.9				

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Sweden

Sweden	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017		
Macro Economic Indicators (Annual % growth)	Real GDP	4.7	3.4	-0.6	-5.2	6.0	2.7	-0.3	1.2	2.6	4.5	3.2	2.3	
	Total employment	1.7	2.3	0.9	-2.4	1.0	2.1	0.7	1.0	1.4	1.5	1.7	2.3	
	Labour productivity	2.9	1.1	-1.4	-2.8	5.0	0.5	-1.0	0.3	1.2	3.0	1.5	0.0	
	Annual average hours worked per person employed	-0.4	0.8	0.3	-0.5	1.6	-0.2	-0.9	-0.6	0.0	0.0	1.0	-1.1	
	Real productivity per hour worked	3.3	0.3	-1.8	-2.4	3.3	0.7	-0.1	0.9	1.1	3.0	0.5	1.0	
	Harmonized CPI	1.5	1.7	3.3	1.9	1.9	1.4	0.9	0.4	0.2	0.7	1.1	1.9	
	Price deflator GDP	1.8	2.9	3.3	2.4	1.0	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.8	2.1	1.6	2.1	
	Nominal compensation per employee	3.1	5.3	3.7	2.7	2.2	3.2	3.1	1.9	2.2	2.7	2.8	1.9	
	Real compensation per employee (GDP deflator)	1.3	2.4	0.3	0.3	1.2	2.0	2.0	0.9	0.4	0.7	1.2	-0.1	
	Real compensation per employee (private consumption deflator)	1.6	3.6	0.3	0.8	0.3	1.8	2.1	1.5	2.0	2.0	1.6	0.1	
	Nominal unit labour costs	0.2	4.2	5.2	5.7	-2.6	2.6	4.1	1.7	1.0	-0.3	1.3	2.0	
	Real unit labour costs	-1.7	1.4	1.8	3.2	-3.6	1.4	3.1	0.5	-0.8	-2.2	-0.3	-0.2	
	Labour Market Indicators - Total	Total population (000)	9048	9113	9183	9256	9341	9416	9483	9556	9645	9747	9851	9995
		Population aged 15-64 (000)	5922	5982	6033	6069	6100	6113	6114	6116	6127	6152	6187	6257
		Total employment (000)	4429	4541	4593	4499	4524	4626	4657	4705	4772	4837	4910	5022
Employment aged 15-64 (000)		4352	4453	4494	4391	4403	4498	4510	4554	4598	4660	4736	4834	
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)		78.8	80.1	80.4	78.3	78.1	79.4	79.4	79.8	80.0	80.5	81.2	81.8	
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)		73.1	74.2	74.3	72.2	72.1	73.6	73.8	74.4	74.9	75.5	76.2	76.9	
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)		40.3	42.2	42.2	38.3	38.8	40.9	40.2	41.7	42.8	43.9	44.5	44.9	
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)		84.7	86.1	86.5	84.5	84.0	85.1	85.2	85.4	85.4	85.6	85.9	86.3	
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)		69.6	70.0	70.1	70.0	70.4	72.0	73.0	73.6	74.0	74.5	75.5	76.4	
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)		72.6	74.0	74.3	72.6	72.2	73.6	73.9	74.3	74.8	75.2	75.9	76.7	
Self-employed (% total employment)		10.4	10.3	10.2	10.5	10.7	10.2	10.2	10.4	10.1	10.0	9.7	9.6	
Part-time employment (% total employment)		23.6	23.5	25.7	26.0	25.8	25.2	25.0	24.7	24.5	24.3	23.9	23.3	
Temporary employment (% total employment)		12.9	12.7	11.5	10.9	12.2	12.6	12.0	12.2	12.9	13.1	12.8	12.8	
Employment in Services (% total employment)				76.7 b	77.8	78.2	78.2	78.5	78.9	79.6	79.9	80.1	80.2	
Employment in Industry (% total employment)				21.4 b	20.3	20.0	19.8	19.3	18.8	18.4	18.4	18.2	18.3	
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)				1.9 b	1.9	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.7	1.7	1.6	1.5	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)		78.8	79.1	79.3	78.9	79.1	79.9	80.3	81.1	81.5	81.7	82.1	82.5	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)		51.3	52.2	52.8	51.0	51.6	53.0	52.6	54.5	55.4	55.1	54.8	54.7	
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)		89.4	90.0	90.4	90.0	89.8	90.3	90.6	90.9	90.8	90.9	90.9	91.3	
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)		72.8	72.8	72.8	73.9	74.8	76.0	77.0	77.5	78.2	78.7	79.7	80.5	
Total unemployment (000)		336	298	305	408	425	390	403	411	411	387	366	358	
Unemployment rate (% labour force)		7.1	6.1	6.2	8.3	8.6	7.8	8.0	8.0	7.9	7.4	6.9	6.7	
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)		21.5	19.2	20.2	25.0	24.8	22.8	23.7	23.6	22.9	20.4	18.9	17.8	
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)		1.0 e	0.8	0.8	1.1	1.6	1.5	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.5	1.3	1.2	
Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)		14.7 e	13.6	12.3	13.1	18.1	19.0	18.3	17.7	18.2	19.6	18.3	18.5	
Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)		11.0	10.1	10.7	12.8	12.8	12.1	12.4	12.8	12.7	11.2	10.4	9.8	
Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)		68.1 b	68.0	67.6	65.2	64.7	65.8	65.4	63.8	63.6 b	63.3	63.3	64.0	
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)		82.9 b	84.2	84.4	82.6	82.4	83.9	84.1	84.4	84.5 b	84.9	85.1	85.9	
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)		87.3 b	88.5	89.1	88.1	87.7	88.3	88.7	89.2	89.0 b	89.3	89.5	89.5	
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)		73.9	75.0	75.1	73.0	73.1	74.8	75.1	75.8	76.2	77.0	78.0	78.6	
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)		70.7	69.9	73.0	74.4	73.1	72.3	71.8	72.6	73.9	75.4	75.2	77.7	
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)		48.1	49.9	50.3	47.1	44.6	44.1	44.2	46.3	47.8	46.8	47.9	50.2	
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)		75.1	76.2	76.3	74.2	74.4	76.0	76.2	77.2	77.7	78.5	79.3	79.9	
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)		72.0	72.4	72.2	73.1	72.7	73.4	73.9	74.7	74.9	75.7	76.5	77.7	
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)		56.6	58.9	60.5	57.4	56.6	58.2	58.6	58.5	59.5	60.2	61.2	62.7	
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)				4.4	4.8	4.6	4.5	4.7	4.9	4.6	4.1	3.4	3.2	
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)		1.9	1.9	1.8	1.8	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.1	2.0	2.0	
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)		2.4	2.2	2.1	2.8	2.7	2.4	2.6	2.8	2.6	2.4	2.1	1.8	

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Sweden	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017		
Labour Market Indicators - Male	Total population (000)	4487	4524	4564	4604	4649	4690	4727	4766	4814	4872	4931	5013	
	Population aged 15-64(000)	3008	3040	3067	3084	3100	3107	3107	3108	3114	3131	3152	3195	
	Total employment (000)	2331	2390	2422	2359	2394	2438	2442	2468	2502	2530	2562	2629	
	Employment aged 15-64 (000)	2280	2333	2357	2291	2312	2355	2350	2373	2391	2420	2457	2515	
	Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	81.7	83.1	83.5	80.9	81.1	82.1	81.9	82.2	82.2	82.5	83.0	83.8	
	Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)	75.5	76.5	76.7	74.2	74.6	75.8	75.6	76.3	76.5	77.0	77.5	78.3	
	Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)	40.2	42.0	42.2	37.7	38.5	40.8	38.8	40.5	41.6	42.4	43.1	43.9	
	Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)	87.8	89.1	89.4	86.9	87.0	87.9	87.8	88.0	87.8	87.9	88.1	88.5	
	Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)	72.3	72.9	73.4	73.2	74.0	75.2	76.3	76.9	76.5	76.8	77.5	78.4	
	FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	79.2	80.7	81.1	78.6	78.6	79.7	79.5	79.9	80.0	80.1	80.7	81.5	
	Self-employed (% total employment)	14.8	14.6	14.2	14.6	14.7	14.2	14.3	14.3	13.9	13.7	13.3	13.3	
	Part-time employment (% total employment)	10.3	10.3	11.9	12.6	12.7	12.3	12.5	12.8	12.8	13.2	13.0	13.1	
	Temporary employment (% total employment)	12.9	12.7	11.5	10.9	12.2	12.6	12.0	12.2	12.9	13.1	12.8	12.8	
	Employment in Services (% total employment)			63.8 b	65.4	66.1	66.6	67.5	68.2	68.5	68.5	68.9	69.3	
	Employment in Industry (% total employment)			33.3 b	31.8	31.2	31.3	30.8	29.9	29.4	29.1	28.8	28.6	
	Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)			2.9 b	2.8	2.7	2.6	2.6	2.5	2.4	2.3	2.2	2.2	
	Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)	81.2	81.4	81.7	81.4	81.9	82.4	82.6	83.3	83.6	83.5	83.9	84.3	
	Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)	50.8	51.8	52.6	51.1	52.0	53.2	51.8	53.9	54.9	53.8	54.2	54.1	
	Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)	92.5	92.9	93.1	92.8	92.9	93.2	93.5	93.6	93.5	93.3	93.3	93.6	
	Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)	76.0	76.2	76.5	77.8	79.3	79.9	80.9	81.6	81.5	81.8	82.5	83.2	
	Total unemployment (000)	173	149	152	222	227	207	218	220	222	206	202	195	
	Unemployment rate (% labour force)	6.9	5.9	5.9	8.6	8.7	7.8	8.2	8.2	8.2	7.5	7.3	6.9	
	Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)	21.0	18.7	19.7	26.3	25.9	23.3	25.0	24.8	24.3	21.3	20.5	18.7	
	Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)		0.9	0.8	1.2	1.7	1.6	1.7	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.4	1.4	
	Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)		15.5	13.9	13.6	20.1	21.0	20.1	19.5	19.5	21.9	19.5	20.7	
	Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)	10.7	9.7	10.4	13.4	13.4	12.4	13.0	13.3	13.3	11.4	11.1	10.2	
	Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)	74.5 b	74.6	74.6	71.6	72.6	73.1	72.8	71.5	71.0 b	71.1	70.5	70.9	
	Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)	86.0 b	87.3	87.3	85.1	85.5	86.8	86.9	87.2	87.1 b	87.3	87.4	88.2	
	Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)	87.9 b	89.3	90.2	89.2	88.8	89.4	89.7	90.4	90.2 b	90.2	90.4	90.4	
	Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)	76.1	77.1	77.2	74.7	75.1	76.6	76.6	77.3	77.5	78.1	78.9	79.5	
	Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)	73.1	73.0	77.0	78.2	79.1	78.0	76.3	76.5	78.6	81.9	79.0	81.4	
	Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)	54.7	57.6	59.3	55.4	54.9	53.9	52.5	54.0	55.6	53.1	55.3	59.2	
	Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)	77.1	78.0	77.9	75.6	76.0	77.5	77.4	78.3	78.5	79.3	79.8	80.4	
	Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)	75.9	76.1	77.3	76.1	76.8	77.1	77.7	77.6	78.2	79.8	79.2	79.9	
	Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)	61.0	64.8	66.5	62.8	63.3	63.9	63.7	63.8	64.7	63.9	65.4	67.6	
	Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)			2.2	2.8	2.7	2.6	2.9	3.2	3.0	2.8	2.4	2.3	
	Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)	1.6	1.7	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.8	1.7	1.7	1.9	1.8	1.7	
	Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)	2.3	1.9	2.0	2.6	2.5	2.2	2.5	2.7	2.5	2.3	2.1	1.8	
	Labour Market Indicators - Female	Total population (000)	4561	4590	4619	4653	4692	4725	4756	4790	4831	4875	4920	4982
		Population aged 15-64(000)	2914	2943	2966	2985	3001	3007	3008	3012	3021	3021	3034	3062
		Total employment (000)	2099	2150	2171	2140	2130	2188	2215	2237	2270	2307	2348	2393
		Employment aged 15-64 (000)	2072	2121	2137	2101	2092	2143	2160	2181	2207	2240	2278	2319
		Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	75.8	77.1	77.2	75.7	75.0	76.5	76.8	77.2	77.6	78.3	79.2	79.8
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)		70.7	71.8	71.8	70.2	69.7	71.3	71.8	72.5	73.1	74.0	74.8	75.4	
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)		40.4	42.3	42.1	38.9	39.2	41.0	41.6	42.9	44.0	45.5	45.9	46.0	
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)		81.5	83.0	83.5	81.9	80.9	82.2	82.5	82.7	82.8	83.3	83.7	84.1	
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)		66.9	67.0	66.7	66.7	66.9	68.9	69.6	70.3	71.5	72.1	73.5	74.4	
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)		67.2	68.4	68.7	67.5	66.8	68.4	69.1	69.6	70.2	70.9	71.8	72.5	
Self-employed (% total employment)		5.5	5.5	5.6	6.0	6.2	5.8	5.7	6.0	6.0	6.0	5.8	5.5	
Part-time employment (% total employment)		38.3	38.0	40.8	40.5	40.3	39.3	38.6	37.7	37.2	36.3	35.6	34.4	
Temporary employment (% total employment)		17.9	18.6	17.5	16.3	16.8	17.5	17.0	17.5	17.8	17.2	16.7	16.8	
Employment in Services (% total employment)						91.5 u	91.6 u	91.3 u	91.3 u	91.9 u	92.2 u	92.2 u	92.0 u	
Employment in Industry (% total employment)						7.6 u	7.6 u	7.8 u	7.8 u	7.3 u	6.9 u	6.9	7.2 u	
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)				0.8 b	0.9	0.9	0.8	0.9	0.9	0.8	0.9	0.9	0.9	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)		76.3	76.8	76.9	76.4	76.2	77.3	77.9	78.8	79.3	79.9	80.2	80.7	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)		51.9	52.7	53.1	51.0	51.3	52.8	53.4	55.2	56.0	56.5	55.5	55.4	
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)		86.3	87.1	87.6	87.1	86.6	87.3	87.6	88.1	88.0	88.4	88.5	88.8	
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)		69.6	69.4	69.0	69.9	70.2	72.1	73.0	73.4	74.9	75.5	76.9	77.8	
Total unemployment (000)		164	148	152	186	198	184	185	191	189	180	165	163	
Unemployment rate (% labour force)		7.2	6.5	6.6	8.0	8.5	7.7	7.7	7.9	7.7	7.3	6.5	6.4	
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)		22.0	19.8	20.8	23.7	23.6	22.2	22.3	22.3	21.5	19.5	17.2	16.8	
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)			0.8	0.7	1.0	1.3	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.2	1.1	1.0	
Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)			11.7	10.8	12.5	15.8	16.7	16.0	15.5	16.5	17.0	16.9	15.9	
Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)		11.4	10.4	11.0	12.1	12.1	11.8	11.9	12.3	12.0	11.1	9.6	9.4	
Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)		61.7 b	61.4	60.5	58.7	56.7	58.2	57.3	55.2	55.2 b	54.0	55.0	56.1	
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)		79.1 b	80.4	80.7	79.3	78.4	80.2	80.4	80.9	81.1 b	81.8	82.1	82.8	
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)		86.8 b	87.9	88.4	87.2	86.8	87.4	88.0	88.3	88.0 b	88.6	88.9	88.8	
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)		71.6	72.7	72.8	71.3	71.1	72.9	73.5	74.1	74.9	75.9	77.0	77.6	
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)		68.3	67.1	69.0	70.5	67.1	66.4	67.1	68.6	69.3	69.1	71.2	73.7	
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)		41.9	42.3	41.8	39.4	35.2	34.5	36.1	38.4	40.0	40.2	39.9	40.3	
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)		73.1	74.3	74.5	72.8	72.8	74.4	75.0	75.9	76.8	77.7	78.8	79.4	
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)		68.8	69.4	67.8	70.5	69.1	70.1	70.5	72.1	72.1	72.2	74.2	75.8	
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)		52.2	53.3	55.1	52.5	50.5	52.9	53.7	53.2	54.4	56.7	57.1	57.9	
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)				6.8	7.0	6.8	6.6	6.7	6.7	6.4	5.5	4.6	4.2	
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)		2.3	2.2	2.0	2.1	2.2	2.3	2.2	2.3	2.4	2.3	2.2	2.2	
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)		2.6	2.4	2.3	3.0	2.9	2.7	2.8	3.0	2.8	2.4	2.1	1.9	

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Sweden		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017			
Social Indicators	All	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of total population)	16.3	13.9	16.7 b	17.8	17.7	18.5	17.7	18.3	18.2	18.6	18.3			
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of total population)	12.3	10.5	13.5 b	14.4	14.8	15.4	15.2	16.0	15.6	16.3	16.2			
		At-risk-of-poverty threshold (PPS single person)	9068	9545	10495 b	10885	10535	10819	11366	12017	11718	12092	12424			
		Poverty gap (%)	22.7	20.3	18.0 b	19.2	19.9	20.3	22.7	19.2	21.7	19.9	21.1			
		Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of total population)		2.1	2.6	3.7	4.9	4.1	7.2 b	7.6	6.6	7.0 b	6.1			
		At-risk-of-poverty before social transfers excl. pensions (% of total population)	29.0	27.5	30.0 b	28.8	29.0	29.8	29.0	28.9	30.0	29.8	29.9			
		Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (%)	57.6	61.8	55.0 b	50.0	49.0	48.3	47.6	44.6	48.0	45.3	45.8			
		Severe Material Deprivation (% of total population)	2.1	2.2	1.8 b	2.0	1.9	1.7	1.8	1.9	1.0	1.1	0.8			
		Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of people aged 0-59)	6.8	6.0	7.0 b	8.5	8.5	9.4	8.1	9.4	9.0	8.7	8.5			
		Real Gross Household Disposable income (growth %)	4.5	5.5	3.3	1.8	2.6	3.2	3.5	2.2	2.8	2.6	3.3	1.9		
		Income quintile share ratio S80/S20	3.6	3.3	3.7 b	4.0	3.8	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.2	4.1	4.3			
		GINI coefficient	24.0	23.4	25.1 b	26.3	25.5	26.0	26.0	26.0	26.9	26.7	27.6			
		Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18-24)	8.6 b	8.0 b	7.9 b	7.0	6.5	6.6	7.5	7.1	6.7 b	7.0	7.4	7.7		
NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of total population aged 15-24)	9.3 b	7.5 b	7.8 b	9.6	7.7	7.5	7.8	7.5	7.2	6.7	6.5	6.2				
Social Indicators	Male	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of male population)	15.9	13.6	15.8 b	16.6	16.6	16.9	16.8	16.9	17.2	17.4	17.0			
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of male population)	12.3	10.5	12.9 b	13.6	13.9	14.2	14.4	14.7	14.8	15.3	15.2			
		Poverty gap (%)	26.4	22.7	20.0 b	20.4	22.3	20.5	25.1	20.3	23.8	21.9	24.3			
		Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of male population)		1.9	2.5	3.1	4.4	2.9	6.1 b	6.9	5.2	5.8 b	6.3			
		Severe Material Deprivation (% of male population)	2.1	2.2	1.6 b	2.0	1.8	1.7	1.9	1.8	1.1	1.1	0.9			
		Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of males aged 0-59)	6.3	5.6	6.7 b	8.3	8.3	9.4	8.1	9.3	8.8	8.0	8.3			
		Life expectancy at birth (years)	78.8	79.0	79.2 b	79.4	79.6 b	79.9		80.2	80.4 b	80.4	80.6			
		Healthy life years at birth (years) - men	67.3 bd	67.7	69.4 b	70.7	67.0 b	67.0		66.9	73.6 b	74.0	73.0			
		Early leavers from education and training (% of males aged 18-24)	10.1 b	9.5 b	9.0 b	8.0	7.5	7.8	8.5	7.9	7.3 b	7.6	8.2	8.2		
		NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of males aged 15-24)	9.6 b	7.5 b	7.5 b	9.8	7.8	7.6	7.9	7.7	7.5	6.9	6.9	6.1		
		Social Indicators	Female	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of female population)	16.7	14.2	17.7 b	19.0	18.8	20.0	18.7	19.6	19.2	19.8	19.5	
				At-risk-of-poverty (% of female population)	12.3	10.6	14.1 b	15.2	15.6	16.6	16.1	17.2	16.4	17.3	17.3	
				Poverty gap (%)	20.9	18.3	16.9 b	17.5	18.8	19.9	20.1	18.4	20.5	18.4	18.9	
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of female population)				2.2	2.7	4.3	5.2	5.2	8.2 b	8.2	8.0	8.3 b	5.8			
Severe Material Deprivation (% of female population)	2.1			2.1	1.9 b	2.1	2.0	1.8	1.7	2.0	0.9	1.2	0.7			
Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of females aged 0-59)	7.3			6.4	7.4 b	8.7	8.7	9.5	8.1	9.5	9.2	9.4	8.8			
Life expectancy at birth (years)	83.1			83.1	83.3 b	83.5	83.6 b	83.8		83.8	84.2 b	84.1	84.1			
Healthy life years at birth (years) - women	67.5 bd			66.8	69.0 b	69.6	66.4 b	65.5		66.0	73.6 b	73.8	73.3			
Early leavers from education and training (% of females aged 18-24)	7.1 b			6.5 b	6.8 b	6.0	5.5	5.4	6.3	6.2	6.0 b	6.4	6.4	7.2		
NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of females aged 15-24)	9.0 b			7.4 b	8.2 b	9.5	7.6	7.5	7.8	7.2	6.8	6.5	6.1	6.2		
Social Indicators	Children (0-17)			At-Risk-of-poverty or exclusion of children (% of people aged 0-17)	18.5	14.9	17.3 b	18.8	19.2	20.3	19.4	20.2	20.5	19.8	19.9	
				At-risk-of-poverty (% of Children population)	15.0	12.0	15.1 b	16.0	17.1	17.9	17.7	19.0	18.2	18.1	18.7	
				Severe Material Deprivation (% of Children population)	2.8	3.2	2.2 b	2.2	2.1	2.2	2.1	2.6	1.5	1.4	0.7	
		Share of children living in low work intensity households (% of Children population)	5.5	5.5	5.7 b	7.2	7.8	8.1	7.6	9.2	8.8	8.7	8.2			
		Risk of poverty of children in households at work (Working Intensity > 0.2)	11.6	8.4	10.7 b	10.7	10.7	11.8	11.6	10.9	11.9	11.4	12.2			
		Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (0-17) (%)	59.0	64.7	57.6 b	52.8	50.4	47.5	48.3	43.8	50.5	45.8	47.5			
Social Indicators	Working age (18-64)	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of Working age population)	16.5	14.5	16.8 b	17.8	18.1	18.5	17.6	18.6	18.8	18.9	18.1			
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of Working age population)	11.4	10.2	12.4 b	13.3	14.1	14.4	14.2	15.3	15.4	15.8	15.1			
		Severe Material Deprivation (% of Working age population)	2.1	2.2	1.8 b	2.3	2.1	1.9	2.1	2.1	1.1	1.3	1.0			
		Very low work intensity (18-59)	7.4	6.2	7.5 b	9.1	8.7	9.9	8.2	9.4	9.1	8.7	8.7			
		In-work at-risk-of poverty rate (% of persons employed 18-64)	7.4	6.5	7.4 b	7.5	7.8	7.5	7.3	7.6	7.7	8.1	6.8			
		Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (18-64) (%)	59.3	61.8	57.2 b	51.8	50.7	50.7	49.3	46.7	48.3	46.3	47.6			
Social Indicators	Elderly (65+)	At-Risk-of-poverty or exclusion of elderly (% of people aged 65+)	11.9	10.4	15.9 b	16.5	14.8	16.4	16.2	15.2	13.7	16.2	17.0			
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of Elderly population)	11.3	9.9	15.3 b	16.2	14.2	15.9	15.9	15.0	13.6	15.9	16.8			
		Severe Material Deprivation (% of Elderly population)	0.9	0.6	0.9 b	0.8	1.0	0.7	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.5	0.3			
		Relative median income of elderly (ratio with median income of people younger than 65)	0.85	0.81	0.76 b	0.76	0.79	0.77	0.78	0.79	0.82	0.79	0.77			
		Aggregate replacement ratio (ratio)	0.62	0.63	0.61 b	0.60	0.59	0.57	0.55	0.56	0.59	0.57	0.57			
Expenditure in social protection indicators (% of GDP)		Sickness/Health care	7.4	7.1	7.1	7.5	7.0	7.1	7.3	7.5	7.5	7.5 p				
		Disability	4.2	4.1	4.0	4.2	3.8	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.5	3.3 p				
		Old age and survivors	11.0	10.9	11.3	12.5	11.9	11.9	12.5	12.9	12.5	12.3 p				
		Family/Children	2.8	2.8	2.9	3.0	2.9	2.9	3.0	3.1	3.1	3.0 p				
		Unemployment	1.5	1.0	0.8	1.2	1.3	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.1	1.0 p				
		Housing and Social exclusion n.e.c.	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.4 p				
		Total (including Admin and Other expenditures)	28.6	27.4	27.7	30.1	28.6	28.2	29.3	30.0	29.5	29.2 p				
		of which: Means tested benefits	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.7 p				

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United Kingdom

United Kingdom		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	
Macro Economic Indicators (Annual % growth)	Real GDP	2.5	2.4	-0.5	-4.2	1.7	1.5	1.5	2.1	3.1	2.3	1.9	1.8	
	Total employment	1.0	0.8	0.8	-1.6	0.2	0.5	1.1	1.2	2.4	1.7	1.4	1.0	
	Labour productivity	1.4	1.5	-1.3	-2.6	1.4	0.9	0.4	0.9	0.7	0.6	0.5	0.7	
	Annual average hours worked per person employed	-0.3	0.1	-1.3	-0.3	-0.7	0.8	0.9	0.6	0.4	-1.0	0.9	-0.1	
	Real productivity per hour worked	1.8	1.4	0.0	-2.3	2.1	0.1	-0.5	0.3	0.3	1.7	-0.4	0.8	
	Harmonized CPI	2.3	2.3	3.6	2.2	3.3	4.5	2.8	2.6	1.5	0.0	0.7	2.7	
	Price deflator GDP	3.0	2.6	2.8	1.5	1.6	2.0	1.6	1.9	1.7	0.5	2.0	2.0	
	Nominal compensation per employee	6.0	5.4	0.5	2.3	3.2	1.1	1.7	2.8	0.5	1.1	3.3	2.9	
	Real compensation per employee (GDP deflator)	2.8	2.8	-2.3	0.8	1.6	-0.9	0.2	0.9	-1.2	0.6	1.3	0.9	
	Real compensation per employee (private consumption deflator)	3.6	3.0	-2.9	0.1	0.0	-3.3	-1.1	0.3	-1.0	1.1	2.5	0.2	
	Nominal unit labour costs	4.4	3.8	1.8	5.1	1.8	0.1	1.3	1.9	-0.1	0.4	2.7	2.2	
	Real unit labour costs	1.4	1.2	-1.1	3.6	0.2	-1.9	-0.2	0.0	-1.9	0.0	0.7	0.2	
	Labour Market Indicators - Total	Total population (000)	60620	61073	61572	62042	62510	63023	63495	63905	64351	64875 e	65383 e	65809
		Population aged 15-64 (000)	40098	40498	40842	41100	41325	41577	41681	41658	41724	41902 e	42069 e	42182
		Total employment (000)	29041	29261 b	29520 b	29059	29125	29282	29596	29954	30671	31193	31628	31963
Employment aged 15-64 (000)		28417	28622 b	28827 b	28319	28290	28404	28650	28917	29559	30016	30424	30783	
Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)		75.2	75.2 b	75.2 b	73.9	73.5	73.5	74.1	74.8	76.2	76.8	77.5	78.2	
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)		71.6	71.5 b	71.5 b	69.9	69.4	69.3	69.9	70.5	71.9	72.7	73.5	74.1	
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)		53.6	52.6 b	52.0 b	47.9	46.8	45.8	46.2	46.3	48.0	50.0	50.8	50.7	
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)		81.2	81.3 b	81.3 b	80.1	79.8	80.1	80.5	80.8	82.1	82.4	82.9	83.8	
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)		57.3	57.4 b	58.0 b	57.5	57.2	56.7	58.1	59.8	61.0	62.2	63.4	64.1	
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)		66.5	66.5 b	66.6 b	65.0	64.5	64.4	64.8	65.5	66.9	67.7	68.2	69.0	
Self-employed (% total employment)		12.9	13.0 b	13.0 b	13.3	13.7	13.8	14.3	14.2	14.9	14.7	15.1	15.0	
Part-time employment (% total employment)		24.2	24.1	24.1	24.9	25.6	25.5	25.9	25.6	25.3	25.2	25.2	24.8	
Temporary employment (% total employment)		4.1	4.2	3.8	4.1	4.6	4.6	4.6	4.6	4.7	4.6	4.4	4.2	
Employment in Services (% total employment)				77.0 b	79.4	79.8	79.8	80.0	80.3	80.0	80.4	80.6	80.8	
Employment in Industry (% total employment)				22.0 b	19.6	19.2	19.2	19.0	18.8	18.9	18.6	18.5	18.2	
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)				1.0 b	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.0	0.9	1.1	1.0	1.0	1.0	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)		75.7	75.5 b	75.8 b	75.7	75.4	75.5	76.1	76.4	76.7	76.9	77.3	77.6	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)		62.3	61.4 b	61.2 b	59.2	58.4	58.2	58.6	58.3	57.8	58.5	58.4	57.6	
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)		84.5	84.5 b	84.8 b	85.0	84.9	85.3	85.5	85.7	86.0	85.8	86.1	86.5	
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)		59.1	59.3 b	59.8 b	60.3	60.0	59.7	61.1	62.8	63.5	64.4	65.8	66.4	
Total unemployment (000)		1640	1624	1757	2369	2459	2559	2534	2437	1996	1746	1599	1448	
Unemployment rate (% labour force)		5.4	5.3	5.6	7.6	7.8	8.1	7.9	7.5	6.1	5.3	4.8	4.4	
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)		13.9	14.3	15.0	19.1	19.9	21.3	21.2	20.7	17.0	14.6	13.0	12.1	
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)		1.2	1.3	1.4	1.9	2.5	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.2	1.6	1.3	1.1	
Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)		22.3	23.7	24.1	24.5	32.5	33.4	34.7	36.1	35.8	30.7	27.1	25.9	
Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)		8.7	8.8 b	9.2 b	11.3	11.6	12.4	12.4	12.1	9.8	8.6	7.6	7.0	
Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)		64.4	64.2 b	59.4 b	57.8	56.0 b	56.4 b	57.4	57.5	59.6 b	60.1	62.8	64.3	
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)		80.8	81.1 b	79.2 b	77.3	76.7 b	77.6 b	77.3	77.8	78.8 b	79.1	79.3	80.0	
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)		88.1	88.0 b	86.0 b	85.4	85.1 b	83.8 b	84.1	84.9	85.2 b	85.5	85.6	85.8	
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)		72.0	71.9 b	71.8 b	70.2	69.7	69.6	70.2	70.9	72.2	72.9	73.7	74.4	
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)		75.0	76.2 b	77.0 b	75.6	74.9	75.7	75.7	76.5	77.9	78.8	78.6	80.0	
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)		62.1	60.4 b	61.7 b	60.0	60.1	59.7	58.9	59.0	59.9	60.9	61.3	61.1	
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)		72.3	72.2 b	72.1 b	70.5	70.0	69.8	70.6	71.1	72.4	73.2	73.9	74.5	
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)		75.5	75.9 b	76.8 b	75.5	74.6	75.5	74.7	75.9	77.9	79.1	79.2	79.9	
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)		62.9	62.8 b	63.5 b	61.9	62.3	62.0	62.4	63.4	65.0	65.5	67.1	67.8	
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)				4.1	5.0	5.4	5.6	6.0	6.0	5.6	5.3	4.9	4.5	
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)		0.9	1.0	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.0	1.1	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)		2.2	2.1	2.3	2.5	2.7	2.5	2.5	2.4	2.1	2.1	1.9	1.8	

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United Kingdom		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	
Labour Market Indicators - Male	Total population (000)	29651	29895	30164	30417	30669	30951	31206	31424	31663	31947 e	32225 e	32466	
	Population aged 15-64(000)	19937	20137	20312	20441	20556	20694	20752	20741	20780	20880 e	20977 e	21053	
	Total employment (000)	15636	15790 b	15890 b	15483	15527	15618	15808	15953	16325	16611	16842	16954	
	Employment aged 15-64 (000)	15247	15385 b	15447 b	15037	15027	15089	15233	15322	15661	15894	16105	16233	
	Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	82.1	82.2 b	81.9 b	79.7	79.3	79.3	80.0	80.4	81.9	82.5	83.1	83.4	
	Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)	77.6	77.6 b	77.4 b	74.9	74.4	74.3	75.0	75.4	76.8	77.6	78.3	78.6	
	Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)	54.7	54.0 b	53.3 b	47.9	47.6	46.3	46.4	46.4	48.2	50.3	50.5	50.5	
	Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)	87.9	88.2 b	87.7 b	85.7	85.4	85.9	86.6	86.7	88.0	88.3	89.0	89.6	
	Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)	65.9	66.2 b	67.2 b	66.1	64.1	65.4	66.8	67.8	68.6	68.6	69.6	69.3	
	FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	79.4	79.4 b	79.0 b	76.6	75.9	75.7	76.1	76.6	78.1	78.8	79.3	79.7	
	Self-employed (% total employment)	17.4	17.5 b	17.6 b	17.8	18.1	18.2	18.6	18.5	19.1	18.7	19.1	18.9	
	Part-time employment (% total employment)	9.1	9.3	9.7	10.3	11.0	10.9	11.6	11.5	11.2	11.2	11.3	11.1	
	Temporary employment (% total employment)	4.1	4.2	3.8	4.1	4.6	4.6	4.6	4.6	4.7	4.6	4.4	4.2	
	Employment in Services (% total employment)			65.8 b	68.5	68.9	69.0	69.6	70.1	69.9	70.3	70.6	70.9	
	Employment in Industry (% total employment)			33.0 b	30.1	29.6	29.5	29.0	28.7	28.6	28.3	28.1	27.7	
	Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)			1.3 b	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.4	1.3	1.5	1.3	1.4	1.4	
	Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)	82.3	82.2 b	82.4 b	82.0	81.5	81.5	82.0	82.1	82.2	82.2	82.5	82.3	
	Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)	64.9	64.2 b	64.3 b	61.3	60.9	60.7	60.9	60.2	59.5	60.0	59.3	58.3	
	Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)	91.7	91.6 b	91.6 b	91.7	91.4	91.7	92.0	92.0	92.2	91.9	92.2	92.4	
	Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)	68.3	68.9 b	68.8 b	70.3	69.2	68.4	69.5	70.6	70.9	71.4	72.6	72.2	
	Total unemployment (000)	943	921	1026	1437	1455	1477	1434	1377	1109	958	873	787	
	Unemployment rate (% labour force)	5.7	5.5	6.1	8.5	8.6	8.7	8.4	8.0	6.4	5.5	5.0	4.5	
	Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)	15.6	15.8	17.1	21.9	22.0	23.8	23.9	23.0	18.9	16.2	14.8	13.5	
	Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)	1.5	1.6	1.7	2.3	3.2	3.3	3.2	3.2	2.6	1.9	1.5	1.3	
	Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)	26.8	28.4	28.4	26.6	37.1	37.8	38.0	39.5	40.2	34.3	30.3	28.7	
	Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)	10.2	10.2 b	11.0 b	13.4	13.4	14.4	14.6	13.9	11.3	9.7	8.8	7.9	
	Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)	70.7	70.8 b	70.5 b	68.3	66.3 b	66.9 b	67.8	68.0	70.3 b	70.3	73.1	73.6	
	Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)	84.7	85.1 b	85.0 b	82.4	81.8 b	82.4 b	82.8	83.5	84.5 b	85.0	85.5	85.6	
	Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)	90.0	89.9 b	89.7 b	88.8	88.6 b	87.9 b	88.7	88.9	89.4 b	89.7	89.7	90.0	
	Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)	77.6	77.6 b	77.3 b	74.8	74.4	74.2	74.8	75.3	76.6	77.4	78.0	78.2	
	Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)	82.5	84.3 b	85.7 b	83.9	81.9	81.8	83.1	83.9	85.5	84.5	86.1	87.6	
	Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)	72.9	72.2 b	73.2 b	69.4	70.4	70.2	70.8	69.0	71.8	71.5	72.5	72.4	
	Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)	77.7	77.6 b	77.3 b	74.8	74.4	74.1	74.7	75.2	76.4	77.3	77.7	77.8	
	Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)	82.3	84.1 b	85.2 b	82.9	80.7	81.3	82.1	83.3	84.6	84.4	86.1	87.0	
	Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)	74.8	74.7 b	74.6 b	72.1	72.3	72.7	74.1	73.6	76.2	76.2	78.0	79.1	
	Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)			2.4	3.1	3.5	3.7	4.1	4.2	3.8	3.6	3.4	3.0	
	Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)	0.7	0.8	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.9	0.8	0.8	0.8	1.0	0.9	
	Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)	1.8	1.8	1.9	2.2	2.4	2.2	2.1	2.2	1.9	1.9	1.7	1.6	
	Labour Market Indicators - Female	Total population (000)	30969	31178	31407	31626	31841	32071	32289	32481	32688	32928 e	33158 e	33343
		Population aged 15-64(000)	20161	20361	20530	20659	20769	20883	20928	20917	20945	21021 e	21092 e	21129
		Total employment (000)	13405	13471 b	13630 b	13576	13598	13664	13788	14001	14347	14582	14786	15009
		Employment aged 15-64 (000)	13170	13237 b	13380 b	13281	13263	13315	13418	13595	13898	14122	14319	14550
		Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)	68.6	68.4 b	68.8 b	68.2	67.9	67.8	68.4	69.3	70.6	71.3	72.1	73.1
Employment rate (% population aged 15-64)		65.8	65.5 b	65.7 b	64.9	64.5	64.4	64.9	65.8	67.1	67.9	68.8	69.7	
Employment rate (% population aged 15-24)		52.5	51.3 b	50.7 b	47.9	46.1	45.3	46.0	46.2	47.8	49.7	51.1	50.9	
Employment rate (% population aged 25-54)		74.6	74.6 b	75.1 b	74.6	74.3	74.4	74.5	75.1	76.2	76.6	77.0	78.1	
Employment rate (% population aged 55-64)		49.0	48.8 b	49.0 b	49.2	49.5	49.5	51.0	53.0	54.4	56.0	57.4	59.1	
FTE employment rate (% population aged 20-64)		55.0	55.0 b	55.5 b	54.7	54.3	54.5	54.8	55.8	56.9	58.0	58.4	59.5	
Self-employed (% total employment)		7.7	7.8 b	7.7 b	8.2	8.6	8.8	9.2	9.3	10.1	10.0	10.4	10.6	
Part-time employment (% total employment)		41.6	41.3	40.9	41.5	42.2	42.1	42.2	41.4	41.2	40.9	40.8	40.2	
Temporary employment (% total employment)		5.9	5.8	5.5	5.4	5.8	5.8	6.0	5.9	6.1	5.9	5.8	5.5	
Employment in Services (% total employment)				89.9 b	91.8	92.1	91.9	91.8	91.8	91.4	91.8	91.9	91.8	
Employment in Industry (% total employment)				9.5 b	7.7	7.4	7.5	7.6	7.7	8.0	7.7	7.6	7.7	
Employment in Agriculture (% total employment)				0.7 b	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.5	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)		69.2	68.9 b	69.3 b	69.5	69.3	69.6	70.2	70.9	71.3	71.7	72.2	72.9	
Activity rate (% population aged 15-24)		59.7	58.6 b	58.2 b	57.1	55.9	55.7	56.3	56.4	56.1	57.0	57.5	56.9	
Activity rate (% population aged 25-54)		77.6	77.5 b	78.2 b	78.6	78.6	79.0	79.2	79.5	79.9	79.8	80.1	80.8	
Activity rate (% population aged 55-64)		50.1	49.9 b	50.2 b	50.6	51.1	51.3	53.0	55.3	56.4	57.7	59.2	60.9	
Total unemployment (000)		697	703	751	931	1004	1083	1100	1060	887	788	727	661	
Unemployment rate (% labour force)		4.9	5.0	5.1	6.4	6.9	7.4	7.4	7.1	5.8	5.1	4.7	4.2	
Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)		12.0	12.5	12.7	16.1	17.6	18.5	18.2	18.1	14.8	12.9	11.1	10.6	
Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)		0.8	0.9	0.9	1.4	1.8	2.0	2.2	2.2	1.8	1.3	1.1	1.0	
Share of long term unemployment (% of total unemployment)		16.2	17.6	18.1	21.4	25.9	27.6	30.3	31.6	30.2	26.3	23.3	22.5	
Youth unemployment ratio (% population aged 15-24)		7.2	7.4 b	7.4 b	9.2	9.8	10.3	10.3	10.2	8.3	7.4	6.4	6.0	
Employment rate for low skilled 25-64 (ISCED 0-2)		59.4	58.8 b	51.0 b	49.7	48.0 b	48.0 b	48.6	48.2	50.4 b	50.9	53.0	55.1	
Employment rate for medium skilled 25-64 (ISCED 3-4)		76.0	76.1 b	72.6 b	71.6	71.0 b	72.2 b	71.2	71.6	72.5 b	72.8	72.8	73.9	
Employment rate for high skilled 25-64 (ISCED 5-8)		86.1	86.1 b	82.4 b	82.1	81.8 b	79.9 b	79.8	81.3	81.5 b	81.7	81.8	82.0	
Employment rate (Nationals aged 15-64)		66.4	66.2 b	66.5 b	65.6	65.1	65.0	65.7	66.4	67.8	68.5	69.6	70.5	
Employment rate (Other EU28 aged 15-64)		67.8	67.9 b	68.5 b	67.9	68.3	70.3	69.0	69.8	71.3	73.5	71.6	72.8	
Employment rate (Other than EU28 aged 15-64)		51.9	48.8 b	50.6 b	50.9	50.2	49.2	47.7	49.7	48.5	50.8	50.9	51.3	
Employment rate (Born in the same country aged 15-64)		67.1	66.9 b	67.0 b	66.2	65.6	65.6	66.4	67.1	68.4	69.1	70.1	71.2	
Employment rate (Born in other EU28 aged 15-64)		69.1	67.9 b	68.9 b	69.0	69.0	70.5	68.1	69.5	72.0	74.3	72.8	73.3	
Employment rate (Born outside EU28 aged 15-64)		51.7	51.4 b	52.8 b	52.1	52.7	51.9	51.5	53.6	54.3	55.5	56.9	57.7	
Underemployment (% of labour force aged 15-74)				6.0	7.1	7.5	7.8	8.2	8.0	7.7	7.2	6.6	6.3	
Seeking but not available (% of labour force aged 15-74)		1.1	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.3	1.3	
Discouraged, available but not seeking (% of labour force aged 15-74)		2.7	2.6	2.7	2.9	3.0	2.8	2.9	2.7	2.4	2.3	2.1	2.0	

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United Kingdom		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	
All	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of total population)	23.7	22.6	23.2	22.0	23.2	22.7	24.1 b	24.8	24.1	23.5	22.2		
	At-risk-of-poverty (% of total population)	19.0	18.6	18.7	17.3	17.1	16.2	16.0	15.9	16.8	16.6	15.9		
	At-risk-of-poverty threshold (PPS single person)	10578	11267	11126	10091	9521	9466	9868 b	10060	10138	10669	10512		
	Poverty gap (%)	22.8	22.4	21.0	20.6	21.4	21.3	20.9 b	19.6	19.4	20.4	22.4		
	Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of total population)			8.5	8.0	7.4	6.9	8.6	7.8	6.5	7.3	9.4		
	At-risk-of-poverty before social transfers excl. pensions (% of total population)	30.1	29.7	28.9	30.4	31.0	30.5	29.7 b	30.1	29.4	29.3	28.1		
	Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (%)	36.9	37.4	35.3	43.1	44.8	46.9	46.1 b	47.2	42.9	43.3	43.4		
	Severe Material Deprivation (% of total population)	4.5	4.2	4.5	3.3 u	4.8	5.1	7.8	8.3	7.4	6.1	5.2	4.9 p	
	Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of people aged 0-59)	12.0	10.4	10.4	12.7	13.2	11.5	13.0 b	13.2	12.3	11.9	11.3		
	Real Gross Household Disposable income (growth %)	1.6	2.8	-1.0	2.3	1.3	-2.3	1.9	-0.2	1.3	3.4	1.3		
	Income quintile share ratio S80/S20	5.4	5.3	5.6	5.3	5.4	5.3	5.0 b	4.6	5.1	5.2	5.1		
	GINI coefficient	32.5	32.6	33.9	32.4	32.9	33.0	31.3 b	30.2	31.6	32.4	31.5		
	Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18-24)	11.2	16.6 b	16.9 b	15.7	14.8 b	14.9 b	13.4	12.4	11.8 b	10.8	11.2	10.6	
	NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of total population aged 15-24)	8.6	11.9 b	12.1 b	13.2	13.6	14.2	13.9	13.2	11.9	11.1	10.9	10.3	
	Male	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of male population)	22.1	21.1	21.7	21.1	22.1	21.4	23.4 b	23.6	22.9	22.5	21.1	
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of male population)	18.0	17.6	17.4	16.7	16.4	14.8	15.8	15.4	16.0	16.1	15.2	
Poverty gap (%)		22.8	22.9	21.1	20.9	23.0	22.2	21.9 b	19.9	19.6	20.7	23.6		
Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of male population)				7.7	7.6	7.0	6.1	8.1	7.0	5.7	6.3	8.9		
Severe Material Deprivation (% of male population)		4.4	3.9	4.3	3.4 u	4.8	5.0	7.5	8.0	7.3	5.8	5.2	4.5 p	
Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of males aged 0-59)		10.8	9.6	9.7	12.0	12.5	10.8	12.5 b	12.5	11.9	11.2	10.7		
Life expectancy at birth (years)		77.3	77.6	77.7	78.3	78.6	79.0	79.1	79.2	79.5	79.2	79.4		
Healthy life years at birth (years) - men		64.8	64.6	65.0	65.0	64.9	65.2	64.6	64.4	63.4	63.7	63.0		
Early leavers from education and training (% of males aged 18-24)		12.3	17.6 b	18.2 b	16.9	15.6 b	16.1 b	14.5	13.6	12.9 b	11.7	12.7	12.1	
NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of males aged 15-24)		7.5	10.1 b	10.1 b	11.9	12.1	13.1	12.8	12.1	10.7	9.7	10.3	10.2	
Female		At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of female population)	25.4	24.1	24.7	22.8	24.2	24.1	24.9 b	25.8	25.2	24.4	23.2	
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of female population)	19.9	19.6	20.0	17.8	17.8	17.6	16.3	16.4	17.6	17.2	16.5	
		Poverty gap (%)	22.7	21.9	20.9	20.5	19.3	20.5	19.5 b	19.2	19.4	19.9	21.5	
		Persistent at-risk-of-poverty (% of female population)			9.2	8.3	7.7	7.8	9.1	8.6	7.2	8.2	9.9	
		Severe Material Deprivation (% of female population)	4.7	4.4	4.8	3.2 u	4.9	5.1	8.1	8.6	7.5	6.4	5.2	5.3 p
		Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of females aged 0-59)	13.2	11.1	11.2	13.4	13.9	12.3	13.6 b	14.0	12.7	12.7	11.9	
	Life expectancy at birth (years)	81.7	81.8	81.8	82.5	82.6	83.0	82.8	82.9	83.2	82.8	83.0		
	Healthy life years at birth (years) - women	64.9	66.0	66.3	66.1	65.6	65.2	64.5	64.8	64.2	63.3	63.1		
	Early leavers from education and training (% of females aged 18-24)	10.2	15.6 b	15.6 b	14.5	13.9 b	13.8 b	12.2	11.1	10.8 b	9.8	9.5	9.0	
	NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of females aged 15-24)	9.6	13.7 b	14.1 b	14.5	15.1	15.4	15.0	14.4	13.1	12.4	11.5	10.4	
	Children (0-17)	At-Risk-of-poverty or exclusion of children (% of people aged 0-17)	30.1	27.6	29.6	27.4	29.7	26.9	31.2 b	32.6	31.2	30.3	27.2	
		At-risk-of-poverty (% of Children population)	23.8	23.0	24.0	20.7	20.4	18.0	18.0	18.9	19.7	19.9	18.5	
		Severe Material Deprivation (% of Children population)	7.1	6.3	6.5	4.4 u	7.3	7.1	12.5	12.3	10.8	9.6	7.5	7.0 p
		Share of children living in low work intensity households (% of Children population)	15.4	13.8	13.9	16.1	17.1	14.1	16.3 b	16.7	15.1	14.8	13.0	
		Risk of poverty of children in households at work (Working Intensity > 0.2)	15.1	14.7	16.2	12.2	12.7	12.1	13.2 b	14.8	15.1	14.7	13.2	
		Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (0-17) (%)	42.8	43.6	39.6	51.6	54.2	57.6	57.0 b	57.2	53.8	53.8	53.1	
Working age (18-64)	At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of Working age population)	20.7	19.6	19.7	19.8	21.2	21.4	23.7 b	24.1	23.2	22.8	21.8		
	At-risk-of-poverty (% of Working age population)	15.5	15.1	14.7	14.8	14.9	14.1	15.3	14.7	15.6	15.6	14.6		
	Severe Material Deprivation (% of Working age population)	4.3	4.0	4.7	3.6 u	5.0	5.5	8.0	8.7	7.9	6.3	5.6	5.3 p	
	Very low work intensity (18-59)	10.8	9.1	9.2	11.4	11.7	10.6	11.9 b	12.0	11.3	10.9	10.7		
	In-work at-risk-of poverty rate (% of persons employed 18-64)	7.7	7.9	8.0	6.3	6.7	7.8	8.7 b	8.2	8.8	8.2	8.6		
	Impact of social transfers (excl. pensions) in reducing poverty (18-64) (%)	38.3	38.9	38.0	44.4	45.2	48.0	44.0 b	46.6	41.4	41.1	43.6		
Elderly (65+)	At-Risk-of-poverty or exclusion of elderly (% of people aged 65+)	27.5	27.9	28.5	23.1	22.3	22.7	17.3 b	18.1	19.0	17.9	18.0		
	At-risk-of-poverty (% of Elderly population)	26.1	26.5	27.3	22.3	21.3	21.8	16.4	16.6	17.7	16.5	17.1		
	Severe Material Deprivation (% of Elderly population)	2.1	1.9	1.4	1.2 u	1.3	1.3	1.4	2.1	1.9	1.6	1.2	1.3 p	
	Relative median income of elderly (ratio with median income of people younger than 65)	0.73	0.74	0.74	0.80	0.81	0.81	0.88 b	0.87	0.87	0.88	0.89		
	Aggregate replacement ratio (ratio)	0.45	0.44	0.43	0.44	0.48	0.48	0.50 b	0.53	0.51	0.50	0.53		
Expenditure in social protection indicators (% of GDP)	Sickness/Health care	7.3	7.1	7.3	8.0	8.2	8.8	8.7	8.6	8.4	9.9 p			
	Disability	2.2	1.8	1.8	2.0	1.9	1.9	1.8	1.6	1.6	1.7 p			
	Old age and survivors	10.3	10.0	10.5	11.7	11.8	11.8	12.2	12.0	11.7	11.7 p			
	Family/Children	2.2	2.4	2.6	3.0	3.1	3.1	2.9	2.8	2.8	2.7 p			
	Unemployment	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.4	0.4 p			
	Housing and Social exclusion n.e.c.	2.2	1.9	2.1	2.4	2.4	2.3	2.3	2.2	2.1	2.0 p			
	Total (including Admin and Other expenditures)	25.1	24.7	25.8	28.6	29.0	29.0	29.1	28.2	27.3	28.6 p			
	of which: Means tested benefits	3.8	3.5	3.7	4.2	4.2	4.2	4.1	3.8	3.5	3.4 p			

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2. SELECTED INDICATORS

Real GDP (yearly growth)

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
European Union 28		3.3	3.1	0.5	-4.3	2.1	1.7	-0.4	0.3	1.8	2.3	2.0	2.5
Euro Area 19		3.2	3.1	0.4	-4.5	2.1	1.6	-0.9	-0.2	1.3	2.1	1.8	2.4
Belgium		2.5	3.4	0.8	-2.3	2.7	1.8	0.2	0.2	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.7
Bulgaria		6.9	7.3	6.0	-3.6	1.3	1.9	0.0	0.9	1.3	3.6	3.9	3.6 p
Czech Republic		6.9	5.6	2.7	-4.8	2.3	1.8	-0.8	-0.5	2.7	5.3	2.6	4.4
Denmark		3.9	0.9	-0.5	-4.9	1.9	1.3	0.2	0.9	1.6	1.6	2.0	2.2
Germany		3.7	3.3	1.1	-5.6	4.1	3.7	0.5	0.5	1.9	1.7	1.9	2.2
Estonia		10.3	7.7	-5.4	-14.7	2.3	7.6	4.3	1.9	2.9	1.7	2.1	4.9
Ireland		5.5	5.2	-3.9	-4.6	1.8	3.0	0.0	1.6	8.3	25.6	5.1	7.8
Greece		5.7	3.3	-0.3	-4.3	-5.5	-9.1 p	-7.3 p	-3.2 p	0.7 p	-0.3 p	-0.2 p	1.4 p
Spain		4.2	3.8	1.1	-3.6	0.0	-1.0	-2.9	-1.7	1.4	3.4 p	3.3 p	3.1 p
France		2.4	2.4	0.3	-2.9	1.9	2.2	0.3	0.6	1.0	1.1	1.2 p	2.2 p
Croatia		4.8	5.2	2.1	-7.4	-1.4	-0.3	-2.2	-0.6	-0.1	2.3	3.2	2.8
Italy		2.0	1.5	-1.1	-5.5	1.7	0.6	-2.8	-1.7	0.1	1.0	0.9	1.5
Cyprus		4.5	4.8	3.9	-1.8	1.3	0.3	-3.1	-5.9	-1.4	2.0	3.4 p	3.9 p
Latvia		11.9	10.0	-3.5	-14.4	-3.9	6.4	4.0	2.4	1.9	3.0	2.2	4.5
Lithuania		7.4	11.1	2.6	-14.8	1.6	6.0	3.8	3.5	3.5	2.0	2.3	3.8
Luxembourg		5.2	8.4	-1.3	-4.4	4.9	2.5	-0.4	3.7	5.8	2.9	3.1	2.3
Hungary		3.9	0.4	0.9	-6.6	0.7	1.7	-1.6	2.1	4.2	3.4	2.2	4.0
Malta		1.8	4.0	3.3	-2.5	3.5	1.3	2.7	4.6	8.1	9.6	5.2	6.4
Netherlands		3.5	3.7	1.7	-3.8	1.4	1.7	-1.1	-0.2	1.4	2.3	2.2 p	3.2 p
Austria		3.5	3.7	1.5	-3.8	1.8	2.9	0.7	0.0	0.8	1.1	1.5	3.0
Poland		6.2	7.0	4.2	2.8	3.6	5.0	1.6	1.4	3.3	3.8	3.0	4.6
Portugal		1.6	2.5	0.2	-3.0	1.9	-1.8	-4.0	-1.1	0.9	1.8	1.6 p	2.7 e
Romania		8.1	6.9	8.3	-5.9	-2.8	2.0	1.2	3.5	3.1	4.0	4.8 p	6.9 p
Slovenia		5.7	6.9	3.3	-7.8	1.2	0.6	-2.7	-1.1	3.0	2.3	3.1	5.0
Slovakia		8.5	10.8	5.6	-5.4	5.0	2.8	1.7	1.5	2.8	3.9	3.3	3.4
Finland		4.1	5.2	0.7	-8.3	3.0	2.6	-1.4	-0.8	-0.6	0.1	2.1	2.6
Sweden		4.7	3.4	-0.6	-5.2	6.0	2.7	-0.3	1.2	2.6	4.5	3.2	2.3
United Kingdom		2.5	2.4	-0.5	-4.2	1.7	1.5	1.5	2.1	3.1	2.3	1.9	1.8

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Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
European Union 28	67.9	68.9	69.8	70.3	69.0	68.6	68.6	68.4	68.4	69.2	70.1	71.1	72.2
Euro Area 19	67.9	69.0	69.9	70.2	68.8	68.4	68.4	68.0	67.7	68.2	69.0	70.0	71.0
Belgium	66.5	66.5	67.7	68.0	67.1	67.6	67.3	67.2	67.2	67.3	67.2	67.7	68.5 b
Bulgaria	61.9	65.1	68.4	70.7	68.8	64.7 b	62.9 b	63.0	63.5	65.1	67.1	67.7	71.3
Czech Republic	70.7	71.2	72.0	72.4	70.9	70.4	70.9 b	71.5	72.5	73.5	74.8	76.7	78.5
Denmark	78.0	79.4	79.0	79.7	77.5	75.8	75.7	75.4	75.6	75.9	76.5	77.4 b	76.9
Germany	69.4 b	71.1	72.9	74.0	74.2	75.0 b	76.5 b	76.9	77.3	77.7	78.0	78.6	79.2
Estonia	72.0	75.9	76.9	77.1	70.0	66.8	70.6	72.2	73.3	74.3	76.5	76.6	78.7
Ireland	74.1	74.7	75.1 b	73.5	68.0	65.5	64.6	64.4	66.5	68.1	69.9	71.4	73.0
Greece	64.4	65.6	65.8	66.3	65.6 b	63.8	59.6	55.0	52.9	53.3	54.9	56.2	57.8
Spain	67.5 b	69.0	69.7	68.5	64.0	62.8	62.0	59.6	58.6	59.9	62.0	63.9	65.5
France	69.4	69.4	69.9	70.5	69.5	69.3	69.2	69.4	69.5	69.8	70.0	70.4	71.0
Croatia	59.9 e	60.6 e	63.9	64.9	64.2	62.1	59.8	58.1	57.2	59.2	60.6	61.4	63.6
Italy	61.5	62.4	62.7	62.9	61.6	61.0	61.0	60.9	59.7	59.9	60.5	61.6	62.3
Cyprus	74.4	75.8	76.8	76.5	75.3	75.0	73.4	70.2	67.2	67.6	67.9	68.7	70.7
Latvia	69.1	73.2	75.2	75.4	66.6	64.3	66.3	68.1	69.7	70.7	72.5	73.2	74.8
Lithuania	70.7	71.3	72.7	72.0	67.0	64.3	66.9	68.5	69.9	71.8	73.3	75.2	76.0
Luxembourg	69.0	69.1	69.6 b	68.8	70.4 b	70.7	70.1	71.4	71.1	72.1	70.9 b	70.7	71.5
Hungary	62.2	62.6	62.3	61.5	60.1	59.9	60.4	61.6	63.0	66.7	68.9	71.5	73.3
Malta	57.4 b	57.9	58.6	59.2	59.0	60.1	61.6	63.1	64.8	66.4	67.8	69.6	71.4
Netherlands	75.1	76.3	77.8	78.9	78.8	76.8 b	76.4 b	76.6	75.9	75.4	76.4	77.1	78.0
Austria	70.4	71.6	72.8 b	73.8	73.4	73.9	74.2	74.4	74.6	74.2	74.3	74.8	75.4
Poland	58.3	60.1	62.7	65.0	64.9	64.3 b	64.5	64.7	64.9	66.5	67.8	69.3	70.9
Portugal	72.2	72.6	72.5	73.1	71.1	70.3	68.8 b	66.3	65.4	67.6	69.1	70.6	73.4
Romania	63.6	64.8	64.4	64.4	63.5	64.8 b	63.8	64.8	64.7	65.7	66.0	66.3	68.8
Slovenia	71.1	71.5	72.4	73.0	71.9	70.3	68.4	68.3	67.2	67.7	69.1	70.1	73.4
Slovakia	64.5	66.0	67.2	68.8	66.4	64.6	65.0 b	65.1	65.0	65.9	67.7	69.8	71.1
Finland	73.0	73.9	74.8	75.8	73.5	73.0	73.8	74.0	73.3	73.1	72.9	73.4	74.2
Sweden	77.9 b	78.8	80.1	80.4	78.3	78.1	79.4	79.4	79.8	80.0	80.5	81.2	81.8
United Kingdom	75.2	75.2	75.2 b	75.2 b	73.9	73.5	73.5	74.1	74.8	76.2	76.8	77.5	78.2

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Activity rate (% population aged 15-64)

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
European Union 28	69.7	70.1	70.4	70.7	70.8	71.0	71.1	71.7	72.0	72.3	72.6	73.0	73.4
Euro Area 19	69.9	70.5	70.8	71.2	71.3	71.3	71.5	72.0	72.2	72.4	72.5	72.9	73.1
Belgium	66.7	66.5	67.1	67.1	66.9	67.7	66.7	66.9	67.5	67.7	67.6	67.6	68.0 b
Bulgaria	62.1	64.5	66.3	67.8	67.2	66.7 b	65.9 b	67.1	68.4	69.0	69.3	68.7	71.3
Czech Republic	70.4	70.3	69.9	69.7	70.1	70.2	70.5 b	71.6	72.9	73.5	74.0	75.0	75.9
Denmark	79.8	80.6	80.1	80.7	80.2	79.4	79.3	78.6	78.1	78.1	78.5	80.0 b	78.8
Germany	73.8 b	74.9	75.6	75.9	76.3	76.7 b	77.3 b	77.2	77.6	77.7	77.6	77.9	78.2
Estonia	70.7	72.8	73.2	74.2	74.0	73.9	74.7	74.8	75.1	75.2	76.7	77.5	78.8
Ireland	73.9	74.9	75.6 b	74.8	73.0	71.6	71.2	71.1	71.8	71.8	72.0	72.7	72.6
Greece	66.4	66.7	66.5	66.7	67.4 b	67.8	67.3	67.5	67.5	67.4	67.8	68.2	68.3
Spain	70.0 b	71.1	71.8	72.7	73.1	73.5	73.9	74.3	74.3	74.2	74.3	74.2	73.9
France	69.2 e	69.2 e	69.3 e	69.4 e	69.8 e	69.8 e	69.7 e	70.3 e	70.7 e	71.1	71.3	71.4	71.5
Croatia	63.3 e	63.0 e	65.7	65.8	65.6	65.1	64.1	63.9	63.7	66.1	66.9	65.6	66.4
Italy	62.5	62.6	62.4	62.9	62.3	62.0	62.1	63.5	63.4	63.9	64.0	64.9	65.4
Cyprus	72.4	73.0	73.9	73.6	73.0	73.6	73.5	73.5	73.6	74.3	73.9	73.4	73.7
Latvia	69.1	71.0	72.6	74.2	73.5	73.0	72.8	74.4	74.0	74.6	75.7	76.3	77.0
Lithuania	68.7	67.6	67.9	68.4	69.6	70.2	71.4	71.8	72.4	73.7	74.1	75.5	75.9
Luxembourg	66.6	66.7	66.9 b	66.8	68.7 b	68.2	67.9	69.4	69.9	70.8	70.9 b	70.0	70.2
Hungary	61.3	62.0	61.6	61.2	61.2	61.9	62.4	63.7	64.7	67.0	68.6	70.1	71.2
Malta	57.6 b	57.9	58.8	59.1	59.4	60.4	61.8	63.1	65.0	66.3	67.6	69.1	70.4
Netherlands	76.9	77.4	78.5	79.3	79.7	78.2 b	78.1 b	79.0	79.4	79.0	79.6	79.7	79.7
Austria	71.4	72.4	73.5 b	73.9	74.3	74.4	74.6	75.1	75.5	75.4	75.5	76.2	76.4
Poland	64.4	63.4	63.2	63.8	64.7	65.3 b	65.7	66.5	67.0	67.9	68.1	68.8	69.6
Portugal	73.2	73.6	73.9	73.9	73.4	73.7	73.6 b	73.4	73.0	73.2	73.4	73.7	74.7
Romania	62.3	63.6	63.0	62.9	63.1	64.9 b	64.1	64.8	64.9	65.7	66.1	65.6	67.3
Slovenia	70.7	70.9	71.3	71.8	71.8	71.5	70.3	70.4	70.5	70.9	71.8	71.6	74.2
Slovakia	68.9	68.6	68.3	68.8	68.4	68.7	68.7 b	69.4	69.9	70.3	70.9	71.9	72.1
Finland	74.7	75.2	75.6	76.0	75.0	74.5	74.9	75.2	75.2	75.4	75.8	75.9	76.7
Sweden	78.2 b	78.8	79.1	79.3	78.9	79.1	79.9	80.3	81.1	81.5	81.7	82.1	82.5
United Kingdom	75.4	75.7	75.5 b	75.8 b	75.7	75.4	75.5	76.1	76.4	76.7	76.9	77.3	77.6

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Unemployment rate (% labour force)

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
European Union 28	9.0	8.2	7.2	7.0	9.0	9.6	9.7	10.5	10.9	10.2	9.4	8.6	7.6
Euro Area 19	9.1	8.4	7.5	7.6	9.6	10.2	10.2	11.4	12.0	11.6	10.9	10.0	9.1
Belgium	8.5	8.3	7.5	7.0	7.9	8.3	7.2	7.6	8.4	8.5	8.5	7.8	7.1 b
Bulgaria	10.1	9.0	6.9	5.6	6.8	10.3 d	11.3	12.3	13.0	11.4	9.2	7.6	6.2
Czech Republic	7.9	7.1	5.3	4.4	6.7	7.3	6.7	7.0	7.0	6.1	5.1	4.0	2.9
Denmark	4.8	3.9 d	3.8	3.4	6.0	7.5	7.6	7.5	7.0	6.6	6.2	6.2	5.7
Germany	11.2 d	10.1	8.5	7.4	7.6	7.0	5.8	5.4	5.2	5.0	4.6	4.1	3.8
Estonia	8.0	5.9	4.6	5.5 d	13.5	16.7	12.3	10.0	8.6	7.4	6.2	6.8	5.8
Ireland	4.7	4.8	5.0	6.8	12.7	14.6	15.4	15.5	13.8	11.9	10.0	8.4	6.7
Greece	10.0	9.0	8.4	7.8	9.6	12.7	17.9	24.5	27.5	26.5	24.9	23.6	21.5
Spain	9.2	8.5	8.2	11.3	17.9	19.9	21.4	24.8	26.1	24.5	22.1	19.6	17.2
France	8.9	8.8	8.0	7.4	9.1	9.3	9.2	9.8	10.3	10.3	10.4	10.1	9.4
Croatia	13.0	11.6 d	9.9	8.6	9.3	11.8	13.7	15.8	17.4	17.2	16.1	13.4	11.1
Italy	7.7	6.8	6.1	6.7	7.7	8.4	8.4	10.7	12.1	12.7	11.9	11.7	11.2
Cyprus	5.3	4.6	3.9	3.7	5.4	6.3	7.9	11.9	15.9	16.1	15.0	13.0	11.1
Latvia	10.0	7.0	6.1	7.7	17.5	19.5	16.2	15.0	11.9	10.8	9.9	9.6	8.7
Lithuania	8.3	5.8	4.3	5.8	13.8	17.8	15.4	13.4	11.8	10.7	9.1	7.9	7.1
Luxembourg	4.6	4.6 d	4.2	4.9	5.1	4.6	4.8	5.1	5.9	6.0	6.5	6.3	5.6
Hungary	7.2	7.5	7.4	7.8 d	10.0	11.2	11.0	11.0	10.2	7.7	6.8	5.1	4.2
Malta	6.9	6.8	6.5	6.0	6.9	6.9	6.4	6.3	6.4	5.8	5.4	4.7	4.0
Netherlands	5.9	5.0	4.2	3.7	4.4	5.0	5.0	5.8	7.3	7.4	6.9	6.0	4.9
Austria	5.6	5.3	4.9	4.1	5.3	4.8	4.6	4.9	5.4	5.6	5.7	6.0	5.5
Poland	17.9	13.9	9.6	7.1	8.1 d	9.7	9.7	10.1	10.3	9.0	7.5	6.2	4.9
Portugal	8.8	8.9	9.1	8.8	10.7	12.0	12.9	15.8	16.4	14.1	12.6	11.2	9.0
Romania	7.1	7.2	6.4	5.6	6.5	7.0	7.2	6.8	7.1	6.8	6.8	5.9	4.9
Slovenia	6.5	6.0	4.9	4.4	5.9	7.3	8.2	8.9	10.1	9.7	9.0	8.0	6.6
Slovakia	16.4	13.5	11.2	9.6	12.1	14.5	13.7 d	14.0	14.2	13.2	11.5	9.7	8.1
Finland	8.4	7.7	6.9	6.4	8.2	8.4	7.8	7.7	8.2	8.7	9.4	8.8	8.6
Sweden	7.7	7.1	6.1	6.2	8.3	8.6	7.8	8.0	8.0	7.9	7.4	6.9	6.7
United Kingdom	4.8	5.4	5.3	5.6	7.6	7.8	8.1	7.9	7.5	6.1	5.3	4.8	4.4

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Youth unemployment rate (% labour force 15-24)

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
European Union 28	19.0	17.7	15.8	15.9	20.3	21.4	21.8	23.3	23.8	22.2	20.3	18.7	16.8
Euro Area 19	18.4	17.1	15.6	16.1	20.7	21.5	21.4	23.6	24.4	23.7	22.3	20.9	18.8
Belgium	21.5	20.5	18.8	18.0	21.9	22.4	18.7	19.8	23.7	23.2	22.1	20.1	19.3 b
Bulgaria	21.0	18.3	14.1	11.9	15.1	21.9 d	25.0	28.1	28.4	23.8	21.6	17.2	12.9
Czech Republic	19.3	17.5	10.7	9.9	16.6	18.3	18.1	19.5	18.9	15.9	12.6	10.5	7.9
Denmark	8.6	7.7 d	7.5	8.0	11.8	13.9	14.2	14.1	13.0	12.6	10.8	12.0	11.0
Germany	15.4 d	13.6	11.8	10.4	11.1	9.8	8.5	8.0	7.8	7.7	7.2	7.1	6.8
Estonia	15.1	12.1	10.1	12.0 d	27.4	32.9	22.4	20.9	18.7	15.0	13.1	13.4	12.1
Ireland	8.8	8.9	9.3	13.6	24.8	28.4	29.9	31.1	27.0	23.7	20.5	17.0	14.5
Greece	25.8	25.0	22.7	21.9	25.7	33.0	44.7	55.3	58.3	52.4	49.8	47.3	43.6
Spain	19.6	17.9	18.1	24.5	37.7	41.5	46.2	52.9	55.5	53.2	48.3	44.4	38.6
France	21.0	22.0	19.5	19.0	23.6	23.3	22.6	24.4	24.9	24.2	24.7	24.6	22.3
Croatia	31.7	28.9 d	25.4	23.6	25.4	32.3	36.6	42.2	49.9	44.9	42.3	31.8	27.0
Italy	24.1	21.8	20.4	21.2	25.3	27.9	29.2	35.3	40.0	42.7	40.3	37.8	34.7
Cyprus	13.9	10.0	10.2	9.0	13.8	16.6	22.4	27.7	38.9	36.0	32.8	29.1	24.7
Latvia	15.1	13.6	10.6	13.6	33.3	36.2	31.0	28.5	23.2	19.6	16.3	17.3	17.0
Lithuania	15.8	10.0	8.4	13.3	29.6	35.7	32.6	26.7	21.9	19.3	16.3	14.5	13.3
Luxembourg	14.6	15.5 d	15.6	17.3	16.5	15.8	16.4	18.0	16.9	22.3	16.6	19.1	15.3
Hungary	19.4	19.1	18.1	19.5 d	26.4	26.4	26.0	28.2	26.6	20.4	17.3	12.9	10.7
Malta	16.1	15.5	13.5	11.7	14.5	13.2	13.3	14.1	13.0	11.7	11.8	11.0	10.4
Netherlands	11.8	10.0	9.4	8.6	10.2	11.1	10.0	11.7	13.2	12.7	11.3	10.8	8.9
Austria	11.0	9.8	9.4	8.5	10.7	9.5	8.9	9.4	9.7	10.3	10.6	11.2	9.8
Poland	36.9	29.8	21.6	17.2	20.6 d	23.7	25.8	26.5	27.3	23.9	20.8	17.7	14.8
Portugal	20.8	21.2	21.4	21.6	25.3	28.2	30.2	38.0	38.1	34.7	32.0	28.2	23.8
Romania	19.1	20.2	19.3	17.6	20.0	22.1	23.9	22.6	23.7	24.0	21.7	20.6	18.3
Slovenia	15.9	13.9	10.1	10.4	13.6	14.7	15.7	20.6	21.6	20.2	16.3	15.2	11.2
Slovakia	30.4	27.0	20.6	19.3	27.6	33.9	33.7 d	34.0	33.7	29.7	26.5	22.2	18.9
Finland	20.1	18.7	16.5	16.5	21.5	21.4	20.1	19.0	19.9	20.5	22.4	20.1	20.1
Sweden	22.6	21.5	19.2	20.2	25.0	24.8	22.8	23.7	23.6	22.9	20.4	18.9	17.8
United Kingdom	12.8	13.9	14.3	15.0	19.1	19.9	21.3	21.2	20.7	17.0	14.6	13.0	12.1

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Long term unemployment rate (% labour force)

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
European Union 28	4.0	3.7	3.0	2.6	2.9	3.8	4.1	4.6	5.1	5.0	4.5	4.0	3.4
Euro Area 19	4.0	3.8	3.2	2.9	3.3	4.3	4.6	5.2	5.9	6.0	5.5	5.0	4.4
Belgium	4.4	4.2	3.8	3.3	3.5	4.0	3.5	3.4	3.9	4.3	4.4	4.0	3.5 b
Bulgaria	6.0	5.0	4.1	2.9	3.0	4.7 b	6.3 b	6.8	7.4	6.9	5.6	4.5	3.4
Czech Republic	4.2	3.9	2.8	2.2	2.0	3.0	2.7 b	3.0	3.0	2.7	2.4	1.7	1.0
Denmark	1.1	0.8	0.6	0.5	0.6	1.5	1.8	2.1	1.8	1.7	1.7	1.4 b	1.3
Germany	5.9 b	5.7	4.9	3.9	3.5	3.3 b	2.8 b	2.4	2.3	2.2	2.0	1.7	1.6
Estonia	4.4	2.9	2.3	1.7	3.7	7.6	7.1	5.5	3.8	3.3	2.4	2.1	1.9
Ireland	1.4	1.4	1.4 b	1.7	3.6	6.9	8.8	9.2	8.0	6.7	5.4	4.3	3.0
Greece	5.2	4.9	4.2	3.7	3.9 b	5.7	8.8	14.5	18.5	19.5	18.2	17.0	15.6
Spain	2.2 b	1.8	1.7	2.0	4.3	7.3	8.9	11.0	13.0	12.9	11.4	9.5	7.7
France	3.7 e	3.8 e	3.3 e	2.9 e	3.3 e	3.9 e	4.0 e	4.1 e	4.4 e	4.5	4.6	4.6	4.2
Croatia	7.4	6.7	6.0	5.3	5.1	6.6	8.4	10.2	11.0	10.1	10.2	6.6	4.6
Italy	3.7	3.3	2.9	3.0	3.4	4.0	4.3	5.6	6.9	7.7	6.9	6.7	6.5
Cyprus	1.3	0.9	0.7	0.5	0.6 b	1.3	1.6	3.6	6.1	7.7	6.8	5.8	4.5
Latvia	4.5	2.4	1.6	1.9	4.5	8.8	8.8	7.8	5.7	4.6	4.5	4.0	3.3
Lithuania	4.4	2.6	1.4 u	1.3 u	3.3	7.4	8.0	6.6	5.1	4.8	3.9	3.0	2.7
Luxembourg	1.2	1.4	1.2 b	1.6	1.2 b	1.3	1.4	1.6	1.8	1.6	1.9 b	2.2	2.1
Hungary	3.2	3.4	3.5	3.6	4.2	5.5	5.2	5.0	4.9	3.7	3.1	2.4	1.7
Malta	3.4 b	2.7	2.7	2.6	2.9	3.1	3.0	3.1	2.9	2.7	2.4	1.9	1.7
Netherlands	1.9	1.7	1.2	0.9	0.8	1.2 b	1.6 b	1.9	2.5	2.9	3.0	2.5	1.9
Austria	1.4	1.5	1.3 b	1.0	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.5	1.7	1.9	1.8
Poland	10.3	7.8	4.9	2.4	2.5	3.0 b	3.6	4.1	4.4	3.8	3.0	2.2	1.5
Portugal	3.7	3.9	3.8	3.6	4.2	5.7	6.2 b	7.7	9.3	8.4	7.2	6.2	4.5
Romania	4.0	4.1	3.2	2.4	2.2	2.4 b	2.9	3.0	3.2	2.8	3.0	3.0	2.0
Slovenia	3.1	2.9	2.2	1.9	1.8	3.2	3.6	4.3	5.2	5.3	4.7	4.3	3.1
Slovakia	11.7	10.2	8.3	6.6	6.5	9.2	9.2 b	9.4	10.0	9.3	7.6	5.8	5.1
Finland	2.1	1.9	1.5	1.2	1.4	2.0	1.7	1.6	1.7	1.9	2.3	2.3	2.1
Sweden	1.1 e	1.0 e	0.8	0.8	1.1	1.6	1.5	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.5	1.3	1.2
United Kingdom	1.0	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.9	2.5	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.2	1.6	1.3	1.1

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At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion (% of total population)

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
European Union 28						23.8	24.3	24.8	24.6	24.4	23.8	23.5	
Euro Area 19	22.0	22.1	21.9	21.7	21.6	22.0	22.9	23.3	23.1	23.5	23.1	23.1	
Belgium	22.6	21.5	21.6	20.8	20.2	20.8	21.0	21.6	20.8	21.2	21.1	20.7	
Bulgaria		61.3	60.7	44.8 b	46.2	49.2	49.1	49.3	48.0	40.1 b	41.3	40.4 b	38.9
Czech Republic	19.6	18.0	15.8	15.3	14.0	14.4	15.3	15.4	14.6	14.8	14.0	13.3	
Denmark	17.2	16.7	16.8	16.3	17.6	18.3	17.6 b	17.5	18.3	17.9	17.7	16.7	17.2
Germany	18.4	20.2	20.6	20.1	20.0	19.7	19.9	19.6	20.3	20.6	20.0	19.7	
Estonia	25.9	22.0	22.0	21.8	23.4	21.7	23.1	23.4	23.5	26.0 b	24.2	24.4	
Ireland	25.0	23.3	23.1	23.7	25.7	27.3	29.4	30.3	29.9	27.7	26.0	24.2	
Greece	29.4	29.3	28.3	28.1	27.6	27.7	31.0	34.6	35.7	36.0	35.7	35.6	
Spain	24.3	24.0	23.3	23.8 b	24.7	26.1	26.7	27.2	27.3	29.2	28.6	27.9	
France	18.9	18.8	19.0	18.5 b	18.5	19.2	19.3	19.1	18.1	18.5	17.7	18.2	
Croatia						31.1	32.6	32.6	29.9	29.3	29.1	27.9	
Italy	25.6	25.9	26.0	25.5	24.9	25.0	28.1	29.9	28.5	28.3	28.7	30.0	
Cyprus	25.3	25.4	25.2	23.3 b	23.5	24.6	24.6	27.1	27.8	27.4	28.9	27.7	
Latvia	46.3	42.2	35.1	34.2 b	37.9	38.2	40.1	36.2	35.1	32.7	30.9	28.5	28.2
Lithuania	41.0	35.9	28.7	28.3	29.6	34.0	33.1	32.5	30.8	27.3	29.3	30.1	
Luxembourg	17.3	16.5	15.9	15.5	17.8	17.1	16.8	18.4	19.0	19.0	18.5	19.8 b	
Hungary	32.1	31.4	29.4	28.2	29.6	29.9	31.5	33.5	34.8	31.8	28.2	26.3	25.6
Malta	20.5	19.5	19.7	20.1	20.3	21.2	22.1	23.1	24.0	23.8	22.4	20.1	
Netherlands	16.7	16.0	15.7	14.9	15.1	15.1	15.7	15.0	15.9	16.5	16.4	16.7 b	
Austria	17.4	17.8	16.7	20.6 b	19.1	18.9	19.2	18.5	18.8	19.2	18.3	18.0	
Poland	45.3	39.5	34.4	30.5 b	27.8	27.8	27.2	26.7	25.8	24.7	23.4	21.9	
Portugal	26.1	25.0	25.0	26.0	24.9	25.3	24.4	25.3	27.5	27.5	26.6	25.1	
Romania			47.0	44.2	43.0	41.5	40.9	43.2	41.9	40.3	37.4	38.8	35.5 p
Slovenia	18.5	17.1	17.1	18.5	17.1	18.3	19.3	19.6	20.4	20.4	19.2	18.4	
Slovakia	32.0	26.7	21.4	20.6	19.6	20.6	20.6	20.5	19.8	18.4	18.4	18.1	
Finland	17.2	17.1	17.4	17.4	16.9	16.9	17.9	17.2	16.0	17.3	16.8	16.6	15.7
Sweden	14.4	16.3	13.9	16.7 b	17.8	17.7	18.5	17.7	18.3	18.2	18.6	18.3	
United Kingdom	24.8	23.7	22.6	23.2	22.0	23.2	22.7	24.1 b	24.8	24.1	23.5	22.2	

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At-risk-of-poverty (% of total population)

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
European Union 28						16.5	16.9	16.8	16.7	17.2	17.3	17.3	
Euro Area 19	15.5	15.6	16.1	16.1	16.2	16.3	16.8	16.9	16.7	17.1	17.2	17.4	
Belgium	14.8	14.7	15.2	14.7	14.6	14.6	15.3	15.3	15.1	15.5	14.9	15.5	
Bulgaria		18.4	22.0	21.4	21.8	20.7	22.2	21.2	21.0	21.8	22.0	22.9 b	23.4
Czech Republic	10.4	9.9	9.6	9.0	8.6	9.0	9.8	9.6	8.6	9.7	9.7	9.7	
Denmark	11.8	11.7	11.7	11.8	13.1	13.3	12.1	12.0	11.9	12.1	12.2	11.9	12.4
Germany	12.2	12.5	15.2	15.2	15.5	15.6	15.8	16.1	16.1	16.7	16.7	16.5	
Estonia	18.3	18.3	19.4	19.5	19.7	15.8	17.5	17.5	18.6	21.8	21.6	21.7	
Ireland	19.7	18.5	17.2	15.5	15.0	15.2	15.2	16.6	15.7	16.4	16.3	16.6	
Greece	19.6	20.5	20.3	20.1	19.7	20.1	21.4	23.1	23.1	22.1	21.4	21.2	
Spain	20.1	20.3	19.7	19.8	20.4	20.7	20.6	20.8	20.4	22.2	22.1	22.3	
France	13.0	13.2	13.1	12.5	12.9	13.3	14.0	14.1	13.7	13.3	13.6	13.6	
Croatia						20.6	20.9	20.4	19.5	19.4	20.0	19.5	
Italy	19.2	19.3	19.5	18.9	18.4	18.7	19.8	19.5	19.3	19.4	19.9	20.6	
Cyprus	16.1	15.6	15.5	15.9	15.8	15.6	14.8	14.7	15.3	14.4	16.2	16.1	
Latvia	19.4	23.5	21.2	25.9	26.4	20.9	19.0	19.2	19.4	21.2	22.5	21.8	22.1
Lithuania	20.5	20.0	19.1	20.9	20.3	20.5	19.2	18.6	20.6	19.1	22.2	21.9	
Luxembourg	13.7	14.1	13.5	13.4	14.9	14.5	13.6	15.1	15.9	16.4	15.3	16.5 b	
Hungary	13.5	15.9	12.3	12.4	12.4	12.3	14.1	14.3	15.0	15.0	14.9	14.5	13.4
Malta	14.3	14.2	15.1	15.3	14.9	15.5	15.6	15.1	15.7	15.9	16.3	16.5	
Netherlands	10.7	9.7	10.2	10.5	11.1	10.3	11.0	10.1	10.4	11.6	11.6	12.7 b	
Austria	12.6	12.6	12.0	15.2	14.5	14.7	14.5	14.4	14.4	14.1	13.9	14.1	
Poland	20.5	19.1	17.3	16.9	17.1	17.6	17.7	17.1	17.3	17.0	17.6	17.3	
Portugal	19.4	18.5	18.1	18.5	17.9	17.9	18.0	17.9	18.7	19.5	19.5	19.0	
Romania			24.6	23.6	22.1	21.6	22.3	22.9	23.0	25.1	25.4	25.3	23.5 p
Slovenia	12.2	11.6	11.5	12.3	11.3	12.7	13.6	13.5	14.5	14.5	14.3	13.9	
Slovakia	13.3	11.6	10.6	10.9	11.0	12.0	13.0	13.2	12.8	12.6	12.3	12.7	
Finland	11.7	12.6	13.0	13.6	13.8	13.1	13.7	13.2	11.8	12.8	12.4	11.6	11.5
Sweden	9.5	12.3	10.5	13.5 b	14.4	14.8	15.4	15.2	16.0	15.6	16.3	16.2	
United Kingdom	19.0	19.0	18.6	18.7	17.3	17.1	16.2	16.0	15.9	16.8	16.6	15.9	

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Severe Material Deprivation (% of total population)

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
European Union 28						8.4	8.8	9.9	9.6	8.9	8.1	7.5	6.7 e
Euro Area 19	6.3	6.0	5.6	5.9	6.0	6.1	6.9	7.8	7.5	7.4	7.0	6.6	5.8 e
Belgium	6.5	6.4	5.7	5.6	5.2	5.9	5.7	6.3	5.1	5.9	5.8	5.5	5.2 p
Bulgaria		57.7	57.6	41.2	41.9	45.7	43.6	44.1	43.0	33.1	34.2	31.9 b	30.0
Czech Republic	11.8	9.6	7.4	6.8	6.1	6.2	6.1	6.6	6.6	6.7	5.6	4.8	3.7 p
Denmark	3.2	3.1	3.3	2.0	2.3	2.7	2.3	2.7	3.6	3.2	3.7	2.6	3.1
Germany	4.6	5.1	4.8	5.5	5.4	4.5	5.3	4.9	5.4	5.0	4.4	3.7	3.6 p
Estonia	12.4	7.0	5.6	4.9	6.2	9.0	8.7	9.4	7.6	6.2	4.5	4.7	4.1 p
Ireland	5.1	4.8	4.5	5.5	6.1	5.7	7.8	9.8	9.9	8.4	7.5	6.5	
Greece	12.8	11.5	11.5	11.2	11.0	11.6	15.2	19.5	20.3	21.5	22.2	22.4	21.1 p
Spain	4.1	4.1	3.5	3.6	4.5	4.9	4.5	5.8	6.2	7.1	6.4	5.8	5.1 p
France	5.3	5.0	4.7	5.4	5.6	5.8	5.2	5.3	4.9	4.8	4.5	4.4	4.1 p
Croatia						14.3	15.2	15.9	14.7	13.9	13.7	12.5	10.3 p
Italy	6.8	6.4	7.0	7.5	7.3	7.4	11.1	14.5	12.3	11.6	11.5	12.1	9.2 p
Cyprus	12.2	12.6	13.3	9.1	9.5	11.2	11.7	15.0	16.1	15.3	15.4	13.6	11.7 p
Latvia	39.3	31.3	24.0	19.3	22.1	27.6	31.0	25.6	24.0	19.2	16.4	12.8	11.3
Lithuania	32.6	25.3	16.6	12.5	15.6	19.9	19.0	19.8	16.0	13.6	13.9	13.5	12.4 p
Luxembourg	1.8	1.1	0.8	0.7	1.1	0.5	1.2	1.3	1.8	1.4	2.0	1.6 b	
Hungary	22.9	20.9	19.9	17.9	20.3	21.6	23.4	26.3	27.8	24.0	19.4	16.2	14.5
Malta	5.4	3.9	4.4	4.3	5.0	6.5	6.6	9.2	9.5	10.2	8.1	4.4	3.3 p
Netherlands	2.5	2.3	1.7	1.5	1.4	2.2	2.5	2.3	2.5	3.2	2.6	2.6 b	2.6 p
Austria	3.5	3.6	3.3	5.9	4.6	4.3	4.0	4.0	4.2	4.0	3.6	3.0	
Poland	33.8	27.6	22.3	17.7	15.0	14.2	13.0	13.5	11.9	10.4	8.1	6.7	
Portugal	9.3	9.1	9.6	9.7	9.1	9.0	8.3	8.6	10.9	10.6	9.6	8.4	6.9 p
Romania			38.0	32.7	32.1	30.5	29.5	31.1	29.8	25.9	22.7	23.8	19.4 p
Slovenia	5.1	5.1	5.1	6.7	6.1	5.9	6.1	6.6	6.7	6.6	5.8	5.4	4.5 p
Slovakia	22.1	18.2	13.7	11.8	11.1	11.4	10.6	10.5	10.2	9.9	9.0	8.2	
Finland	3.8	3.3	3.6	3.5	2.8	2.8	3.2	2.9	2.5	2.8	2.2	2.2	2.1
Sweden	2.3	2.1	2.2	1.8 b	2.0	1.9	1.7	1.8	1.9	1.0	1.1	0.8	
United Kingdom	5.3	4.5	4.2	4.5	3.3 u	4.8	5.1	7.8	8.3	7.4	6.1	5.2	4.9 p

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Share of people living in low work intensity households (% of people aged 0-59)

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
European Union 28						10.3	10.5	10.6	11.0	11.3	10.7	10.5	
Euro Area 19	9.8	10.3	9.7	9.3	9.1	10.4	11.0	10.7	11.2	11.9	11.2	11.1	
Belgium	15.1	14.3	13.8	11.7	12.3	12.7	13.8	13.9	14.0	14.6	14.9	14.6	
Bulgaria		14.7	16.0	8.1 b	6.9	8.0	11.0	12.5	13.0	12.1	11.6	11.9 b	11.1
Czech Republic	8.9	8.9	8.6	7.2	6.0	6.4	6.6	6.8	6.9	7.6	6.8	6.7	
Denmark	10.1	9.6	10.1	8.5	8.8	10.6	10.5	10.2	11.9	12.2	11.6	10.6	10.0
Germany	12.0	13.6	11.5	11.7	10.9	11.2	11.2	9.9	9.9	10.0	9.8	9.6	
Estonia	9.5	7.1	6.2	5.3	5.6	9.0	10.0	9.1	8.4	7.6 b	6.6	5.8	
Ireland	14.7	12.9	14.3	13.7	20.0	22.9	24.2	23.4	23.9	21.0	19.2	18.2	
Greece	7.6	8.1	8.1	7.5	6.6	7.6	12.0	14.2	18.2	17.2	16.8	17.2	
Spain	6.9	6.4	6.8	6.6	7.6	10.8	13.4	14.3	15.7	17.1	15.4	14.9	
France	8.7	9.1	9.6	8.8	8.4	9.9	9.4	8.4	8.1	9.6	8.6	8.4	
Croatia						13.9	15.9	16.8	14.8	14.7	14.4	13.0	
Italy	11.0	11.3	10.2	10.4	9.2	10.6	10.5	10.6	11.3	12.1	11.7	12.8	
Cyprus	4.4	3.8	3.7	4.5 b	4.0	4.9	4.9	6.5	7.9	9.7	10.9	10.6	
Latvia	8.3	7.1	6.2	5.4	7.4	12.6	12.6	11.7	10.0	9.6	7.8	7.2	7.8
Lithuania	9.6	8.3	6.4	6.1	7.2	9.5	12.7	11.4	11.0	8.8	9.2	10.2	
Luxembourg	5.7	5.2	5.0	4.7	6.3	5.5	5.8	6.1	6.6	6.1	5.7	6.6 b	
Hungary	9.5	13.1	11.3	12.0	11.3	11.9	12.8	13.5	13.6	12.8	9.4	8.2	6.6
Malta	9.6	9.7	9.6	8.6	9.2	9.2	8.9	9.0	9.0	9.8	9.2	7.3	
Netherlands	9.8	10.9	9.7	8.2	8.5	8.4	8.9	8.9	9.3	10.2	10.2	9.7 b	
Austria	7.3	8.1	8.2	7.4 b	7.1	7.8	8.6	7.7	7.8	9.1	8.2	8.1	
Poland	14.3	12.4	10.1	8.0	6.9	7.3	6.9	6.9	7.2	7.3	6.9	6.4	
Portugal	6.0	6.6	7.2	6.3	7.0	8.6	8.3	10.1	12.2	12.2	10.9	9.1	
Romania			9.9	8.5	8.1	7.7	7.3	7.9	7.6	7.2	7.9	8.2	6.9 p
Slovenia	8.6	6.9	7.3	6.7	5.6	7.0	7.6	7.5	8.0	8.7	7.4	7.4	
Slovakia	6.6	6.2	6.4	5.2	5.6	7.9	7.7	7.2	7.6	7.1	7.1	6.5	
Finland	10.0	9.1	8.8	7.5	8.4	9.3	10.0	9.3	9.0	10.0	10.8	11.4	10.7
Sweden	7.6	6.8	6.0	7.0 b	8.5	8.5	9.4	8.1	9.4	9.0	8.7	8.5	
United Kingdom	12.9	12.0	10.4	10.4	12.7	13.2	11.5	13.0 b	13.2	12.3	11.9	11.3	

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Income quintile share ratio S80/S20

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
European Union 28						4.9	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.2	5.2	5.2	
Euro Area 19	4.7	4.7	4.8	4.9	4.9	4.9	5.0	5.0	5.1	5.2	5.2	5.2	
Belgium	4.0	4.2	3.9	4.1	3.9	3.9	3.9	4.0	3.8	3.8	3.8	3.8	
Bulgaria		5.1	7.0	6.5	5.9	5.9	6.5	6.1	6.6	6.8	7.1	7.7 b	8.2
Czech Republic	3.7	3.5	3.5	3.4	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.4	3.5	3.5	3.5	
Denmark	3.5	3.4	3.7	3.6	4.6	4.4 b	4.0 b	3.9	4.0	4.1	4.1	4.1	4.1
Germany	3.8	4.1	4.9	4.8	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.3	4.6	5.1	4.8	4.6	
Estonia	5.9	5.5	5.5	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.3	5.4	5.5	6.5 b	6.2	5.6	
Ireland	5.0	4.9	4.8	4.4	4.2	4.7	4.6	4.8	4.7	4.9	4.5	4.4	
Greece	5.8	6.1	6.0	5.9	5.8	5.6	6.0	6.6	6.6	6.5	6.5	6.6	
Spain	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.6 b	5.9	6.2	6.3	6.5	6.3	6.8	6.9	6.6	
France	4.0	4.0	3.9	4.4 b	4.4	4.4	4.6	4.5	4.5	4.3	4.3	4.3	
Croatia						5.5 b	5.6	5.4	5.3	5.1	5.2	5.0	
Italy	5.6	5.4	5.4	5.2	5.3	5.4	5.7	5.6	5.8	5.8	5.8	6.3	
Cyprus	4.3	4.3	4.4	4.3 b	4.4	4.5	4.3	4.7	4.9	5.4	5.2	4.9	
Latvia	6.7	7.8	6.4	7.3	7.4	6.8	6.5	6.5	6.3	6.5	6.5	6.2	6.3
Lithuania	6.9	6.3	5.9	6.1	6.4	7.3	5.8	5.3	6.1	6.1	7.5	7.1	
Luxembourg	3.9	4.2	4.0	4.1	4.3	4.1	4.0	4.1	4.6	4.4	4.3	5.0 b	
Hungary	4.0	5.5	3.7	3.6	3.5	3.4	3.9	4.0	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3
Malta	3.9	4.0	3.9	4.3	4.0	4.3	4.0	3.9	4.1	4.0	4.2	4.2	
Netherlands	4.0	3.8	4.0	4.0	4.0	3.7	3.8	3.6	3.6	3.8	3.8	3.9 b	
Austria	3.8	3.7	3.8	4.2 b	4.2	4.3	4.1	4.2	4.1	4.1	4.0	4.1	
Poland	6.6	5.6	5.3	5.1	5.0	5.0	5.0	4.9	4.9	4.9	4.9	4.8	
Portugal	7.0	6.7	6.5	6.1	6.0	5.6	5.7	5.8	6.0	6.2	6.0	5.9	
Romania			8.1	7.0	6.5	6.1	6.2	6.6	6.8	7.2	8.3	7.2	7.0 p
Slovenia	3.4	3.4	3.3	3.4	3.2	3.4	3.5	3.4	3.6	3.7	3.6	3.6	
Slovakia	3.9	4.1	3.5	3.4	3.6	3.8	3.8	3.7	3.6	3.9	3.5	3.6	
Finland	3.6	3.6	3.7	3.8	3.7	3.6	3.7	3.7	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.5
Sweden	3.3	3.6	3.3	3.7 b	4.0	3.8	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.2	4.1	4.3	
United Kingdom	5.9	5.4	5.3	5.6	5.3	5.4	5.3	5.0 b	4.6	5.1	5.2	5.1	

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NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training (% of total population aged 15-24)

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
European Union 28	12.7	11.7 b	11.0	10.9	12.4	12.8	12.9	13.2	13.0	12.5	12.0	11.6	10.9
Euro Area 19	12.1	11.3 b	10.7	11.0	12.6	12.8	12.8	13.1	12.9	12.6	12.2	11.7	11.2
Belgium	13.0	11.2 b	11.2	10.1	11.1	10.9	11.8 b	12.3	12.7	12.0	12.2	9.9	9.3 b
Bulgaria	25.1	22.2 b	19.1	17.4 b	19.5	21.0 b	21.8	21.5	21.6	20.2	19.3	18.2	15.3
Czech Republic	13.3	9.2 b	6.9	6.7	8.5	8.8	8.3 b	8.9	9.1 b	8.1	7.5	7.0	6.3
Denmark	4.3	3.6	4.3 b	4.3	5.4	6.0	6.3	6.6	6.0	5.8	6.2	5.8 b	7.0
Germany	10.9 b	9.6	8.9	8.4 b	8.8	8.3 b	7.5 b	7.1	6.3	6.4	6.2	6.7	6.3
Estonia	10.6	8.8	8.9	8.7	14.5 b	14.0	11.6	12.2	11.3	11.7	10.8	9.1	9.4
Ireland	10.9	10.1 b	9.5 b	13.9	18.3	19.4	19.2	19.2	16.4	15.3	14.3	12.6	10.9 b
Greece	15.9	12.0 b	11.3	11.4 b	12.4 b	14.8	17.4	20.2	20.4	19.1	17.2	15.8	15.3
Spain	13.0 b	11.8 b	12.0	14.3	18.1	17.8	18.2	18.6	18.6	17.1 b	15.6	14.6	13.3
France	11.2	11.3	10.7	10.5	12.7	12.7	12.3	12.5	11.2 b	11.4 b	12.0	11.9	11.5
Croatia	16.7 b	14.2 b	12.9	11.6	13.4	15.7	16.2	16.6	19.6	19.3	18.1	16.9	15.4
Italy	17.1	16.8 b	16.1	16.6	17.6	19.0	19.7	21.0	22.2	22.1	21.4	19.9	20.1
Cyprus	19.5	10.7 b	9.0	9.7	9.9 b	11.7	14.6	16.0	18.7	17.0	15.3	16.0	16.1
Latvia	10.6	11.5 b	11.9	11.8	17.5	17.8	16.0	14.9	13.0	12.0	10.5	11.2	10.3
Lithuania	8.8	8.3 b	7.1	8.8	12.1	13.2	11.8	11.2	11.1	9.9	9.2	9.4	9.1
Luxembourg	5.5	6.7 b	5.7 b	6.2	5.8 b	5.1	4.7	5.9	5.0	6.3	6.2 b	5.4	5.9
Hungary	12.9	12.4 b	11.5	11.5	13.6	12.6	13.2	14.8	15.5	13.6	11.6 b	11.0	11.0
Malta	11.9 b	10.3 b	11.5	8.3	9.9	9.5	10.2	10.6	9.9	10.5	10.4	8.5	8.0 b
Netherlands	5.3	4.0 b	3.5	3.4	4.1	4.3 b	4.3	4.9	5.6 b	5.5	4.7	4.6	4.0
Austria	8.6	7.8 b	7.4 b	7.4	8.2	7.4	7.3	6.8	7.3	7.7	7.5	7.7	6.5
Poland	13.9	12.6	10.6	9.0 b	10.1	10.8 b	11.5	11.8	12.2 b	12.0	11.0	10.5	9.5
Portugal	11.1	10.6 b	11.2	10.2	11.2	11.4	12.6 b	13.9	14.1	12.3	11.3	10.6	9.3
Romania	16.8	14.8 b	13.3	11.6	13.9	16.6 b	17.5	16.8	17.0	17.0	18.1	17.4	15.2
Slovenia	8.9	8.5 b	6.7	6.5	7.5	7.1	7.1	9.3	9.2	9.4	9.5	8.0	6.5
Slovakia	15.8	14.4 b	12.5	11.1	12.5	14.1	13.8 b	13.8	13.7	12.8	13.7	12.3	12.1
Finland	7.8	7.7	7.0	7.8	9.9	9.0	8.4	8.6	9.3	10.2	10.6	9.9	9.4
Sweden	10.5 b	9.3 b	7.5 b	7.8 b	9.6	7.7	7.5	7.8	7.5	7.2	6.7	6.5	6.2
United Kingdom	8.4	8.6	11.9 b	12.1 b	13.2	13.6	14.2	13.9	13.2	11.9	11.1	10.9	10.3

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3. DATA SOURCES AND DEFINITIONS

Most of the data used in this report originates from Eurostat, the Statistical Office of the European Union. The main data sources used are:

- European Union Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS)
- ESA2010 National Accounts
- EU-Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC)
- European System of Social integrated protection Statistics (ESSPROS)

The European Union Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS) is the EU's harmonised household survey on labour market participation. While in the early years, it was carried out as an annual survey conducted in the spring quarter in many Member States it is now a continuous quarterly survey in all EU Member States. If not mentioned otherwise, the results based on the LFS for years before the introduction of the quarterly survey refer to the spring quarter of each year. LFS data covers the population living in private households only (collective households are excluded) and refers to the place of residence (household residence concept). They are broken down by various socio-demographic categories, in particular gender and age. The EU-LFS covers all EU Member States as well as Macedonia and Turkey plus Iceland, Norway and Switzerland.

A particular data collection connected to the EU-LFS is Eurostat's 'LFS main indicators' which present a selection of the main statistics on the labour market. They encompass annual and quarterly indicators of population, activity and inactivity; employment; unemployment; education and training. Those indicators are mainly but not only based on the results of the EU-LFS, in few cases integrated with data sources like national accounts employment or registered unemployment. National accounts employment data covers all people employed in resident producer units (domestic concept), including people living in collective households. In the main indicators, these national accounts figures are broken down by sex, working-time status (full-time/part-time) and contract status (permanent/temporary) using LFS distributions. Where available, all key employment indicators in this report are based on the 'LFS main indicators'.

For the unemployment-related indicators, Eurostat's series on unemployment comprises yearly averages, quarterly and monthly data. It is based on the (annual and quarterly) EU-LFS data and monthly data on unemployment, either from the national LFS or other national sources, mainly unemployment register data. For the compilation of monthly unemployment estimates, these monthly figures from national sources are benchmarked against the quarterly EU-LFS data, and they are used to produce provisional unemployment figures for recent months which are not yet covered by quarterly EU-LFS results. Monthly unemployment by skills or duration is not available from this data collection.

Most macro-economic indicators are based on Eurostat's collection of national accounts data according to the European System of National Accounts (ESA2010 National Accounts). The recent changeover to ESA2010 could produce some changes in relation with previous years. Data is compiled by the Member States and collected by Eurostat. The collection comprises aggregates such as GDP, from which derived measures such as productivity and real unit labour costs are calculated. In addition, national accounts also cover population and employment data, the latter expressed in persons and in hours worked and also broken down by economic activity, but not by socio-demographic categories.

The main data source for the social indicators is the EU-SILC (EU-Statistics on Income and Living Conditions). The EU-SILC instrument is the EU reference source for comparative statistics on income distribution and social inclusion at the European level. It provides two types of annual data for 28 European Union countries, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and Turkey: Cross-sectional data pertaining to a given time or a certain time period with variables on income, poverty, social exclusion and other living conditions, and Longitudinal data pertaining to individual-level changes over time, observed periodically over a four year period. EU-SILC does not rely on a common questionnaire or a survey but on the idea of a "framework". The latter defines the harmonised lists of target primary (annual) and secondary (every four years or less frequently) variables to be transmitted to Eurostat; common guidelines and procedures; common concepts (household and income) and classifications aimed at maximising comparability of the information produced.

Data regarding social protection expenditures are from the European System of integrated Social PROtection Statistics (ESSPROS). ESSPROS is an instrument of statistical observation which enables international comparison of the administrative national data on social protection in the EU Member States. The conventional definition used for the scope of social protection definition is the following:

"Social Protection encompasses all interventions from public or private bodies intended to relieve households and individuals of the burden of a defined set of risks or needs, provided that there is neither a simultaneous reciprocal nor an individual arrangement involved. The list of risks or needs that may give rise to social protection is, by convention, as follows: Sickness/Health care, Disability, Old age, Survivors, Family/children, Unemployment, Housing and Social exclusion not elsewhere classified".

Physically, data is generally obtained from Eurobase, Eurostat's online dissemination database and open to public access. Data shown here represents availability and revision status of mid-July 2015.

3.1 Definitions and data sources of macro-economic indicators

1. Real GDP: Gross Domestic Product (GDP), volume, annual change (Source: Eurostat, ESA2010 National Accounts [tec00115]).
2. Total employment: Employment, total economy, annual change (Source: Eurostat, ESA2010 National Accounts [nama_10_a10_e]).
3. Labour productivity: GDP volume per person employed, annual change (Source: Eurostat, ESA2010 National Accounts [nama_10_lp_ulc]).
4. Annual average hours worked per person employed, annual change (Source: Eurostat, ESA2010 National Accounts and DG EMPL calculations).
5. Productivity per hour worked: GDP volume per hour worked, annual change (Source: Eurostat, ESA2010 National Accounts [nama_10_lp_ulc]).
6. Harmonised CPI: harmonised consumer price index, annual change (Source: Eurostat, HCIP [prc_hicp_aind]).
7. Price deflator GDP: Implicit price deflator of GDP, annual change (Source: Eurostat, ESA2010 National Accounts [nama_10_gdp]).
8. Nominal compensation per employee, total economy, annual change (Source: Eurostat, ESA2010 National Accounts and DG EMPL calculations).
9. Real compensation per employee (GDP deflator): nominal compensation deflated with the implicit deflator of GDP, per employee, annual change (Source: Eurostat, ESA2010 National Accounts and DG EMPL calculations).
10. Real compensation per employee (private consumption deflator): nominal compensation deflated with the implicit deflator of private consumption expenditure, per employee, annual change (Source: Eurostat, ESA2010 National Accounts and DG EMPL calculations).
11. Nominal unit labour costs: Nominal compensation per employee divided by labour productivity, annual change (Source: Eurostat, ESA2010 National Accounts [nama_10_lp_ulc]).
12. Real unit labour costs: Real compensation per employee divided by labour productivity, annual change (Source: Eurostat, ESA2010 National Accounts and DG EMPL calculations).

3.2 Definitions and data sources of key employment indicators

1. Total population in 1000s, excluding population living in institutional households (Source: Eurostat, demographics [demo_pjanbroad]).
2. Total population aged 15-64 (the 'working age population') in 1 000s (Source: Eurostat, Demographics [demo_pjanbroad]).
3. Total employment in 000s (Source: Eurostat, LFS [lfsa_egan]).
4. Population in employment aged 15-64 in 1 000s (Source: Eurostat, EU-LFS [lfsa_egan]).
- 5-9. Employment rates: calculated by the number of employed divided by the population in the corresponding age bracket (Source: Eurostat, EU-LFS [lfsi_emp_a]).

10. Full-time equivalent employment rate: calculated by dividing the full-time equivalent employment by the total population in the 20-64 age group. Full-time equivalent employment is defined as total hours worked on both main and second job divided by the average annual number of hours worked in full-time jobs (Source: Eurostat, EU-LFS and DG EMPL calculations).
11. Self-employed in total employment: number of self-employed as a share of total employment (Source: Eurostat, EU-LFS and DG EMPL calculations).
12. Part-time employment in total employment: number of part-time employed as a share of total employment (Source: Eurostat, EU-LFS [lfsi_pt_a]).
13. Fixed-term contracts in total employees: number of employees with contracts of limited duration as a share of total employees (Source: Eurostat, EU-LFS [lfsi_pt_a]).
14. Employment in services: employed in services (NACE Rev. 2 sections G-U) as a share of total employment (Source: Eurostat, EU-LFS and DG EMPL calculations).
15. Employment in industry: employed in industry, including construction (NACE Rev. 2 sections B-F) as a share of total employment (Source: Eurostat, EU-LFS and DG EMPL calculations).
16. Employment in agriculture: employed in agriculture, forestry and fishing (NACE Rev. 2 section A) as a share of total employment (Source: Eurostat, EU-LFS and DG EMPL calculations).
- 17-20. Activity rates: labour force (employed and unemployed) as a share of total population in the corresponding age group (Source: Eurostat, EU-LFS [lfsi_emp_a]).
21. Total unemployment in 1 000s (Source: Eurostat, EU-LFS [une_rt_a]).
- 22-23. Unemployment rates: unemployed as a share of the labour force (employed and unemployed persons) in the corresponding age group (Source: Eurostat, EU-LFS [une_rt_a]).
24. Long-term unemployment rate: persons unemployed for duration of 12 months or more as a share of the labour force (Source: Eurostat, EU-LFS [une_ltu_a]).
25. Share of long-term unemployment: persons unemployed for duration of 12 months or more as a share of the total unemployed force (Source: Eurostat, EU-LFS [une_ltu_a]).
26. Youth unemployment ratio: young unemployed (aged 15-24) as a share of the total population in the same age group (Source: Eurostat, EU-LFS [yth_empl_140]).
- 27-35. Employment rates: calculated by the number of employed divided by the population in the corresponding age bracket, by education attainment (based in the ISCED classification), nationality and country of birth (Source: Eurostat, EU-LFS [lfsa_ergaed]).
36. Underemployment, persons in part-time jobs that would like to work more hours (Source: Eurostat, EU-LFS [lfsi_sup_a]).
37. Seeking but not available, persons seeking a job but not available to work immediately (Source: Eurostat, EU-LFS [lfsi_sup_a]).
38. Discouraged, available but not seeking persons available to work but not seeking job at the moment (Source: Eurostat, EU-LFS [lfsi_sup_a]).

3.3 Definitions and data sources of key social indicators

- At-risk-of-poverty-or-exclusion. Percentage of a population representing the sum of persons who are: at risk of poverty or severely materially deprived or living in households with very low work intensity (Eurostat, EU-SILC [ilc_peps01])
- At-risk-of-poverty. Share of people with an equivalised disposable income (after social transfer) below the at-risk-of-poverty threshold, which is set at 60 % of the national median equivalised disposable income after social transfers (Eurostat, EU-SILC [ilc_li02])

- At-risk-of-poverty threshold. 60 % of the national median equivalised disposable income after social transfers (Eurostat, EU-SILC [ilc_li01])
- Poverty gap. Difference between the median equivalised disposable income of people below the at-risk-of-poverty threshold and the at-risk-of-poverty threshold, expressed as a percentage of the at-risk-of-poverty threshold (cut-off point: 60 % of national median equivalised disposable income) (Eurostat, EU-SILC [ilc_li11])
- Persistent at-risk-of-poverty. Percentage of the population living in households where the equivalised disposable income was below the at-risk-of-poverty threshold for the current year and at least two out of the preceding three years (Eurostat, EU-SILC [ilc_li21])
- At-risk-of-poverty before social transfers excl. pensions. Share of people having an equivalised disposable income before social transfers that is below the at-risk-of-poverty threshold calculated after social transfers (Eurostat, EU-SILC [ilc_li10])
- Impact of social transfers. Computed indicator (Eurostat, EU-SILC), formula: $100 \cdot (B-A)/B$, where:
 - B: At-risk-of-poverty before social transfers excl. pensions
 - A: At-risk-of-poverty
- Severe Material Deprivation. Inability to afford some items (at least 4 on a list of 9) considered by most people to be desirable or even necessary to lead an adequate life (Eurostat, EU-SILC [ilc_mddd11])
- Share of people living in low work intensity households. Share of persons living in a household having a work intensity below a threshold set at 0.20. The work intensity of a household is the ratio of the total number of months that all working-age household members have worked during the income reference year and the total number of months the same household members theoretically could have worked in the same period (Eurostat, EU-SILC [ilc_lvhl11])
- Real Gross Household Disposable Income growth. The amount of money available for spending or saving. This is money left after expenditure associated with income, e.g. taxes and social contributions, property ownership and provision for future pension income (Eurostat, National Accounts and DG EMPL calculations)
- Income quintile share ratio S80/S20. Ratio of total income received by the 20 % of the population with the highest income (the top quintile) to that received by the 20 % of the population with the lowest income (the bottom quintile) (Eurostat, EU-SILC [ilc_di11])
- GINI coefficient. The relationship of cumulative shares of the population arranged according to the level of equivalised disposable income, to the cumulative share of the equivalised total disposable income received by them (Eurostat, EU-SILC [ilc_di12])
- Life expectancy at birth. The mean number of years a newborn child can expect to live if subjected throughout his or her life to the current mortality conditions, the probabilities of dying at each age (Eurostat [hlth_hlye])
- Healthy life years at birth. Number of years that a person is expected to continue to live in a healthy condition (Eurostat [hlth_hlye])
- Early leavers from education and training. Early leaver from education and training, previously named early school leaver, generally refers to a person aged 18 to 24 who has finished no more than a lower secondary education and is not involved in further education or training; their number can be expressed as a percentage of the total population aged 18 to 24. (Eurostat, EU-LFS [edat_lfse_14])
- NEET: Young people not in employment, education or training. Share of people aged 15 to 24 who are unemployed, not engaged in housework, not enrolled in school or work-related training, and not seeking work (Eurostat, EU-LFS [edat_lfse_20])
- Risk of poverty of children in households at work (Working Intensity > 0.2). Share of children at-risk-of-poverty living in households with work intensity bigger than very low (Eurostat, EU-SILC [ilc_li06])
- In-work at Risk-of-poverty rate. The share of persons who are at work and have an equivalised disposable income below the risk-of-poverty threshold, which is set at 60 % of the national median equivalised disposable income (after social transfers) (Eurostat, EU-SILC [ilc_iw01])

- Relative median income of elderly. Ratio of the median equivalised disposable income of people aged above 65 to the median equivalised disposable income of those aged below 65.(Eurostat, EU-SILC [ilc_pnp2])
- Aggregate replacement ratio. Ratio of the median individual gross pensions of 65-74 age category relative to median individual gross earnings of 50-59 age category, excluding other social benefits.(Eurostat, EU-SILC [ilc_pnp3])
- Social indicators expenditure. Percentage of expenditure in different social protection areas in relation with the GDP (Eurostat, ESSPROS [spr_exp_sum, spr_exp_gdp])

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